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Abstract 
This thesis explores how Mexican fresh produce supply chains have responded to US bio-
security regulations designed to prevent the intentional and accidental contamination of 
imported food. It explores the compliance processes, which are theorised using a 
framework drawn from the Resource-Based View (RBV) and the Supply Chain 
Governance (SCG) literatures. 
The constructs developed herein regarding capabilities and supply chain ‘governance 
structures’ complement previous Regulation Studies (RS) explaining compliance behaviour. 
The thesis analysed 12 case studies, and tested causal conditions of compliance using a 
multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA) method. The main results show: 1) 
the pathways to meet the regulatory requirements; 2) the limited diversity of capabilities 
associated with higher levels of compliance; and 3) the importance of tight supply chain 
coordination to source and exchange knowledge for compliance, regardless of how or who 
governs the supply chain. 
The thesis contributes to various academic debates. It removes the RVB assumptions that 
resources and capabilities are intrinsically valuable and complementary, and therefore 
contributes towards making the theory less tautological. It shows how SCG benefits when 
the effects of supply chain integration and coordination are examined independently. It 
differentiates between firms lacking willingness and firms lacking capabilities to comply, 
making it possible to define suitable regulatory strategies for each type of firm. 
The thesis makes a methodological contribution as it is one of the first studies applying the 
mvQCA in Science, Technology and Innovations Studies (STIs). The new methodology is 
used here to test the causal conditions of compliance, but can also be applied to innovative 
performance more generally.  
The thesis concludes by showing how US regulations were effective in achieving their 
regulatory aims without significant negative consequences, and suggesting that STI 
regulatory policies can be used to increase business engagement to prevent the intentional 
and accidental contamination of the food chain. 
 
vi 
 
 
Table of Contents 
1. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1. United States’ New Security Agenda in The 9/11 Aftermaths 2 
1.2. The US Regulatory Diffusion 10 
1.3. Thesis Structure 12 
2. CHAPTER 2 THEORY AND FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING COMPLIANCE 14 
2.1. Regulations: Public, Private, and Public-Private Partnership 18 
2.2. A Resource-Based View of Compliance 25 
2.3. Supply Chain Governance Structures and Compliance 39 
2.4. Minding Some Gaps in the Literature 45 
2.5. Analytical Framework 48 
3. CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 53 
3.1. Aim, Objective and Research Questions 53 
3.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses Testing Roadmaps 55 
3.3. Research Design 66 
3.4. Research Process 72 
3.5. Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Multi-Value and Crisp Sets 81 
3.6. Summary 85 
4. CHAPTER 4 BACKGROUND 86 
4.1. Supply Chains and Post 9/11 Security Regulation 86 
5. CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDIES 103 
5.1. Supply Chain 1 Distributor (SC1D) 106 
5.2. Supply Chain 1 Grower/Packer/Exporter (SC1E) 112 
5.3. Supply Chain 1 & 5 Transport Provider (SC1&5T) 121 
5.4. Supply Chain 2 Distributor (SC2D) 128 
5.5. Supply Chain 2 Grower/Packer & Transport Provider (SC2E&T) 134 
5.6. Supply Chain 3 Distributor (SC3D) 141 
5.7. Supply Chain 3 Packer/Exporter (SC3E) 148 
5.8. Supply Chain 3 Transport Provider (SC3T) 155 
5.9. Supply Chain 4 Distributor (SC4D) 162 
5.10. Supply Chain 4 Packer/Exporter & Transport Provider (SC4E&T) 170 
5.11. Supply Chain 5 Distributor (SC5D) 176 
5.12. Supply Chain 5 Packer/Exporter (SC5E) 184 
5.13. Brief Remarks on the Case Studies 194 
6. CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 195 
6.1. Regulatory Compliance Process 195 
6.1.1. Summary of Compliance Processes 195 
6.1.2. MVQCA of The Regulatory Compliance Process 212 
6.2. Capability Building 224 
6.2.1. Summary of Capabilities Building Processes 224 
6.2.2. MVQCA of The Compliance Capabilities Building 238 
6.3. Supply Chain Relationships 249 
6.3.1. Summary of Supply Chains Governance Structures 250 
6.3.2. MVQCA of The Supply Chains Governance Structures 256 
7. CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 274 
7.1. Business Regulation and The Compliance Process 274 
7.2. Leveraging Value from Compliance Capabilities 280 
7.3. Supply Chain Relationships for Capability Building 286 
7.4. Compliance Capability Building’s Governance Structures 294 
8. CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS 297 
8.1. Answering the Research Questions 297 
8.2. Theoretical Contributions and Implications 300 
8.3. Methodological Contributions, Limitations and Implications 305 
8.4. Regulatory Implications 307 
8.5. STI Security Regulation and Policy Implications 309 
9. APPENDICES 315 
9.1. Appendix A: Cover Letter 315 
vii 
 
 
9.2. Appendix B: Interview COMCAP 2007-2008 316 
9.3. Appendix C: Questionnaire COMCAP 2007-2008 318 
9.4. Appendix D: Guide to Read Tosmana Reports 324 
10. REFERENCES 328 
 
 
viii 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1.2.1: US CBP mutual recognition agreements with foreign governments related to CTPAT ....... 10 
Table 2.1: Selected Federal Regulations in the United States 1887-2006 .............................................. 15 
Table 2.5.1: Compliance capabilities: an organising framework ........................................................... 52 
Table 3.2.1: Classification of capabilities by sophistication level .......................................................... 59 
Table 3.2.2: Illustrative example of capabilities upgrading by compliance levels (no real data) ........... 60 
Table 3.2.3: Illustrative example of capabilities configurations causing compliance (no real data) ...... 60 
Table 3.2.4: Supply chains governance structures: constructs and definitions ..................................... 64 
Table 3.2.5:Illustrative example (no real data): firms’ governance structures ...................................... 65 
Table 3.2.6. Illustrative example (no real data): Governance structures for capabilities sophistication65 
Table 3.3.1: Case study outline/template............................................................................................. 70 
Table 3.4.1: Validating the instruments ............................................................................................... 74 
Table 3.4.2: Content-Analytical Matrix (Compliance Process by Security Capabilities Matrix) .............. 80 
Table 3.5.1: Illustrative example of the Boolean logic .......................................................................... 82 
Table 4.1.1: CTPAT Security criteria/guidelines sections .................................................................... 100 
Table 4.1.2: CTPAT Statistics (April 2005) ........................................................................................... 102 
Table 5.1: Case study outline ............................................................................................................. 103 
Table 5.2: Classification of variables from case studies ...................................................................... 104 
Table 5.1.1: SC1D Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication .............................. 111 
Table 5.2.1: SC1E Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication ............................... 120 
Table 5.3.1: SC1&5T Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication .......................... 127 
Table 5.4.1: SC2D Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication .............................. 133 
Table 5.5.1: SC2E&T Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication .......................... 140 
Table 5.6.1: SC3D Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication .............................. 147 
Table 5.7.1: Compliance enforcement team and roles SC3E ............................................................... 149 
Table 5.7.2: SC3E Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication ............................... 154 
Table 5.8.1: SC3T Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication ............................... 161 
Table 5.9.1: SC4D Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication .............................. 169 
Table 5.10.1: SC4E&T Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication......................... 175 
Table 5.11.1: SC5D Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication............................. 183 
Table 5.12.1: SC5E Capability building and resource development ..................................................... 193 
Table 6.1.1.1. Sources of regulatory information ............................................................................... 196 
Table 6.1.1.2: Regulatory regimes and communication systems ........................................................ 203 
Table 6.1.1.3: Regulatory regimes, conformance, and implementation strategies ............................. 204 
Table 6.1.1.4: Participation in the evaluation of the development of security resources ................... 206 
Table 6.1.1.5: Speed and intensity of the conformance process ......................................................... 208 
ix 
 
 
Table 6.1.1.6: Summary of the conformance processes (Selected firms: SC3T and SC5E) ................... 211 
Table 6.1.2.1: Causal configurations of regulatory process for Middle-High Compliance * ................. 215 
Table 6.2.1.1: Compliance and conformance levels ............................................................................ 225 
Table 6.2.1.2: Summary of capabilities building ................................................................................. 227 
Table 6.2.1.3: CTPAT Security Resources Development ...................................................................... 228 
Table 6.2.1.4: Compliance levels and capabilities sophistication ........................................................ 229 
Table 6.2.1.5: Inventory of intermediate capabilities by low compliant firms .................................... 233 
Table 6.2.1.6: Inventory of intermediate capabilities by middle compliant firms ............................... 234 
Table 6.2.1.7: Inventory of advanced capabilities (Vertical alignment) by middle and high compliant 
firms ......................................................................................................................................... 236 
Table 6.2.2.1: Causal configurations of the compliance capability building* ...................................... 240 
Table 6.3.1.1: Supply chain governance structures ............................................................................. 251 
Table 6.3.1.2: Summary of supply chain governance structure .......................................................... 253 
Table 6.3.2.1. Causal conditions, thresholds, and interpretations of governance structures .............. 260 
Table 6.3.2.2: Governance and structure configurations of capability building* ................................ 262 
 
x 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Snowball technique (Firms undisclosed by request) .............................................................. 77 
Figure 2: CANAMEX Corridor ................................................................................................................ 91 
Figure 3: The Basic Fresh Produce Supply Chain from Mexico to United States .................................... 95 
Figure 4: Summary of the compliance process by SC1D ...................................................................... 108 
Figure 5: Summary of the compliance process by SC1E ...................................................................... 114 
Figure 6: Compliance process SC1&5T ................................................................................................ 124 
Figure 7: Compliance process SC2D .................................................................................................... 130 
Figure 8: Compliance process SC2E&T ................................................................................................ 137 
Figure 9: Supply chains reorganisation by lost certification by SC3D .................................................. 142 
Figure 10: Compliance process SC3D .................................................................................................. 144 
Figure 11: Compliance process SC3E ................................................................................................... 151 
Figure 12: Compliance process SC3T ................................................................................................... 157 
Figure 13: Supply chains effects of lost certification by SC4D ............................................................. 163 
Figure 14: Compliance process SC4D .................................................................................................. 166 
Figure 15: Compliance process SC4E&T .............................................................................................. 171 
Figure 16: Compliance process SC5D .................................................................................................. 178 
Figure 17: Compliance process SC5E ................................................................................................... 187 
Figure 18: CTPAT related security resources ....................................................................................... 192 
Figure 19: Regulatory awareness diffusion ......................................................................................... 197 
Figure 20: Compliance decision making .............................................................................................. 199 
Figure 21: Negative feedback loops in the compliance decision-making ............................................ 202 
Figure 22: mvQCA of regulatory awareness as causes of middle-high compliance ............................. 217 
Figure 23: Compliance decision and conformance decision as drivers of compliance ......................... 219 
Figure 24: Communication mechanisms for compliance ..................................................................... 220 
Figure 25: Monitoring and evaluation for compliance ........................................................................ 222 
Figure 26: Capability building by compliance level ............................................................................. 230 
Figure 27: Capability building in low compliance ................................................................................ 242 
Figure 28: Capability building for middle compliance ......................................................................... 243 
Figure 29: Capability building for high compliance ............................................................................. 245 
Figure 30: Compliance capability building .......................................................................................... 247 
Figure 31: Evolutionary compliance capability building ...................................................................... 248 
Figure 32: Visual representation of the governance structures .......................................................... 254 
Figure 33: Governance structures for security-based managerial systems ......................................... 263 
Figure 34: Governance structures for security-based desorptive capacity .......................................... 265 
xi 
 
 
Figure 35: Governance structures for security-based vertical alignments........................................... 267 
Figure 36: Governance conditions for security-based compliance capabilities ................................... 269 
Figure 37: Structural conditions for security-based compliance capabilities ....................................... 270 
Figure 38: Governance structures for security-based compliance capabilities .................................... 271 
 
xii 
 
 
List of Charts 
Chart 1: United States imports of produce from Mexico from 1991-1993 to 2006-2008 ....................... 87 
Chart 2: Fruit and vegetable consumption by selected regions. ........................................................... 88 
Chart 3: Import Value (Million US dollars) ............................................................................................ 88 
Chart 4: Share of autumn-winter production value of main Mexican States ........................................ 90 
Chart 5. Threshold setting for power asymmetry ............................................................................... 258 
Chart 6. Threshold setting for Asset specificity ................................................................................... 259 
 
 
 
List of Images 
Image 1: Screening and controlling the access to the packaging facilities .......................................... 115 
Image 2: Access control to packaging and greenhouses (biometrics) ................................................. 116 
Image 3: Banners, Sensor-activated hands sanitizer, and GMP no contact with the produce ............. 118 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
 
Abbreviations 
9/11   Terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001 
ACI    Advanced Commercial Information 
ACR SmartButton  ACR systems - miniature-sized temperature logger 
AD    Administrative Detention of Cargo 
ADOT   Arizona Department of Transportation 
AEO   Authorized Economic Operator 
ALIGN    Vertical alignment 
BioShield  Project BioShield Act 
CAADES  Confederacion de Asociaciones Agricolas del Estado de Sinaloa 
CBP   Customs Border Protection Agency 
CCM   Cold Chain Monitoring 
CCTV   Closed-Circuit Television 
CEO   Chief Executive Officer 
CIAD   Centro de Investigacion en Alimentacion y Desarrollo 
Alimentacion 
CIDH   Comision para la Investigacion y Defensa de las Hortalizas 
CM   Compliance Manager 
CO   Compliance Officer 
COAC    Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations 
COMCAP 2007-2008 Research on Compliance Capabilities 2007-2008 
Consul   Consultant 
COOLTRAX  Cold Chain Monitoring and Tracking Temperature 
CoordActivities  Supply Chain Activities Coordination 
CoorInverst  Supply Chain Investment Coordination 
CSI   Container Security Initiative 
csQCA   Crisp Sets Qualitative comparative analysis 
CTPAT   Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
D   Distributor 
DHS   Department of Homeland Security 
ECPR   European Consortium for Political Research 
EM   Electronic Manifest 
EU    European Union 
Exp   Exporter 
FAO    United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FAST   Fast and Secure Trade Lanes 
FBI   United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FDA   Food and Drug Administration 
FPAA   Fresh Produce Association of the Americas 
FSC   Food Safety Certifiers 
fsQCA   Fuzzy sets Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
GAP    Good Agricultural Practices 
GHP   Good Handling Practices 
GM-Free   Generically Modified Free 
GMP    Good Manufacturing Practices 
GPS   Global Positioning System 
HACCP    Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
HAZMAT  Hazardous Materials 
Homeland Act  Homeland Security Act 2002 
IA   Industry association 
ID   Digital Identification 
IN   Industry Network 
INTCOORD   Internal coordination 
IS   Invoicing System 
ISO    International Standard Organisation 
ITS   Information and Communication Systems 
L-M   Low-Medium 
xiv 
 
 
MANSYS   Managerial systems 
Mex   Mexican government 
M-H   Medium-High 
MR    Maintenance and Inspections of Records of Food 
mvQCA   multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
MX   Mexico 
NAFTA   North American Free Trade Agreement 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisations 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ORGCAP   Organisational competencies 
OSHA    United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PEP   Policia Estatal Preventiva 
PN    Prior Notice of Imported Food Shipments 
POE   Mariposa Port of Entry 
PPP    Public-Private Partnership Regulation 
QCA   Qualitative comparative analysis 
RBV   Resource-Based View 
RF    Registration of Food Facility 
RFID    Radio frequency identification 
SAGARPA  Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y  
SC   Supply Chain 
SEDENA  Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional 
SENASICA   Mexican Ministry of Agriculture 
SIAP   Sistema de Informacion Agroalimentaria y Pesquera 
Small-N   Small sample size 
SPPA   Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism Initiative 
SPS    Microbiological controls 
STAH    Stakeholders support    
STI   Science, Technology and Innovation 
SUPDEV   Suppliers development 
TAPA    Transported Asset Protection Association 
TBA    2,4,6-tribromoanisole 
TOSMANA  Tool for Small-N Analysis 
TPC   Third party certifiers 
UK   United Kingdom 
US BioAct 2002  Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and  
   Response Act of 2002 
US EPA   United States Environment Protection Agency 
US   United States of America 
USD   United States Dollars 
USDA    United States Department of Agriculture 
USDOT   United States Department of Transportation 
USSG   United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 
VACIS   Gamma ray inspection machines 
VCG    Value Chain Governance 
WCO    World Customs Organisation 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1. CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
In 2004, Tommy G. Thompson, the then United States Health and Human Services 
Secretary, expressed major security concerns about food poisoning, and stated “I, for the 
life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not, you know, attacked our food 
supply because it is so easy to do” (Branigin, Allen, & Mintz, 2004). This thesis addresses 
these concerns and analyses how agri-businesses become compliant with regulations 
intended to prevent the accidental and intentional contamination of food in the supply 
chain. The investigation explores how firms’ ability to prevent regulatory disruptions, and 
in some instances to potentially gain advantage from them, relates to their supply chain’s 
relationships, with a particular focus on how knowledge is sourced. 
Specifically, the main research questions in this thesis are: To meet regulations for the 
prevention of accidental and intentional contamination of food: 1) what compliance 
processes do firms follow, 2) what capabilities do firms build up, and 3) what governance 
structures enable firms to build up their capabilities?  
These questions are important because one of the key roles of the modern regulatory state 
is to harness private capacity to secure compliance with regulatory goals (Parker, 2000, p. 
542). In other words, if regulators are interested in knowing how firms’ capabilities (with 
human intervention) may produce resources that are compliant with regulations, then it 
may be worth paying attention to how can those capabilities be produced, what impact will 
those regulations have on international supply chain relationships, and what programmes 
should be designed to enhance private compliance capacity. 
The thesis identifies the factors that may influence the effectiveness of different 
compliance processes in a variety of supply chain contexts. This research could not identify 
a single model of compliance for firms and supply chains. 
In other words, although there are a number of options related to regulatory awareness, 
assessment, implementation, and evaluation, there are only limited choices conducive to 
compliance. Hence, many capabilities could be built to enhance the security of firms and 
supply chains, but only a limited number of them are conducive to compliance; and 
although there are multiple types of supply chain relationships under which firms may build 
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up capabilities, again only a limited number of these relationships are conducive to 
compliance. 
These results were found using an innovative analytical methodology, the qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) (Kogut & Ragin, 2006; Ragin, 1989). This methodology is 
suitable for comparative case studies, and especially for studies with sample sizes that are 
insufficient for statistical generalisations, but too large for complex and time consuming 
single case study analysis. 
The contributions of this thesis focus on two main areas. First, it suggests that including 
compliance and capabilities building processes in the analysis of compliance in a regulatory 
studies framework, may improve understanding of the relationship between regulators and 
regulated firms. This helps move analyses beyond the commonly held idea that compliance 
is just a matter of incentives, sanctions and willingness. Second, it suggests that combining 
the Resource-Based View (RBV) with this new methodological approach allows us to drop 
some of the core assumptions in the RBV that knowledge, capabilities, and resources are 
complementary and heterogeneous, by offering another way of assessing when 
complementarities are valuable. This suggests that heterogeneity may not be enough for 
competitive advantage. 
The policy recommendations, directed at policy makers in government bodies such as the 
Department of Homeland Security, suggest that security policy focused on improving 
infrastructure may discourage supply chain participation in CTPAT/FAST, the flagship 
Public-Private Partnership programme against terrorism. 
 
1.1. United States’ new security agenda in the 9/11 aftermaths 
Most countries have public and private regulations to prevent accidental contamination of 
food; however, regulations to prevent intentional contamination are a later development. 
Preventing life-threatening intentional contamination involving humans, plants and animals 
are now covered by counter-terrorism initiatives. This has been a United States (US) 
concern since before the 9/11 attacks and was, for example, suggested in 1999 when the 
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US Government Accounting Office recommended developing a risk assessment method 
(Cordesman & Burke, 2001, p. 2; Zilinskas, 2003, p. 2).  
After 9/11, however, the US worked on a new biosecurity system that included the 
prevention of intentional contaminations. This new US biosecurity system was prioritised 
within public policy, as shown by the budget for the Department of Homeland Security, 
which, together with project BioShield, grew more than the total US budget from 2004 to 
2005, 12.4% and 7.8% respectively (Homeland Security, 2006, p. 5; Office of Management 
and Budget, 2006b, p. 22). 
According to Haftendorn (1991) such ‘security systems’ presuppose the existence of 
institutions to regulate interactions between units (states) and enforce rules and norms, 
with such interaction being influenced by the internal capabilities of the units (Haftendorn, 
1991, p. 11). Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) enhanced the previous notion of units 
and included actors within and across nations such as firms (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 
1998, p. 6). Based on the previous definitions, we understand that the new US biosecurity 
system may be a conglomerate of governmental agencies, firms and related organisations 
interacting and enforcing rules and norms; such interactions and enforcements depend on 
their own capabilities to lower the risk of disruptive activities in the food supply. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leads the new US biosecurity system. The 
DHS reorganised and created new public resources for security and public safety. It was 
developed from the merger of 22 different former agencies, and its general purpose was to 
coordinate all their non-defense related activities (Office of Management and Budget, 
2006a, p. 131).  
Also under the leadership of the DHS, the biosecurity system for the prevention of 
contamination of the food supply, seeks to engage (regulate) the private sector (food supply 
chains included) with programmes such as the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (CTPAT), CSI-Container Security Initiative, and SPPA-Strategic Partnership 
Program Agroterrorism Initiative1. Each one of these has its own guidelines, certification  
and enforcement mechanisms. 
                                                 
1 The US DHS gets investigative support from institutions like the National Center for Food Protection and 
Defense and the National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense. The full list of centres 
can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/xres/programs/editorial_0498.shtm 
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The engagement of the private sector (food supply chains included) in the biosecurity 
system was one of the functions given to the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
by the Homeland Security Act 2002 (Homeland Act). The Homeland Act mandated the 
inclusion of a special assistant to the Secretary of the DHS in charge of communicating, 
interfacing, partnering and assisting in the development and promotion of best practices 
with the private sector, as well as advising the Secretary on the development of regulatory 
policies to address homeland security challenges ("Homeland Act," 2002, pp. 2143-2144).  
 
The regulatory arms of the biosecurity system 
Of three the main regulations included in the biosecurity system, one was compulsory and 
two were ‘voluntary’, reflecting State Regulations, Public-Private Partnership, and Self-
Regulations respectively. 
The State (compulsory) regulations with direct implications for food supply chains came 
from the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 20022. The US 
BioAct 2002 gave regulatory powers to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), whilst 
monitoring and enforcement powers were held by the Customs Border Protection Agency 
(CBP), one of the largest and most complex components of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). The FDA ruled that along international food supply chains, administrative 
procedures, office, and business operations for security have to be developed and deployed 
(US BioAct 2002), thus non-compliance by the food and its supply chain would lead to 
foreign firms being denied the opportunity to trade with the US. 
The public-private partnership (voluntary) regulation, Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (CTPAT), is also important for foreign firms. It would prevent CTPAT certified 
firms from being forbidden access to the US in the event of another terrorist attack. Based 
on regulatory understanding that they had the capabilities needed to prevent their facilities 
or products being used to harm the US population, such firms would be seen as ‘low risk’. 
Furthermore, even when the US is not being attacked, these regulations allow CTPAT 
                                                 
2 (US BioAct 2002), and specifically from section 303, Administrative Detention of cargo (AD) in case of suspicious 
cargo/driver; section 305, Registration of Food Facility (RF); section 306, Maintenance and Inspections of Records of Food 
(MR); and section 307, Prior Notice of Imported Food Shipments (PN) 
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certified firms to have preferential access, releasing cargo from the border faster and with 
fewer security inspections. This would give them an economic advantage over non-
compliant firms. The programme is administered by the Customs Border Protection 
(CBP)3 (C-TPAT/CBP, 2004). 
On the other hand, self-regulations are those elicited and enforced by industry associations, 
international organisations, and/or firms themselves. These regulations have been a way of 
responding to consumer concerns about product quality, safety, environment and social 
issues. For the prevention of contaminations by the food industry there are regulations 
such as the International Standard Organisation-22000 (ISO-22000), Hazard Analysis 
Critical Control Point (HACCAP), Organic, Generically Modified Free (GM-Free) 
products, labelling, and other good agricultural and handling regulations to increase food 
safety. The transport industry adheres to regulations such as the Transported Asset 
Protection Association (TAPA) and the International Standard Organization (ISO-28000). 
Furthermore, it is expected that even firms without security certifications may still have 
security measures in place, because a consequence of reputational damage following a 
security failure may be for buyers to terminate their relationships with the firm (Meidinger, 
2006, p. 76; Raynaud, Sauvee, & Valceschini, 2005, p. 50); assuming that buyers are able to 
find firms as substitutes for the previous suppliers. Also, firms may introduce security 
measures because they may want to build up reputational capital to access better business 
deals (Klein, 1996, pp.454-455; Lafontaine & Slade, 2010 Forthcoming; Raynaud et al., 
2005, p.56), to correct market failures, or to follow interest groups (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 
46). For instance, in 1994 Wal-Mart conducted a four month exercise in Jacksonville, 
Texas, to protect what it considers their most valuable resources, 650,000 associates and 60 
million weekly customers, putting in place safety and security measures that drove up sales 
by 13% by the end of the exercise (Gorman, 1996, pp. 56-57)4. 
All three regulatory regimes (i.e. Public Regulations, Public-Private Partnership Regulation, 
and Self-Regulation) may contribute to biosecurity and help prevent accidental and 
                                                 
3 For all business except transport providers, the certification is called Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (CTPAT); while for transport providers the certification is called Fast and Secure Trade Lanes 
(FAST). 
4 Also Safeway removes unsafe or hazardous products from their stores as a food safety measure. See for 
instance the Safeway product recalls webpage for the latest recalls, 
http://www.safeway.com/IFL/Grocery/Product-Recalls 
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intentional contaminations of the food supply. However, an important question remains: 
which forms of regulation best achieve the purposes of the biosecurity system?  
A study suggested that implementing FDA compulsory biosecurity regulations in the US 
milk supply chain is less cost effective than the use of real-time tracking with smart seals 
and voluntary biosecurity regulations (Nganje, Bier, Han, & Zack, 2008, p. 1271), which are 
part of the best practices guidelines of CTPAT (C-TPAT/CBP, 2010, pp. 14,18). 
These results, combined with the fact that firms’ capabilities determine whether and how 
biosecurity regulations are applied to prevent contaminations, suggest that, in some 
instances, CTPAT may be a more cost effective way of enhancing supply chain biosecurity 
capabilities than the FDA Public regulations (taking self-regulation as a baseline). This 
raises the question of what the food supply chain biosecurity baseline was before the FDA 
and CTPAT regulations. 
 
Food supply chain system 
The traditional concern of the international food supply chains had been to increase their 
efficiency in order to reach markets faster, at less cost, with greater accuracy, and often 
“just-in-time” (Swafford, Ghosh, & Murthy, 2006; Walters, 2006). More recently, issues 
related to food safety (preventing accidental contamination) and quality have also gained 
importance (Bollen, Riden, & Opara, 2006; Frearne, Hornibrook, & Dedman, 2001; 
Hobbs, Fearne, & Spriggs, 2002; Opara, 2003; Pimentel, Borin, & Claro, 2004; Sohal, 
Millen, Maggard, & Moss, 1999).  
The main actors associated with Mexico-US fresh produce supply chains who traditionally 
deal with food safety and quality issues are the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture 
(SENASICA), industry associations (e.g. CAADES-Confederacion de Asociaciones 
Agricolas del Estado de Sinaloa, FPAA-Fresh Produce Association of the Americas), third 
party certifiers (e.g. PrimusLabs, Scientific Certifications Systems, Mexico Calidad 
Suprema), and the firms themselves (Iizuka & Borbon-Galvez, 2009, pp. 16-17). 
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The biosecurity baseline for US and Mexican fresh produce growers, processors and 
distributors before the FDA and CTPAT regulations seemed to be mainly complying with 
food safety regulations, such as the Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAP), Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP), 
Microbiological controls (SPS), and so on (Iizuka & Borbon-Galvez, 2009, pp. 16-17). 
Studies have shown that supply chain measures based on CTPAT biosecurity voluntary 
regulations (e.g. monitoring and tracking systems) are more cost efficient than FDA 
compulsory regulations (Nganje et al., 2008, p. 1271) and increase supply chain efficiency 
(Willis & Ortiz, 2004, p. 22). Yet another study argues that firms weakens their supply 
chain collaboration when they try to comply with CTPAT biosecurity voluntary 
regulations, which suggests that firms mostly build up capabilities for FDA biosecurity 
compulsory regulations (Agiwal, Mohtadi, & Kinsey, 2008, p. 10) are not willing to give up 
collaboration for cost efficiency of their supply chain. 
Moreover, if a firm that previously used food safety measures to prevent contamination 
shifts to (voluntary) CTPAT biosecurity regulations it may be better off, compared to it 
moving to (compulsory) FDA biosecurity regulations, in which case the new biosecurity 
system may be clashing with the food supply chain system.  
 
The clash of the systems: trade-offs between costs and risks 
One explanation of the clash of the systems is the trade-offs between implementation costs 
and risk reduction. According to Bongers (2004), security regulations increase the long 
term costs of doing business all over the world, but particularly in North America, where 
the estimated cost of compliance in 2003 was USD $11,810 for a facility5 to develop 
security policies, training and initial physical assessments (Bongers, 2004, p. 35). In the 
same line of argument, a study commissioned by the US Department of Homeland 
Security, surveying 29% of the CTPAT certified companies, out of which 16% said costs 
                                                 
5 “The term ‘facility’ includes any factory, warehouse, or establishment (including a factory, warehouse, or 
establishment of an importer) that manufactures, processes, packs, or holds food. Such term does not include 
farms; restaurants; other retail food establishments; nonprofit food establishments in which food is prepared 
for or served directly to the consumer; or fishing vessels (except such vessels engaged in processing as 
defined in section 123.3(k) of title 21, Code of Federal Regulations)” (US BioAct 2002, p. 116 STAT. 668). 
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outweigh the benefits, and 24% said cost and benefits are about the same (C-TPAT/CBP, 
2007, p. 58), with an estimated average potential implementation costs of CTPAT of USD 
$187,480 per facility in nine security resources: business partners, physical security, access 
controls, personnel control, procedural security, information and communication 
technologies, container and trailer security, conveyance security, and threat awareness. The 
CTPAT programme annual maintenance costs were USD $118,244, which resulted in firms 
almost doubling their annual expenditure on supply chain security (C-TPAT/CBP, 2007, 
pp. 41-45). 
Firms therefore face trade-offs between the increased business costs of regulatory 
compliance and the risks and consequences of non-compliance. This has organisational 
implications, as firms with Mexico-US supply chains have a choice of either adapting their 
technological capabilities for compliance or running the risk that they may be displaced by 
firms or entire supply chains that already have security capabilities6. 
An example of what might happen to a non-compliant firm can be seen in the Tylenol case 
in 1982. On that occasion, seven people died after taking Extra-Strength Tylenol that had 
been laced with cyanide and placed on Chicago-area pharmacy shelves. Tylenol 
manufacturer Johnson & Johnson initiated one of the largest drug recalls in US history, 
which cost them more than $100 million. The company replaced capsules for caplets and 
unveiled new tamper-resistant packaging, which has now become the industry norm. Later 
the US Congress made drug tampering a federal offence (Fintor, 2002) allowing the use of 
national police resources (the FBI) to become involved.  
A more recent recall of Johnson & Johnson products was prompted by ‘2,4,6-
tribromoanisole’ (TBA) applied to wooden pallets used to transport and store packaging 
materials (Kavilanz, 2010). Johnson & Johnson recalled over 40 medications for 
approximately six million bottles, and in May 2010 shut down the manufacturing facility in 
Fort Washington, PA responsible for repeated contaminations of drugs7. This caused a 
13.6% reduction in over-the-counter pharmaceutical and nutritional products sales in the 
                                                 
6 Although security capabilities are defined in different ways (Closs, 2005), based on the definitions of 
resources and capabilities in the theoretical chapter, we understand security capabilities as “ways of acquiring, 
researching, experimenting, planning, designing, preventing, developing, coordinating, learning, predicting, or 
reconfiguring, security resources”. 
7 http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/ucm210443.htm 
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second fiscal quarter, causing an approximately USD $176 million loss of sales, and 
damaging the company brand (Wernau, 2010). 
Another recent case involved poultry and hogs tainted by dioxin is being investigated by 
the German government to see if it has criminal origins, on the grounds that some firms 
had been aware of the contamination since March 2010. At the moment 4,700 farms in 
Germany have been closed8.  
Not only producers, but any stage in the supply chain (i.e. material and input providers, 
exporters, transporters, distributors, wholesalers, retainers, food chains, consumers) may be 
at risk. An investigation about fatalities and injuries due to intentional contamination shows 
various stages of the supply chain, water supply, pre-harvest, post-harvest, retail and food 
service, may be at risk. Although these acts are not very likely to be from terrorists inspired 
by ideological motives9, they are certainly cases of intentional contamination; and although 
the US has the most cases, such attacks have also been seen in the rest of the world 
(Dalziel, 2009, p. 24)10. 
In summary, there is an open question of how firms may deal with new US biosecurity 
regulations? How they build up their supply chain biosecurity capabilities (if at all)? 
Although these questions are relevant for the Mexico-United States food supply, they may 
also capture the attention of business and regulators from other parts of the world, as 
shown in the following section. 
Of the three types of regulations, the empirical focus of this thesis is on the effect of 
Public-Private-Partnership Regulation (PPP) on the capabilities building of the firm, i.e. 
how the Mexico-US fresh produce supply chain build up their capabilities to comply with 
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) guidelines. A reason for 
selecting this regulation, as will be shown in the background (i.e. Chapter 4), is that efforts 
                                                 
8 http://www.euractiv.com/en/print/cap/germany-investigates-criminal-origin-dioxin-contamination-news-
501084, accessed on 11 January 2011. In the presentation of the case studies (SC2D) capability [18] shows the 
importance of preventing potential cross-contamination. 
9 The author would argue that terrorism may include efforts to create terror simply due to misanthropy or 
malice as well as ideologically (e.g. Islamist extremism) efforts. 
10 It is thought that Dalziel makes the most comprehensive account of intentional contaminations of the food 
supply chain, by injuries, fatalities, contaminants, segment of the supply chain where the contamination 
occurred, country and year, from 1950 to 2008. 
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to comply with the public and private regulations overlap to great extent with the Public-
Private Partnership Regulation. 
 
1.2. The US regulatory diffusion 
Although CTPAT was designed for North Americans (Canada, US, and Mexico), a number 
of firms importing from the rest of the world into the US were invited by the CBP to 
voluntarily join CTPAT/FAST, including exporters and logistics providers. 
Later, other initiatives around the world followed the US security systems. The European 
Union (EU) initiated similar regulations, including the Authorized Economic Operator 
Program (European Commission, 2005). The EU, US, and other countries are also 
pursuing mutual recognition of their supply chain security programmes (CBP, 2010). 
Following such initiatives, the World Customs Organisation (WCO) have invited all 
customs offices around the world to partner with business in increasing security to prevent 
any kind of terrorism activities throughout global supply chains (World Customs 
Organizations, 2007). Singapore, which is considered the most efficient port in the world in 
facilitating transit of goods (InSYNC, 2007), launched a similar security programme 
(Singapore Customs, 2007). As of January 2010, the CBP had signed four mutual 
recognition agreements like CTPAT, and was working on three more. 
 
Table 1.2.1: US CBP mutual recognition agreements with foreign governments related to CTPAT 
Signed In negotiations 
June 2007 – New Zealand Customs Service’s 
Secure Export Scheme Program 
Korean Customs – Authorized Economic Operator 
Program 
June 2007 – Jordan Customs Department’s Golden 
List Program 
Singapore Customs – Secure Trade Partnership Plus 
Program 
June 2008 – Canada Border Services Agency’s 
Partners in Protection Program 
European Union – Authorized Economic Operator 
Program 
June 2009 – Japan Customs and Tariff Bureau’s 
Authorized Economic Operator Program 
 
Source: www.CBP.gov 
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One interesting feature of this set of regulations is the focus on international supply chains 
rather than just single business units. This gives these regulations an inherently 
transnational flavour, as they impose a de facto responsibility on foreign nations to assist 
their businesses to develop the capacity to respond to the new security systems. Even 
though foreign national governments are not supposed to harmonise their regulatory 
regimes to those of the US, Mexican exporters sometimes request the State to support 
them to meet their regulatory commitments. An example of this will be shown in Section 
5.5 of Chapter 5, the empirical chapter, which describes how one of the Mexican cases that 
was struggling with its capability building responded. 
On the other hand, as of 2005, 18% of the firms applying for CTPAT certification had 
their application rejected. This suggests that they did not have, or were perceived not to 
have, the capabilities needed to secure their international supply chain. Furthermore, while 
the overall certified/rejected ratio in the programme was 3.8, this ratio was only 0.95 for 
Mexican organisations, which shows that more than half of the firms that applied were 
perceived to lack the capability to secure their supply chain (Rojas, 2005). 
In light of the global diffusion of security regulations, questions arise about what has been 
the case for firms and supply chains in other developing countries that have been subject to 
the compliance requirements of the evolving global security regulatory regimes. The 
question has yet to be investigated. However, in this thesis a slightly different question is 
addressed: whether and how compliance capabilities are built. 
Thus, the key issue in this dissertation is to understand how firms build up their 
capabilities, if at all, in order to meet the new biosecurity regulations. Equally important is 
to investigate the role played by the international supply chains in these processes, given 
the new scope of the regulation, CTPAT, which includes various stages of the supply chain, 
some of which may be located in different countries. 
From the Mexico-US case, this investigation attempts to contribute to the Resource-Based 
View by incorporating compliance capabilities as another cause of competitive advantage.  
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1.3. Thesis structure 
To reach that aim, this dissertation is structured as follows. After this introduction chapter, 
a second literature and theory chapter explores how various streams of literature have 
contributed to the understanding of the State’s rationale and mechanisms to regulate 
businesses. It explores the ways businesses react to regulatory interventions, specifically in 
terms of developing and acquiring the resources and capabilities for compliance from the 
perspective of the Resource-Based View (RBV). Similarly, it explores the role international 
supply chains play in capability building from a Value Chain Governance (VCG) 
perspective. The chapter also briefly highlights the problems of previous contributions to 
the literature and attempts to disentangle the relationship between business regulation, 
compliance, and the role of supply chains. The chapter ends by putting forward a 
framework that integrates business regulation, capability building, and supply chain 
relationships, to contribute to better theoretical understanding of compliance-capability 
building. 
The third, methodology, chapter formalises the questions and hypothesis driving the 
empirical investigation and describes the methodology and research design. The fourth, 
background, chapter describes the Mexico-US fresh produce supply chains and their 
evolution, highlighting the contribution made to the Mexican economy by international 
trade. It also describes the multiple stages of the Mexico-US supply chains and their 
operations, and the complexities of what the new security systems is attempting to regulate. 
The chapter concludes with a more detailed account of the characteristics of the BioAct 
2002 and CTPAT/FAST.  
The fifth chapter describes the 12 cases that comprise this comparative research. The 
comparative approach of the research design of the thesis means that all the case studies 
are structured in the same way. They first present the regulatory compliance processes: this 
is followed by the resources and capabilities developed by each firm, and finally the role of 
internal and external sources of knowledge for capability building (i.e. other stakeholders 
and supply chain partners). 
The sixth chapter summarises all the cases, and provides an overview of the regulatory 
compliance processes, the resources and capabilities developed, and the supply chain 
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relationships evolution during compliance. This chapter is intended to discover whether 
there was a ‘model’ for compliance or a diverse set of pathways that firms followed when 
they attempted to build up their compliance capabilities. 
Based upon this qualitative comparative analysis, the thesis continues in Chapter 7 with the 
specific compliance processes, capability building and supply chain relationships that led 
towards compliance. Chapter 8 discusses the results. The main argument of the thesis is 
that firms overcoming the biosecurity and supply chain systems clash based on PPP 
regulation (i.e. CTPAT guidelines), do not follow a single compliance model. Instead, 
CTPAT compliant firms may follow a ‘limited diversity of patterns’ of compliance 
capability building processes. The chapter discusses previous contributions, and the extent 
to which the questions and hypotheses in the thesis were covered. To conclude, the thesis 
summarises the results and the discussion, and explores how the contributions of this 
dissertation helped to reach the aim of the investigation. The thesis ends with some policy 
and methodological recommendations for investigating the supply chain security. 
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2. CHAPTER 2 Theory and Framework: Understanding Compliance 
This chapter summarises scholarly interpretations of the State’s rationale to regulate 
businesses, why and how businesses comply, and the relationships that enable or constrain 
firms’ collaboration with the State to achieve regulatory aims. It begins with a brief 
introduction to the history of Federal regulation in the United States, and a brief 
explanation of the theoretical models used to understand businesses compliance behaviour. 
Although public and private sectors co-exist in the regulation, Braithwaite and Drahos 
(2000) have argued that global business regulation has been characterised by major shifts in 
who ‘dominated’ the regulation of the firms; in the 1800s-1930s it was business, in the 
1940s-1970s, the State, and from the 1980s they have shared the responsibility, with 
steering in the hands of States, and rowing undertaken by businesses (Braithwaite & 
Drahos, 2000). 
According to Rabin (1986), in the US social and economic concerns have changed over 
time, and this can be seen by the enactment of the main federal regulations. The first US 
Federal regulations were concerned with economic, industrial organisation and market 
conditions. For instance, the first US Federal regulation was in 1887, concerned with 
railway discriminatory market access. In the early 1900s a couple of unusual but very 
important regulations related to food safety were introduced. Transportation issues re-
gained importance in the 1920s and in the 1930s economic recovery and market stability 
were very important. The social regulations related to safety again became important after 
the 1950s; and environmental concerns became the new agenda for the US in the 1970s. At 
the same time consumer safety regulations increased, all under a wave of economic, 
industry, and market deregulation (Rabin, 1986). In the 1980s, concerns related to terrorism 
and crime were expressed in the enactment of several Acts (HeinOnline, 2011; McLeish & 
Nightingale, 2007), some of which are listed below (see Table 2.1 below). 
Business compliance and compliance behaviour studies have followed many approaches. 
Among others, key approaches are rule-based, regulatory studies, economic, sociological, 
institutional, evolutionary, organisation, and resource-based. According to Kingsbury 
(1997), approach is important because “compliance is not a free-standing concept, but 
derives meaning and utility from theories, so that different theories lead to significantly 
different notions of what is meant by compliance” (Kingsbury, 1997, p. 346). 
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Table 2.1: Selected Federal Regulations in the United States 1887-2006 
Year Regulation – purpose 
1887 Interstate Commerce Act. Addressing issues of railroad abuse and discrimination 
1889 Administrative Regulation (Alliance plan) - registration of public cooperatives 
1890 Sherman Antitrust Act  
1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act – Meat Inspection Act 
1920 Transportation Act 
1933 National Industry Recovery Act 
1933-34 Security and Exchange Act (Stock issuances and transactions) 
1935 Social Security Act; National Labor Relations Act 
1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act 
1946-50 Administrative procedure Act 
1966 Automobile Safety Act 
1967 Wholesome Meat Act 
1970 Clean Air Act and Federal Water Pollution Control Act, National Environmental Policy Act, 
Endangered Species Act, Occupational Health and Safety Act; Crime control Act 
1972 Consumer Product Safety Act (Trade and Consumer Safety) 
1978 Airline Deregulation Act  
1980 Motor Carrier Reform Act, Staggers Rail Act, Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act 
1984 Act to combat terrorism; Cigarette Safety Act; Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
1987 Water Quality Act; Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act 
1988 Medical Waste Tracking Act; US - Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments; Oil Pollution Act; Safe Medical Devices Act; Americans with 
Disabilities Act; Fire Safe Cigarette Act; Immigration Act 
1991 Civil Rights Act; Solid Waste Disposal Act (amended) 
1992 Energy Policy Act of 1992 
1994 International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act; Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(Amendments); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act; Prison Litigation Reform Act; Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
2001 Uniting and Strengthening of America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Corporate Fraud Responsibility); Technology, Education and Copyright 
Harmonization Act; Homeland Security Act; Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act 
2005 Energy Policy Act 
2006 Military Commissions Act 
Source: Based on (HeinOnline, 2011; McLeish & Nightingale, 2007; Rabin, 1986) 
 
Rule-based approaches, for example, do not lend themselves to our analyses because they 
focus on how legal rules and sanctions are set, and the assessment of compliance as the 
outcome (Kingsbury, 1997, p. 349). In spite of the importance of rules and their 
compliance outcomes, the rule-based approached do not explore how such outcomes are 
reached, i.e. the compliance processes. Moreover, rule-based approaches pay comparatively 
less attention to the relationship between the regulator and the regulated parties in a wider 
processes of compliance (Kingsbury, 1997, p. 349). In particular, studies in this field often 
assume that the firm will be able to comply, once it decides to do so. Although this is an 
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incomplete perspective11 it may offer some of the information needed to explain what 
happens within the firm in their consideration of compliance and attempts to comply.  
The economics, psychological and sociological perspectives of compliance behaviour 
include analyses of the economics of detection and sanction (e.g. cost-benefit analysis) 
(Sutinen & Gauvin, 1989, p. 417). The economics perspectives suggest an increase in the 
size of a penalty to promote compliance; the psychological and sociological perspectives 
suggest that compliance is associated to the level of the individual's moral development and 
social influence on individual, which might be achieved through fair regulatory procedures 
and effective regulatory programmes (Kuperan & Sutinen, 1998, p. 325; Tyler, 2006, p. 
165). Even though those elements may relate to conformity to norms, those contributions 
have been focused on analysing criminal deterrence rather than compliance; in other words 
deterring the terrorist rather than analysing how can firms prevent terrorist from using the 
firms’ supply chain to make an attack. 
The institutional approaches are interested in the arrangements of inspections to identify 
non-compliance, setting up liabilities, regulation by insurance, disclosures of activities of 
the regulated firm; public status to organised interest groups which serve as monitors, 
private party enforcers, incentives, contracting out regulatory functions, interests, 
commitment, coherence (Grabosky, 1995). However, these approaches mostly focus on 
institutional actors or instruments to promote compliance, rather than the internal 
processes by which firms and their supply chains might acquire the knowledge to comply. 
Although, disclosure may actually lead to self-awareness, learning and self-correction for 
compliance, it had not been analysed from the firms’ side. 
The evolutionary approach is appealing for this thesis. It focuses on units of selection (e.g. 
capabilities), selection mechanisms (e.g. regulations and markets), adaptation (e.g. 
capabilities transformation) and variation (e.g. innovation) (Dosi & Nelson, 1994, p. 155). 
Although it will be useful to describe how each firm responded to regulations, as will be 
shown in thesis, for the regulations we are analysing, there is no change in the selection 
                                                 
11 The gap between theory and practice here may reflect the common assumption in economics of ‘perfect 
information’ in which all techniques that might be employed by the firm are readily available although they 
may differ in cost. That a firm would choose not to comply is therefore implicitly a conclusion that non-
compliance is less expensive than compliance. If, however, it is recognised that firms may require time and 
investment to gather and co-ordinate the skills and tools needed for compliance, immediate compliance 
cannot be seen as possible nor can non-compliance be seen as a choice. 
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mechanisms, they will be given. Therefore, there is not much methodological ground to 
assess a co-evolution between the biosecurity regulations and capabilities building. 
Thus, the two main approaches used in this thesis to understand compliance from the 
point of view of the firm are organisation theories (e.g. French, Neighbors, Carswell, 
Williams, & Bush, 1992; Henson & Heasman, 1998; Sproull, 1981) and the resource-based 
view RBV (e.g. Hart, 1995; Penrose, 1955; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Teece & Pisano, 
1994; von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2003; Wernerfelt, 1984). These approaches aid our 
understanding of the processes by which firms reach compliance, and the capabilities 
required to do so, thus, being able to give insights to regulatory scholars on the importance 
of understanding the firms behaviour. The RBV is also taken to understand whether firms 
are able to gain competitive advantage out of compliance. 
The chapter shows that although scholars from regulatory studies12, innovation studies13, 
and supply chain governance14 have been interested in business compliance, individually 
they have been limited in explaining how firms manage comply, and even less on the role 
of their supply chain partners, taking into account that, as will be shown later, security 
regulations not only expect compliance from single firms, but also from their supply chains 
partners. 
Therefore, this review focuses on understanding three elements: 1) the compliance 
processes, 2) the resources and capabilities of the firm for compliance, and 3) the supply 
chain partners’ role for compliance. After exploring these elements, a framework 
integrating business regulation, capability building, and supply chain relationships15 is 
presented. 
 
                                                 
12 (Baldwin & Black, 2007; Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Christmann & Taylor, 2005; Parker, 2000; Viscusi, 
Vernon, & Harrignton, 1995; Yapp & Fairman, 2006). 
13 (Ashford, Heaton, & Priest, 1979; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Delmas, 1999; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Porter 
& van der Linde, 1995; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Williams & Edge, 1996) 
14 (Cousins, Lamming, & Bowen, 2004; Delmas, 1999; Garcia-Martinez, Fearne, Caswell, & Henson, 2007; 
Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005; Henson & Heasman, 1998; Phillips, Lamming, Bessant, & Noke, 
2006; Teece, 1986) 
15 Although related literatures such as transaction costs, governance structures, and value chain governance 
are included in the analysis, they are only used instrumentally for the understanding of the external sources of 
knowledge of the firm, and we are not expecting to make theoretical contributions in this area. 
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2.1. Regulations: public, private, and public-private partnership 
 
Public and private regulations 
Regulations allow society, in the form of the State and other stakeholders, to shape human 
behaviour to achieve social aims. This can involve preventing or correcting undesirable 
outcomes of social, economic and political processes using markets16, contracts, rules, and 
so on (Baldwin, Schott, & Hood, 1998). According to Black (2010, p. 302), regulations are 
forms of managing risks (on life and health), and beyond the State (with organisations in 
general) managing risk has become a benchmark of good governance. 
The ways regulations are enforced vary according to who sets them. Private regulations 
may be set up in business contracts requiring to related firms to acquire or work on 
acquiring certifiable standards issued by third party certifying agencies (Christmann & 
Taylor, 2005), however, standards need not to be necessarily certifiable. The case above, as 
well as regulations set for the firm itself, is a case of self-regulations. Public regulations set 
up laws requiring firms with given characteristics to acquire standards issued by the State, 
and usually verifiable by a public agency, and infringement may incur penalties (Kitching, 
2006, p. 801). The case above is a case of command-control regulation.  
To prevent or correct undesirable risks to life and health, the evidence suggests relying on 
free markets and deregulation as regulatory policy may lead to undesirable outcomes 
(Sunstein, 1997, p. 9). Scheppele (1988) explains that under free markets, caveat emptor 
generally applies, as sellers know little about the products that pass through their hands, 
and buyers have more opportunity to inspect products, and not taking advantage of this 
makes them liable, but when the seller and the buyer are equally ignorant, the loss stays 
where it finally fell (Scheppele, 1988, p. 283), presumably more often on the consumer or 
civil society. Hence free markets may give incentives to sellers to remain ignorant about the 
                                                 
16 Markets depend on law for their existence, and the system of private property only exists with legal rules 
telling who owns what, penalties for trespassing, and saying who can do what to whom (Sunstein, 1997). 
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risks and defects of the products they are selling, lowering the possibilities of a law suit, and 
therefore not having the need to self-regulate17. 
Governments may try to mind such market failures with public regulations (Tran & Daim, 
2008), forcing the development or implementation of the best available technologies – and 
specific capabilities – at rates or directions that were not expected to be initiated by firms 
otherwise (Schot & Rip, 1996, pp. 259-261). These regulations have been also called 
Constructive Technology Assessment (Schot & Rip, 1996; van Merkerk & Smits, 2008), 
Technology Assessment (Guston & Sarewitz, 2002), Anticipatory Governance (Philbrick, 
2010), Social Shaping and Construction of Technology (Pinch & Bijker, 1984; Williams & 
Edge, 1996), and they are applied to areas such as environmental protection (Kemp, 2000, 
p. 35), auto safety and systems (Fleischman, 2001; M. Lee, T., 1998; Schot, Hoogman, & 
Elzen, 1994), occupational health and safety (Parashes, 1978, p. 55), and so on. 
There are criticisms to public regulations on various grounds. First, technology forcing 
relies on a strong sense of technological determinism/imperatives, as, for instance, 
assuming that the rate, nature and direction of technological change is not problematic, can 
be determined, and produces social and organisational change (Williams & Edge, 1996, p. 
868); as if technology could be forecasted as a demonstrated fact, rather than as a 
speculative possibility. Second, public regulations may lack enforcement capacity in 
geographically dispersed firms (Bednar, 2006, pp. 368-369; Boyd, 1998, pp. 2, 31-32). 
Thirdly, they tend to limit pro-active compliance by driving firms to not doing more than 
what is being dictated. This seems to be a reason behind environmentalists’ pressuring 
businesses to adopt and implement environmental practices going beyond the dictates of 
statues and regulations (Stenzel, 2000, p. 243). Fourth, public agencies may lack the 
knowledge of the technological capabilities, options, and availabilities to be implemented 
by the industry, at the time they are setting up regulatory standards (Majone, 2002, p. 89). 
And fifth, precautionary principles applied to risk management in public regulations may be 
misused to justify protectionist measures, with undesirable distributive consequences 
(Majone, 2002, p. 89). Although, according to Kaufman (2007), security policies inheritably 
                                                 
17 See for instance a case of health care services, where the consumers preferred to remain in a state of 
ignorance, and not devote efforts to actively seeking out information about their doctor or evaluating his or 
her services (Lupton, Donaldson, & Lloyd, 1991, p. 567). 
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create trade obstacles, the concern is how international trade can be enhanced given the 
new security policies (Kaufman, 2007, p. 641). 
Yet, as in the case of the regulations for preventing the depletion of the ozone layer 
(Andersen, Sarma, & Sinclair, 2002, p. 265), unclear final consumer messages for security 
and uncoordinated efforts by suppliers to engage in biosecurity self-regulations, gives 
importance to comprehensive and universal regulation to avoid coordination and market 
failures. 
There are instances actually in which firms and their associations try to control their own 
behaviour with private regulations. For instance in Mexico and the US, supermarkets define 
quality and food safety standards for their food suppliers (Calvin & Barrios, 1999; Dolan & 
Humphrey, 2000; Reardon, 2006; Reardon, Henson, & Berdegue, 2007). 
Criticisms on private regulations focus on the effectiveness to achieve desirable social aims 
(Garcia-Martinez, Fearne, Caswell, & Henson, 2007, p. 300), to ensure public 
accountability (Bartle & Vass, 2007, p. 897), and the issue of the capacity and incentives to 
identify and control risks, because this requires the knowledge not only of the costs of 
reducing the risks, but of the probability and severity of them (Shavell, 1983, p. 359). 
Although private parties may know more than regulators about the costs of specific 
activities in their firms to reduce risks, it is unlikely that the fresh produce industry know 
more about the probability and severity of the risks of bioterrorism than regulators.  
Although regulations exist, one should not expect perfect compliance. Compliance can be 
costly for the firm (Froud & Ogus, 1996), and monitoring and enforcement may neither be 
easy nor cheap (Parker, 2000, p. 560). Regulatory enforcement of any type (public or 
private) tends to be imperfect (Farina, Gutman, Lavarello, Nunes, & Reardon, 2005, p.306; 
North, 1995, p.95; Viscusi, Vernon, & Harrignton, 1995, p.819), making perfect 
compliance unlikely. 
A wrong-doing firms, is one lacking the efforts to continuously enhance compliance rather 
than one not eliminating risks. Stuart (2008) argues that total control over food safety may 
be just an illusion, despite the new technologies and the war against nature (Stuart, 2008), 
or despite measures to prevent human frustrations vented over food. But, firms should be 
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monitored and given penalties to discourage non-compliance and rewards to incentivise 
voluntary compliance (OECD, 2000, pp. 55-56). 
From the point of view of the firm, some of the benefits of private regulation are: 1) it 
limits competition and promotes sectoral interests, 2) it helps to pre-empt public 
regulation, and 3) it informs consumers of the quality (and safety and security) provisions 
of the suppliers; but 4) it mostly involves gaining reputational capital or reducing the risk of 
reputational damage (Nunez, 2007, pp. 211-212) by means of terminating business relations 
with non-compliant firms (Meidinger, 2006, p. 75; Raynaud et al., 2005, p. 50).  
Private regulations are useful instruments when formal obligations and public regulations 
are absent or ineffectively enforced (Busch, Jorgens, & Tews, 2005, p. 147). Furthermore, 
even when compulsory statutory regulations are present and effectively enforced, they may 
still not be sufficient to achieve social aims (OECD, 2000, pp. 7, 11). So, what are the 
alternatives? 
 
Public-Private Partnership Regulations 
Although the traditional view of regulation is that the State should legislate, execute, and 
enforce compliance18, in the food industry at least, many roles are actually shared between 
the State and the private sector (Iizuka & Borbon-Galvez, 2009; Meidinger, 2009), and this 
is the main idea behind a Public-Private Partnership Regulation. 
Public-private partnership regulations (PPPs) have been set up to cover aspects not 
considered individually by private and public regulations. Achieving regulatory aims, 
responding to consumer needs, assuring non-discriminatory conditions, effectively 
achieving social aims with fewer burdens are some of those aspects (Garcia-Martinez et al., 
2007, pp. 301, 312), allowing for some form of accountability, and preventing rent-seeking 
behaviours (Ogus, 1995, p. 98). Yet, Baldwin and Black (2008) warn that complex and 
uncertain regulations may hinder compliance (Baldwin & Black, 2008, p. 63), which may be 
the case of PPPs. 
                                                 
18 The private sector may face severe challenges of impartiality when enforcing locally and legitimating 
internationally their own developed regulations and certifications (C-TPAT/CBP, 2010, p. 6). 
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PPPs evolved on the one hand by handing public regulatory functions over private sectors, 
for instance the regulatory enforcement functions (Wigger & Nolke, 2007, p. 488). In the 
agri-food supply chain chains some of the reasons behind such substitutions had been: 1) 
lack of direct State supervision in supplying countries, 2) increasing use of private standards 
as tools to coordinate internationally dispersed suppliers, 3) to manage risk (Berdegue, 
Balsevich, Flores, & Reardon, 2005, p. 259; Reardon, 2006; Tallontire, 2007, p. 776), 4) 
better monitoring systems that reduce the overall chains’ transactions costs (Delmas & 
Toffel, 2008, p. 1035; Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005, p. 2032), and 5) due to the rapid 
obsolescence of public regulations after industry transformations (McInerney, 2007, p. 
183). 
PPPs also evolved by taking private regulations as the model for setting up public 
regulations, but with private standards setting organisations remaining private. States’ 
reasons behind may this may include: 1) the need for universal compliance, 2) need of 
governmental accountability, 3) need to adhere to international trade rules (Aruoma, 2006, 
p. 123), need to comply with international agreements and control regimes (Smith & 
Crotty, 2008, p. 343). There are examples of this in the agrifood sector (Hutter, 1993, p. 
238; Iizuka & Borbon-Galvez, 2009, pp. 12-13).  
PPPs had also emerged by means of States mandating the creation of standards by the 
private sector. The UK 1990 Food Safety Act mandated operators in the food industry to 
exercise ‘due diligence’ over supply chains delivering to ensure safe food, which has driven 
firms to develop a series of food safety measures along their global supply chains (Henson 
& Humphrey, 2009, p. 11), which indicates the case of command-control regulations with 
private standards with presence of both private and public enforcement mechanisms, the 
former by firms’ due diligence, and the second by governments’ public enforcement. 
A comprehensive literature survey by Henson and Humphrey (2009) concludes that the 
difference between public and private regulations may be explained by the fact that 
governments are interested in meeting public expectations, while the private sector may be 
interested in meeting customer needs, or reacting to public interventions that affect the 
competitive advantage of the firm19 (Henson & Humphrey, 2009). This would have not 
                                                 
19 Henson and Humphrey (2009) present a comprehensive debate and discussion of the increasing 
importance of private regulations in preventing the contamination of the food supply chain (food safety 
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been a problem if the private as much as the public regulation was accountable not only to 
the buyers, but to all the population in terms of human protection and fair trade, or as 
Yapp and Fairman (2006) argue, if there was not regulatory competition; because to meet 
regulatory aims, firms require resources and capabilities that adhere to the norms (Yapp & 
Fairman, 2006, p. 44). 
Thus, under the risk of 1) negative effects on economic growth as a direct consequence of 
public regulations set by unknowledgeable public agencies, and 2) business discrimination 
as a consequence of self-regulation that are set by opportunistic and rent-seeking private 
parties, public rule-making with informal discussion, negotiation, consensus, and with 
multiple institutions involvement appears to be more effective (Braun & Wield, 1994, p. 
270; Stewart, 1981, pp. 1346-1347; Viscusi, 1988, p. 304). This, of course, assumes that the 
private sector is represented among the institutions involved in the regulatory design and 
standards setting, which then would mean that such regulations are Public-Private 
Partnerships Regulations (PPPs). 
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) is a PPP, which combines 
public and private regulatory characteristics such as: a) duty payments and electronic 
transmission of cargo before importing through the Advanced Commercial Information-
ACI (non-compulsory features are administered by the US Customs Border Protection-
CBP); the system is managed by Prior Notice of Food Import Shipments (which has 
command-control features and is administered by the US Food and Drug Administration-
FDA); and b) reduced cargo inspections as incentives for good security records in cross-
border operations (a non-compulsory feature of CTPAT that is administered by CBP) (C-
TPAT/CBP, 2006, p. 7; FDA/HHS, 2009, p. 4). Furthermore, it was designed by public 
(i.e. Customs Border Protection) and private organisations (i.e. 50 international trade 
experts) representing most stages of the supply chains (Laden, 2007, p. 76)20.  
                                                                                                                                               
standards), and its use as a Non-Tariff Barrier to trade, the argument is that it is not completely clear whether 
private regulations distort trade, and public regulation should find the ways to adapt to the sector and local 
conditions of the food supply chain (Iizuka & Borbon-Galvez, 2009). 
20 CTPAT requires that firms adopt, adapt or develop resources that prevent terrorism such as safe firm 
relationships, physical security, access control, personnel security, procedural security, information systems, 
trailers and containers security, conveyance security, security training and awareness (Henson & Humphrey, 
2009). 
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Yet, since the question is whether firms are able to comply with CTPAT, it is necessary to 
explore the other side of the regulatory story: the firms’ compliance processes. 
 
Regulatory Compliance 
Regulatory scholars generally consider that “non-compliance is, first of all, a violation of 
the law” (Lai, Yung, Li, & Ho, 2007, p. 539). Such violations may be due to lack of: 1) 
enforcement capacity, 2) rewards systems, 3) organisational expectations of regulatory 
benefits, or 4) adequate institutional arrangements, or management tactics opening up 
planning legislation to the public and stakeholders. 
There are however regulatory scholars interested from the ‘responsive regulations’ strand 
that have transcended the above view, acknowledging the importance of resources, 
competencies, capabilities, operational and cognitive frameworks of the firms such as 
Parker (2006), Nielsen & Parker (2008), and Baldwin and Black (2008).  
According to Yapp and Fairman (2006), compliance with a regulation requires 
technologies, procedures, systems and capabilities that enable the firm to adhere to the 
regulation’s norms (Yapp & Fairman, 2006, p. 44), and they need to be available at the 
precise moment they are required (Williams & Edge, 1996, p. 873). Moreover, it is possible 
for early movers in allocating resources to gain advantage for achieving compliance, 
according to Ashford et al., (1979) and Porter and van der Linde (1995), raising resource 
barriers (Wernerfelt, 1984), i.e. the limited resources already allocated (e.g. specialised 
human resources already hired exclusively to manage compliance in a given firm). 
Yet again, responsive regulation scholars believe that allocating resources for compliance 
will depend mainly on the hegemony, power, and legitimacy of the regulation (Braithwaite 
& Drahos, 2000, p. 398; Scott, 1987, p. 451), and of a clear understanding by the regulated 
of ‘who’ is ruling ‘what’ (Baldwin & Black, 2008, p. 63). 
This suggests that regulatory compliance depends on the regulatory design, which drives 
the allocation of resources and capabilities for compliance. It is then necessary 
understanding what had scholars discussed about how capabilities and resources can 
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contribute to the firm to become compliant. For this enterprise we mainly rely on the 
Resource-Based View scholars. 
 
2.2. A Resource-Based View of Compliance 
The introduction chapter discussed that security often requires the ‘engagement’ of the 
private sector. But understanding how firms can engage (comply), requires as suggested by 
‘responsive regulation’ scholars, understanding the role of capabilities, resources, and 
organisational processes to become compliant. And first of all, to clarify how capabilities 
and resources relate to compliance, we need to understand what are they, how are they 
built, and how can they meet regulations?  
 
Compliance capabilities 
The Resource-Based View (RBV) scholars have spent a long time around what capabilities 
are, how they are built, and how they can sustain the competitive advantage of the firms 
(Barney, 1991; Hart, 1995; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Penrose, 1955; Rugman & Verbeke, 
1998; Teece & Pisano, 1994; von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2003; Wernerfelt, 1984; Winter, 
2000). 
A capability is “a high-level routine (or collection of routines) that, together with its 
implementing input flows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision 
options for producing significant outputs of a particular type ... ‘routine’ is a behaviour that 
is learned, highly patterned, repetitious, or quasi-repetitious, founded in part in tacit 
knowledge ... and in the specificity of objectives” (Winter, 2000, p. 983). Competitive 
advantage is defined as “implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being 
implemented by any current or potential competitor. It is sustained ... when other firms are 
unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy” (Barney, 1991, p. 102). 
Delmas and Toffel (2008) have shown that nonmarket pressures – i.e. regulations – are 
usually channelled throughout firm’s legal departments, which later may influence other 
firm managers, taking the form of direct control over the decision making, or indirectly 
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through information sharing and training; later with the help of marketing – and other 
managers – firms may be able to convey such nonmarket management decisions into firm’s 
competitiveness (Delmas & Toffel, 2008, pp. 1032-1033). However, turning external 
pressures into internal decision making processes, learning, innovating, and conveying 
those by managers into the firm’s competitiveness, may require skills, experience, 
knowledge, technologies and systems; or what had been broadly called capabilities 
(Langlois & Robertson, 1993, p. 35; Nightingale, 2004, p. 1273; Song, Droge, Hanvanich, 
& Calantone, 2005, pp. 260-261). When these capabilities respond to external pressures of 
regulatory nature, they should be called compliance capabilities hereafter. 
In this line of argument, Fermeth (2009) showed how the decision to comply by US electric 
utilities exposed to environmental regulations depends on the capabilities and their 
redeployment or development to meet externally established objectives – i.e. Regulations 
(Fremeth, 2009, p. 90). 
To comply with safety and traceability regulations, firms complemented new radio 
frequency identification (RFID) technologies with operations optimisation of all stages of 
the their supply chains (Jones, Clarke-Hill, Comfort, Hillier, & Shears, 2005).  
New organisational (Johannessen, 2008, p. 409) and administrative capabilities (Yamin, 
Mavondo, Gunasekaran, & Sarros, 1997, p. 166) have been complemented with 
technologies and systems for compliance. For instance, as the US Environment Protection 
Agency (US EPA) banned the ethylene dibromide and approved the hot water treatment 
for fruit flies in mangos, new and complex organisational capabilities such as engineering 
protocols, machinery and plant designs, logistical operations, and coordination between 
public agencies and Mexican mango exporters, were integrated with information and 
communication technologies, and biotechnologies (biological analysis and control 
technologies), etc. These organisational capabilities, together with the new technologies, 
have liberalised Mexican mango exporters and other fruit exporters from intra-regional 
trade, and allowed them to exploit global markets (Alvarez, 2001, p. 125).  
According to Fremeth, when compliance capabilities are similar to those existing within the 
firm, firms may only need to be redeployed capabilities from previous uses to compliance 
(Fremeth, 2009, p. 91). This implies that when capabilities for compliance are dissimilar to 
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the existing within the firm, it might be necessary to develop them or, if possible, source 
them from outside the firm. 
 
External compliance capabilities 
According to Lamm (1997), it is not uncommon that small firms have difficulties to 
comply. In the United Kingdom such firms required compliance expertise on occupational 
health and safety, which was usually sourced from outside non-governmental actors and 
organisations (Lamm, 1997, p. 156). According to Drew (2007) not only small but any 
firms may need external expertise (experience) to assess and approach risks and compliance 
(Drew, 2007, p. 23). For instance, SMEs with environmental problems, and without 
sufficient internal capabilities to comply with regulations, have used external expertise to 
refocus existing capacity to environmental compliance, adapting existing organisational 
structures, procedures and recording systems (Perez Sanchez, Barton, & Bower, 2003, p. 
74). 
Furthermore, even though firms could develop capabilities internally, it is not rare for their 
development costs, i.e. search, planning, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcement, to be 
too high. When they are able to have control over capabilities developed externally, it is 
more economical to outsource their development and merge internal capabilities of the 
firm with the outsourced skills, routines and capabilities (Blomqvist, Kyläheiko, & 
Virolainen, 2002, pp. 7-8). However, to reduce the risks of control loss and knowledge 
spillovers to competitors (Premus & Sanders, 2003, p. 53), in-site outsourcing (transfer of 
property without relocation of operations) is usually preferred over near-site (transfer of 
property with relocation of operations to near sites) or off-shore outsourcing (transfer of 
property with off-shore relocation of operations). Overall, outsourcing happens because 
suppliers are able to provide products or services at lower cost than the firm is able 
internally (Strange, 2009). 
Carlson and Fernandes (2006) suggest that large firms also need a great deal of external 
support for their capabilities to comply with regulations. They have had to increase 
considerably the share of outside resources in the overall compliance efforts, because of 
the difficulties in expanding internal compliance support fast enough, to be able to initiate 
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activities not related to compliance, e.g. developing new products and services, to acquire 
IT systems, new personnel and other compliance activities: in some instances they are not 
even suitable to the compliance activities. The opportunity costs of these compliance 
trends included shifted management focus, disrupted provision of products and services, 
and waiting times (Carlson & Fernandez, 2006, p. 8).  
Hence, it is still not clear whether firm size correlates with compliance capabilities (Aragón-
Correa, Hurtado-Torres, Sharma, & García-Morales, 2008, p. 93), regardless of what some 
scholars may argue (Lynch-Wood & Williamson, 2010). 
 
Compliance capabilities and firm performance 
Compliance capabilities may have positive effects on various areas of firm performance. 
Chinander et al. (1998) regulations trigger R&D activities, human resources development, 
and organisational transformations for the execution of compliance activities; later, the 
assessment of compliance drove changes in the development strategy of the firm, by 
modifying product, processes and market strategies (Chinander, Kleindorfer, & 
Kunreuther, 1998, p. 137). 
In response to regulations, when required changes are identified, Hart (1995) showed that 
compliance drove drive firms to either introduce end-of-pipe technologies or processes and 
organisational changes. To various degrees, these capabilities influenced the productive 
capacity and technologies and systems of the firm, eliminating unnecessary and simplifying 
steps in the production operation. Firms, after compliance saw positive revenues, profits, 
business relations, and markets of the firms (Hart, 1995, pp. 992-998). 
Similarly, Ashford, Heaton and Priest (1979) showed how although building up 
technological capabilities for compliance represents a burden for the firm, those capabilities 
may help offset the burden. Based on a case study of vinyl chloride “regulations” enforced 
by the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), they showed 
a series of innovations following compliance capabilities, including improved product 
developments exceeding the long run costs of compliance for the industry (Ashford et al., 
1979, p. 180). 
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Porter and van der Linde (1995) described cases of organisational innovations that would 
have not existed without compliance to regulatory pressures. One was the Molten Metal 
Technology which developed a process (organisational capability) for hazardous waste that 
reduced the cost of compliance. Another case was the Robbins Company, which developed 
a new handling and purification system of water used for plating, with results over 40 times 
cleaner than the city water, increasing the competitiveness of the firm (Porter & van der 
Linde, 1995, p. 101).  
Dewick and Miozzo in 2002 showed that building regulations in Sweden, the Netherlands 
and Germany were stricter than in the UK, contributing to higher material and labour 
costs. However, the technologies and economies of learning derived from compliance with 
stricter regulations contributed to making the total building costs lower than those in UK 
(Dewick & Miozzo, 2002, p. 826). 
To sum up, although compliance may be a burden for firms, compliance leadership in 
some instance may lead to better firm performance. The question is how are capabilities for 
compliance built? 
 
Compliance capability building process 
As noticed earlier, firm’ compliance had been subject of regulatory studies (Aruoma, 2006; 
Crotty, 2006; Froud & Ogus, 1996; Grabowski, Viscusi, & Evans, 1989; James, Johnstone, 
Quinlan, & Walters, 2007; Millstone, 1994; Nicholas Hughes, 2006; Parker, 2000; Smith & 
Crotty, 2008; Viscusi, 1979). However, they mostly focused on the regulation as a cause 
and the firm’s output (innovation, increased efficiency, market exit, so on) as an effect, 
leaving the middle-ground unstudied. Hence, the processes by which firms achieved or not 
compliance have typically remained “black boxed”. 
The following sections review the key contributions on compliance capability building, like 
Ashford, Heaton and Priest (1979) from a technological change point of view, Scott (1981) 
from an institutional perspective, and Henson and Heasman (1998) from an organisational 
perspective have advanced understanding of firm’s compliance. Later, based upon the RBV 
contributions, the review explores how the skills and capabilities required for compliance, if 
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innovative, may be difficult to acquire, develop, or mobilise (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). 
This can be a criticism to Ashford et al. (1979) Scott (1981) and Henson and Heasman 
(1998) who assume the availability and readiness of resources and capabilities at each stage 
of a compliance process.  
The RBV touches upon issues of compliance, assembled into a framework that tries to 
clarify the relationships between regulations, compliance, and intra and inter firm learning 
(Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Delmas, 1999; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Pilkington, 1998; 
Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Williams & Edge, 1996). The next sections are organised as 
follows, 1) compliance processes, 2) capability building, and 3) supply chain relationships, 
and finish by presenting the analytical framework connecting the three elements with the 
regulatory regimes.  
 
The compliance process 
Ashford, Heaton and Priest (1979) show that the first activity of the firm for compliance is 
allocating resources, initially diverting them from other business and R&D activities to 
create compliance departments, involving dedicated personnel, financial resources and 
time. The allocation of resources increases according to the desired level of compliance 
leadership. 
Later, Sproull (1981) proposed so analyse compliance as an organisational process, 
consisting of the following stages: 1) identify regulations, 2) perceive and interpret 
regulations, 3) investigate the internal organisational context looking for plausible 
responses (ability to comply), 4) decide to comply21, 5) communicate compliance strategies, 
and, finally, 6) assess conformance to the regulatory requirements (Sproull, 1981).  
Like Ashford, she stressed the internal struggles for attracting the resources and capabilities 
for each stage of the compliance process. She however, did not question whether: 1) 
resources and capabilities were unavailable, and 2) deployment of resources and capabilities 
across the organisation in some and not all instances meet the regulatory requirements. 
                                                 
21 Internal organisation competition for resources and whether to avoiding certain resources from the 
repertoire, adding resources from the repertoire, or resources from the repertoire to the pre-existing business 
operations). 
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Scott (1987) acknowledged that resources and capabilities – as roles and functions within 
the firm – may not be available nor meet the regulatory requirements. For him, 
organisations need to create structures according to their complex environments, adapting, 
creating and embedding functions and roles in their structures as their environments 
change. Eventually, the whole organisational structure of the firm reflects the patterns of 
the strategic contingencies to meet the regulatory changes (Scott, 1987).  
The problems with such view are: 1) the an assumption that regulations are fully met, 
implying that organisational structures and activities are fully developed by the time another 
regulatory change appears; 2) the little consideration given to the fact that firms may pre-
empt their regulatory environment change, hence their organisational structure may not 
fully reflect or meet regulatory changes22; and 3) there is limited insight of how resources 
and capabilities get developed and deployed across organisations, mainly due to the 
contingent approach, it would not make sense identifying patterns of development. 
French et al. (1992) and Henson and Heasman (1998) refined Sproull’s compliance process 
and applied it to the food industry in response to food safety and labelling regulations. The 
general compliance model follows the following stages (French et al., 1992; Henson & 
Heasman, 1998): 
1. Identifying the regulation, awareness; 
2. Interpreting the regulation; 
3. Identify the degree of compliance prior to implementation to estimate required 
changes; 
4. Deciding the desired level of compliance (exit to partial to full compliance) in 
the function of the apparent direct compliance costs; 
5. Search of the methods or alternatives for compliance and allocation of 
resources for assessment and implementation; 
6. Communicating the compliance decision, strategies, and implications it has for 
the whole organisation; 
7. Implementation of changes at technological and organisational level; 
                                                 
22 For instance, from a survey of C-TPAT members ordered by CBP, only 4.7% of the businesses had not 
had any of the security criteria, while the rest of the businesses have implemented at least to some extent the 
security criteria (CTPAT/CBP, 2006).  
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8. Allocation of resources for monitoring and evaluation of the compliance 
process.  
This approach acknowledges feedback loops to each of the stages of the process. However, 
the fundamental difference of Henson and Heasman’s model compared to previous ones is 
the role of resources availability – financial and human – in their analysis. Their study 
concluded that the main factor contributing to compliance was firm size, rooted in the 
economies of scale that financial resources and staff time has over the compliance 
processes; and nothing can be said regarding the organisational compliance processes, or 
whether differences in those had an impact on compliance. They added that regardless of 
their technological and organisational capabilities, smaller firms tend to follow partial or 
non-compliance strategies, while larger firms follow full compliance strategies (Henson & 
Heasman, 1998, p. 20).  
Similarly, the US federal government, through the Sentencing Commission, Guidelines 
Manual §3E1.1 (November 2009) ruled that all firms must exercise due diligence and 
promote an organisational culture of prevention and detection of crime. However, a 
compliance programme may vary according to the size of the firm. Large organisations 
should have more formal operations and greater resources than small organisations. Large 
organisations should also encourage small organisations (those related or seeking to have 
business relations with large organisations) to implement effective compliance programmes 
(USSG, nov. 2009, p. 506). The elements of a compliance model for all firms in the US are 
(USSG, nov. 2009, p. 503): 
1. Standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal conduct; 
2. Knowledge from the organisation’s governing authority about the compliance 
programme, and top level personnel engaged in it; 
3. No responsibility given to high-risk persons; 
4. Effective communication of standards and procedures: training programmes 
and/or disseminating information; 
5. Monitoring and auditing, evaluating, and publicising systems of the programme; 
6. Compliance programme shall include incentives and disciplinary measures; 
7. Detection should be followed by response, and corrections of the compliance 
programmes. 
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Thus, based on Henson and Heasman (1998) and the US Federal Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines Manual §3E1.1 (November 2009), it seems that compliance requires only a great 
deal of resources; hence large firms with more financial and human resources tend to 
comply whereas small firms, lacking those resources, will comply much less often or 
effectively. However, in one of the cases in Henson and Heasman’s study, a multiple 
retailer (presumably a large firm), who declared, after trying to pre-empt a UK food safety 
regulation, it lost millions when the state modified the rules and resulted in the firm being 
non-compliant (Henson & Heasman, 1998, p. 19). Even large firms may not be able to 
comply, adding to the open debate of the relationship between firm size and compliance; 
hence. Hence, it seems that it has to do with accumulation of resources and capabilities. 
The question then is, how those capabilities and resources are build? 
 
The resource and capability building 
“Scholars who identify themselves with the “Resource-Based View” examine the 
question of what sort of resources confer lasting competitive advantages, how these 
advantages can be extended, and what considerations prevent the elimination of the 
gap between the costs of the resources and the market value of the output produced” 
(Dosi, Faillo, & Marengo, 2008, p. 19). 
To understand what resources and capabilities are required for compliance, it is necessary 
to know how they are built and their relationship with firm performance. This takes us 
back to Penrose (1955). 
Penrose was concerned with the limits on the growth of firms in the 1950s. She suggested 
that these limits were given by the firm’s internal resources: experiences, skills, and 
technological know-how related to internal operations (Penrose, 1956, p. 225). These 
resources may be combined to form capabilities, and the most important capabilities are 
research and planning, managerial services, and the ability to re-interpret and understand 
their own resources. Resources and capabilities are not homogeneous (e.g. fixed and 
variable capital and assets), instead they are heterogeneous (e.g. skills, technologies, 
knowledge, managerial services, etc.), yet valuable and conducive of unlimited growth, as 
long as the span of control allows it (Penrose, 1955, pp. 532-533, 537, 540, 1960, p. 19). 
Hence, if resources and capabilities are available a firm will be able to comply.  
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Later, Wernerfelt (1984) contested Penrose’s view on the limits of growth of the firm, 
because, even if available, resources were not easy to acquire in the marketplace, they may 
be difficult to imitate, substitute, or move: this means that there are resource barriers 
(Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 173).  
Yet, Wernerfelt (1984) it also goes down to availability of resources and capabilities, 
developed or acquired. Then, we wonder if upon availability of capabilities and resources, a 
firm will be always able to comply. If not, then what else apart from resources and 
capabilities availability is needed? 
Wernerfelt however, did mentioned that firms may follow acquisition strategies to get 
resources that ‘combines effectively’ with those of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 175). 
Similarly, Pilkington (1998) argued that radical regulations, those that require technologies 
that are beyond the operating region of the firm, may drive them into joint-ventures or 
take-overs (Pilkington, 1998, p. 213) to acquire the necessary resources to combine and 
combine them with the existing ones. This implies the risk of vertical integration to after 
regulatory pressures.  
However, Wernerfelt (1984) and Pilkington (1998) did not explain how those internal and 
external resources were developed or how they may be combined to achieve compliance. 
For instance, at this point it is unclear why, by 2005, 18.5% of the firms that developed 
resources and built up capabilities to comply with CTPAT had their applications rejected 
(Rojas, 2005), and why by the end of 2008, 7.4% of the applications were rejected 
(COAC/CBP, 2008).  
 
Resources and capabilities 
According to Dosi, Faillo and Marengo (2008) resources are ‘things’ while capabilities are 
‘ways of doing’ things (Dosi et al., 2008, p. 11). Further, “capabilities fill the gap between 
intention and outcome, and they fill it in such a way that the outcome bears a definite 
resemblance to what was intended” (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2000, p. 2). 
Resources (things) constitute brand names, skilled personnel, physical technologies, assets, 
inputs to production, institutional structures and institutional linkages, etc. (Bell & Pavitt, 
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1995; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Maijoor & Van Witteloostuijn, 
1996; Nightingale, 2004; Prieto & Easterby-Smith, 2006; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Capabilities (ways of doing) on the other hand constitute acquisitions, researching, 
experimentation, planning, designing, preventing, developing, coordinating, learning by 
doing, predicting, reconfiguring, etc., of resources (things) (Hart, 1995; Kogut & Zander, 
1996; Nightingale, 2004; Penrose, 1955, 1956, 1960; Zhou, Zhang, & Liu, 2005; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). 
In other words, firms’ intention to comply may trigger the collection of input resources (such 
as skilled personnel, physical technologies, inputs to production, assets, software, and so 
on), to build up capabilities (such as researching, learning by doing, coordinating, 
reconfiguring, etc.), which in turn sets the options and implements the creation of output 
resources and products, such as new security systems and technologies. These output resources 
and products should resemble the firm’s intention to comply. 
 
Capability building 
According to Hoopes and Madsen (2008), there are broadly four areas related to how 
capabilities are built up, or what input resources are collected for: 
1) Intra-firm capability replication, i.e. managerial systems23 (internal capability 
building), and intra-firm capability imitation, i.e. organisational competencies 
and capabilities (internal capability building) (Hoopes & Madsen, 2008, p. 400; 
Pettus, Kor, & Mahoney, 2009, p. 189; Winter & Szulanski, 2001, pp. 733-734); 
2) Capability integration, i.e. internal coordination (internal capability building) 
(Hoopes & Madsen, 2008, p. 403; Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 388; McInerney, 2004, 
p. 193); 
3) Capability creation. Intra-firm capability creation based upon leadership, 
organisational culture, information technology, social networks, skills, know-how, 
etc., i.e. organisational competencies and capabilities (internal capability 
                                                 
23 The bold text represents the classification of capabilities that are included in the analytical framework. 
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building) (Hoopes & Madsen, 2008, p. 407; Montealegre, 2002, p. 522), or based 
upon organisational coordination mechanisms and cross-functional teams, i.e. 
internal coordination (internal capability building) (Henderson, 1994, p. 617; 
Hoopes & Madsen, 2008, p. 408).  
4) Inter-firm creation is based upon interaction to combine knowledge and capabilities 
of the science base, i.e. stakeholders support (external capability building), or with 
suppliers, i.e. supplier development or desorptive capacity (external capability 
building), and vertical alignment (external capability building) (Halldorsson, 
Kotzab, Mikkola, & Skjøtt-Larsen, 2007, p. 290; Hoopes & Madsen, 2008, pp. 408-
409; Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009, p. 1325; Romijn, 1997, p. 367; Romijn & 
Albaladejo, 2002, p. 1062; von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2003, pp. 39, 47). 
The difference between building up capabilities based upon stakeholders support and 
vertical alignment, is that the former follows the traditional absorptive capacity argument 
where the firm builds up capabilities to innovate, based on communication between the 
external environment and internal subunits, distributing expertise within the organisation 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 131). Vertical alignment is where a firm’s internal capabilities 
align to the evolving capabilities of the clients/suppliers (von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2007, 
p. 202). Desorptive capacity on the other hand, is the ability of the firm to identify external 
opportunities, transfer knowledge to external organisations and exploit it, even without 
internal application (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009, p. 1322). 
Other contributions have also made distinctions between static and dynamic capabilities, 
where the static capabilities are organisational processes designed for conventional 
products/services and unsuitable for new product/processes, whilst dynamic capabilities 
are coordinative management processes for interorganisational learning to find solutions to 
introduce new products/services (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997, p. 518). Static capabilities 
may be more suitable for stable markets where there is limited or no technical change, and 
for conditions which approximate perfect knowledge (Nightingale, 2008, p. 559). Hence 
static regulations, or those suffering little change over time, or that are fully understood 
may be approached by building up static capabilities. On the other hand, regulations that 
change continuously, or change significantly, or are uncertain or not fully understood, may 
drive firms to respond by building up dynamic capabilities. 
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Overall, dynamic capabilities consist of changing capabilities to sustain competition 
(Hoopes & Madsen, 2008, p. 413; Winter, 2003, p. 992). From an evolutionary view point 
however, it has been suggested that, if a capability changes in order to remain competitive, 
it should be in light of the capability changes of the firm’s suppliers and clients, i.e. vertical 
alignment; dynamic capabilities should be accumulated within the firm based on external 
interaction with a network of suppliers (Del Sorbo, 2010, p. 33; Lamming, 2000, p. 771; 
von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2003, pp. 39, 47, 2007, p. 203). Hence, radical changes in 
regulations may drive firms towards collaborative interaction with their stakeholders and 
suppliers. 
To sum up, there are broadly three internal and three external mechanisms to build up 
capabilities. The internal capability buildings are: 1) organisational competencies and 
capabilities, leading to capabilities creation and imitation; 2) managerial systems, leading to 
capabilities replication; and 3) internal coordination, leading to capabilities creation, 
integration and coordination across functional teams. The external capability build ups are: 1) 
stakeholders’ support, which lead to exert the firm’s absorptive capacity; 2) supplier 
development, based on developing the firm’s desorptive capacity (a definition is given 
below); and 3) vertical alignment, which leads to the adapting of internal firm’s capabilities 
in function of the capabilities of the supply chain partners. In theory, each one of the 
mechanisms to build up capabilities may be used accordingly by firms to respond to their 
regulatory environment. 
Assuming that building up internal capabilities may require less input resources than 
external capabilities, and that absorptive and desorptive capacity may require less input 
resources than vertical alignment, because the later requires both of the interacting firms 
building up capabilities, rather than only one of the two interacting; later in the discussion 
and analysis the internal capability building will be classified as basic, the external with one 
firm building up capabilities will be classified as intermediate, and the external with the two 
interacting firms building up capabilities will be classified as advanced. 
According to Carmeli (2001), and Lechner and Gudmundsson (2008) it is not given that 
resources and capabilities have value on their own. It is more important the ‘way’ resources 
and capabilities are ‘combined’ to create value (Carmeli, 2001, p. 665). It is the resources 
and capabilities ‘bundle’, the interactive or simultaneous effects that may have an effect on 
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firm performance (Lechner & Gudmundsson, 2008, p. 3). This implies that attempting to 
add up the individual values of resources and capabilities to estimate total value or 
performance of a firm may render incorrect interpretations.  
In relation to the need at instances of external sources of knowledge to combine or bundle 
resources and capabilities form different firms, the question is whether accessibility, 
development and exploitation may be conditioned to the governance and structures of the 
organisations pulling resources and capabilities together. The assumption of this thesis is 
yes. 
 
External knowledge sourcing 
The RBV literature about supply chain and client/supplier relationships (Bessant, 
Kaplinsky, & Lamming, 2003; Bowen, Cousins, Lamming, & Faruk, 2001; Buysse & 
Verbeke, 2003; Crotty, 2006; Lamming, 1992; von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2003) has only a 
limited number of contributions that explicitly analyse how relationships are governed and 
structured so that resource- and capability-building across organisational boundaries can be 
understood (Delmas, 1999; Dosi et al., 2008, p. 23), with Delmas (1999) apparently having 
the only empirical study that considers such issues. 
Hence, there is need to empirical investigations that explore and validate explanations of 
how supply chain partners relate one another (i.e. ownership, power distribution, 
coordination, etc.) to building up input resources and capabilities, appropriate and exploit 
output resources and capabilities, to reach compliance and gain competitive advantage. 
What is more, the RBV have largely considered that capabilities are complementary 
(Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009, p. 1318) but omitted testing whether the 
complemented resources and capabilities had in fact been valuable (Fiss, 2007, p. 1192).  
Ghoshal, Hanh and Moran (1999) argue that there are reasons for the possibility of non-
complementarity of capabilities. First, just as in the division of labour, different specialised 
bodies of knowledge may not necessarily complement each other. As a result, bodies of 
knowledge may become substitutes and drive firms, for instance, into vertical 
disintegration. Second, when two bodies of knowledge are complementary, the 
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transformation of one of them may not sustain their complementary status (Ghoshal, 
Hahn, & Moran, 1999, pp. 133-134). Recently Nooteboom (2009) also noticed that 
accumulating dissimilar and non-complementary capabilities, increases the complexity of 
cognitive coordination required to exploit their combinations, and argues that it limits the 
size of a firm (Nooteboom, 2009, pp. 121-122). 
Thus, if understanding compliance requires knowledge of the regulatory aim (Buysse & 
Verbeke, 2003, pp. 458,460-461,464-465), how firms respond to regulations (Delmas, 1999, 
p. 645), and industrial performance (Boyd, 1998, p. 42; Viscusi, 1979, p. 125), i.e. better or 
longer supply chain relationships, then it is important to understand whether capabilities 
turn out to be complementary, and the role in these complementarities played by the 
supply chain relationships. 
 
2.3. Supply Chain Governance Structures and Compliance 
An international fresh produce supply chain moves produce from the growing areas 
through packing facilities, warehouses for transportation, the containers and trucks for 
transportation, distribution facilities, and the supermarket warehouses (Closs & McGarrel, 
2004, p. 8; US BioAct 2002), and includes all the logistics activities taking place in each one 
of the mentioned stages of the supply chain24. 
Value chains are series of activities that adds value to the produce (Gereffi, Humphrey, & 
Sturgeon, 2005; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). For instance, modifying the packing materials 
or the brands the customers’ perceptions of the value of the product can change, whilst it is 
very unlikely for a change in transport or warehousing to change the customers’ 
perceptions of the value product. On the other hand, faster transport or better cooled or 
controlled atmosphere containers and warehousing may sustain the quality of fresh 
produce for a longer time, hence, influencing the customers’ perceptions of the value of the 
produce, in which the value adding activity is not the change of transport, or warehousing, 
but the incorporation of more efficient systems or technologies. 
                                                 
24 For the purpose of this study, transportation (logistics) from and to different supply chain stages, is also 
part of the supply chain, hence it represents another stage. See the background chapter, section on Mexico-
US fresh produce supply chains. 
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The supply chain literature has been mainly concerned with setting performance measures 
of how supply chain parties act and react according to other parties actions and reactions 
(Beamon, 1999; Bullinger, Kühner, & Van Hoof, 2002; Chan & Qi, 2003) as well as of how 
they cooperate or coordinate their activities (Griffith & Myers, 2005; Hewitt-Dundas, 
Andreosso-O'Callaghan, Crone, & Roper, 2005; Lawson, Tyler, & Cousins, 2008; Reeves, 
2007). 
In the study of the impact of regulations on the interrelationships between firms, studies 
from value chain perspective and supply chain management perspective have a common 
interest which is understanding what happens at the level of governance and the structure 
of the relationships between chain partners (Bitran, Gurumurthi, & Sam, 2007; Gyau & 
Spiller, 2008; Macdonald, 2007; Nadvi, 2008; Raynaud et al., 2005; Squire, Cousins, & 
Brown, 2009). 
Briefly, as described in the next subsection, governance structures, these may be 
understood as types of markets (e.g. open markets, relational, hierarchies) and relationships 
(e.g. power distribution, inter-firm coordination) contexts in which business transactions 
occur.  
Surprisingly, in the literature about firms’ capabilities, understanding the building, 
development and sharing of governance structures have not been much of a concern. 
Although for some scholars capabilities are important for governance structures, they do 
not explain the how capabilities may evolve to influence the governance structures (Dosi et 
al., 2008; Gereffi et al., 2005; Reeves, 2007). 
Fortunately, Delmas (1999), Delmas and Toffel (2008), and Lamming, Bessant and Noke 
(2006) have provided insights on how to understand the relationships between governance 
structures and capability building. Delmas (1999) initially focused on the waste 
management industry, and voluntary environmental regulations. She predicted that alliances 
are chosen over vertical integration to complement competencies to develop tacit 
knowledge and re-deployable technologies in contexts of high technological and regulatory 
uncertainty (Delmas, 1999, p. 662). 
One of the difficulties in Delma’s study (1999) was explaining the presence of ‘highly 
specific investments’ under ‘contractual arrangements’, which contradicts the theory, 
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because ‘high asset specificity’ should, in theory, correspond to ‘vertically integrated 
structures’ (Delmas, 1999, p. 659). This means that European and North American waste 
management companies subject to regulatory changes opted for deploying specific assets 
with technology that had been already developed outside the firm, rather than by 
developing the assets by themselves within vertically integrated governance structures (as 
the transaction costs theory would suggest). Delmas’ explanation is that the assets, although 
specific to the transactions, are actually meant to be redeployable (for the introduction of 
other technologies and products) (Delmas, 1999, p. 660). 
However, there is a problem of not distinguishing between coordination and integration in 
the analysis of the governance structures. By making such distinctions, one could argue 
that, although the specific assets have been developed and acquired outside the boundaries 
of the firm, it may have happened under a coordinated governance structure, resembling 
dynamic capabilities, i.e. vertical alignments, because specific assets may not need vertical 
integration but may occur under contractual arrangements. Some of the reasons for this 
are, for instance, presence of strong appropriability regimes, non-critical assets, a weak 
financial situation, and presence of imitators/strong competitors (Teece, 1986, p. 296). 
Hence, developing and incrementally improving biosecurity of the firm and their supply 
chains may require important collaborative efforts with clients and suppliers, which in turn 
may lead to important investments in highly specific assets, driving higher vertical 
coordination but not necessarily integration of the supply chain. 
Similarly, it was shown that in the transport service sector, access to knowledge may 
happen on a short-term basis with not much commitment among businesses, reducing the 
need for mergers and acquisitions or in-house capability development (Phillips, Lamming, 
Bessant, & Noke, 2006, p. 455). However, it contradicts a more recent argument by 
Delmas and Toffel (2008) about heavy polluting industrial sectors, where there is a positive 
role of buyers’ and suppliers’ (receptivity to market pressure) engagement in local firms’ 
compliance (Delmas & Toffel, 2008, p. 1045), which implies a sustained relationship to 
meet regulatory requirements. So, since knowledge transfers are facilitated by firms’ 
relationships, that in service sectors seem to be short-term and non-committing while in 
heavy polluting industries seem to be committing and long lasting, the question is what 
about the fresh produce industry? 
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Thus, the question is how governance structures mediated the ways firms in the food 
supply chain build up their capabilities to comply with biosecurity regulations. However, it 
is still to be explored how governance and structure influence the way capabilities are built 
for compliance. If governance structures are relevant for the capabilities building, and 
consequently for the firm and its supply chain’s biosecurity resources, then governance 
structures may indirectly influence the valuation that CTPAT regulators make of those 
capabilities, even when such valuations are contextual. 
 
Governance Structures 
Governance structures, heavily based on transaction costs and the value chain governance 
literatures, have been classified as market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchical 
(Dosi et al., 2008; Gereffi et al., 2005; O'Toole & Donaldson, 2000; Williamson, 1981). 
Each one of them differs to some extent in four fundamental aspects: power asymmetry, 
dependency, integration and coordination (Bowen et al., 2001; Cousins, 2002; Dahlstrom, 
McNeilly, & Speh, 1996; Delmas, 1999; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Jaspers & van den Ende, 
2006; Pietrobelli & Saliola, 2008; Robertson & Langlois, 1995; Squire et al., 2009; Teece, 
1986). 
The power asymmetry in the supply chain means that the decision to mobilise capabilities 
along the chain is concentrated in a lead firm, and the concentration of decision making 
powers is more likely to happen in hierarchies than in markets because hierarchies tend to 
be vertically integrated firms and markets are at the opposite spectrum of hierarchies 
(Gereffi et al., 2005, p. 88; Monteverde & Teece, 1982, p. 324), thus hierarchy transactions 
are coordinated under unified directions, whilst market transactions are not coordinated 
under unified directions. Supply chain power refers to who enforces 
standards/norms/regulations in the chain (Pietrobelli & Saliola, 2008, p. 953), as well as 
whether there are firms concentrating the supply chain roles, activities and responsibilities25 
(Dahlstrom et al., 1996, p. 120). 
                                                 
25 Although Dahlstrom, McNeilly and Speh (1996:120-122) consider definition of roles and responsibilities 
from a formal or informal control mechanism, we considered it more relevant to capture changes in 
responsibilities along the chain, as well as roles and activities accumulated by each partner of the chain, 
43 
 
 
Compliance may also be influenced by various degrees of dependency of the firms’ assets 
to its clients/suppliers. These degrees may be null (no dependency among firms), unilateral 
(one firm depends on the other, but not the other way around) and bilateral (both firms are 
interdependent) (Teece, 1986, p. 289). Dependency increases when: 1) the switching costs 
of doing business with other firms increases (Cousins, 2002, p. 79; Monteverde & Teece, 
1982, p. 324; Strange, 2009; Teece, 1986, p. 289), 2) the share of sales to a given supply 
chain partner increases (Delmas, 1999, p. 635), 3) the asset specificity of the firm to the 
transaction increases (Dahlstrom et al., 1996, pp. 120-122; Patnayakuni, Rai, & Seth, 2006, 
p. 21), and 4) the relationship length of the supply chain partners increases. Dependency is 
associated with embedded relationships to acquire routines and norms that become the 
stable expectations of both parties, facilitating the collaborations and mutuality of the 
dependency between supply chain partners throughout time (Cousins, 2002, p. 81; Squire et 
al., 2009, p. 466). Hence, the extent that a firm requires its suppliers’ and clients’ capabilities 
for its own compliance, it can be said to have deeper dependency on those partners. 
The dominant view is that governance structures relate to degrees of vertical integration as 
suggested by the Transactions Costs and the Value Chain Governance literatures (Gereffi 
et al., 2005; Williamson, 1971). However, governance structures also relate to coordination 
or interaction routines, because there are alternative forms of vertical relationships 
(Raynaud, Sauvee, & Valceschini, 2009, p. 18). 
Vertical coordination and vertical integration differ in that the first are vertical interactions 
and information flows (Jaspers & van den Ende, 2006, p. 819; Patnayakuni et al., 2006, p. 
15), while the second are controlled and owned or holding shares of their suppliers/clients 
(Jaspers & van den Ende, 2006, p. 821; Robertson & Langlois, 1995, p. 547). 
More specifically, vertical integration refers to the ownership of the different stages of 
the supply chain, and the more stages are owned by one firm, the more integrated the 
supply chain is. However, it is not given that these firms are managed by a central office 
(hierarchical control). In fact when Williamson discussed the differential control properties 
of firms in comparison to markets (Delmas, 1999, p. 663; Williamson, 1971, p. 113), he 
referred to different types of governance structures exerting control over firms, the 
                                                                                                                                               
modifying the sense of the measurement from formal control mechanisms to accumulation of power, giving 
the possibility to capture how asymmetric if distributed along the supply chain.  
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underlying assumption was the possibility of hierarchical inter-firm controls. Further, he 
explicitly mentioned that activities within each section of the firm can be run independently 
from one another (Williamson, 1971, p. 113). 
The view of regulatory studies is that if compliance requires increasing divisional 
coordination, and if such divisions are located in different supply chain stages (e.g. exporter 
and transporter), then vertical integration will occur, especially if the knowledge that supply 
chain partners are sharing is tacit (Gorga & Halberstam, 2007, p. 1203; McInerney, 2004, p. 
194). On the other hand, there are studies that challenge that view, arguing that 
disintegrated structures rely more on tacit knowledge (van den Berg, 2008, p. 192). Hence, 
the relationship between knowledge exchange, capability building and supply chains’ 
degrees of integration remains ambiguous in the literature. 
Vertical coordination refers to integrating capabilities in efficient configurations, 
provision of technical expertise, and loans to supply chain partners (Arshinder, Kanda, & 
Deshmukh, 2008, p. 318; Frank & Henderson, 1992, p. 942; Jaspers & van den Ende, 2006, 
p. 819; Patnayakuni et al., 2006, p. 15; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007, p. 277). 
Integration and coordination are neither mutually exclusive nor inclusive; it may be 
possible to find vertically integrated and uncoordinated firms, when owned and managed by the 
same company but each party in the chain may not coordinate or share activities (Raynaud 
et al., 2009, p. 18), such as the case of Agrilink Foods Inc. (Chaddad & Cook, 2004, p. 356). 
Vertically disintegrated and uncoordinated firms have separated ownership and control, and their 
activities are not shared or coordinated between them, what is commonly known as market 
transactions. Vertically integrated and coordinated firms share ownership and managerial control, 
as well as coordinating and sharing activities across parties in the chain (Chaddad & Cook, 
2004, p. 352; Sporleder, 1994, p. 537), such as the case of American Apparel (American 
Apparel, 2009, p. 5). Vertically disintegrated and coordinated firms have different ownerships and 
control, yet they share activities and systems, coordinate processes and management across 
parties in the chain. This is what Teece (1986) called specialised and co-specialised 
complementary assets. Examples of this type are repair facilities for rotary engines by 
Mazda (Teece, 1986, p. 289), also exclusive and specialised warehousing, for instance, in 
the construction industry (Bayazit, Karpak, & Yagci, 2006), Toyota’s suppliers’ exclusive 
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warehousing supporting Toyota’s just-in-time systems (Kalwani & Narayandas, 1995, p. 5), 
or the distribution centre for exports of Supply Chain 1 (p.106). 
To sum up, coordinative or integrative governance structures relate to various degrees of 
assets complementarities, and various degrees of dependency and power relations between 
firms (Teece, 1986, p. 289). Surprisingly, the analysis of the interfaces between firms’ 
internal and external relationships remains under-investigated (Peck & Juttner, 2000, p. 42), 
and empirical contributions are still scarce (Matopoulos, Vlachopoulou, Manthou, & 
Manos, 2007, p. 177). 
The following sections specify the areas of concern in the previous literature, and present 
the main theoretical question driving the empirical investigation for this thesis. 
 
2.4. Minding some gaps in the Literature 
To understand how business regulation may drive organisations towards or away from 
desirable or undesirable social, economic, environmental, or security consequences, it is 
necessary to understand compliance processes and firms’ capability building. However, 
both the regulatory studies and the Resource-Based View miss important elements to 
advance such an understanding.  
The regulatory studies:  
1) Assumed that business compliance is a matter of ‘willingness’ or financial 
resources to meet a regulatory aim; hence the regulators would just need to 
force or tactfully motivate the firms to comply, omitting, at least empirically, the 
capability building and compliance processes. 
2) Focus on the cost and negative effects of regulations, with limited contributions 
about how firms might engage in innovative compliance to regulatory 
commitments and the role of regulatory structures in allowing the flexibility to 
undertake such innovation. 
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3) Have not sufficiently investigated the impact of regulations in the context of 
inter-firm relationships, even though regulations are explicitly engaging the 
focal firm and their clients and suppliers. 
4) Because public-private partnership regulations (PPPs) are recently being suggested 
as a model for regulatory policy (Garcia-Martinez et al., 2007) scholars have 
focused much on the regulatory standard setting, rather than in their impacts in 
international supply chains’ governance structures. 
5) Not investigating the impacts of PPPs on international supply chain governance 
structures, implies uncritically accepting the world-wide diffusion of the 
potential shortcoming so the PPPs, which may include their potentially, can be 
used as Non-Tariff Measures in the global trade. 
6) And, although there are compliance models, they have not yet been sufficiently 
empirically tested to validate them26. 
The Resource-Based View scholars, on the other hand:  
1) Have not yet systematically studied the organisational capabilities building 
processes that are not driven by the need to capture market-value, but by 
regulations. In other words, the RBV remains narrowed in its investigations by 
focusing on productive capabilities, whereas not enough attention has been 
paid to understand the roles of facilitative, enabling, supportive capabilities, 
such as compliance capabilities. As a result, they have been unable to capture 
non-market-based sources of competitive advantage and any unforeseen long 
term ancillary benefits of organisational innovations from compliance. 
2) Have assumed that capabilities have intrinsic value and they are complementary, 
rather than testing whether such value exists and whether they are 
complementary. 
3) Have not assessed transformations of governance structures in the context of 
capabilities building along supply chains. 
4) Have paid limited attention to innovation processes in ‘low tech’ sectors, such 
as the agri-food business.  
                                                 
26 For instance, the US federal sentencing commission publishes information about compliance programmes 
only from organisations accused of infringements (See http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm). 
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All in all, there are gaps in the supply chain relationships literature, in the resource-based 
view, and the regulatory studies that make it difficult to connect the impact of regulations 
on firms’ compliance. For instance, it is unknown whether the potential shortcomings of 
the PPPs – ineffectiveness or illegitimate - distort the ways firms’ capabilities are evaluated 
by the regulators. There is still need to understand how supply chain governance structures 
relate to compliance capabilities building, so that issues of dependency and power 
asymmetries are at least acknowledged, and issues of integration and coordination are 
envisaged in international trade policies. It is necessary to understand the relationship 
between regulation and capabilities in the processes of compliance, should regulators want 
to design smarter or more responsive regulations to promote compliance.  
Hence, this thesis offers a framework and tests it with an empirical investigation that allows 
communicating better between regulatory scholars, RBV scholars, and supply chain 
governance scholars.  
 
Theoretical question 
The theoretical question is according to the RBV which capabilities are best for regulatory 
compliance? The answer to this question expects to clarify and differentiate the processes 
to acquired knowledge –intra-firm and inter-firm- to build up capabilities, the capabilities 
built at each compliance level, and resources developed by the capabilities and which are 
finally evaluated by regulators to determine whether a firm is complying or not with the 
regulations.  
In addition, the theoretical question allows to identifying suitability (value), persistency, and 
complementarity of capabilities at each compliance level. This contributes to removing a 
common assumption that knowledge, capabilities and assets are complementary. Moving 
forward from only analysing variety, heterogeneity, and bundle of capabilities and 
resources, to analysing whether they are complementary. 
For instance, assuming that a variety of capabilities and resources are not necessary enough 
for compliance with CTPAT, but it is necessary to identify the most suitable capabilities at 
each compliance level, then, CTPAT Regulators and firms may want to know which and 
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under what conditions capabilities lead firms to compliance. Perhaps CTPAT seminars 
(capacity building) would transcend from informing the guidelines with the bunch of 
resources needed for compliance, to facilitating the learning processes of the firms to 
identify their own ways to build and complement capabilities to secure their supply chains. 
This may in turn help achieve the social aim of the regulation, reducing the risk of 
biosecurity threats.  
To address such question and concerns, the following analytical framework was devised 
integrating regulatory, capability building, and governance structures contributions. 
 
2.5. Analytical framework  
Regulatory studies have stressed the need to regulate businesses, and particularly the food 
industry. Regulations may vary in their degrees of constraints according to industry types 
(Ashford et al., 1979, p. 161; Baldwin et al., 1998; Braun & Wield, 1994, p. 261; Delmas & 
Toffel, 2008, p. 1035; Henson & Humphrey, 2009, p. 11; Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005, p. 
2032). To build up reputational capital (Rivera, 2002, p. 338), reduce the risk of the 
negative consequences of reputational damage (Meidinger, 2006, p. 75; Pfarrer, Smith, 
Bartol, Khanin, & Zhang, 2008, p. 388; Raynaud et al., 2005, p. 50), or to be allowed to 
remain in business firms follow compliance processes (Identification, Interpretation, 
Identifying requirements, Compliance decision, Compliance method, Communication, 
Implementation (routines), and Evaluation and monitoring) (French et al., 1992; Henson & 
Heasman, 1998, p. 20; Sproull, 1981, p. 454)27. The degree of success in meeting regulatory 
requirements-i.e. compliance leadership (low, medium, high compliance)- may vary 
according to the types of capabilities and resources that the firms have or can build (Buysse 
& Verbeke, 2003, pp. 458,460-461,464-465; Delmas, 1999; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; McGee, 
1998; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998, pp. 371-372)28.  
Given that, 1) the agricultural and food sectors tend to concentrate efforts in technological 
and organisational forms of innovations (Pavitt, 1984, p. 354, 1998, p. 434), and 2) the 
                                                 
27 See page 30, Table 2.5.1, p.52. 
28 See pages 28 to 30, and Table 2.5.1, p. 52. 
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security resources required for compliance, i.e. business partnership, physical, access 
controls, personnel, information technology, procedural, trailer and conveyance, training 
and threat awareness (C-TPAT/CBP, 2006, p. iii, 2007, p. 3), indicate organisational 
routines, the analysis in this thesis focuses on organisational forms of innovation for the 
development of biosecurity resources for compliance29. 
Since resources are ‘things’ and capabilities are ‘ways of doing things’ (Dosi et al., 2008, p. 
11), in other words, capabilities are a ‘collection of routines’ for the ‘production of 
significant outputs’ (Hoopes & Madsen, 2008, p. 397), the focus in this framework is on 
how firms build up capabilities to develop resources, or how intra-firm and inter-firm 
routines are collected to produce security-based systems and technologies (resources).  
This framework focuses attention on how organisational routines contribute to build up 
the following capabilities: managerial systems and organisational competencies 
(Montealegre, 2002, p. 522; Winter & Szulanski, 2001, pp. 733-734), internal coordination 
mechanisms (Henderson, 1994, p. 617; Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 388; McInerney, 2004, p. 
194), interaction with external organisations, suppliers, and clients (e.g. stakeholders 
support, supplier development, vertical alignment) (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003, p. 465; Del 
Sorbo, 2010, p. 33; Hart, 1995, p. 1001; Lamming, 2000, p. 771; Lichtenthaler & 
Lichtenthaler, 2009, p. 1321; Romijn, 1997, p. 367; Romijn & Albaladejo, 2002, p. 1062; 
Sako, 2004, p. 281; von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2003, pp. 39, 47, 2007, p. 203)30. 
Also, given that interactions with external organisations for capability building require some 
form of governance structures (Delmas, 1999, p. 663; Williamson, 1971, p. 113)31, in this 
framework we analyse how the firms are governed and structured in their supply chains 
(Arshinder et al., 2008, p. 318; Frank & Henderson, 1992, p. 942; Jaspers & van den Ende, 
2006, p. 819; Patnayakuni et al., 2006, p. 15; Sirmon et al., 2007, p. 277)32. 
The firms’ interactions are structured by degrees of integration (Jaspers & van den Ende, 
2006, p. 821; Robertson & Langlois, 1995, p. 547; Williamson, 2002, p. 180) and 
coordination (Jaspers & van den Ende, 2006, p. 819; Patnayakuni et al., 2006, p. 15; 
                                                 
29 See page 8, and Table 2.5.1, p. 52. 
30 See pages 34 to 39, and Table 2.5.1, p. 52. 
31 Governance structures are forms of inter-firm controls in Delmas and Williamson.  
32 See pages 42 to 45, and Table 2.5.1, p. 52 
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Williamson, 1991, p. 279). These are neither mutually exclusive nor inclusive and may 
interact. 
The firms’ interactions are governed by degrees of dependency and power asymmetry 
between firms. Dependency of the firm increases when the switching costs of doing 
business with other firms increase (Cousins, 2002, p. 79; Monteverde & Teece, 1982, p. 
324; Strange, 2009; Teece, 1986, p. 289). Switching costs are assumed to be related to the 
degree of asset specificity (Dahlstrom et al., 1996, pp. 120-122; Patnayakuni et al., 2006, p. 
21; Williamson, 1991, p. 281), market concentration of the firm in the supply chain 
(Delmas, 1999, p. 635; Pietrobelli & Saliola, 2008, p. 955), and the length of the relationship 
(Cousins, 2002, p. 81; Squire et al., 2009, p. 466; Williamson, 1991, p. 280). 
Power asymmetry increases with the concentration of the decision making powers in a lead 
firm (Gereffi et al., 2005, p. 88; Monteverde & Teece, 1982, p. 324). The power is assumed 
to be located in the firm that decides and enforces standards/norms/regulations to the 
supply chain partners (Pietrobelli & Saliola, 2008, p. 953). 
In this analytical framework the regulations, standards, and norms are exogenous. This 
helps to identify various regulations and make it easier to compare the resources and 
capabilities building by regulation. Although regulations drive the resources and capabilities 
building processes and compliance, and vice versa (Paraskevopoulou, 2008), this thesis 
centres on the first part of the analysis, regulations driving capabilities.  
However, the capacity of the firm to build up capabilities to meet regulations may also be 
constrained or enhanced by their supply chain governance structures. Some governance 
structures may favour building certain capabilities configurations; moreover if such 
configurations require capabilities located in different firms along the supply chain. 
Altogether, when a regulation is set and a firm identifies the regulation, the compliance 
process starts. The firm evaluates the potential benefits of complying with the new 
regulation in terms of benefits of reputational capital or reduced risk of reputational 
damage, and they may or may not decide to comply. If the firm decides to comply, it needs 
to go further in the compliance process, for which capabilities are required. There are three 
types of capabilities: basic, intermediate and advanced. These capabilities will be used 
mainly in the implementation process, in order to develop security resources. There are 
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nine types of security resources: business partners, physical security, access controls, 
personnel control, procedural security, information and communication technologies, 
container and trailer security, conveyance security, and threat awareness. 
The ways knowledge is sourced and resources deployed depend on the firm’s supply chain 
governance structures. The governance structure indicates degrees of integration, 
coordination, dependency, and power asymmetry in the supply chain. 
The framework is thought to assess the firms’ compliance levels against the processes 
followed by firms in their attempts to achieve compliance, from which we identify the 
compliance processes. It is also thought to assess the compliance levels against capabilities, 
from which we identify the compliance capabilities, and it is also thought to assess 
compliance capabilities, against governance structures, from which we identify the valuable 
governance structures. 
Although further assessment may be run, such as compliance levels with governance 
structures, or compliance levels and security resources, or security resources and 
governance structures, the assessments will limit to the necessary for answering the 
research questions and test the hypothesis, which will be described in the next section. 
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Table 2.5.1: Compliance capabilities: an organising framework 
Regulatory compliance Resource and Capability Building Supply chain relationships 
Compliance leadership Processes Capabilities Security Resources Governance structures 
Low 
Middle 
High 
Identification 
Interpretation 
Identifying requirements 
Compliance decision 
Compliance method 
Communication 
Implementation (routines) 
  Merge routines/resources 
  Add routines/resources 
  Avoid routines/resources 
Evaluation and monitoring 
Basic capabilities 
Organisational competencies 
Management systems 
Internal coordination 
 
Intermediate capabilities 
Strategies (with stakeholder) 
Supplier development 
 
Advance capabilities 
Vertical alignment 
Business partners 
Physical security 
Access controls 
Personnel security 
Procedural security 
Information systems 
security 
Container security 
Conveyance security 
Training and threat 
awareness 
Structure 
Integration vs disintegration 
Coordination vs. un-coordination 
 
Dependency 
Asset specificity 
Market concentration 
Relationship length 
 
Power Asymmetry 
Symmetric 
Asymmetric 
(Buysse & Verbeke, 2003, 
pp. 458,460-461,464-465; 
Delmas, 1999; Delmas & 
Toffel, 2008; McGee, 
1998; Rugman & 
Verbeke, 1998, pp. 371-
372) 
(French et al., 1992; Henson 
& Heasman, 1998, p. 20; 
Sproull, 1981, p. 452) 
(Buysse & Verbeke, 2003, p. 465; 
Del Sorbo, 2010, p. 33; Dosi et 
al., 2008, p. 11; Henderson, 1994, 
p. 617; Hoopes & Madsen, 2008, 
p. 400; Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 
388; Lamming, 2000, p. 771; 
Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 
2009, p. 1321; Montealegre, 2002, 
p. 522; Romijn, 1997, p. 367; 
Romijn & Albaladejo, 2002, p. 
1062; von Tunzelmann & Wang, 
2003, pp. 39, 47, 2007, p. 203; 
Winter & Szulanski, 2001, pp. 
733-734) 
(C-TPAT/CBP, 2004, p. 
7, 2006, pp. 1, 7; Closs, 
2005; Erera, 2005; 
FDA/HHS, 2009, p. 4; 
Manning, Baines, & 
Chadd, 2005; Rice & 
Spayd, 2005; Sarathy, 
2006; Sheu, Lee, & 
Niehoff, 2006) 
(Arshinder et al., 2008, p. 318; 
Bowen et al., 2001; Cousins, 2002; 
Dahlstrom et al., 1996; Delmas, 
1999; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Frank 
& Henderson, 1992, p. 942; Gereffi 
et al., 2005; Jaspers & van den Ende, 
2006; Monteverde & Teece, 1982, p. 
324; Patnayakuni et al., 2006, p. 15; 
Pietrobelli & Saliola, 2008; 
Robertson & Langlois, 1995; Sirmon 
et al., 2007, p. 277; Squire et al., 
2009; Teece, 1986; Williamson, 1971, 
1991, 2002) 
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3. CHAPTER 3 Methodology 
The methodological chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents the 
aim of the present investigation and the research questions. The second section sets the 
hypotheses and the way these are tested; it also describes how it is expected to answer the 
research questions. Thirdly, it shows how the traditional comparative case studies research 
design is complemented with a novel approach for the science, technology and innovation 
studies for case comparisons, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis.  
 
3.1. Aim, objective and research questions 
Aim 
In the previous discussion about the role of technology forcing and constructive 
technology assessment was said that regulation needed to drive firms to develop new 
technologies and capabilities to achieve social aims, when on their own they were not able 
to solve the coordination problems and in case of market failures (Schot & Rip, 1996; 
Williams & Edge, 1996). But the question is, given that firms may knowingly limit their 
knowledge to self-regulate, caveat emptor (Scheppele, 1988, p. 283), would firms in the fresh 
produce supply chains have secured themselves against being used by terrorists without the 
‘push’ of regulation, and if so, to what extent? Yet, because it is unlikely to get all supply 
chains partners in a coordinated effort, the risk of terrorism throughout the fresh produce 
supply chain is still ‘arguably high’, hence the necessity of regulation to solve coordination 
failures. 
Having decided that a comprehensive or universal regulation is necessary, it then becomes 
important to assess the regulatory burden on different forms of implementation. Previously 
it was said that Public-Private Partnerships are the least burdensome methods (Garcia-
Martinez et al., 2007). The arguments were based on the following assumptions:  
1) governments are not sufficiently knowledgeable to choose the best means of 
implementation; they are not able to assess relative costs of implementing 
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different types of regulation, and hence cannot choose the best type of 
technologies from a compliance costs viewpoint; and  
2) governments search for means of reducing costs of enforcement, and one way 
of doing this is to set standards that make it possible to audit compliance. 
However these standards are best set in collaboration with industry because 
industry is better informed about the relative cost of monitoring/audit schemes. 
Both the coordination efforts of the supply chains partners for biosecurity, and the 
knowledge of technologies (and capabilities) to meet the regulatory requirements, led to a 
consideration of the value of the compliance capabilities, the principle domain of this thesis 
research.  
Hence, the aim of this thesis is to add to the RBV the ‘compliance capabilities’ as another 
factor explaining competitive advantage, given that firms may be subject to any form of 
regulatory pressure (public, private or PPP).  
 
Objective 
Based upon assessment of Mexico-US supply chains partners attempting to comply with 
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT), the objective of this 
investigation is developing an analytical framework capable of analysing firms’ compliance 
processes with social regulations in the context of their supply chains relationships. 
 
Research questions 
To meet the aim and objective, this investigation will address the following research 
questions: 
1. What compliance processes do firms follow to meet regulations for the prevention of 
accidental and intentional contamination of food?  
a. Do differences in the compliance processes across firms explain the differences 
in their compliance levels with CTPAT? 
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2. What capabilities do firms build up to meet regulations for the prevention of accidental 
and intentional contamination of food? And how? 
a. Do differences in the capabilities building across firms explain the differences in 
their compliance levels with CTPAT?  
3. What governance structures enable firms to build up their capabilities to meet 
regulations for the prevention of accidental and intentional contamination of food? 
a. Do differences in the governance structures across firms explain the difference 
in their compliance capabilities built for CTPAT? 
 
3.2. Research questions and hypotheses testing roadmaps 
By answering the research questions and the following hypotheses, we try to identify the 
relationships between: 1) compliance processes and compliance; 2) capability building and 
compliance; and, 3) governance structure and capability building.  
On the other hand, the aim of the thesis will be met to the extent that three aspects are 
covered. First, given that firms are in the same marketplace (fresh produce industry), by 
showing how firms follow different capability building patterns according to whether they 
seek compliance or not. Second, by showing how firms configure their capabilities is as 
important as the capabilities themselves (or their bundles) to receive a certification. And 
third, showing how firms’ capability building relates to their supply chains governance 
structures. 
Finally, note that the research questions 1, 2 and 3, are more explorative and have no 
hypothesis testing associated, however, research questions 2a, and 3a try to perform 
assessments, comparisons and/or evaluations, which is why they have hypothesis testing 
associated. For research question 1a, although is comparative, there are not previous 
theoretical insights, which is why it is left to the conclusions. 
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Questions and hypotheses 1: The compliance processes 
1. What compliance processes do firms follow to meet regulations for the prevention of 
accidental and intentional contamination of food?  
a. Do the differences in the compliance processes across firms explain the 
differences in compliance levels with CTPAT? 
These questions try to capture the correlation compliance processes and compliance levels 
with CTPAT. 
However, because other regulatory regimes overlap with the CTPAT regulatory 
requirements, we expect that the answers to these questions have also implications for 
other regulatory regimes. Nganje et al. (2004) have shown that the United States Food 
Safety and Public Act 2002 (US BioAct 2002) overlaps with CTPAT regulatory aims 
(Nganje, Wilson, & Nolan, 2004, p. 149), and self-regulatory regimes also may overlap, 
such as Food safety Standards33.  
The US BioAct 2002 requires procedures in three main aspects: 1) prior notification of 
imports, 2) electronic manifest, and 3) records keeping (US BioAct, 2002:670-671). The 
CTPAT requires procedures in several aspects: 1) partners’ involvement in implementation 
of security measures, 2) physical security, 3) access controls, 4) personnel security, 5) 
procedural (e.g. documentation, traceability, discrepancies, shipping, manifesting, etc.), 6) 
information technology security, 7) container and trailer security, 8) conveyance, 9) training 
and threat awareness (C-TPAT/CBP, 2006). Finally, there are Food Safety Standards and 
other preventive measures developed by firms themselves will be described in more detail 
in the background chapter. 
Question 1 does not require hypotheses because it is a description and story-telling of the 
organisational compliance processes model explained based upon the analytical framework 
(Table 2.5.1, page 52). It also paves the ways for questions 1a and 1b, which are more 
about comparisons and evaluations of organisational compliance processes. 
Although Questions 1a could have a hypothesis, there are not enough insights from 
previous studies on whether different compliance processes may explain differences in 
                                                 
33 The CTPAT is a Public-Private Partnership regulatory regime; the US BioAct 2002 is a public regulatory 
regime; and Food Safety Standards and other voluntary measures are self-regulatory regimes. 
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compliance levels. Hence, we have left the hypothesis for the conclusions of this 
investigation. 
Therefore, these research questions drive the description and comparative analysis of the 
pathways that each of the firms followed for compliance. The discovery of variations and 
similarities in those processes will yield theoretical and policy insights about organisational 
compliance process models. 
 
Questions and hypotheses 2: The compliance capability building 
2. What capabilities do firms build up to meet regulations for the prevention of accidental 
and intentional contamination of food? And how? 
a. Do differences in the capabilities building across firms explain the differences in 
their compliance levels with CTPAT?  
The second pair of questions explores the correlations between capability building and 
compliance levels. Research question 2 requires a description and story-telling of the 
capability building by the firms, including the inter-firm resources and capabilities 
exchanges.  
Thus, the firms were asked to describe whether and how they built up the following 
security-related capabilities, which were identified with the literature review (Barratt & Oke, 
2007; Boske, 2006; Closs, 2005; Closs & McGarrel, 2004; Erera, 2005; Goddard, 2005; 
Kinser, Seltzer, & Friddle, 2005; H. L. Lee, 2004; LLTRM, 2004; Manning et al., 2005; 
Petersen, Handfield, & Ragatz, 2003; Rice & Spayd, 2005; Sarathy, 2006; Shannon, Lee, & 
Stephenson, 2006; Sheu et al., 2006; Suarez-Bello, 2003): 
1) Assessment capacity; 
2) Visibility and monitoring capacity; 
3) Supply chain coordination and integration; 
4) Vulnerability reduction capacity; 
5) Operations agility capacity; 
6) Learning and knowledge capabilities. 
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This set of capabilities tries to be comprehensive including the necessary for CTPAT, US 
BioAct 2002, and any self-regulatory regimes. It gives the flexibility to regroup capabilities 
by the RBV classification, as well as to regroup resources by CTPAT requirements. The 6 
capabilities listed above were the basis of the interview guidelines (see appendix 9.2) and 
used for the classification of the interview data (see Table 3.4.2, p.80). Later, capabilities 
were regrouped to match the RBV literature classification of capabilities, which were the 
basis for the summary of capabilities and resources built by each firm, presented at the end 
of each case study: they became the primary data for the analyses to answer the following 
research questions. 
Question 2a compares the types of capabilities built by firms to meet the regulatory 
requirements according to each compliance level to CTPAT, i.e. low, intermediate, and 
high compliance levels. The hypothesis for this question is: 
Hypothesis 2a: the higher the CTPAT compliance level of the firm, the more 
predominant will be the presence of intermediate and advanced capabilities built for 
compliance, consequently, less predominant will be the presence of basic capabilities built 
for compliance. 
 
Assessments 
Compliance level 
The compliance level is measured by the security certification status to CTPAT held by the 
firms. There are three ordinal levels by which firms may be classified: low in those cases 
where there is no implementation of CTPAT/FAST guidelines; middle in those cases 
where there is implementation of the guidelines and the application for certification had 
been filled, but these have not yet been validated (certified); and high in those cases where 
the firm holds a CTPAT/FAST certification. 
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Capabilities sophistication 
After grouping the types of capabilities that firms built up for compliance with security 
regulations, capabilities may be grouped into three levels of sophistication. The basic 
capabilities of the firm are organisational competencies, managerial systems, and internal 
coordination mechanisms; these represent basic capabilities used to develop security-based 
resources. The intermediate capabilities of the firm are unidirectional knowledge 
transfers with stakeholders, i.e. absorptive capacity and desorptive capacity (as explained in 
the section on capability building in the theory chapter, p.35); and these represent dynamic 
capabilities used to develop security-based resources. The advanced capabilities of the 
firms are bidirectional knowledge transfers with the supply chain partners; and these 
represent dynamic interactive capabilities used to develop security-based resources. 
 
Table 3.2.1: Classification of capabilities by sophistication level 
Qualitative Capabilities Ordinal Code 
Basic capabilities 
Organisational competencies 
Management systems 
Internal coordination 
Basic BCs 
Dynamic capabilities 
Strategy design feedbacks from 
stakeholders 
Supplier development 
Intermediate ICs 
Dynamic interactive capabilities Vertical alignment with the supply chain Advanced ACs 
 
For each of the cases, there will be an assessment of the capabilities built up and resources 
developed. This allows counting the capabilities in each firm by sophistication level, i.e. 
basic, intermediate, and advanced capabilities counts34. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 These counts must be taken with care, since there it represents stacking up qualitatively different 
capabilities. This is story of counting apples and oranges together. The assumption is that each sophistication 
level will group capabilities with shared characteristics. 
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Relationship between capabilities upgrading and compliance levels 
By classifying the firms in low, middle and high compliance categories, it will be possible to 
identify the share of each level of capability sophistication in the total count of capabilities 
by compliance level (see Table 3.2.2 for an illustrative example). 
 
Table 3.2.2: Illustrative example of capabilities upgrading by 
compliance levels (no real data) 
Compliance 
                  Capabilities 
Basic Intermediate Advanced Total 
Low 5 2 1 8 
Middle 3 4 2 9 
High 2 2 4 8 
Total 10 8 6 25 
 
 
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of all cases will complement the previous relationship 
allowing the identification of the set of capabilities behind each compliance level (see Table 
3.2.3 for an illustrative example). 
 
Table 3.2.3: Illustrative example of capabilities configurations causing 
compliance (no real data) 
Compliance level Capabilities configurations 
0. Low compliance 
Organisational competencies and stakeholder 
support 
1. Middle compliance Supplier development and stakeholder support 
2. High compliance Vertical alignment and stakeholder support 
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The previous illustrative example (Table 3.2.3, above) may indicate that organisational 
competencies, supplier development, and vertical alignment have only relational value; 
furthermore, they are only valuable at a given compliance level. On the other hand, 
stakeholder support has not only relational but also intrinsic value. This is because the 
capability retains value at any compliance level, which would indicate that a firm may want 
to build up that capability with some certainty that it will be required at any stage of their 
compliance journey, not only for a given level.  
This exercise may address not only the research question but also contributes to the 
achievement of the aim, by showing how compliance capabilities may be a source of 
competitive advantage, from the RBV.  
 
Questions and hypotheses 3: The governance structures 
3. What governance structures enabled firms to build up their capabilities to meet 
regulations for the prevention of accidental and intentional contamination of food? 
a. Do differences in the governance structures across firms explain the difference 
in their compliance capabilities built for CTPAT? 
The third set of questions tries to identify the enabling conditions for capability building 
conducive to compliance. Question 3 examines what type of governance structure was 
present at the time when firms built their capabilities for compliance, and how 
those governance structures may have facilitated or inhibited capability building. 
Thus, each case includes a story-telling and description of the role that knowledge 
exchange and capability building played while interacting with external organisations, i.e. 
supply chain partners and stakeholders. 
Based on the analytical framework, the firms were asked in a questionnaire (Appendix C: 
Questionnaire COMCAP 2007-2008) to describe their supply chain governance and 
structure (see Table 3.2.4, p.64). Due to the descriptive and explorative nature of the 
question, there are no hypotheses associated with this question. 
62 
 
 
The results of each firms’ constructs from the questionnaire will be compared against the 
rest of the firms. For each firm we may be able to say if it had decision making powers, if it 
was dependent on or independent from its supply chain, if it was coordinated or not, and 
whether it was integrated or not, compared with the rest of the firms (for an illustrative 
example see Table 3.2.5). 
Question 3a on the other hand, does allow hypothesis testing. Williamson (1991, p.279, 
and 2002, p.180) stated that tighter governance structures in terms of control and 
hierarchies are required when the firm needs to build up specific assets, when the 
complexity of the adaptations between firms increases, when the length of the relationships 
between firms increases, and when bilateral dependency increases.  
However, Delmas (1999) found that specific investments (usually associated to vertical 
integration) were present under contractual arrangements (markets) (Delmas, 1999, p. 645). 
This seems to be a contradiction that implies that there is more than a straight path 
between markets and hierarchies; this is because vertical coordination and vertical 
integration should be taken separately, rather than considering that coordination is directly 
related to integration. 
Thus, given that learning and knowledge exchange with supply chain partners to build up 
capabilities to meet regulatory compliance with CTPAT may be related to tighter 
governance structures, this investigation will test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: the transition from basic to sophisticated capabilities is associated to 
changes in governance structures, this is: 1) increased controls or asymmetric power, 2) 
increased bilateral dependency, 3) increased coordination, and 4) increased integration. 
 
Assessment 
Governance structures 
To assess governance structures it was necessary to follow the analytical framework (Table 
2.5.1, p.52). Thus the questionnaire (COMCAP 2007-2008) was created and validated to 
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capture the four components of Hypothesis 3a into their corresponding constructs (see 
Table 3.2.4, p.64).  
The descriptions and explorative analysis of question 3, allows us to move forward to test 
Hypothesis 3a stated before. 
For that, the qualitative comparative analysis will be applied, this time to identify the 
governance structures that are common across firms with capabilities associated to each 
compliance level. This is possible by analysing the results of question 3 in light of the 
results of research question 2a. 
After establishing such analyses and relationships we will be in position to discuss more 
specifically how governance structures enabled capabilities building, as well as the 
differences between governance structures associated to advanced capabilities built to meet 
the CTPAT requirements (see below an illustrative example of the type of relationships 
between capabilities sophistication and governance structures). 
All in all, understanding the compliance process, capabilities building analysed, and the role 
of governance structures clarified, we will show from the RBV what and how capabilities 
are built, and how they leverage value, even though the process is not market driven, but 
regulatory driven. With this, we expect to say how compliance capabilities contribute to the 
competitive advantage of the firm, the aim of the thesis.  
Finally, we expect to depict some regulatory policy implications related to compliance, and 
policy recommendations related to corporate strategy in a supply chain context. 
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Table 3.2.4: Supply chains governance structures: constructs and definitions 
 Constructs Variables Scales Definitions 
G
o
v
er
n
an
ce
 
Power 
Asymmetry35 
Decision 
making 
1 to 10 
1 means that decisions are made by the supply chain 
partners, 10 means that decisions are made by the firm; 
and 5 means that decision are jointly made between the 
firm and its supply chain partners. 
Dependency36 
Asset 
specificity 
-6 to 6 
-6 denotes that assets are not specific and 6 means that 
assets are highly specific. 6 types of assets were 
evaluated: 1) Geographic location, 2) infrastructure, 3) 
human capital, 4) brand, 5) technology and processes, 
and 6) marketing windows.  
Relationship 
length 
0 to 30 
0 means that the firm does not expect to complete even 
1 year in relationship with its supply chain partners, 
whilst 30 means that the firm expects to complete 30 
years of relationship with the partners. 
Market 
Concentration 
0 to 100 
0 represents the 0% of production volume is distributed 
throughout distributor X or 0% of production volume 
distributed for exporter X. 100 represents the 100% of 
production volume is distributed throughout distributor 
X or 100% of production volume is distributed for 
exporter X. 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
s 
Coordination37 
Activities 0 to 5 
0 represents no coordination of skills and capability 
building activities with the supply chain partners and 5 
represents complete coordination. 5 activities were 
evaluated: 1) systems (synergies between projects), 2) 
roadmaps (information sharing), 3) joint development 
planning, 4) exchange (temporal) of human resources, 
and 5) shared teams (continuous) 
Investments 0 to 4 
0 implies that there were no efforts to coordinate 
investments in assets between the firm and supply chain 
partners, whilst 4 means maximum coordination. 4 
Investment types were evaluated: 1) systems (synergies 
between projects), 2) roadmaps, 3) parallel and 
interacting investments among firms (synergies between 
units), and 4) loans and financing the client/supplier. 
Integration38 
Hierarchies 0 to 2 
0 indicates that the firm manages the skills formation 
and capability building activities only within its 
boundaries; 1 indicates that the firm also manages the 
skills formation of other stages of the supply chain; and, 
2 indicates that the firm also manages the entire 
capability building activities of other stages of the supply 
chain. 
Ownership 0 to 3 
0 means separate ownership between the firm and other 
supply chain partners; 1 means the presence of minority 
shares of the firm in their supply chain partners' 
business; 2 means the presence of joint ventures 
(resulting in creation of new entities) between the firm 
and the supply chain partners; and 3 means that the firm 
is under unified ownership (acquisition/merger) with 
other supply chain partners. 
 
                                                 
35 COMCAP 2007-2008, question 18 
36 COMCAP 2007-2008, questions 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16,  
37 COMCAP 2007-2008, question 8b 
38 COMCAP 2007-2008, question 8a 
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Table 3.2.5:Illustrative example (no real data): firms’ governance structures 
Firm Power asymmetry Dependency Coordination Integration 
A 
Symmetric 
(Decision making 
power 5) 
Independent 
(Asset spec. -3, 
relationship length 10, 
market share 30%) 
Uncoordinated 
(Activities 0, 
Investments 0) 
Disintegrated 
(Hierarchies 0, 
Ownership 0) 
B 
Partners 
(Decision making 
power 1) 
Independent 
(Asset spec. 0, 
relationship length 5, 
market share 30%) 
Coordinated 
(Activities 5, 
Investments 4) 
Integrated 
(Hierarchies 2, 
Ownership 3) 
C 
Firm 
(Decision making 
power 10) 
Dependent 
(Asset spec. 6, 
relationship length 25, 
market share 80%) 
Coordinated 
(Activities 3, 
Investments 3) 
Disintegrated 
(Hierarchies 1, 
Ownership 1) 
 
 
Table 3.2.6. Illustrative example (no real data): 
Governance structures for capabilities sophistication 
Capabilities Commonalities across firms 
Organisational competencies Symmetric power and lack of coordinated investments 
Stakeholder support Specific assets and coordinated activities 
Vertical alignment and stakeholder 
support 
Power asymmetry, long term relationships, specific 
assets, and coordinated activities 
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3.3. Research design 
Methods of data collection 
The information for the investigation is mainly primary data, collected through interviews 
and questionnaires. The information and data were processed, structured, and entered in a 
database, and later analysed using a comparative case study approach. Also secondary data 
was used to complement the background chapter and gather regulatory information. 
 
Sources of information and bias 
The information was gathered in situ from the firm responsible for security 
implementations’ general managers or CEOs. However, direct observation was not always 
possible due to restricted access to the work floor. Secondary data was also gathered from 
governmental and official online sources to collect information regarding CTPAT and 
BioAct 2002.   
To address researcher bias and errors, the summary reports of the information provided by 
each firm were submitted to each interviewee (as well as to other researchers and/or 
practitioners) for revision and correction. So far there have been no responses with 
corrections. 
Internal validity of the information increases to the extent that the researcher is able to 
refute invalid information, use comparative methods, treat the data comprehensively, 
consider deviant cases, and use appropriate tabulations (Silverman, 2005, p. 212). The 
following strategies were followed in this research. To be able to refute the information, 
the researcher complemented the interview with an in situ observation of the facilities. The 
comparative method and deviant cases are part of the research design, by contrasting 
(comparative) the information between low, medium and high compliant firms (deviant 
cases). It was shown how the data was as exhaustive (comprehensive) as possible capturing 
the compliance process, resources development and supply chain relationships, by 
implementing not only qualitative, but also quantitative data collection methods. Moreover, 
considerable care was given to the data management, classification and analysis (data 
treatment).  
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Furthermore, external validity was achieved by cross-referencing information among 
supply chain partners. 
The reliability of the research was assured by keeping a case database and the research 
protocols (Richards, 2005, p. 55). While some interviewees agreed to the disclosure of their 
identity and position in their organisation, for practical reasons the identity of the 
interviewee and organisation is not disclosed. 
 
Comparative case studies 
Understanding complex relationships between compliance, capability building, and 
governance structures requires attention to the firms’ internal and external contexts; 
consequently, the research is based upon explanatory case study methods (Gyau & Spiller, 
2008; O'Toole & Donaldson, 2000). This is particularly important in the compliance 
capability building process because multiple cases add analytical power by comparing them 
and picking up common patterns across the cases; furthermore, process related changes are 
more easily picked up by case study methods, which traditional statistical methods hardly 
do (Ragin, 1989). 
A previous study analysing CTPAT (Sheu et al., 2006) used similar research methods, 
complemented with secondary data. Secondary data is necessary for comparative case 
analyses (Gimenez, 2006, p. 318; McCarthy & Golicic, 2002, p. 436; Seuring, 2006, p. 248). 
Sheu et al. (2006) analysed five cases (one custom broker, three importers and one 
transport provider) to understand three elements: 1) their certification processes, 2) 
whether and how collaboration along the international supply chain takes place, and 3) the 
benefits and impacts of certifications. However, in their study no reference to different 
compliance levels was made, or to how capabilities and resources were built. Sheu et al’s 
study used within-case and cross-case analysis, with the former used to identify unique 
patterns while the later method was used to establish the relationships between 
independent and dependent variables (Sheu et al., 2006, p. 368). Our investigation modifies 
their approach, by including the identification of common patterns based on cross-case 
comparisons. 
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The relationships and common patterns will be undertaken by comparing firms by 
compliance levels. According to Yin’s case comparisons strategies (Yin, 2003, p. 40), to 
refine findings at least one case per compliance level should be included. 
 
Case study template 
A reliable comparison across cases in this study required structuring the cases for easy 
identification of the themes. Case study templates have been used in different social 
sciences and engineering disciplines to facilitate comparability of co-variation patterns 
across cases (Aiken, Kock, & Mandviwalla, 2000; Cashore, Gale, Meidinger, & Newson, 
2006; Gerring & McDermott, 2007).  
Each case adhered as much as possible to a case study template. The sections of the cases 
include: 1) the compliance processes, 2) the security resources developed, as well as the 
capabilities used by firms for that purpose, and 3) the knowledge and learning mechanisms 
to indicate whether the firms built up capabilities based on its internal efforts or external 
support (supply chain or stakeholders) (see Table 3.3.1). 
The first sections of the case studies present the compliance processes, as the basis for the 
assessment of research question 1, and which is based upon the compliance process model 
displayed in the analytical framework (Table 2.5.1, p.52) and explained in the compliance 
process section of the theory chapter (pp. 37-41). From the description of the ways firms 
built up capabilities and developed security resources, an identification and coding (Table 
5.2, p.104) was performed to have the information for the descriptions of the compliance 
processes of the firms. At the end of the description a figure is displayed as a way of visual 
summary of the compliance processes.  
After the compliance process, the case study describes the capability building and resources 
development processes. These sections contain the information and data required for the 
assessment of the research question and hypothesis 2, which, again, is based on the 
capability building and resource development displayed in the analytical framework and 
explained in the resources and capability building section of the theory chapter (p.33), and 
the background section (Table 4.1.1, p.100).  
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An additional and complementary section on internal and external sources of knowledge 
and learning was added to capture information related to the influence of external actors in 
the compliance processes, as well as in the resources and capability building processes. 
Each case study finalises with a table of the relationship between resources development 
and capability building which contains the count value of compliance capabilities built to 
be able to develop security resources (e.g. Table 5.1.1, p.111). After identifying the 
compliance level of each firm, the table feeds the database for the summary of results 
(statistical) and the multi value qualitative comparative analysis-mvQCA- (chapter 6, 
empirical). 
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Table 3.3.1: Case study outline/template 
Themes Description 
The process Story telling of the compliance process 
P
ro
ce
ss
 s
ta
ge
s 
Regulatory 
identification 
The role of stakeholders and supply chain partners for regulatory awareness 
Regulatory 
interpretation 
Firms assessment of the regulations (public, private, and PPP) based on 
perception of the benefits of compliance 
Assessment of change Firm’s evaluations of the required changes and of their capacity to change. 
Compliance options 
and levels 
Security regulations firms decided to comply with (Public, Private, and 
PPPs), as well as their expected degree of compliance (full, partial, 
delay/exit). 
Communication 
systems 
Formal and informal communication systems 
Implementation  Describing the mechanisms for security resource development (trial and 
error, design and implementation, outsourced, or combinations); and the 
strategies to prevent interference with normal business operations. 
Evaluation and 
Monitoring 
Actors and mechanisms for assessing the overall compliance process 
Feedback loops Iterative connection between regulatory process stages 
Summary of the compliance process (Figure) 
Security resources and 
capability building 
Descriptions of the resources that firms argued were needed to enhance 
their firm and supply chain security; and descriptions their related capabilities 
building processes. 
R
es
o
u
rc
es
 
Business partners Selection and screening of main business partners 
Physical security Alarm systems, building structure, fencing, lighting, locking devises, and key 
controls, and so on. 
Access control Employees, visitors, removal of unauthorised persons, and so on. 
Personnel security Personnel backgrounds, verification and termination procedures, and so on. 
Procedural security Manifesting, shipping, receiving, and cargo procedures and analysis, and so 
on. 
Information 
Technology Security 
Identification, accountability, controls, password protection, and so on. 
Container and Trailer 
security 
Container inspection, trailer inspection, container and trailer seals, container 
and trailer storage, and so on. 
Conveyance Security Container security (in transit), conveyance inspection procedures, 
conveyance tracking and monitoring procedures, and so on. 
Threat awareness Training and threat awareness for countering terrorism and smuggling 
C
ap
ab
ili
ti
es
 
Organisational 
competencies 
Internal individual and functional competencies coordination mechanisms 
Management systems Structures and administrative control systems 
Internal coordination Coordination across interfaces, functions and organisational divisions 
Stakeholder support Involvement of stakeholders in the firm’s strategic planning of resources 
development 
Supplier development Commitments to enhance the suppliers capability building 
Vertical alignment Bilateral support between supply chain partners 
Temporal dimension When it was available, the date of each event was included 
Summary of internal and external sources of knowledge and learning for capability building 
Summary of relationship between resources development and capabilities building (Table) 
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Critical point of view on the research method 
The first critical point relates to the firm as the unit of analysis in this investigation. We 
examine the firms’ internal compliance and capability building processes, the firms’ external 
compliance and capability building processes (with other supply chain partners and 
stakeholders), and the firms’ supply chain’s governance structures. The latter is critical 
because, as described in the question and hypothesis section, although two firms may 
belong to the same supply chain, they may not depend to the same extent on one another, 
they may not have the same decision making powers, they may not have the same 
expectations in terms of the length of their relationship, and so on. Thus, governance 
structures are not supply chain but firm-specific. 
Secondly, the fact that the investigation is a small-N comparative case study implies that 
only limited generalisations may be possible. Aiming at theoretical generalisations, as 
suggested elsewhere (Sheu et al., 2006, p. 363), the supply chains and firms were chosen for 
their exemplary value rather than for their statistical representativeness. They fall within 
different compliance levels, i.e. low, middle and high. This approach is important to grant 
the researcher the advantage of the uniqueness of each case and the emergence of themes 
to improve findings, as suggested by methodological experts (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 542; 
Koulikofff-Souviron & Harrison, 2006, p. 270) and applied by well-established political 
scientists (Kogut & Ragin, 2004; Levi-Faur, 2002). Yet, since it is the common features of 
the compliance processes of the three stages of the supply chains what the mvQCA will try 
to identify, the lack of significance and presence of theoretical significance of compliance 
call for further empirical investigations for theoretical validations. Further, there is no 
reason to believe that securing the standard facilities and supply chain operations of a 
tomatoes exporter would be too dissimilar to securing those of a cucumber exporter or of 
other fresh produce exporters; or to believe that securing the transport operations of the 
exporter would be too dissimilar if the transport had been outsourced.  
Thirdly, as will be developed in Section 3.5 Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Multi-value 
and Crisp Sets (p.81), our approach is based on a logical inference, which is not to be 
confused with a statistical inference. This is important because given the complexity of the 
pathways and diversity of observations, from a statistical inference view one might 
conclude that further observations could be inconsistent with the observed patterns. Whilst 
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a logical inference in comparative-case studies claims that depending on the context, in 
which our cases are embedded, a given condition may have a different effect on the 
outcome, hence acknowledging the possibility of different causal paths (Rihoux, 2003, p. 
353), this means there is no definite and unquestionable causality. 
Hence, rather than “trying to specify a single causal model that fits the data best” – as the 
statistical inference would do, with the help of logical inferences with QCA we would like 
to “determine the number and character of the different causal models that exist among 
comparable cases” (Ragin, 1987, p. 167). This implies that more cases, rather than 
contradicting previous results, would refine and enhance multiple causal conditions or 
pathways to regulatory compliance based on added characteristics of the new contexts 
where compliance may be occurring. 
 
3.4. Research Process 
In studying cause-effect relationships between compliance process and capability building, 
a five stage process was used to increase validity and reliability (Seuring, 2006, p. 246). The 
fifth stage is the dissemination of the results of the investigation; however, since the results 
of the present doctoral dissertation will be publicly available, the discussion of this stage 
will be omitted. Hence, this section contains only four stages. 
 
First stage: research questions 
The research was grounded on a priori identifying constructs from the literature review and 
setting an analytical framework. The literature review was narrowed down to three 
scholarly disciplines: the Resource-Based View of the Firm, Regulation Studies, and Supply 
Chain Relationships. For each of them, the literature search was based on three criteria: 
disciplinary early contributions (from the 1950s onwards), high citations and new 
contributions to the disciplines.  
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Second stage: instrument development and case selection 
The access to firms derived from a snowballing technique. The technique consisted of 
contacting a focal firm (i.e. the US importer), requesting them to identify their main first-
tier supplier (shipper/exporter from Mexico) and closest to them in terms of compliance to 
CTPAT. Later, the Mexican partner provided the contact and access to the main transport 
provider between the Mexican and US partner, just as suggested by supply chain study 
specialists (Stuart, McCutcheon, Handfield, McLachlin, & Samson, 2002, p. 420).  
However, the case selection was based upon initial identification of distributors having 
supply chain partners with similar compliance levels. The initial identification was based on 
perception and recommendations of the Fresh Produce Association of the Americas 
(FPAA) to the author, taking into account that the FPAA experience had grown as a result 
of the continuous exchange of information with CTPAT officials regarding the compliance 
of US fresh produce distributors (members) and their supply chains39. The selection 
consisted of low compliant supply chains (SC1 and SC2), middle compliant supply chains 
(SC3 and SC4), and high compliant supply chains40 (SC5). The production sites of the 
supply chains were not as important (as long as they were in Mexico) as the location of the 
distribution centre, which was Nogales, Arizona, US. Yet, most of the growers were 
located in the province Sinaloa, whilst one was in Nayarit, the neighbour province of 
Sinaloa. 
The research involved conducting qualitative cross-cases and single-case analysis; thus the 
instruments included structured and unstructured questions for each of the three types of 
actor. To capture how compliance capabilities were developed, unstructured, standardised 
interview protocols were used. The use of the questionnaire was to capture issues related to 
governance structures. The instruments were validated by several experts during a pilot 
study conducted between summer 2006 and autumn 2007 (see Table 3.4.1, p.74). 
As suggested earlier, the study planned to include three supply chains, each including at 
most three partners (distributor, grower/shipper and transporter), for a total of nine firms. 
                                                 
39 In this selection process, the support of the Fresh Produce Association of the Americas (FPAA) was 
crucial for the identification of supply chains, and for the information regarding the perception that FPAA 
had about the overall security/conformance levels of the potential supply chains to be sampled. 
40 SC6 was another candidate for high compliant firm, however the supply chain did not provide sufficient 
information for a reliable analysis, hence this supply chain was dropped from the sample. 
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However, during field work it was possible to contact additional supply chains. This 
opportunity was not only relevant to enhance robustness, but also, as will be shown later, 
because 12 is the best number of cases to perform relevant Qualitative Comparative 
Analyses with reasonable control over the complexities associated with each case study. 
Fortunately, the hazard of identifying like-minded people by snowball techniques was 
overcome by the fact that there is a good balance of low, middle and high compliant cases, 
as well as a great diversity of governance structures in the supply chain relationships, as will 
be shown in the empirical chapters. Perhaps this was also the result of explicitly asking the 
industry association, Fresh Produce Association of the Americas, to nominate distributors 
with different levels of compliance, taking into account that the association is . This is 
relevant to enhance the validity of the assessment of the relationships between capability 
building and compliance processes, as well as between capability building and governance 
structures. 
 
Table 3.4.1: Validating the instruments 
Expert Validations Institution Classification 
CEO and compliance 
team (four quality and 
safety managers) 
Ganfer Sociedad Agricola, SA 
de CV 
Grower/Packer/Exporter 
Dr Vidal Salazar 
Solano, Senior 
agricultural economist 
Centro de Investigacion en 
Alimentacion y Desarrollo, AC. 
Public Research Centre 
Mr Evangelos 
Demerutis, CEO 
Trocadero CAADES-
Confederacion de Asociaciones 
de Agricultores del Estado de 
Sinaloa. 
Growers Industry 
Association 
Mrs Marcela Placencia, 
Manager 
Pacific Brokerage Customs Broker 
Alison Moore 
(Communications 
director) and Georgina 
Felix (Industrial 
Engineer) 
Fresh Produce Association of 
the Americas 
Importers/Distributors 
Industry Association 
Mr Jacobo Escobosa, 
Warehouse foreman 
MG-Brothers/hired by Fresh 
Farms 
Distributor 
75 
 
 
In fact, the intention was initially to select six supply chains (18 firms in total). However, 
one supply chain did not provide complete information and was eliminated from the 
analysis (15 firms in total), one transporter was fully integrated to the grower (14 firms in 
total), and one more was the main transport provider for two of the supply chains included 
in this study (13 firms in total); further, one transport provider, although not integrated, 
worked in full coordination with the exporter and they provided information as if they 
were one single case (12 cases in total). Hence, although there were 13 firms, only 12 case 
studies were reported.  
 
Third stage: Data gathering 
The third stage, as suggested elsewhere (Koulikofff-Souviron & Harrison, 2006, pp. 269-
270; I. Stuart et al., 2002, p. 420), consisted of identifying the informants, functions, and 
hierarchy within the organisation. Thus, asking for the one officer in charge of 
implementing security-related measures in each firm, the result was that all the interviewees 
were either the chief executive officers (CEOs) or the compliance managers in security and 
safety. 
Previously, the author was involved in a research project with CIAD (Food and 
Development Research Centre in Mexico) to investigate technology transfers and 
development needs in the food supply chains from Mexico (September to November 
2007). It was discovered that one of the interviewees in that project was attempting to 
comply with CTPAT, which in turn opened up the door to the network of distributors and 
their supply chains (see Figure 1, p.77).  
Once access was granted, the first fieldwork period started, and lasted from November 
2007 to January 2008. The instrument for gathering data in the first period was an 
unstructured and standardised interview. The second fieldwork period was in March 2008, 
when the instrument for gathering data was a structured and standardised questionnaire. 
The first fieldwork period coincided with the beginning of the winter production and 
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export season of fresh produce from Mexico to the United States, whilst the second 
fieldwork period occurred at the peak of the production and shipping season41.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 During the second period the CEOs and security/compliance directors from SC6E and SC6T were too 
busy to provide information, which left Supply Chain 6 with incomplete information for the analysis. For that 
reason this supply chain was eliminated from the study.  
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Figure 1: Snowball technique (Firms undisclosed by request) 
 
3. CAADES
(Trocadero
Nogales, MX)
6. Distributor
(SC6D)
4. Distributor
(SC3D)
5. Distributor
(SC2D)
2. Grower/Shipper (SC3E)
1. CIAD Hermosillo
(Nayarit Project)
7. Fresh Poduce Association
of the Americas FPAA
(Nogales, US)
8. Distributor
(SC4D)
9. Distributor
(SC5D)
10. Distributor
(SC1D)
16. Grower/Shipper
(SC6E)
11. Grower/Shipper (SC1E)
13. Grower/Shipper (SC5E)
14. Grower/Shipper
(SC2E&T)
17. Grower/Shipper (SC4E)
19. Transport Provider
(SC6T)
20. Transport Provider
(SC3T)
15. Transport Provider
(SC2E&T)
20. Transport Provider
(SC4T)
18. Transport Provider
(SC1&5T)
12. CIAD Culiacan
(Visiting)
Institutions contacted to facilitate contacting firms Distributors Growers Transport Providers
Customs Bosrder
Protection/CTPAT
Operations Manager
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Fourth stage: Organising and developing the data42 
Firstly, using field notes, reducing them to tables and coding them, the data was organised 
to facilitate the identification of similarities and differences across cases. As suggested 
elsewhere (Koulikofff-Souviron & Harrison, 2006, p. 271; Seuring, 2006, pp. 246-247; I. 
Stuart et al., 2002, p. 426), the strategy contributed to the identification of patterns by 
compliance levels, contexts, and time frames. 
Fieldwork notes were directly transcribed into content-analytic matrixes, which are 
traditionally used for single cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 183). Each case study 
report summarises the content-analytical matrix, according to a case study template, thus 
facilitating the comparisons across cases. 
The content-analytical matrix contains the information from the standardised semi-
structured interviews. They reflect the development and building up of resources and 
capabilities. From the interviews, the first classification of information was based on the 
supply chain security capabilities literature (Barratt & Oke, 2007; Boske, 2006; Closs, 2005; 
Closs & McGarrel, 2004; Erera, 2005; Goddard, 2005; Kinser et al., 2005; H. L. Lee, 2004; 
LLTRM, 2004; Manning et al., 2005; Petersen et al., 2003; Rice & Spayd, 2005; Sarathy, 
2006; Shannon et al., 2006; Sheu et al., 2006; Suarez-Bello, 2003), which is what structured 
the interviews in the first place (See appendix B), and which is reflected in the titles row of 
the content-analytical matrix. After the classification of interview information by supply 
chain security capabilities, the second classification was done according to the basic 
compliance process described by Henson (1998), and which is reflected in the titles 
column. Consequently, the content-analytic matrixes represent ‘process-by-security 
capabilities’ built by firms (see Table 3.4.2, p.80). The cells in the content-analytic matrixes 
contain the security resources and the capabilities built for their development. Expectedly, 
the resources and capabilities would be different according to the stage of the compliance 
process in turn. In detail, each cell contains: 
 Challenges and experiences in the specific stage of the compliance process;  
 Whether and how capabilities were built to meet the need of security resources; 
and 
 Date of the events 
                                                 
42 Although the fourth part should be organisation and analysis of the fieldwork data, the second part will be 
discussed in the next section. 
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The date of event is a useful variable to identify the timeframes of the compliance 
processes, which in turn measures the time required for compliance. The combination of 
this variable with the extent to which firms progress in compliance, contributed also to a 
variable capturing the intensity of the capability building processes.  
The last capability in the content-analytic matrix is the learning and knowledge sources. 
This in turn, enhanced our understanding of the role of the supply chain partners and other 
stakeholders in the firm’s capability building (see Table 3.4.2, p.80).  
In addition to supporting the understanding of the capabilities and compliance processes, 
the matrixes served the purpose of exhaustive accounts of the resources and capabilities 
developed by the firms, as described by the interviewees. Hence, whenever the interviewee 
made reference to a capability built and the resources that such capability was trying to 
develop, it was numbered. 
This was useful when the cases had to be revisited to verify the consistency of the analysis 
and the case study presentation. The numbering is similar to the coding suggested by 
qualitative researchers in the transcripts of data for initial analysis and to enhance the rigour 
of the qualitative research (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 55-56; Poland, 1995). However, it 
was thought that the numbering may also be useful to the reader, hence its inclusion in the 
case studies writing up, and its summaries in the capabilities-resources matrixes at the end 
of each case study. 
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Table 3.4.2: Content-Analytical Matrix (Compliance Process by Security Capabilities Matrix) 
(SC_Firm) Supply chain security capabilities 
Supply chain 
Security 
Literature 
Compliance 
Process 
(Henson, 1998) 
Assessment 
Visibility and 
monitoring 
Coordination 
and integration 
Vulnerability 
and risk 
reduction 
Agility (Velocity, 
Variability, 
Predictability) 
Learning and 
knowledge sources 
Identifying regulation 
1. Security resources required 
2. Capabilities used 
3. Time 
1. Security resources 
required 
2. Capabilities used 
3. Time 
1. 
2. 
3. 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
 
1. Security 
resources required 
2. Capabilities used 
3. Time 
1. Internal sources 
2. External sources 
Interpreting regulation 
1. Security resources required 
2. Capabilities used 
3. Time 
1. 
2. 
3. 
… … 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1. Internal sources 
2. External sources 
Loop to Interpret regulation: 
Attempt to influence regulation 
… … … … … … 
Identify change (assessment of 
current and expected activities) 
… … … … … … 
Compliance decisions: whether 
to comply or not (awareness of 
costs and benefits) 
… … … … … … 
Specifying the method of 
compliance (Available options) 
… … … … … … 
Communication 
1. 
2. 
3. 
… … … … 1. 
2. 
Implementation 
1. Security resources required 
2. Capabilities used 
3. Time 
1. 
2. 
3. 
… … 1. 
2. 
3. 
1. Internal sources 
2. External sources 
Evaluation and monitoring 
1. Security resources required 
2. Capabilities used 
3. Time 
1. Security resources 
required 
2. Capabilities used 
3. Time 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1. Security 
resources required 
2. Capabilities used 
3. Time 
1. Internal sources 
2. External sources 
Adapted from Miles and Huberman (1994, p.183) 
81 
 
 
3.5. Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Multi-value and Crisp Sets 
After organising, summarising and coding, the research moved onto the analysis. In a 
previous section, it was noted that this is a small-N research design; therefore traditional 
parametric tests of statistical significances are unreliable (Field, 2009). 
Other very powerful and novel options are the re-sampling methods, such as bootstrapping 
and permutation tests. However their assumptions include random sampling and 
independent variables (Good, 2006, p. 95). These assumptions do not adhere to the needs 
of the present investigation, which include systematic sample selection (i.e. by compliance 
levels) and testing whether the value of capabilities and resources are complementary or 
interdependent, rather than assuming independence between variables. 
Thus, cross-case displays for ordering and explanations based on presence causal-effect and 
associative analysis was used (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 207; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 
250; Silverman, 2005, p. 202), which is the basis of the comparative case study methods.  
The analytical method in this investigation is the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). 
This, as with other comparative approaches, studies how different conditions combine in 
one setting and compare it with how they combine in another setting, to unveil the 
convergent causal conditions of a setting (Ragin, 1989, p. 13). 
The Qualitative Comparative Analysis applies John Stuart Mill’s (1867) method to assess 
causality (Vink & Van Vliet, 2009, p. 272). It helps to identify a cause even when it is small 
in relation to many changeable related causes that may be jointly causing a certain effect. 
The advantage of this method is that is logical (Boolean), combinatorial, highlights 
irregularities for further investigation, does not require a representative sample of the 
population, and it is compatible with the vocabulary of necessary and sufficient causation; 
which is valuable for assessing the limits of social scientific generalisations (Kogut, 
MacDuffie, & Ragin, 2004; Kogut & Ragin, 2004, 2006, p. 46; Ragin, 1989, pp. 15,16, 101, 
2000, pp. 5, 13, 88). All in all, it helps assess relationships for theoretical generalisations 
while exploring different configurations of explanatory variables with small sample sizes.  
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For instance, assume A, B and C, may be causal conditions of innovation (Y). Displaying 
all the possible combinations of A, B, and C, and the presence (Y) or not (y) of innovation, 
we have the following possible configurations (see Table 3.5.1). 
 
Table 3.5.1: Illustrative example of the Boolean logic 
Causal configurations Effects 
A B C Y 
A B c y 
A B C Y 
A B c y 
a B C y 
a B c y 
a B C y 
a B c y 
A  C Y 
 
In the illustrative example, innovation (Y) happens when both A and C are present. If one 
of those is not present, innovation does not happen. 
In this investigation the multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA) was 
chosen to test the causal conditions of compliance, which is one of the three existing 
QCAs methods43. The mvQCA is a generalised method considered the best choice when 
investigations are of small to medium sample sizes, also when the richness of information 
to be handled is higher than in standard quantitative methods. It is perfect when the 
datasets include between 10 to 15 cases (Cronqvist, 2005; Ragin, 1989, 2000). 
The disadvantage of the method is that the dependent variable can only take dichotomous 
values, which requires running more than one analysis when the dependent variable has 
more than three categories (Herrmann & Cronqvist, 2009; Rihoux, 2006, p. 686; Vink & 
                                                 
43 The three methods are the Crisp Sets (csQCA), Multi-value (mvQCA) and the Fuzzy sets (fsQCA). The 
first method allows only dichotomic variables. The second method allows multiple values, yet, they are all 
categorical. The third method allows scale variables; however, the software available for this method is not as 
user friendly as the software for the mvQCA. 
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Van Vliet, 2009, p. 266). However, as the empirical analyses will show, it does not represent 
a problem.  
Another potential issue with the mvQCA is that the variables denote only categories. Even 
if the variables are ordinal or scale, each one of the values of the variables will be taken as 
nominal (Vink & Van Vliet, 2009, p. 266). This may be a problem for investigations where 
there is need to quantify or establish marginal relationships. However, in this investigation 
the qualitative character of the variables is maintained; hence, the causal conditions are only 
categorical. Rather than unveiling a trajectory from low to high (i.e. compliance levels), the 
analysis identifies the causal conditions at each one of those levels. 
In general the method for QCA consists of three phases:  
1) cases selection (described in the second stage of the research process) and 
identifying causal conditions (using the Boolean logic);  
2) testing the sufficiency and necessity of the causal conditions; and  
3) evaluation and interpretation of results (Kogut & Ragin, 2006, p. 49). 
In the first phase, the identification of causal conditions based on mvQCA requires three 
additional steps:  
1) Setting up a table that shows whether the causal conditions and the outputs are present or not. 
Since the mvQCA allows for multi-values, the conditions (scale or ordinal 
variables) do not need to be dichotomous; however the output (dependent 
variable) needs to be dichotomous;  
2) Constructing a truth table listing all the possible logical combinations of causal conditions. In 
this step, if the variables are multi-value, thresholds should be set, indicating 
when a range of the variable represents a different category from other ranges 
of the same variables (e.g. compliance may be broken down into two or three 
categories: low compliance, middle compliance and high compliance); and  
3) Applying the Boolean algebra to identify the causal conditions of the outputs (i.e. in our 
examples of compliance: causal conditions of low compliance, causal conditions 
of middle compliance, and causal conditions of high compliance) (Mill, 1867, p. 
318).  
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If the researcher finds contradictions (e.g. Y and y) in the outcome derived from the same 
causal configurations, Herrmann and Cronqvist (2009) suggest adding thresholds to the 
causal conditions, i.e. changing the variables from crisp to multi-values, but trying to keep a 
low number of categories in the variable to reduce complexity, which helps identify more 
parsimonious solutions (Herrmann & Cronqvist, 2009, pp. 35-38). 
In the second phase, a cause is necessary and sufficient if it is the only cause producing 
an outcome; a cause is necessary but not sufficient when is present together with other 
causes, and they all produce the outcome; a cause is sufficient when it is able to produce 
the outcome, but it may be that it is missing and other causes can still produce the 
outcome; finally, the cause is neither necessary nor sufficient if it appears in various causal 
configurations, but not in all (Mill, 1867, p. 206). 
Although the lexicon suggests that we are testing causality, it is not actually argued that the 
causal conditions are the reason for compliance to exist, but only that they co-exist. This is 
what statisticians call co-variance. 
This thesis subscribes to the interpretation of ‘cause-effect’ as described by Mill (1867), 
which represents a ‘relation of co-existence’. In other words, if compliance exists and 
underlying causal conditions are present, this is because they co-exist, not because the 
causal conditions originated or produced compliance. 
The QCA have also been subject of various critiques. The most important are: there are 
limited number of causal conditions (variables) to be analysed, dichotomisation of variables 
obscures complexity; it is difficult to capture marginal and dynamic (temporal) effects 
(Caren & Panofsky, 2005, p. 147; Cortina, 1993, pp. 915-922; Lieberson, 2004, pp. 13-14). 
However, new methodological contributions try to take note of these limitations. For 
instance rather than including a quantitative variables in two points in time, a fixed time 
effect would be applied, to capture the total change in the dependent variable, and same for 
the independent variables, in a specified (fixed) time period, so to assess whether the 
change in the dependent variable was caused by changes in a variable, or by a combination 
of changes in of the a set of independent variables (Hino, 2009; Ragin & Strand, 2008). 
Further, the limited number of causal conditions for assessment in the QCA, is now limited 
to the computing capacity of the researcher’s equipment, thanks to the development of the 
algorithms for STATA (Longest & Vaisey, 2008). 
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The analysis is run in the software TOSMANA-Tool for Small-N Analysis, which together 
with the Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis was developed by Cronqvist 
(Cronqvist, 2009). Furthermore, due to the prolific use of TOSMANA, an appendix was 
included with a guide to read the software reports (See Appendix D: Guide to Read 
TOSMANA Reports, p.324). 
 
3.6. Summary 
This chapter presented the methodology devised to address the thesis aim, objective, 
questions and the corresponding hypotheses. It presented the way the research was 
designed, yet because there is always room for improvement, it included a section with a 
critical view regarding the research method. Also we presented the actual process followed 
during the research as an attempt as a way to transparency and replicability of the research. 
Finally, the section presented the key concepts to use throughout the rest of the thesis, and 
a brief description of the qualitative comparative analysis, from which the hypotheses were 
tested. The next section, will present the background ad context information of the supply 
chains that were subject of study. Followed by the case studies, analysis and conclusions.  
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4. CHAPTER 4 Background 
This chapter first contextualises the Mexican agri-business industry and its main fresh 
produce supply chains for exports to the United States. It describes the most relevant post 
9/11 security regulations and details the Public Private Partnership regulation, which is the 
regulation whose effect is under investigation. 
 
4.1. Supply Chains and Post 9/11 Security Regulation 
Mexico-US Agri-business44 
The demand for fresh produce in the United States has changed over the last two decades. 
The consumption of fresh fruit increased from 88.7 pounds to 101.2 pounds per person 
between 1983-85 and 2003-05. The consumption of fresh vegetables rose from 123.2 
pounds to 173.5 pounds per person in the same period. Not only US but also other 
international producers benefited from that trend in consumption. Imports accounted for 
50% of the growth in fresh vegetable consumption and 25% of the growth of fresh fruit 
consumption (Huang & Huang, 2007, p. 10). 
US imports of produce from Mexico also grew steadily. The movement of fruit and 
vegetables from Mexico to the US increased by 169% of the initial volume: from 1991-
1993 to 2006-2008 it increased from 1.6 to 4.3 million metric tons. More notable is the size 
of the increase in the value of such exports, which was 309% of the initial level: in absolute 
terms this was an increase from US$1.2 to US$5 billion in the same period (see Chart 1, 
p.87). 
 
 
  
                                                 
44 The supply chain and logistical description in this section is based on the present investigations as well as 
previous publications (Borbon-Galvez, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2004; Wong-Gonzalez, 2005). 
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Chart 1: United States imports of produce from Mexico from 1991-1993 to 2006-2008 
(Thousands metric tons and millions of dollars) 
1,245
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Volume (Thousands 
Metric tons)
Dollars/Metric Ton
 
Source: Elaborated based on USDA/FAS, US Internet Trade System. Access 24 August 2009 
 
Data from the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), suggests that the 
consumption of fresh produce had been growing all over the world. The main consumers 
were the European Union (EU-15) and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) area.  Interestingly, the rest of the world, on average, grew at about the same rate 
as the EU and the NAFTA countries, albeit lagging until 1991 and then began growing 
faster (see Chart 2, p.88). 
Such consumption trends have been followed by the international trade of fresh produce. 
The EU-15 have increased its imports since the late 1970s and again after 2001, while a 
noticeable growth in North America was experienced in the late 1980s followed by 
NAFTA and another period of growth in 2002 (see Chart 3, p.88). 
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Chart 2: Fruit and vegetable consumption by selected regions. 
(Kilos/per capita/per year) 
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Source: Elaborated based on faostat.fao.org. Accessed 24 August 2009 
 
 
Chart 3: Import Value (Million US dollars) 
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Source: Elaborated based on faostat.fao.org. Accessed 24 august 2009 
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Maranon (1997) argued that North American agri-business influenced the transformation 
of Latin American agricultural activities (Maranon, 1997). The leading US southern 
distributors were also growers, whom, driven by insufficient production during winter 
seasons, engaged with Mexican growers. Their role was more than just consolidating US 
and Mexican agricultural products for the US markets; they were the main capacity builders 
of the Mexican fresh produce exports, providing technological, knowledge, and financial 
support (Borbon-Galvez, 2000, pp. 6, 75; Salazar-Solano, Sandoval, & Wong-Gonzalez, 
1999). 
The growth of the production and consumption of fresh produce had influenced the US-
Mexican agricultural trade since before NAFTA; they created alliances, mergers, and 
acquisitions at all stages of the supply chain (Boehlje, Akridge, & Downey, 1995; Cook, 
1998). Also, many US distributors/growers secured sufficient supplies of fresh produce, 
mainly during the winter seasons. For this, they engaged in yearly contractual arrangements 
for the distribution of given shares of the Mexican production for exports (Dimitri & 
Oberholtzer, 2009; Rama & Rello, 1979). 
The organisational, productive, technological, trade, and logistical strategies developed by 
the Mexico-US industry substantially reduced intermediation costs, transaction costs, 
availability risks, and variability of year round supply (Calvin & Barrios, 1999; Goldberg, 
2007, p. 5; P. N. Wilson & Thompson, 2003, p. 30; P. N. Wilson, Thompson, & Cook, 
1997). 
Hence, a hate-love relationship between US and Mexican growers developed; more of hate 
during the summer seasons, when they were competing for the same markets; and more of 
love during the winter seasons, when they have to consolidate production from different 
growing sites to meet the demand45.  
However, these trends were not felt equally across all Mexican regions. Two Mexican 
States, located on the northwest coast, produced around 50% of the total value of winter 
produce (the normal export season to the US) (see Chart 4, p.90). 
                                                 
45 According to a Congressional Research Service Report for the Members and Committees of the US 
Congress (RL34468), the counter-seasonal imports had not only complemented US production, but also the 
extension of the US production season had narrowed down the winter window for foreign suppliers, yet, the 
net US imports had grown steadily from 1999 to 2009. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34468.pdf 
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The main growers from Mexico had a natural access to the US with the Canada-US-Mexico 
(Canamex) corridor, used by Mexicans to move their exports and supply the western US 
markets, through Nogales46, the main port of entry to the US. This port of entry had been 
the most specialised in the US in cross-border operations of fresh produce. It moved 
around 55% of the total US imported produce from Mexico to US (Wong-Gonzalez, 
2005).  
 
Chart 4: Share of autumn-winter production value of main Mexican States 
Rank State 2007 Cumulative 2000 Cumulative 1992 Cumulative 
1 SINALOA 44% 44% 43% 43% 27% 27% 
2 SONORA 14% 58% 14% 57% 15% 42% 
3 TAMAULIPAS 8% 66% 1% 59% 11% 53% 
4 GUANAJUATO 5% 71% 6% 64% 10% 63% 
5 
BAJA 
CALIFORNIA 
5% 76% 8% 72% 6% 69% 
6 MICHOACAN 4% 80% 5% 77% 6% 74% 
7 JALISCO 3% 83% 3% 80% 2% 77% 
8 PUEBLA 2% 84% 1% 81% 2% 79% 
9 
BAJA 
CALIFORNIA SUR 
2% 86% 1% 83% 2% 81% 
10 MEXICO 2% 88% 1% 84% 2% 83% 
11 NAYARIT 1% 89% 3% 87% 2% 85% 
12 GUERRERO 1% 91% 2% 88% 2% 86% 
Source: Elaborated based on SIAP/SAGARPA www.siap.gob.mx, Access 25 August 2009 
                                                 
46 There are two Nogales cities, one on the Mexican (Nogales-Son) and other on the US (Nogales-Az) side of 
the border.  
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Figure 2: CANAMEX Corridor 
 
Source: www.canamex.org, in Wong-Gonzalez (2005) 
 
Moreover, the demand for cross-border crossing of fresh produce from Mexico to the US 
throughout Nogales increased from around 58,000 thousands cross-border crossings 
crossing in 1992-93 to 100,000 in 2005-06, which represents an increase of over 70%. The 
most export intensive season of fresh produce from Mexico to the US had historically been 
January to March. Nogales port of entry traded over 60% of the yearly exports for all 
agricultural products to the US, and in the 2006-2007 season it saw a cross-border 
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operation every 30 seconds, a maximum of 1000 trucks per day in 10 hours of service 
(CAADES/CIDH, 2007). 
 
Mexico-US fresh Produce Supply Chains47 
Moving fresh produce to the US requires an important logistical activity organised across a 
number of actors. First, not all the small and medium sized produce growers in Mexico had 
enough supply or packing capacity. In some cases, they had to sell to large growers who 
were already operating in international markets, or sell to consolidators or brokers. The 
consolidator/broker did not actually grow anything but purchased or distributed produce 
from various growers who were individually unable to supply because of their low 
production volume.  
Later the produce needed to be labelled and packed. This stage was crucial to sustain the 
traceability of the produce, and had been supported with coding and information systems 
to trace the produce back to its origins. This required high precision to identify the 
different growers of consolidated cargos. 
Often, large firms had internal packing facilities. Since they did not deal with multiple 
growers their traceability systems were more reliable. However, they still dealt with multiple 
origins of the produce, and needed to know where and when the produce was picked up 
from.  
Once the produce had been packed and labelled, it was normally transferred to a cooling 
warehouse where it was treated to reduce its temperature and (in some cases) to keep the 
environment controlled. This is where the cold chain normally started, requiring control 
over the produce’s environmental conditions to regulate its shelf life48.  
                                                 
47 The supply chain and logistical description in this section is based on observations in the present 
investigations, as much as observations in previous investigations, reported in several publications (Borbon-
Galvez, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2004; Nunez-Noriega & Salazar-Solano, 2007; Wong-Gonzalez, 2005). 
48 Shelf life is the time lapse between harvest and the moment in which the product has gone bad. There are 
various systems used by the Mexican agri-food chains to control various gases in the environment such as 
ozone, oxygen, carbon dioxide, ethylene, etc., which allows regulation of the shelf life of the produce. For 
instance, in the packing facilities, melons (honey dew) may be treated with ethylene at 20ºC, followed by 
being washed with cold water. In the warehouse, they may be stored at 7ºC with 90% relative humidity, 10-
15% CO2 and 3% O2, to achieve 3-4 weeks of shelf life (Borbon-Galvez, 1998, p. 30). 
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The next stage in the chain involved sending the produce from the shipping point in 
Mexico to the US distributor’s warehouse49. However, between those supply chain stages 
were various inspection points, some of which were the subject of complaints from the 
fresh food industry. The Mexican Secretary of Defense used inspection points to search for 
drugs. Such inspections increased the lead times of cargo in transit50.  
Further inspection points were located in Nogales-Son51 before the US port of entry. These 
were dedicated to ensuring the cargo was in perfect condition, and performing logistical 
operations to change from double trailer hauling per truck (which is legal in Mexico but not 
allowed in some of the US national highway network, nor in critical highways of Arizona) 
to single trailer hauling per truck (legal and allowed in both the US and Mexico)52. 
In the distributors’ warehouse, the produce could be arranged according to the needs of 
each buyer. Growers may have had different distributors, according to the distributors’ 
specialty. There were also re-packers, who used to take advantage of the fact that some 
growers choose to classify top quality produce as lower grade. The grower does it to make 
sure the consumer only gets the expected or higher quality, to maintain the market. 
However, re-packers might re-classify produce and charge a premium price for the top 
quality produce.  
                                                 
49 There are different economic entities that may control various stages of the supply chain, which will be 
indicated by adding the sections the entity controls, for instance: grower, grower/packer, exporter, 
packer/exporter, grower/packer/exporter, grower/consolidator/packer/exporter, so on. 
50 One of the inspection points (Benjamin Hill, Sonora) was modernised, and new technology is used to 
screen the cargo without physical manoeuvre, using X-Rays and Gamma Rays. The time to realise 100% 
inspection of the cargo was reduced from 60 minutes to 3 minutes. Another two critical inspection points 
were removed (El Desengano, and Potam) on 17 February 2009. However, the new inspection point started 
operations at the end of the export season on 27 April 2009 (the export season is normally November to 
May), hence the effects of the new technologies and inspections operations will be seen during the next 
export season (November 2009 to May 2010), and specially in January, February and March, which are the 
pick of the export season. 
51 Trocadero de CAADES (Confederacion de Asociaciones de Agricultores del Estado de Sinaloa) is one of 
the most important facilities for inspection in the city, serving member and non-members of the association. 
52 It is the practice that Mexican long-haul trucks carry two trailers; on the other hand, the US Federal 
Highway Administration, which is the agency responsible to regulate and enforce the Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act of 1982 and its amendments (72 FR 7747, Feb. 20, 2007), imposed a freeze to the truck and 
trailer sizes, weights, and routes using the national highway network that forbids the truck-trailer-trailer 
combinations, but only allows truck-trailer-semitrailer combinations. Although States are allowed to set their 
own limits on inter-state regulations, the routes across the US are not uniformly connected, such that makes it 
economically impractical for Mexican long-haul trucks-trailer-trailer to operate in the US. In the State of 
Arizona for instance, the only inter-state route allowed to operate truck-trailer-trailer combinations are the 
inter-state from Nevada to Utah, and other limited connections to New Mexico (FHWA/USDOT, 1984).  
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In the US, the market comprised a complex network of commercial or wholesale buyers. 
Each buyer had specific food standards related to quality, safety, security, environment, and 
social issues. The buyers ranged from food processors, supermarkets, food and restaurant 
chains, retailers, to institutional buyers (educational, hotels, and public administration). 
The purchases along the chain were only unidirectional; it appeared more like a network 
than a chain. For instance, some food processors used to buy from supermarket 
warehouses and then sold semi and fully processed food back to the supermarket 
warehouse. 
Some factors might have had negative effects on Mexico-US supply chains performances. 
One of them was the lack of feedback controls systems between partners, leading to 
increasing variability in lead times and lack of traceability capability of the systems (van der 
Vorst, Beulens, de Wit, & van Beek, 1998); this had been commonly known as the bullwhip 
effect53. Another big issue was the use of supply chains for illegal purposes. A third 
important factor was the presence of foodborne illnesses. Others included: inefficient 
facility designs, inefficient monitoring and information systems/technologies, lack of 
training, non-existence of alternative SCs and logistics in case of emergencies, increased 
complexity of regulatory environment, etc. (Nunez-Noriega & Salazar-Solano, 2007; Wong-
Gonzalez, 2005). 
                                                 
53 “The bullwhip or whiplash effect refers to the phenomenon where orders to the supplier tend to have 
larger variances than sales to the buyer (i.e. demand distortion), and the distortion propagates upstream in an 
amplified form (i.e. variance amplification)” (Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997, p. 546). 
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Figure 3: The Basic Fresh Produce Supply Chain from Mexico to United States 
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Post 9/11 security regulatory regimes: safeguarding the food chains 
As noted earlier, one of the main concerns in the international trade of fresh produce to 
the US had been the control of foodborne illness. Harris et al. (2003) identified a growing 
number of outbreaks in the US over the years. They stressed that although pathogens rarely 
reproduce on the outer surfaces of most fresh fruit and vegetables, pathogens survival and 
multiplication is enhanced under broken epidermal barriers of the fruit and vegetables. 
Environmental conditions will hardly affect their survival, and some pathogens only need a 
very small dose to provoke illnesses. What is more, the increased complex logistical 
systems and use of modified environments characteristics of the food supply chains had 
driven the growth rates of pathogens, such as Salmonella, E. Coli, C. Botulinum, and 
others (Harris et al., 2003, p. 86). On the other hand, although leafy greens have been seen 
capable of retaining pathogens due to their vascular structure, a recent investigation 
showed no evidence of retention in spinach (Perry, 2011, p. 7). However when lettuce is 
bruised during harvest or at the processing plants, the plant releases hydrogen peroxide, 
stressing the E. coli and leading the pathogen to activate genes to overcome the stress. 
Once such genes have been activated, E. coli can withstand chlorine - the most frequent 
sanitizer in the food industry for washing and processing (Wood, 2011, p. 14). 
As a result, there were sound concerns of risks of conducting bioterrorism attacks by 
disseminating biological agents through insects, contamination of water and food supply, 
contact, spreading powders, liquids and aerosols (Cordesman, 2001), or by deliberate 
damage to plants that are exposed to pathogens. 
Zilinskas (2003) noted that the risk of BW attacks may have lowered by involving critical 
stakeholders. In fact, he suggested that responsibilities had already been transferred to non-
state parties to counter and even to respond to bioterrorism. However, this suggests that 
new security policies required understanding the vulnerabilities of the new stakeholders, to 
develop the appropriate technological capabilities to prevent or mitigate such activities 
(Zilinskas, 2003).  
Although food supply systems were not the most likely or best delivery mechanism for 
bioterrorist attacks (Zilinskas, 2003), there were incentives for the State and the 
international food supply chain to ensure security. Firstly, the fresh produce exporters had 
always been concerned with the potential closure of cross-border operations and the 
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damage to their reputational capital associated with delivering dangerous biological agents 
(Palac-McMiken, 2004)54. 
Secondly, there might have always been benefits of compliance. For instance, a previous 
study showed estimations that CTPAT certified agribusiness might have reduced the 
maximum cross-border operations times by certified truck from 17 to 4 hours. In addition, 
a combination of public and private efforts to improve efficiency through security had the 
potential to bring maximum times of cross-border operations down to 1.5 hours, which 
means increasing the actual efficiency measures in lead times by more than 1000% (Wong-
Gonzalez, 2005).  
The attacks on 11 September 2001, reinforced the need to enhance the security of the 
United States. In November 2001, the US Customs Border Protection (CBP) and industry 
representatives developed a programme called Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (Flynn, 2004:105), a public-private partnership regulatory regime (PPP) that 
aimed to reduce the risks of terrorists’ attacks on the US population through international 
supply chains. 
Soon after, the US Congress passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (US BioAct 2002), which President Bush signed 
into law on 12 June 2002. This took the form of a traditional command-control public 
regulatory regime (PR) aimed at preparing American society to prevent and respond to 
bioterrorism. 
Later, in September 2003, the programme ‘Free and Secure Trade’ (FAST) was published 
by the CBP to update an electronic cargo release system prototype set in 1997 and 
published in the Federal Register (62 FR 14731) (Department of Homeland Security, 2003). 
This was aimed at gathering advance information and expediting cargo release from the 
border. 
 
                                                 
54 An example of what the industry might face is the case of the Tylenol Effect. Two decades ago seven 
people died after taking Extra-Strength Tylenol that had been laced with cyanide and placed on Chicago-area 
pharmacy shelves. Tylenol manufacturer Johnson & Johnson initiated one of the largest drug recalls in US 
history at a cost of more than US$100 million. The company stopped producing capsules and replaced them 
with caplets as well as unveiling new tamper-resistant packaging, which has now become the industry norm. 
Congress then passed legislation making drug tampering a federal offence (Fintor, 2002).  
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Public regulation 
Section 307 of Subtitle A of Title III of the US BioAct 2002, required exporters (Mexican) 
to issue a Prior Notice (PN) to the FDA that a food shipment would arrive at a US port of 
entry by truck (US BioAct 2002, pp. 670-671). Prior notice (PN) required ex ante knowledge 
of the conditions of the food shipment, such as US port of entry, arrival time, cargo 
conditions, importer, exporter, Transport Company, truck, and driver specified in the PN. 
Although the regulation required very straightforward information, the Fresh Produce 
Association of the Americas, together with several distributors and agri-businesses, 
expressed their concerns that such measures did not consider the complexities of the 
Mexico-US fresh produce supply chains. Furthermore, they commented on the dockets of 
the Prior Notice55, that there should be better coordination between the FDA and the 
Customs Border Protection (CBP), allowing CTPAT/FAST certified firms to issue a Prior 
Notice at the same time it was issued to the CBP, 1.5 hours before arrival at the port of 
entry. This had important consequences, as shipment information may have needed to be 
changed after re-packing, re-loading, changing driver, change of trailer, etc. As a result, 
shipments needed to wait at least two more hours on the highway before they were able to 
join the border queues, whilst the FDA analysed the information to decide whether to 
grant access to the shipment.  
 
Public Private Partnership Regulation: CTPAT/FAST 
CTPAT was launched on 16 April 2002 as a voluntary programme that consisted in 
enhancing the supply chain security practices (Laden, 2007, p. 83). The Customs Border 
Protection (CBP) would issue a certification of partnership with CTPAT. Participating in 
the programme gave a number of benefits to its members, as it reduced the number of 
inspections at the border, provided priority in processing inspections, assigned a supply 
chain security specialist, members would become eligible for self-policing, and they would 
be allowed to attend CTPAT supply chain security training seminars. 
                                                 
55 http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0278/02n0278.htm 
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Its related programme was FAST, which is exclusive for transport providers, and that gave 
similar benefits as CTPAT. The difference was that it allowed members to use FAST lanes 
to cross the border, and advanced technology to clear the cargo and cross the border in 
few minutes. However, to be eligible to use the FAST lanes, not only the transport 
provider had to be a member, the driver must have had a FAST-commercial driver card, 
the cargo should belong to a CTPAT certified exporter/packer, and it had to be destined to 
a CTPAT certified importer. This combination of memberships allowed advanced 
electronic cargo information transmission to the CBP, and expedited cargo processing 
based on risk assessment56 (C-TPAT/CBP, 2006).  
The guidelines and criteria were tailored for each partner of the SC57, however, they all had 
to develop resources for the various security aspects (See Table 4.1.1). 
According to the level of compliance, CTPAT granted three different certifications (tiers). 
First, for those meeting the minimum criteria that were not yet validated in situ, second for 
those validated, and third for those exceeding the minimum criteria. The main advantage of 
acquiring higher levels of compliance had been the reduction of rate of inspections in 
customs based on risk assessments58. This implied a reduction in lead times across the 
border, where the third level meant the closest to having the status of “green light” for 
cargo at customs. The best practices and technologies applied by higher compliant firms 
were used to continuously update a document for communicating SC security best 
practices (C-TPAT/CBP, 2006, p. 4). 
To sum up, in order to obtain the benefits of the CTPAT/FAST programmes, at least the 
Mexican exporter (Foreign Manufacturer), Mexican transport provider (Long Haul Carrier 
in Mexico), driver (with FAST-Commercial Driver Card), and distributor (Importer) had to 
be certified. This extended the lead certified firms’ external controls over their providers 
and clients to meet the same requirements, and this might have been done by specifying it 
in their contractual arrangements.  
                                                 
56 For information on the development of the programme, see http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2003/pdf/03-
24260.pdf. 
57 There are Third Party Logistics Providers, Marine Port Authority and Terminal Operators, Long Haul 
Carriers in Mexico, Customs Brokers, Air Carriers, Rail Carriers, Foreign Manufacturers, Highway Carriers, 
Importers, Sea Carriers, Air Freight Consolidators, Ocean Transportation Intermediaries, and for Non-Vessel 
Operating Common Carriers. 
58 In case of another incident like 9/11, only CTPAT certified firms will have access in case of closing 
borders to international trade. 
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Table 4.1.1: CTPAT Security criteria/guidelines sections 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
p
ar
tn
er
 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t 
Participation/certification in 
foreign customs administrations 
SC security programmes 
Point of origin 
Security procedures (service 
provider screening and selection 
procedures and customer 
screening procedures) 
Other internal criteria for 
selection 
P
ro
ce
d
u
ra
l 
se
cu
ri
ty
 
Bill of lading/manifesting 
procedures 
Cargo (traceability) 
Cargo discrepancies 
Document review 
Documentation processing 
Manifesting procedures 
Shipping & receiving 
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
te
ch
n
o
lo
gy
 
se
cu
ri
ty
 
Accountability 
Fast transponder controls 
Password protection 
P
h
ys
ic
al
 s
ec
u
ri
ty
 
Alarms systems & video 
surveillance cameras 
Building structure 
Fencing 
Gates and gate houses 
Lighting 
Locking devices and key controls 
Parking 
C
o
n
ta
in
er
 
an
d
 t
ra
ile
r 
se
cu
ri
ty
 
Container inspection  
Trailer inspections 
Container and trailer seals (ISO 
17712) 
Container and trailer storage 
C
o
n
v
ey
an
ce
 
se
cu
ri
ty
 
Conveyance inspection 
procedures 
Conveyance tracking and 
monitoring procedures 
P
h
ys
ic
al
 a
cc
es
s 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 
Challenging and removing 
unauthorized persons 
 Deliveries (including mail) 
Employees (authorised access) Security training and threat awareness 
Visitors 
 
Visitors/vendors/service 
providers 
P
er
so
n
n
e
l 
se
cu
ri
ty
 Background checks / 
investigations 
Personnel termination procedures 
Pre-employment verification 
Source: CBP.www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat 
 
However, there were firms unable to comply with CTPAT/FAST even though they had 
committed resources to enhance their security practices. The rate of non-compliance is 
relatively high given the number of rejections of applications for certification in CTPAT. In 
April 2005 there were 4,574 certified firms out of 8,297 applications, so that 18% were 
rejected and 26% were pending information (see Table 4.1.2, p.102). 
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In 2006, from more than 10,000 firms applying for the certification, 6,000 had been 
accepted (C-TPAT/CBP, 2006, p. iii, 2007, p. 3). Although this data does not show 
rejected and pending applications, 4,000 out of 10,000 applications did not receive 
certification, which suggests that 40% of the firms were unable to develop the necessary 
resources for compliance. Extrapolating statistics from April 2005, in 2006 the number of 
rejected applications was around 1,800, and 2,600 of the applications would had been 
pending due to insufficient information being provided by the firms. Interestingly, there 
was no apparent change in the rate of non-compliance. This meant that either potential 
supply was not negotiated and re-channelled through complying channels, or the supply 
entered the market with lower efficiencies compared to complying channels, accumulating 
fewer benefits in the long run yet with higher risks than compliant channels. 
Furthermore, data revealed that non-US parties of international SCs were the ones striving 
more to meet CTPAT security regulations, especially Mexican firms who, without 
considering pending applications, have the lowest certification to rejection ratio (See Table 
4.1.2, p.102).  
To conclude, the Mexico-US fresh produce supply chains have had to face challenges in 
their everyday operations, including the awareness of illegal immigrants and drug 
smugglers. It seems that the post 9/11 security regulations added to those challenges. 
However, the adverse effects of the security regulations may have been mitigated with the 
incentives associated with compliance. It might be advisable for the Mexico-US agri-
businesses to engage with such measures, given the benefits for both brought by their 
growing international trade. 
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Table 4.1.2: CTPAT Statistics (April 2005) 
Business Type Certified Rejected 
Certified to Rejection Ratio 
(CRR= Certified/Rejected) 
Pending 
Additional Info. 
Grand 
Total 
Sector 
Share 
Air Carrier 26 7 3.7 6 39 0% 
Consolidator, NVOCC, Ocean Trans Inter, Intl Air 428 59 7.3 153 640 8% 
Importer 2521 794 3.2 1315 4630 56% 
Licensed U.S. Customs Broker 505 59 8.6 133 697 8% 
Mexican Non-Related Manufacturer 10 13 0.8 30 53 1% 
Mexican Related-Party Manufacturer 118 67 1.8 105 290 3% 
Rail Carrier 7 1 7.0 4 12 0% 
Sea Carrier 74 18 4.1 29 121 1% 
U.S. / Canada Highway Carrier 719 304 2.4 244 1267 15% 
U.S. / Mexico Highway Carrier 142 203 0.7 155 500 6% 
U.S. Marine Port or Terminal Operator 24 8 3.0 16 48 1% 
Grand Total 4574 1533 3.0 2190 8297 100% 
Status Share 55% 18% 3.8 (Average) 26% 100%  
    Source: (Rojas, 2005) 
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5. CHAPTER 5 Case Studies 
The present chapter is a synthesis of the content analytical matrix of each case study. The 
research questions roadmaps described the processes that firms followed to build up 
capabilities, which in turn would support the development of security resources required 
for compliance (see Section 3.2, p.55). There are three issues to be discussed in each of the 
cases, and these are structured in the case study template, or case outline (see Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1: Case study outline59 
1. The process 
Story telling of the compliance process 
2. Figure: Summary of the compliance process 
3. Security resources and capability building 
Descriptions of the resources development for supply chain 
security; and descriptions related capabilities building processes. 
4. Internal and external sources of knowledge and learning for capability 
building 
5. Table: Summary of relationship between resources development and 
capabilities building 
 
Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the case study outline correspond to the compliance process, the 
security resources and compliance capabilities of the firm, respectively. 
The variables to classify the processes, resources and capabilities are summarised below 
(see Table 5.2). 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 This template is a short version of template presented in the methodological section. 
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Table 5.2: Classification of variables from case studies 
Variables Coding 
Compliance Process (P) 
Regulatory identification P.RI 
Regulatory Interpretation P.I 
Compliance assessment P.A 
Compliance level and regime P.OL 
Communication systems P.Com 
Implementation strategy P.Imp 
Compliance evaluation and monitoring P.E 
Feedback loops P.Fb 
Security Resources (R) 
Business partners R.BP 
Physical security R.Phys 
Access controls R.A 
Personnel security R.Per 
Procedural security R.Pro 
Information systems security R.IT 
Container security R.CT 
Conveyance security R.Co 
Training and threat awareness R.TA 
Compliance Capabilities (C) 
Organisational competencies C.OC 
Management systems C.MS 
Internal coordination systems C.IC 
Stakeholders support C.SH60 
Supplier development C.SD61 
Vertical alignment C.VA62 
Temporal dimension  T 
 
It is important to note an overlap between the first and second sections of the case outline. 
Unsurprisingly, the description of the resources and capabilities building processes relates 
directly to the regulatory implementation, monitoring and evaluation63; in other words, they 
occur mainly during the implementation and evaluation stages of the compliance processes. 
However, the resources and capabilities building are described in their own section within 
the case description (See Table 5.1, p.103).  
                                                 
60 Stakeholders comprise: network of suppliers (excluding the supply chain partners) and external 
organisations not directly related to the firms’ normal operations. Exporter, transport, and distributors were 
classified in Supplier Development (C.SD), the rest of the actors (technology and service providers, 
consultancies, research centres, business associations, private certification agencies, customs agencies, so on) 
were classified as stakeholders support (C.SH). 
61 Supporting the development of the suppliers’ resources and capabilities may contribute to the efficient 
operation of the firms’ own security resources. 
62 Capabilities built both ways and in coordination with supply chain partners (exporter, transport provider 
and distributor).  
63 This is not to neglect the need for resources and capabilities in the previous regulatory stages (P.RI, P.I, 
P.A, P.OL, and P.Com), but to narrow the attention on what is the regulatory requirement, i.e. implementing, 
monitoring and assessing security and safety resources according to the regulators’ standards. 
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Although this is an attempt to exhaustively account for the resources and capabilities of the 
firms within the limitations of the data gathering, it includes what the firms’ CEOs 
considered to be the ‘main’ security resources and capabilities available in their firms.  
Finally, all cases include figures with the summary of the firm’s compliance processes, and 
tables (matrixes) with the summary of the firm’s security resources and capabilities built64.  
As a reminder, the case studies were first selected based on supply chain partners with 
similar compliance levels65. We selected low compliant supply chains (SC1 and SC2), 
middle compliant supply chains (SC3 and SC4), and high compliant supply chains66 (SC5)67. 
The production sites of the supply chains were not as important as the location of the 
distribution centre, which was Nogales, Arizona, US. However, most of the growers were 
located in the province Sinaloa, whilst one was in Nayarit, the neighbouring province of 
Sinaloa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 A reference to a capability building and resource development is numbered in [brackets] and listed in the 
matrixes. 
65 In this selection process, the support of the Fresh Produce Association of the Americas (FPAA) was 
crucial for the identification of supply chains, and for the information regarding the perception that FPAA 
had about the overall security/conformance levels of the potential supply chains to be sampled. The FPAA 
experience had grown as a result of the continuous exchange of information with CTPAT officials regarding 
the compliance of US fresh produce distributors (members) and their supply chains. 
66 SC6 was another candidate for a high compliant firm, however the supply chain did not provide sufficient 
information for a reliable analysis, hence this supply chain was dropped from the sample. 
67 For more detail on the selection criteria go to the section on Research Process (p.91), subsection: 
instrument development and case selection. 
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5.1. Supply Chain 1 Distributor (SC1D) 
The compliance process 
In 2003 (T), after the creation of the CTPAT, the CEOs were informed by the US 
government, third party certifiers, and its industry associations that a new programme – 
CTPAT – had been developed, and that it would involve the produce industry (amongst 
others). The CEOs had been actively engaged with one of the strongest fresh produce 
distributors associations of the United States – The Fresh Produce Association of the 
Americas – which gave them access to key information regarding US regulatory and policy 
initiatives (P.RI) in due time. 
According to the CEOs, should a regulation not contribute to three aspects together – 
protecting the produce, the clients and the service – there would not be any reason to 
comply (P.I). Moreover the CEOs did not agree with the notion of the firm needing to 
control their transport providers, as declared in the interview “we have no control 
whatsoever on their compliance decision” (P.A). 
The CEOs decided to comply with the food safety standards GMP/GHP (Good 
Manufacturing Practices/Good Handling Practices) (P.OL) in summer 2005 (T). This was 
after the grower/exporter was ‘practically’68 in full compliance with such standards 
(GMP/GHP) and beginning to implement security measures. SC1D was in the process of 
partially implementing CTPAT standards (P.OL), such as physical security and access 
controls, and traceability systems. However, the CEOs decided to follow a self-regulatory 
approach to enforce security standards, and ‘not looking forward’ to apply for certification 
in CTPAT (P.OL). 
The firm’s own personnel conducted assessments (P.E) of their own security procedures. 
Before implementing tight systems related to conveyance security, the personnel and CEOs 
identified costs associated with the lack of tracking systems (P.A). It was necessary to 
implement security measures (P.Imp) to prevent intrusions in the supply chain. The 
measures have to be not already covered by GMP/GHP regulations (P.OL). Thus the firm 
                                                 
68 Some third party certifiers in food related standards rate the compliance level of the firm in certification 
based on audits conducted on at least a yearly basis. The third party certifier reports the compliance rate to 
any buyer interested in doing business with the certified firm. Although the firm can be certified it may not 
comply in full with the standards, which means that it may have not received 100% rate in the audit.  
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decided to set its own security regulations for conveyance tracking systems (P.OL), 
complementing their ongoing certification process in GMP/GHP (P.OL), which, 
according to the CEOs, was closer to the principles of produce protection, client 
protection and service (P.I). 
Since the GMP/GHP compliance process was given priority in SC1D, the firm only 
partially followed the security guidelines from CTPAT (P.OL). The CEOs final decision 
was not to comply but only to partially meet the CTPAT standards (P.OL). 
The CEOs decided to tighten the security measures by monitoring the cargo ‘transit’ from 
the shipping point to the distribution centre (P.A), based on cost considerations. Their 
post-assessment (P.E) led them to conclude that better monitoring protected the produce 
and contributed to costs being reduced (P.I). SC1D’s cargo monitoring throughout radio 
and mobile (P.E) was saving overtime payments to the USDA inspectors, who charged 
US$400 per hour for waiting for cargo to arrive at the inspection facilities in Nogales-MX 
(P.I). 
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Figure 4: Summary of the compliance process by SC1D 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC1D 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
The CEOs prioritised the implementation of security measures without the involvement of 
the supply chain, apart from the normal information sharing and recommendations 
(P.Imp). By November 2007 (T), SC1D had security resources related to physical, 
procedural, trailer and conveyance security in place. However, those resources were not in 
full compliance with the CTPAT, since the firm did not have CCTV69 (P.OL), there was no 
analysis of the seals monitoring form and trailer inspection before unloading the produce, 
there was no systematic use of high security seals on the container (P.A). 
Most of the security implementations were developed internally. The interaction to external 
organisations in this stage was limited to developing procedural security, i.e. traceability 
systems. This resource was developed by the grower/exporter for produce identification 
and traceability, and later adopted by SC1D who added labels useful for their own 
operations [1]. As mentioned before, the conveyance tracking had to be done in close 
coordination with the driver; however, the firm did not develop any system to monitor the 
status of the ‘cargo’ in transit [2] (SC1D wanted to know where the cargo was, not the 
condition of the produce inside the container). 
The firm also implemented security and safety measures by upgrading the employees’ skills. 
Security measures included setting up administrative systems leading to reliable alarms 
operation [3], and internal training in threat awareness [4]. Safety measures included 
internal training in cargo inspection at shipping and receiving [5]. Safety measures were a 
requirement for certification with GMP/GHP – USDA Food Safety regulations (P.OL), 
which, according to the CEOs, although related well with CTPAT security guidelines, are 
closer to the needs of any distribution centre (P.I, and P.Fb-P.A). 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 According to the CEOs, this is apparently a key security system required by CTPAT/FAST. It is not only 
to record the facilities operations, but to have trained personnel watching the monitor identifying suspicious 
behaviours or threats, before they happen, rather than to analyse past events. However, storing the video 
recordings gives the capability to indentify annomalies in the normal business operations. 
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Sources of knowledge and learning 
Actors external to the firm provided information on regulations and insights on how to 
develop security resources; however the employees are the ones that know how to proceed 
in any circumstance.  
“Although the operations in the grower’s packing facilities are similar to ours and the technologies 
to be implemented are the same, we have different procedures, for that reason although they may 
suggest security operations we have our own training systems for the firm, they have theirs. Let’s 
take an example, the grower packs a big bulk and send it to me, with a standard security 
procedure paying attention in the pallet, but we need to re-pack, re-load, re-label, and arrange by 
quality grades for each client, each client therefore will require different security procedures, it is not 
the same monitoring 50 pounds bulks of produce than 10 x 5 pounds boxes; the ways to protect 
the produce in each case is different” (SC1D, 2007). 
Moreover, the grower/exporter (SD1E) had specialised loading capabilities, whilst SC1D 
has unloading and loading capabilities. Therefore SC1D required specific training 
programmes, which were developed within the firm.  
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Table 5.1.1: SC1D Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
C
a
p
a
b
. 
c
o
u
n
t 
T
o
ta
l 
c
a
p
a
b
. 
C.OC       5 2 4 3 5 
C.MS  3        1 
C.IC           
C.SH     1     1 
C.SD           
C.VA           
Resources count  1   1  1 1 1   
Total resources 5   
  Source: Elaborated based on SC1D 
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5.2. Supply Chain 1 Grower/Packer/Exporter (SC1E) 
The compliance process 
The CEOs in the firm SC1E had been aware of CTPAT since 2003 (T), when the prior 
notice and electronic manifest were required. They initially believed that CTPAT was going 
to be part of such public regulations. The CEOs believed at that time that the programme 
consisted of 1) the protection of the produce, and 2) the protection of the supply chain 
(P.I). 
Before the implementation, the firm had the supply chain protection functions located in 
the shipping department. The CEOs would make sure that the systems and procedures 
were in place to protect the produce but from a food safety point of view (P.A). Later it 
was not as clear to the CEOs whether protecting the produce was related to CTPAT 
guidelines (P.I). For the CEOs only those elements overlapping with food safety were clear 
enough, and the firm was already certified in that area (P.OL).  
By the time CTPAT diffused in the US and Mexico, i.e., by 2004-2005 (T), the firm was 
already partially implementing CTPAT guidelines (P.OL). The main security 
implementations were procedural, i.e. shipping and receiving security developed for 
compliance with the certifications in Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) with Scientific 
Certification Systems (SCS)70 (P.OL). Additionally, the trailer inspecting procedures were 
developed to meet the GMP (P.OL). However, the CEO currently rejects the possibility of 
applying for certification in CTPAT (P.OL). The reason is the belief that there is still much 
to do in that matter in the firm (P.A). On the other hand, the firm would continue 
upgrading their security resources in a self-regulated fashion (P.OL).  
The implementation included two strategies: internal developments and outsourcing. The 
decision to follow one or another would depend on whether or not the expertise required 
for each specific measure was readily available within the firm (P.A, and P.Imp). 
“There are operations for which I rely more in other personnel, for instance, there is need to inspect 
the trailer before loading the produce, that inspection should be done in a rather efficient and 
reliable way, that set of activities are performed by the PEP (State Preventive Police under Sinaloa 
                                                 
70 Third party certifier in environmental, sustainability and food standards (http://www.scscertified.com/). 
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Department of Public Security) with dogs, trained to detect drugs and other chemicals. The access 
controls and surveillance in the packing facilities are also performed by them (PEP)” (SC1E, 
2007). 
The implementation of security measures started before 9/11 and CTPAT (P.Imp) with 
the initiation of their greenhouse production in 1998 (T). The scale of the operations drove 
them to secure their facilities. The firm employed thousands of people in the packing and 
fields71. 
In summer 2001 (T), the firm established a compliance department driven by a food safety 
compliance process. This department was in charge of developing the policies, plans, 
strategies and handbooks that included the criteria to monitor and evaluate whether the 
procedures were efficiently safeguarding the product (P.E). The shipping department, on 
the other hand, had to deal with reporting incidents in the packing and loading areas, 
monitoring the facilities and the behaviour of the personnel (P.E, and P.Imp). Armoured 
public security officers were present to act accordingly in case of any incidents (P.E, P.Imp, 
and P.Fb-P.Com).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 The firm had stressed that they had the responsibility of providing, among other services, housing, 
kindergartens, schools, health services, public security, and transportation, which are all important for the 
wellbeing of the employees. 
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Figure 5: Summary of the compliance process by SC1E 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC1E 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
The firm has had a long term relationship with its only distributor; there was no need, 
therefore, to perform background checks. SC1E used to have one transport provider; 
however the scale of the operations was becoming too big to depend only on one provider, 
so the firm agreed with one more transport provider to diversify operations. The new 
transporter committed to comply with all public regulations, mainly to perform the 
electronic manifest: however, there a thorough background check was not carried out. 
Nowadays, the operations of the firm attract a great number of employees for harvesting 
and packing. When the security risks increased with the density of the population in the 
firm, the CEOs negotiated with the Mexican authorities to bring public security and safety 
into the firm. For such specialised services the firm pays fees to the authorities [6].  
 
Image 1: Screening and controlling the access to the packaging facilities 
(Public security personnel and antidrug/chemicals dog) 
 
Source: Images by the author in the packaging facilities of SC1E 
 
The firm have incorporated management systems technologies to increase physical security 
of the facilities and for access controls [7]. These systems were to make sure that the 
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personnel were only in pre-authorised areas. The technology consists of biometrics to grant 
and register access to the packaging and greenhouses facilities. 
These systems were not originally introduced for access controls, but to have accurate 
human resource management systems, to identify in which area of the company each 
employee was working and at what time, as well as to have accurate control of the overtime 
paid to the employees. With such a system, therefore, the compliance managers had the 
capacity to assess the overall security status of the company, based on the identification of 
unauthorised or unidentified personnel in specific areas (P.E). The compliance managers 
are capable of denying access to the facilities to suspicious persons. Furthermore, since the 
system is in each one of the greenhouses in the field, the compliance managers have the 
ability to know whether and when unauthorised, authorised, or suspicious persons had 
been in contact with the produce [8]. 
 
Image 2: Access control to packaging and greenhouses (biometrics) 
 
Source: Images by the author in the packing facilities of SC1E 
 
117 
 
 
Cargo traceability systems were developed by the shipping department [9], [10]; however, 
when an operation can be effectively managed by external organisations, e.g. electronic 
manifest by the transport provider, the outsourcing of that operation is encouraged. 
Procedural security required internal coordination and external support. For the shipping 
procedures to make sure the trailers and containers were clean by the time they left the 
packaging facilities, the firm used antidrug/chemical detection dogs, managed by the 
Preventive Police under the Sinaloa Department of Public Security (PEP). These 
operations were developed to comply with GMP. When a trailer arrives, it is screened by 
antidrugs/chemical detection dogs, later the container is sanitised with a quaternary 
ammonium compound, the cargo is loaded and the trailer sealed (non CTPAT/ISO 17712) 
[11].  
The warehouse, linked to the shipping area, is equipped with unmanned technologies to 
prevent contamination. In 2003, the CEOs identified (T) an ozone generator during the 
GMP compliance process. The system attacks bacteria, viruses and some chemicals, 
preventing the contamination of the fresh produce, and had been more reliable than 
human surveillance in the warehouse. Moreover, the system acts as a preventive and, in 
cases of minor contamination, as a corrective measure [12]. 
There are security criteria from CTPAT and other self-regulations that were not 
implemented. It was suggested to the rest of the supply chain partners to use the ozone 
system in the containers in transit to the US. However, there was a strong negative reaction 
from their supply chain partners, arguing that it represented unnecessary costs. Another 
rejected aspect was the background checks, “it would be the biggest department in the 
firm”, the CEOs declared. This is because of the nature and, again, scale of the operations, 
with a high annual turnover of personnel, based on migrants from the south of Mexico, 
who are hired as groups rather than as individuals. In the near future the probability of 
using background checks would be even lower, since the firm was expecting to increase its 
current operations of more than 100 hectares of greenhouse production by 50 more 
hectares in the following years. However, there is a record of conduct of the employees 
available in the current system.   
The security systems are interrelated with the safety measures (GMP). The firm prohibits 
any foreign substance in the greenhouse and packaging areas. The produce needs to be 
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handled with care, and with clean and sanitised hands; this is part of the basic induction an 
employee receives for GMP, and reminders of the rules are visible in every section where 
produce is being handled. According to the CEOs, this procedure clearly contributes to the 
prevention of bioterrorism activities. 
 
Internal and external sources of learning and knowledge 
The firm have cumulated knowledge throughout time; this required training sessions with 
GMP certifiers (P.E), including security procedures. The implementation of security 
measures were mainly based on internal capabilities and, when external support was 
provided, it was tightly interrelated with internal operations, excluding the electronic 
manifest, which was entirely outsourced.  
 
Image 3: Banners, Sensor-activated hands sanitizer, and GMP no contact with the 
produce 
 
Source: Images by the author in the packing facilities of SC1E 
 
The CEOs were clear in their strategy of exploiting resources that were already available 
elsewhere. This had important consequences to the internal capability building for security 
resources development. For instance, the firm did not invest resources in awareness skills 
or competencies to identify drugs and chemicals; all those resources were acquired from 
outside the firm. 
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To summarise, the CEOs relied on their own knowledge, experience and internal learning 
systems. Also, they realised that they had limited control over the supply chain, based upon 
their experience with trying to introduce the ozone generator. On the other hand, they also 
realised that resources, in the form of expertise, were available outside the firm for their 
deployment within; for this they had to reach agreement with public stakeholders.  
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Table 5.2.1: SC1E Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
C
a
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b
. 
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t 
T
o
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l 
c
a
p
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b
. 
C.OC     9     1 7 
C.MS   7  10     2 
C.IC  8   12  11   3 
C.SH   6       1 
C.SD           
C.VA           
Resources count  1 2  3  1     
Total resources 7   
Source: Elaborated based on SC1E 
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5.3. Supply Chain 1 & 5 Transport Provider (SC1&5T) 
The compliance process 
When it was made public that the FAST lanes would become operational in August 200672 
(T), (P.RI), various truck drivers in the firm SC1&5T estimated the potential time 
reductions by users of the programme. The CEOs gathered information from the CBP 
webpage, and later from the CTPAT seminars held in Nogales, Arizona. Other sources of 
information were seminars for the electronic manifest (P.RI). According to the CEOs, 
compliance with CTPAT/FAST was not a problem since drivers in the firms were dealing 
with security issues all the time (P.I). 
However, the firm would not deploy resources before being audited by CTPAT. They were 
not speculating about what they really needed, rather, it was preferable to be told by the 
officials what they required to get certified (P.I). The results of the audit at the end of 2006 
(T) by CTPAT officials (P.E) was that they required important investment in physical 
security, and that CTPAT officials would not believe the firm was committed to such 
investment if they were hiring the facilities, rather than owning them (P.A).  
The firm was also unwilling to invest in physical security, most of which was fixed capital, 
in a property not belonging to SC1&5T (P.OL). The implementation of the physical 
security was delayed due to the need to first acquire an area in which to build up their 
secured facilities (P.OL, and P.Imp), which was done in early 2007 (T). 
The entire personnel in the firm was involved in the design of operations and redistribution 
of roles, including compliance-related responsibilities, in the new facilities (P.E). However 
they were still not located in the new facilities, since they were being built at the time of this 
investigation. The CEOs were eager to achieve compliance and the certification for the 
firm, to be able to gain the benefits of using the FAST lanes (P.I, and P.OL). 
In the redesign of the security procedures and responsibility, the CEOs were trying to 
strike a balance between centralising and delegating the responsibilities of the 
implementation stages in the new facilities (P.Imp, and P.Com). However, there was no 
                                                 
72 (http://www.bip.arizona.edu/news_pdf/082106_FASTNogales071806.pdf) 
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systematic supervision and checklist of steps to follow in the implementation of security 
measures (P.Imp). The centralisation of the security measures consisted of:  
1) each area of the firm would propose security procedures for their own area and 
conduct P.A, P.OL, and P.E;  
2) the supervision of all operations and activities would be done by the general 
manager (P.E); and  
3) the security guard would be in charge of the surveillance of the facilities, trucks 
and trailers: the guard is provided by a private security company (P.Imp, and 
P.E).  
At the moment, the managers are able to monitor and control all the security operations 
(P.Imp, and P.E) due to the small scale of their operations. SC1&5T has 37 drivers, 37 
trucks and 62 trailers. 
The highest responsibility is held by the drivers (P.Imp). They need to check for cargo 
discrepancies, what was loaded and unloaded, and match it with the electronic manifest. 
They need to make sure the trailer had not been opened, since they need to keep the 
produce at a constant, low, temperature. The CEOs argue that it is always possible to 
poison a consumer unintentionally. For instance, a common scenario is that the truck is 
under inspection by the Mexican Department of Defence, which do not have the 
technologies in place to perform the inspections. The inspections are performed by hand, 
and exposed to outdoors environments in the Sonora dessert, where even in the winter 
season the maximum temperatures range between 37 to 40 degrees Celsius. If the cold 
chain is broken, the produce might get spoiled; these may not necessarily be detected by 
the random samplings in customs or in the distribution centre, hence the consumption of 
this food could poison consumers (P.A and P.E). If the spoiled produce is detected, the 
transport provider pays for it. To summarise, the truck driver needs to be very careful with 
the produce (P.A). 
At the moment the CEOs are considering a request made by SC5E (P.A) to introduce GPS 
(P.Imp) in their trailers. Furthermore, according to the CEOs, SC1&5T has procedural 
security based on communication systems, such as radio, mobile, and that needs to be very 
accurate to be able to perform the electronic manifest of the cargo: this needs to be 
transmitted exactly two hours before arriving at the port of entry. 
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SC1&5T knows the location of the trucks, based on basic communication with the drivers 
in transit. They inform the firm’s managers when the produce is being loaded and 
unloaded, either at the shipping point, inspection points (Mexican and US), or the 
distribution centres. Furthermore, the firm’s CEOs are collaborating with the electronic 
manifest software developers to link it with the GPS and georeferencing to locate and 
identify suspicious behaviour by the driver in transit. Hence the GPS is in turn becoming 
part of the CTPAT security profile of the firm, and it is planned that this should apply for 
all exporters to whom they may provide their services. 
The drivers follow procedural security criteria. The trucks are sealed when they are loaded, 
and there is a form that needs to be completed in case the seal is broken by an inspecting 
authority: that document needs the signature of the official that broke the seal. However, 
the firm have not developed any procedure for re-sealing the trailer, because after breaking 
the first seal, “all that is needed is trust in the driver” (SC1&5T, 2008). As the firm have not 
had incidents before, they continue trusting the personnel.  
The drivers are also competent in the identification of suspicious behaviour by individuals 
on the road. Training was provided by US governmental agencies, consultancies and 
associations. 
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Figure 6: Compliance process SC1&5T 
 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC1&5T 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
The physical security is under development, based on recommendations from CTPAT 
officials. This required considerable investment, and CEOs’ involvement for the entire 
design of the new facilities [13]. It is planned that the physical access controls are 
performed by the firm’s guards, with basic record-keeping of the entrance and exit of 
people to the firm’s facilities. However in relation to the areas within the facilities, it is 
planned that each person in each area is responsible in allowing only authorised personnel 
to have access to restricted areas [14]. 
The firm is not developing personnel security profiles, since they rely strongly on well-
known and trusted drivers, and their hiring strategy has worked well so far. Therefore 
networking and personal contacts are still the mechanisms by which to hire personnel in 
the firm. 
Procedural security had been performed according to routines established by the exporters 
and the distributor, while the main concern of the driver is to make sure the cargo is legal, 
that it matches the electronic manifest and the bill of lading, that the trailer was not 
opened, and extra care in case the trailer had been inspected due to transiting with a broken 
seal [15]. 
The conveyance traceability systems have been in development with the software provider. 
It requires constant communication to verify that the units are effectively identified in the 
GPS system and that the software is integrated with the electronic manifest systems [16]. 
However, this development did not require any coordination with SC1E or SC5E. 
Finally, the awareness of the drivers has been acquired by experience; however, it has also 
been enhanced by the training seminars provided by the US Department of Transport 
(USDOT) and CTPAT seminars [17]. 
 
Learning and knowledge sources 
The firm has developed experience on its own, and the security changes are planned and 
implemented internally. The required external support in the compliance process comes 
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from CTPAT agents, who assessed the facilities and explained what the firm needed in 
order to get certified (P.A and P.E). The exporters may require certain procedures, which 
are normally granted since they do not require substantial changes, apart from adding more 
operations to the business. This is except for the GPS, which indeed required strong 
collaboration with software developers to integrate the two different systems into one in 
order to be able to monitor and trace the trailer, not the cargo. When all the resources are 
in place, the firm expects to have a second audit to either achieve compliance or introduce 
the changes indicated by the CTPAT auditors. 
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Table 5.3.1: SC1&5T Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
C
a
p
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. 
c
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l 
c
a
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b
. 
C.OC  13        1 8 
C.MS  13        1 
C.IC  13 14  15     3 
C.SH     15;16   16 17 3 
C.SD           
C.VA           
Resources count  1 1  2   1 1   
Total resources 6   
Source: The author, based on interview with SC1&5T 
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5.4. Supply Chain 2 Distributor (SC2D) 
The compliance process 
The FPAA first informed the firm about CTPAT in 2002 (P.RI) (T), and the compliance 
manager followed up the regulation. For the CEOs it was not initially clear how the 
regulations would influence the business operations (P.A), it was necessary to attend the 
CTPAT seminars (P.I). After the seminars the firm understood that the CBP would treat 
cargo coming from compliant firms as safer, and therefore benefits would be associated 
with compliance; a good indication for the CBP of more secured cargo would be the sealed 
trailers (P.I, and P.A). 
In order to be able to qualify for the benefits of the regulations the firm agreed on pursuing 
full compliance at the end of 2002 (P.OL). The compliance manager then had the 
responsibility of developing a handbook of security procedures for the whole distribution 
operations, submitted the firm’s security profile to CTPAT programme at the beginning 
2003 (T), and was granted the certification and validation at the end of 2003 (T) (P.OL).  
The issue of compliance with security regulations is who controls the supply chain (P.I). 
For instance, there is currently a dilemma of who will be held responsible for the use of the 
high security seals, not yet in use in our supply chain. The high security seal is seen by the 
CBP as a very safe measure, reducing the probability of inspections and reducing the cross-
border times (P.I.) (P.Imp). 
Should the seals be managed by SC2E&T, the distributor would be transferring the 
responsibility to them, but the whole supply chain would be accountable. The other option 
would be not giving any duty to SC2E&T, and therefore every cargo would be inspected in 
Nogales-Mex in CAADES, Maynar, or at the Mexican Customs Brokers warehouse. The 
trailer would be sealed just before joining the port of entry. The first option would be 
cheaper than, but not as safe as, the second option; the risks would be higher and costs 
lower in the first option. At the time of the interview, the firm was planning to choose the 
second option, for higher security and control over the supply chain (P.Imp, P.A, and 
P.OL).  
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The firm had used the usual meetings to inform the personnel about the implementation of 
the new security regulations, and they had training sessions on security procedures. There 
are signs around the facilities indicating whether areas are restricted or not and how to 
proceed in case of intrusion. These are reminders of the lines of action given in the training 
sessions to all employees (P.Com). 
The implementation stage required re-organisational capabilities in SC2D. There was a 
need to re-learn and re-design the organisation of the warehouse facilities; there were 
materials that had to be re-located to protected areas (P.Imp). Previously, the produce 
could be contaminated even with other produce. Therefore, each type of produce required 
special storage conditions: if one cargo was contaminated, the organisation of the facilities 
and storage conditions should prevent cross-contamination between cargos [18]. Hence, on 
top of the security awareness and procedural security training, the personnel received post-
harvest handling training, which also contributes to preventing contamination of the 
produce (P.Imp, P.Com).  
The whole personnel have been assigned more activities in their daily routines. Specific 
security training and skills have been developed in each area, built upon previous skills. For 
instance, the compliance officer used to do general background checks before CTPAT, 
based on information supplied by The Blue Book73, and, once or twice per season, in 
relation to food safety regulations. Previously, there were no written reports, however the 
assessments are no longer only for SC2D, but for the regulatory and certifying agencies. 
Therefore written reports of SC2D and its business partners (exporters, and service 
providers) need to be issued to the relevant agencies. Furthermore, the background checks 
of business partners have been enhanced to analyse whether the firms are implementing or 
developing CTPAT or other security criteria, and the firm need to assess whether the 
measures are sufficient to be considered a partner. The firms had the assessment 
competencies, but they were upgraded and formalised for monitoring purposes. 
The firm keeps contact with CTPAT officials to share the status of the security resources 
being developed with them, having continuous feedback from them on how much such 
measures conform to security criteria (P.E).  
                                                 
73 Source of information on credit ratings and trading practices by firms 
(http://www.producebluebook.com/). 
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Figure 7: Compliance process SC2D 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC2D 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
The business partners security procedures were upgraded from previous knowledge of 
research of credit history and trade practices of all its business partners. The compliant 
officer developed the procedures for investigating the firms’ security status, and then 
trained the relevant personnel in charge of investigating and establishing relationships with 
clients and suppliers [19]. 
The physical security and access controls required investment and warehouse re-
arrangements [20], with relevant training of the warehouse personnel on the handling and 
restricted access to the produce and materials [21]. The training came from the fire 
departments and the post-harvest specialist for the prevention of produce cross-
contamination [22]74, as well as from the acquisition and installation of CCTV equipment 
[23]. 
The compliance officer has developed a strategy to conduct background checks on the 
personnel hired to work in the distribution centre, and shared this with human resources 
personnel. However, such activities only required basic internet searching skills, where it is 
possible to find information about individuals with criminal convictions. Again, such 
investigation skills were added to the basic human resources hiring strategies and work 
records examinations [24]. 
According to the compliance manager, their information systems require personnel to have 
basic computing competencies (R.IT). The firm has password protected information 
systems but this is a single password for the whole firm. There is no monitoring of 
individual modifications of the databases and records.  
The procedural and trailer security are tightly coordinated with the grower/transport 
provider (SC2E&T), who had integrated growing, packing and transport operations. The 
cargo and shipping procedures are shared with the partner (SC2E&T) to make sure they 
were followed [25]; furthermore, these procedures were upgraded taking into consideration 
SC2E&T capabilities [26]. The compliance manager argued that this resource is developed 
                                                 
74 This capability is classified as physical security resource and not as Training and Assessment, as it is not a 
formal training system, but a more practical training. It was also not classified as an organisational 
competence, because the knowledge for the training was not based on the internal personnel or 
organisational, but external (C.SH). Yet, in this practical training it was necessary internal coordination 
capacity (C.IC), so that on the job training was possible. 
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mainly by them (SCD2). This is different from the trailer security, which is a result of a 
joint development between SC2D and SC2E&T. 
The trucks and trailers are the property of SC2E&T, which has particular interest for 
sustaining good trailer security inspections. Therefore SC2D and SC2E&T regularly 
updated each other on how to perform better inspections of the trailer during visits of 
SC2D to SC2E&T’s facilities [27]. 
The conveyance security was almost non-existent: the cargoes are transiting unsealed, and 
they have been using the services of the border-crossers (burreros)75. Since the supply chain 
was still not using seals (R.Co), the only way of securing the cargo was by procedural 
security. 
Such vulnerability in conveyance security drove SC2D to train their personnel on security 
awareness in relation to the trailer inspections, thus reinforcing their use of CCTV among 
17 areas in the facilities. One of these areas is the cargo dock area where CCTV is used to 
analyse cargo unloading in case of any incident [28]. 
 
Learning and knowledge sources 
SC2D have supported the upgrading of the supply chain security through internal 
mechanisms, support from specialised stakeholders (consultants, CTPAT supply chain 
security specialists, post-harvest safety), and have been eager to share information and 
encouraging about compliance with the CTPAT regulations to its supply chain partners, 
including SC2E&T. Participation of their suppliers in the new CTPAT regulation will 
precede any transfer of responsibilities to the initial phases of the supply chain (P.A, P.OL, 
and P.E)  
 
                                                 
75 Trucks may carry two trailers from the packing facilities, and one more truck is needed to cross to the US, 
since they do not allow one truck to carry two trailers. The additional truck crossing the trailer to the US is 
hired from a border-crosser (burrero) service provider together with the driver. Therefore the driver from the 
transport provider is responsible for one truck and one trailer together with the transport provider: the 
border-crosser (burrero) is accountable for the other truck and trailer, together with the transport provider. In 
that context, the driver must implement the procedural security before transferring the responsibility to the 
border-crosser (burrero), since the driver is making the transport provider accountable for the actions of the 
border-crosser (burrero). 
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Table 5.4.1: SC2D Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
C
a
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. 
C.OC 19 23  24 28     4 12 
C.MS  20,18 20       2 
C.IC  22 21       2 
C.SH  22   26     2 
C.SD     25     1 
C.VA     27     1 
Resources count 1 4 2 1 4       
Total resources 12   
Source: The author, based on interview with SC2D
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5.5. Supply Chain 2 Grower/Packer & Transport Provider (SC2E&T) 
The compliance process 
The compliance manager from the distribution company (SC2D) provided information on 
safety and security measures to SC2E&T (P.RI, and P.E). Since the firm has its own 
transportation company, at the end of 2003 (T) the distributor (SC2D) and CBP suggested 
participation in the CTPAT to SC2E&T’s CEOs (P.RI). Later, the firm was visited in early 
2006 (T) by CTPAT officials coming from Washington to assess the firm and inform about 
security regulations (P.RI, P.A, and P.E). Later the CEOs attended a series of CTPAT 
seminars (P.RI). 
The CEOs had the impression that getting certified would be important (P.I), however at 
the moment the resources need to be oriented towards an ongoing certification on food 
safety regulations (P.OL, P.A). 
In August 2007 (T), SC2D requested that the firm to become certified in good agricultural, 
manufacturing and handling practices with PrimusLabs76 (P.I), in order to maintain their 
clients in the United States. The firm’s CEOs believe that such food safety regulations 
contribute to security compliance as well. 
The CEOs mentioned that the good manufacturing practices certification includes a 
section on traceability (P.A), which is also an essential criterion of the security regulations 
from CTPAT (P.A). They criticised the inspection points set up by the Mexican authorities, 
arguing that they spoil every security measure implemented by the firm (P.I). This is 
because once they break the trailers’ seals, the cargo remains exposed to any intrusion on 
the road after the inspection points (P.A, and P.I). 
The CEOs were delaying compliance with security regulations (P.OL). However they were 
expecting that upon successfully developing and implementing food safety practices and 
certification, various resources developed for that purpose would also contribute to 
security compliance (P.A). According to the CEOs, a security compliance delay does not, in 
fact, represent a security resources development delay (P.I, P.A, and P.OL).  
                                                 
76 Third party certifier, laboratory and consulting of safety, quality and growing practices and systems of for 
food supply chains (www.primuslabs.com) 
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Although the security compliance process would follow the food safety compliance 
process, the CEOs did not expect to achieve full compliance in CTPAT (P.OL), because 
there is little incentive to fully comply with CTPAT, since the industry is not compliant 
(P.A, P.I).  
“From the transport provider view point, at the moment, we cannot find enough qualified drivers to 
move the produce to the US. At the moment, I have trucks not being used, because I have not 
enough drivers. Now, as soon as I inform a potential driver that I was to conduct a background 
check on them, and they are required to perform extra security operations compared to what the 
rest of the transport industry in Mexico is requiring, they would leave to other firms to work. That 
is what I mean, the CTPAT regulation is possible if the rest of the industry applies the criteria as 
I do” (SC2E&T, 2008). 
According to the firm, the security measures implementation process could be done in two 
ways: within-firm development or outsourcing (P.A, and P.Imp). Since the firm is relatively 
new (its initial operations were in 2000) (T), and the scale of the operations is very small 
compared to the rest of the exporters from the region, the firm decided that security 
measures would be designed and carried out internally since they are able to maintain 
control over the facility (P.A, P.Imp).   
Since all people get involved in the implementation process, and there are only a few 
managers (P.A), the CEO plans to have face-to-face communication systems and controls 
incorporated into the daily routines (P.Com). The CEOs considered that safety and security 
issues were interrelated; hence the safety compliance manager would be made responsible 
for security compliance processes (P.Imp).  
In cases where the businesses’ partners have the competencies, the firm outsourced the 
security activities. For instance, with the operations to comply with Public Regulations, 
their customs brokers performed the Prior Notice, whilst their insurance providers 
performed their Electronic Manifest (P.OL). 
Those services were offered to the firm (SC2E&T) as gratuities for doing business with 
them (P.A, and P.Imp). The CEOs accepted such offers as a result of lacking the 
information technologies and trained personnel to make the electronic transmissions on 
their own to the FDA and CBP (P.A). 
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The firm was also strategically avoiding investment (P.A) in ‘unnecessary’ security 
resources. One of those investments was CCTV, even though the CEOs acknowledged 
that, for CTPAT officials, using CCTV was good security practice (P.I). According to the 
compliance managers, the alternative was to enhance the monitoring systems and 
recordkeeping of the procedures and conditions of the cargo. 
Furthermore, the CEOs criticised the regulatory design of CTPAT, because it does not 
take into account the different configuration of its firm’s operations (P.I). Although the 
firm (SC2E&T) has packing facilities, most of them are in open fields where the produce is 
picked up with mobile packing systems. Moreover, there are mobile cooling systems 
designed to load the trailers and cool them down on the fields. In fact, the produce could 
be sent directly from the field to the United States. 
The CEOs argued that they could not achieve security and protect against bioterrorism 
threats by installing physical technologies in their fixed packing facilities (as required by 
CTPAT), but by developing procedural securities ad hoc to their packaging and logistical 
systems (P.OL, P.Imp). 
There are additional challenges posed by the CTPAT requirements according to the CEOs. 
This is because they hire pickers by the hundreds from the south of Mexico with practically 
no information of their background. Background checks are economically prohibitive in 
these cases. 
Although the firm was visited by CTPAT officials (early 2006) (T), and invited to develop 
the security resources and apply for certification, the firm was reluctant for two reasons: 1) 
at that time they had no security resources at all (P.A, and P.E), and 2) they were expecting 
to apply after their certification in food safety (end of the 2009) (T) (P.OL). 
Only then would the CEOs request the visit of CTPAT specialists. It is then when the 
CEOs would determine the precise security resources needed in the firm to achieve 
compliance and certification (2010) (T) (P.E, and P.A). According to plan, the firm would 
see security implementations in 2010 (T), aiming at certification in CTPAT (P.OL) at the 
end of 2011 (T). Notwithstanding, SC2D is already giving feedback to SC2E&T relating to 
the CTPAT guidelines, and expectedly it would continue to do so during their full 
implementation (P.E).  
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Figure 8: Compliance process SC2E&T 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC2E&T 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
The firm had not developed the resources to realise business partner backgrounds, except 
for credit and marketing ratings that require basic internet browsing and knowledge of the 
industry [29]. The physical security had not yet been developed, but the firm expected to 
rely on its internal personnel’s competencies to build up such resources and design 
facilities. 
Most of the access control systems and procedural security have relied so far on personnel 
competencies, skills and internal management systems [30], [31]. The exceptions are the 
procedures related to traceability of the cargo and the electronic manifests, which are based 
on close coordination between the firm (SC2E&T), the driver, the customs brokers, and 
the insurance providers. The Prior Notice and Electronic Manifest are issued exactly two 
hours before joining the port of entry. This is done when the trailers have been hauled with 
the border-crosser’s trucks in Nogales-Mex [32].  
In relation to the information technologies, the firm relies strongly on their insurer and 
customs brokers. Only they are able to modify or transmit the information to the CBP and 
FDA, while SC2E&T remains accountable for such operations. It is their business partners 
who have the software and knowledge to modify the information of the firm according to 
the US customs and FDA. What the firm has is trust in such business partners, rather than 
security procedures [33]. 
On the other hand, the trailer and container inspections are conducted in Nogales, Mexico 
by the Mexican customs broker or Maymar [34]. Most of the trailers and conveyance 
securities are spoiled by the Mexican inspectors, who do not take into account whether the 
trailer is secured according to the CTPAT security guidelines (P.Imp, and P.E).  
 
Learning and knowledge sources 
The CEOs (owners) mentioned that the firm (SC2E&T) was relatively young; however 
they had previously managed another firm for several years, and had a cumulated 
experience of 30 years. Most of knowledge of security had been acquired through CTPAT 
seminars (P.RI, R.I); however, the firm SC2E&T was relatively new and they were trying to 
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learn to comply from scratch (P.OL). To summarise, the CEOs argument was that they 
had enough experience to acknowledge that they had a vulnerable young firm, leading them 
to delay security regulatory compliance (P.OL), and delay deploying any resource until the 
CTPAT auditors had indicated what was required (P.A, and P.E).  
For the implementation process of public mandates (Electronic Manifest and Prior Notice) 
they identified external organisations able to provide the services of Electronic Manifest 
(EM) and Prior Notice (PN), thus covering one security criteria without the use of internal 
efforts, except using the traditional facsimile transmission to request the EM and PN. The 
CEOs highlighted that young firms like theirs required state support to build up security 
compliance: 
“We do not have the knowledge to assess our security status, but what we need to know is what to 
do, since the implementation I do not think it will represent a big problem, we have people able to 
learn and adapt to the new conditions. However, as a small firm, we do require the support from 
the Mexican State, we require similar regulations as CTPAT in Mexico, which may lead the 
government to set up the institutional support mechanism, such as technological developments and 
transfers, trainings, and specialist that lead us to comply, just as it is happening with the food 
safety regulations” (SC2E&T, 2008).  
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Table 5.5.1: SC2E&T Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
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C.OC 29  30;31  30;31     3 8 
C.MS   30;31  30;31     2 
C.IC           
C.SH     32;33  34   3 
C.SD           
C.VA           
Resources count 1  2  4  1     
Total resources 8   
Source: The author, based on interview with SC2E&T 
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5.6. Supply Chain 3 Distributor (SC3D) 
The compliance process 
The firm had received information related to CTPAT since 2003 (T) from various sources 
such as the CBP, FPAA (The Fresh Produce Association of the Americas), third party 
certifiers offering their services, the Mexican government organising seminars in Mexico, 
and their suppliers (P.RI). The firm not only received information on security regulations, 
they also participated in the seminars given by US and Mexican institutions (P.RI and P.I).  
The firm SC3D had the intention of following the security guidelines and controlling the 
entire supply chain. The problem for the compliance manager was how to do that, as well 
as whether and to what extent the implementations would conform to the regulations (P.I, 
and P.A). The manager was also concerned with the difficulty of strengthening the weak 
link of the chain, transport (P.A, and P.E). 
SC3D knew about their limited capacity to control the supply chain, yet they fully engaged 
with CTPAT (P.OL). The firm went through a trial and error implementation process that 
continuously updated their security profile, which in turn reflected the guidelines given by 
the CTPAT authorities (P.Imp). In the firm, people felt that they were partnering with the 
US government, and they would try to enhance the level of security (P.I, and P.OL). 
Initially the firm soon developed the operational procedures to the new security regulations 
(R.Pro). Since the firm was not far from compliance, it was granted the certification (P.E) 
in 2005 (T) by CTPAT: not only them, but also their main supply chain (P.E).  
One of the limitations of the security measures was the lack of specifications related to the 
experience of the truck drivers; the whole supply chain suffered the consequences. In early 
2006 (T) the transport provider sent a 23 year old driver alone who, although trained, was 
inexperienced in dealing with the border-crossers (burreros) and implementing the 
procedural, trailer, truck, and conveyance security in real-life. The driver hired a ‘burrero’, 
who had a valid US driver licence for cross-border operations, but later was caught by the 
US customs with a backpack carrying drugs (P.E).  
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As a consequence, the all the supply chain partners related with the distributor lost their 
certifications and therefore the benefits of CTPAT/FAST were also lost (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: Supply chains reorganisation by lost certification by SC3D 
SC3D. Lost
certification
Previous transport provider
'A' (Faulty) Lost certification
Exporter 'A' for SC3D. Lost
certification
Exporter 'D' for SC3D.
Developing Security resources
Transport provider 'B'.
Developing security resourcesExporter 'C' for SC3D.
Developing Security resources
Exporter 'B' for SC3D.
Developing Security resources
Unable to benefit from CTPAT/FAST.
Eliminated from the chainUnable to benefit from
CTPAT/FAST
Supply chain 'A'
Supply chain 'B'
Supply chain 'C'
Supply chain 'D'
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC3D 
 
Their exporters (SC ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’), who at the time were developing security measures 
with good prospects of gaining certification, lost a certified transport provider ‘A’, which 
was thus eliminated as supply chain partner. Since then, the exporter could no longer 
benefit from CTPAT compliance until the distributor obtains re-certification. It takes a 
minimum of one year of full clean records to have the right to re-apply for CTPAT re-
certification. The exporters (SC ‘A’ and ‘B’) switched to other transport providers, ‘B’ 
servicing other exporters (SC ‘C’ and ‘D’), but without CTPAT certification. 
After losing the certification, the CEOs decided to keep implementing and refining their 
security practices (P.Imp, and P.OL). According to the compliance manager, the firm have 
not only developed measures that make the SC3D a low risk facility, but they also 
encouraged (forced) its growers/exporters and transport providers to engage in lowering 
the risks of becoming the subject of illegal and bioterrorist activities. They prioritised 
business with firms committed to leverage the security resources, and able to move the 
large volumes of produce they distribute. 
The compliance manager considers that the inspections performed by the Mexican 
authorities are not useful to lower the risks of illegal drug smuggling and bioterrorism, in 
fact they may increase the risks (P.A). 
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The trailer security criteria include the management of high security seals. SC3D required 
that SC3E locks the trailer with high security seals, and for SC3T to have full control of the 
seals in transit. 
However, at their inspection points, the Mexican Secretary of National Defense 
(SEDENA) breaks those seals. Furthermore, there is no Mexican mandate requiring the 
soldier to re-seal or sign the seals monitoring forms, therefore the CEO declared that: 
“Without the commitment of SEDENA, in terms of monitoring the violation of seals, neither we 
(SC3D) nor the US customs are able to tell the difference between a broken seal by SEDENA, 
an irresponsible driver, a drug smuggler, and a bioterrorist. There is no trust on a broken seal; the 
cargo needs to be inspected. Consequently, even if we were certified, we would not be able to get the 
benefits in case the cargo arrives to the US customs with a violated seal” (SC3D, 2007). (P.RI) 
According to assessments realised by the firm (SC3D), and other distributors from 
Nogales, the security resources of the firm conform to the CTPAT security guidelines 
(P.E). These are the result of years of trial and error implementation processes attempting 
to redesign the normal business operations to embed security resources in them, rather 
than just adding more routines to operations (P.Imp). Once the processes are re-designed, 
they are sent to SC3E, other exporters from Mexico, and to the transport providers that 
coordinate with SC3E to secure the cargo. 
Currently the security measures are self-imposed, with the aim of requesting re-certification 
(P.OL). The risk factor identified by the compliance managers (P.E) is out of the control of 
the firm: the inspections are conducted by the Mexican army (SEDENA), which, according 
to the CEOs in SC3D, interfere with their supply chain security implementations (P.A and 
P.Imp). 
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Figure 10: Compliance process SC3D 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC3D 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
Security resources have been leveraged based upon previous experience in quality and 
safety regulations (P.OL). This knowledge had resulted in re-designing compliance 
processes that are cost/routine-effective (P.A). 
In relation to the business partners, the firm conducts a basic investigation of the capacity 
of the firm to comply, and their certification records are useful tools that SC3D uses to 
assess business partners. In the compliance manager’s words: 
“A grower/exporter certified in GAP, has the degree. Every extra module in the certification 
represents a postgraduate degree; the more the better. Our business partners are ranked by 
certifications, by auditing scores, and by years being certified, the highest ranked firms are more 
competent and responsible than the lowest ranked” (SC3D, 2007) [35]. 
In relation to the physical security, the redesign of the building structure and organisation 
of business operations required a trial and error analysis of times, movements and 
monitoring capacity. SC3D has 1 hectare (100,000 square feet) of cooling facility with 
multiple access points. The firm closed its access points one by one, and estimated the ratio 
of tac-time77 to monitoring capacity. The firm ended up with only one access point and 
increased tac-time by 5 minutes per cargo; in 20 cargos this represents one more hour of 
operation costs. However, that is not all: there is an employee exclusively hired and trained 
to perform the monitoring and record keeping of the security operations, to comply with 
CTPAT security guidelines [36]. 
The CEOs declared that the firm’s human capital keeps the security implementations. The 
personnel have been training and experimenting to find ways to embed the security 
operations into normal business routines [37]. The personnel in the firm contributed to the 
reorganisation of internal areas, with internal fences that direct authorised personnel into 
certain areas [38]. Two crucial employees were hired for trailer and procedural security and 
the analysis of biological and chemical agents in the produce. Another crucial security 
resource was related to the CCTV that was being installed. The CCTV itself was considered 
a tool: more important for the firm was the capacity of the personnel managing it [39]. The 
                                                 
77 In supply chain management, tac-time is equivalent to cycle-time. In manufacturing, it represents the 
production time per assembly station. 
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compliance manager thought that CTPAT was not about the analysis of behaviour after the 
cargo has been unloaded but about preventing actions, which is only done by identification 
of suspicious behaviours by a specialised person in charge of the CCTV in real time (P.I). 
Furthermore the CCTV was not arranged to point towards the loading/unloading area, 
because there is a specialist conducting the trailer and procedural security [40], the firm 
would not duplicate security resources.  
In relation to the procedural security, the specialist was in direct communication with the 
exporter and together with the driver was able to match and solve document discrepancies, 
provided by the driver upon arrival. These documents included the electronic manifest, the 
Bill of Lading, and the seals monitoring forms in case the exporter had implemented the 
measure. At this stage discrepancies were cleared based on good communication between 
SC3D, driver and SC3E. SC3D specialist issued recommendations to the exporters and 
transport providers on how to improve the procedural security. Furthermore, the specialist 
keeps records of all the matching documents and cargo discrepancies [41].  
 
Learning and knowledge sources 
The firm have based its implementations heavily on previous experience and on-the-job 
training for their personnel. The employees are encouraged to undertake a critical 
perspective on the implementations, and to try to avoid any increases in number of 
movements performed in their normal activities: the issue the firm have tried to encourage 
in their human resources is how to marry security with efficiency (P.Imp). Rather than 
learning from the supply chain, SC3D had tried to educate its partners (C.SD). Sometimes, 
the CEOs commented, the firm ‘had gone too far’ in educating them, since the growers 
and transport providers have received security profiles from SC3D ready to be 
implemented to their operations. When the firm encounters problems in any aspect of the 
implementation, especially in access control and physical security systems, it immediately 
issues recommendations to its exporters, including SC3E [42] [43]. 
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Table 5.6.1: SC3D Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
C
a
p
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b
. 
c
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t 
T
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l 
c
a
p
a
b
. 
C.OC 35 36;39 38  40  40   5 11 
C.MS  37        1 
C.IC  39 38       2 
C.SH           
C.SD  42 43  41     3 
C.VA           
Resources count 1 4 2  2  1     
Total resources 10   
Source: The author, based on interview with SC3D 
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5.7. Supply Chain 3 Packer/Exporter (SC3E) 
The compliance process 
In May 2005 (T), the distributor SC3D informed the exporter (SC3E) about the need to 
develop a security profile to comply with CTPAT (P.RI). The exporter SC3E developed 
the profile by October 2005 (T), which represents the commitment of the firm to develop 
and implement security resources (P.OL). Development of the security resources was 
started immediately (P.A), and by May 2006 they were partially implemented (P.Imp). The 
application for certification was submitted and they were still waiting for the validation 
from the CTPAT officials (P.E).  
The CEOs and compliance managers commented that CTPAT aimed at protecting the 
food supply chain (P.A), which may be susceptible to bioterrorist attacks. However, since it 
was voluntary, it had to offer benefits to the firms becoming certified (P.RI).  
The compliance manager acknowledged that the firm was still far from compliant, although 
it was aiming to fully comply and get certified (P.Imp and P.E). In October 2005 (T), the 
initial evaluation of SC3E conducted by them and by SC3D was disappointing (P.E), 
finding that they still had to develop many security resources (P.A). However, they felt that 
their personnel had enough experience in compliance issues, based on previous know-how 
built out of food quality and safety regulatory compliance processes (P.I). 
The CEOs and compliance manager prioritised the development of procedural security, 
delaying other security criteria for the later stages of the implementation process (P.Imp, 
and P.OL). However, such implementation did not happen without organisational rigidities 
in early 2006 (T), leading to intense re-distribution of regulatory compliance tasks (P.A, and 
P.Com) in early 2007 (T).  
This was due to the firm’s need to increase the efficiency of their packing operations. The 
firm had quality and safety routines, and increasingly efficient operations. The packing 
manager felt that the efficiency had contributed to a better income for their personnel in 
the packing operations. The personnel rejected the security implementations (P.Imp) since 
that would considerably reduce efficiency for an unknown period of time, in turn leading to 
a reduction in income for at least the same period. The firm does not pay for learning to 
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implement security routines, only for the efficiency of their operations. Furthermore, there 
were personnel unwilling to incorporate more activities in their routines, arguing that they 
would be overloaded (P.A, and P.Imp).  
The CEOs decided to re-distribute the internal roles. The firm had a quality and a safety 
manager (P.Imp). The packing work floor manager was leading the implementation of the 
‘implementation of quality and safety’ guidelines in the packing operations (P.Imp); 
therefore, it was rather difficult for her to be assigned the additional task of security 
guidelines. According to the CEOs, in so doing, SC3E would be at risk of lowering the 
efficiency of their packing operations. The solution taken by the CEOs was releasing the 
work floor manager from her quality and safety responsibilities, and asking her to 
exclusively dedicate herself to the enforcement of security guidelines in the packing 
facilities (P.A). 
At the same time and following recommendations by SC3D, the quality manager was 
assigned safety and security enforcement, and supervision roles. She was named as CTPAT 
compliance manager: the safety manager now had safety and quality roles. The CTPAT 
compliance manager and the packing manager designed the security practices, the latter was 
then in charge of implementing the measures in the packing area. The CTPAT compliance 
manager was supervising implementation not only in the packing facilities, but across all 
departments in SC3E (P.Imp, and P.E).  
 
Table 5.7.1: Compliance enforcement team and roles SC3E 
 Design Implementation 
Roles/Managers Security Safety Quality Security Safety Quality 
CTPAT manager * * * * *  
Work floor manager    *   
Safety manager  * *  * * 
Source: The author, based on interviews with SC3E 
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The CTPAT manager and safety manager designed the safety and quality practices; the 
latter implemented the safety and quality practices in the packing facilities, while the 
CTPAT compliance manager assessed the relevance and interrelationship with security 
measures.  
The packing manager was released from his safety and quality responsibilities, to dedicate 
exclusively to packing operations and security implementation. The packing manager has 
the priority of maintaining the efficiency of the operations, and ensuring the security of the 
packing operations. The results of the security practices, quality and safety assurance were 
being assessed during 2008 (T) (P.E).  
Interestingly, the CEOs and compliance managers in SC3E did not engage in analysing 
whether the CTPAT guidelines were suitable for the firm (P.A); instead, they followed the 
guidelines as suggested by SC3D, where and when they were able (P.Imp).  
Due to the re-distribution of tasks in critical areas in the organisation, the firm supported 
its communication mechanisms with regular meetings, and face-to-face throughout the 
hierarchical structure (P.Com). External communication systems had been tightened with 
the transport provider, since there was now the need to keep tightly coordinated for cross-
border operations; this is supported by the normal communication systems, radio and 
mobile phones, as well as GPS to match the position of the cargo with the activities of the 
driver, to improve traceability and enforce trailer security (P.Imp, and P.Com).  
The implementation of the security measures were assessed with continuous (T) physical 
inspections and supervision by SC3D and CTPAT compliance manager (P.E) . SC3E 
encountered serious problems in assessing the security measures of the transport providers 
(P.E). Initially (October 2005) (T) the firm would expect to find transporters building up 
resources to comply with CTPAT. However they were only able to identify one transport 
provider with such capabilities, and it was the most expensive transport provider in Mexico 
(P.A). 
Later, SC3D recommended that SC3E assess the security implementation of a specific 
transport provider (SC3T). After visiting various facilities from various transport providers, 
SC3E’s compliance manager found that SC3T, suggested by SC3D, was the one with 
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higher security measures and closer to the required CTPAT security guidelines (P.A, and 
P.E).  
 
Figure 11: Compliance process SC3E 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC3E 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
Most of the security practices in SC3E relied heavily on the competence of the CTPAT 
compliance manager. Although there was little information in Mexico to conduct relevant 
background investigations of potential business partners, there are public records that allow 
the firm to know how long a firm has been in existence. Together with public registration 
numbers the firm has conducted visits to the facilities of their business partners, and 
analysed their potential to become CTPAT certified in the short run, creating a list of 
potential business partners [44]. 
The physical and access control securities required coordination between departments, and 
in some instances with external organisations. Internally, if a visitor says that he is visiting 
an employee, the guard in the entrance must contact that employee by radio, who must 
then confirm that he is expecting that visit, and the visitor can only be accompanied by the 
employee [45]. The packing manager had the responsibility of surveillance in the facilities 
and coordinated with the private security providers [46]. Furthermore the visitor can only 
leave with a form signed by the employee authorising their exit from the firm, and with a 
note of the reason for the visit. Externally, the guards’ surveillance and access controls 
were outsourced to a firm providing private security services to firms. The procedures to 
authorise [47] and analyse [48] the visitors and personnel behaviour were designed in 
coordination between the security company and the managers of SC3E. These operations 
are active from May to July (T), when the packing facilities are in operation.  
 
Learning and knowledge sources 
SC3E is heavily dependent on SC3D for the development of their security practices. 
Although it is information that they receive from the distributor, procedures are tested in 
SC3D [49]. On the other hand, those procedures required adaptation by the firm, mainly in 
relation to the packing facilities that require special security control systems, and which do 
not exist in the SC3D [50]. SC3E later makes requests to the transport provider to 
implement specific trailer security measures [51]. There is an apparent flow of security 
recommendations from SC3D to SC3E, and later to SC3T. In the case of the outsourced 
services of access controls, the measures were developed jointly between the security 
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service provider and the different managers of SC3E. The most important learning 
mechanisms, however, are based on increasing the firm’s efficiency levels while 
incorporating the security regulations. It was expected that this would be in a similar way to 
what happened to safety and quality regulations during the compliance process (P.I and 
P.A). 
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Table 5.7.2: SC3E Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
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. 
C.OC 44    50     2 8 
C.MS           
C.IC  46 45       2 
C.SH  47 48  49     3 
C.SD       51   1 
C.VA           
Resources count 1 2 2  2  1     
Total resources 8   
Source: The author, based on interview with SC3E 
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5.8. Supply Chain 3 Transport Provider (SC3T) 
The compliance process 
The transport provider had been informed by SC3E and SC3D in December 2006 (T) 
about the need to implement security measures (P.RI), but, according to the CEO they are 
not knowledgeable about CTPAT security guidelines (P.I). However, the firm have been 
chosen by SC3D and SC3E, and evaluated by the latter (P.E), concluding that SC3T is 
closer to complying with CTPAT security regulations than most of the transport providers 
(P.A).  
The transport provider, however, decided not to pursue any certification, using the 
argument that it would be costly (P.OL). There are two main impediments for SC3T to 
engage with the ‘voluntary’ CTPAT security guidelines. First, they are already implementing 
security procedures that had prevented them from having incidents, and there was no need 
to change their security systems (P.Imp, and P.OL). Second, the US and Mexican 
authorities issue several other standards, including an environmental one, and according to 
the CEO the firm is not able to cope with all of them at once (P.Imp, and P.OL).  
In 2006-07 (T) the United States issued mandatory environmental regulations for the 
transport industry (P.RI). The mandate drove the firm to initiate the substitution of its 
trucks for new ones, equipped with environmentally friendly engines (P.Imp, and P.OL). 
The current trucks were just 4 years old on average, and yet firm is investing in new 
equipment (P.A). This is stressful for the firm financially, diverting them from voluntary 
regulations, while not being enough to avoid strengthening its self-regulated security 
measures (P.OL). The CEO assures that protecting their investments is their priority (P.I). 
Their self-regulatory security implementation started in 2003, while 2007 was the first year 
that SC3T worked with SC3E78 (T). These measures were developed with the experience 
and responsibility of SC3T’s drivers (P.Imp), as they have been increasingly aware of how 
to protect themselves and their cargo (P.Imp, and P.A). However, the security strategies 
and procedures followed by SC3T were the result of protecting, first, the firms’ personnel, 
second, the cargo, and, third, the equipment (P.RI).  
                                                 
78 The firm is substituting a previous SC3D transport provider (SC3E would be equivalent to Exporter ‘B’, 
and SC3T equivalent to transport provider ‘B’, in Figure 9). 
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The security assessments were informal (P.Imp). The firm have not been the subject of any 
incident in all their time in operation (P.E) whilst the rest of the industry complains about 
the situation. As for the facilities and equipment, every truck arriving at the warehouse is 
inspected by the CEO and the driver [52]. 
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Figure 12: Compliance process SC3T 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC3T 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
Although the security resources of the firm were not aimed at meeting CTPAT security 
guidelines, they may be close to fully conforming to them. 
The firm has a fleet of new trucks and trailers to avoid high rates of equipment failure. 
According to the CEOs, this makes their equipment reliable in the delivery of cargo within 
the time agreed between SC3E and SC3D. The trucks and trailers are well safeguarded in 
the warehouse and, rather than having fences, the firm decided to build a wall to protect 
and prevent intrusion into the facilities [53]. There is no access to the facilities unless it is 
with the authorisation of the managers, and accompanied by the employee that is being 
visited [54]. 
The personnel security is more of a trust-based than a formal investigation-based system. 
The firm does not perform criminal background checks on the drivers, nor of the business 
partners. The CEOs consider that “it is the responsibility of the US and Mexican 
authorities, since they are issuing the driving licences, to investigate the drivers and the 
firms” (SC3T, 2008). Furthermore, drivers are only hired after being known by the CEOs, 
and after cross-referencing information about their reputation among SC3T’s drivers and 
other firms [55].  
The procedural security is rather simple. The exporter and the distributor perform the 
shipping and receiving procedural security. The transport provider makes sure that the 
cargo is legal, otherwise they are not responsible for what SC3E loads into the trailer. An 
external company performs the electronic manifest and prior notice under SC3T’s name 
[56]; the CEOs argued that it was a standard service provided to the transport industry. 
The transport provider is responsible for maintaining the cold-chain as required by SC3E 
and SC3D. The trailers are equipped with sensors sending signals to the driver if the 
temperature in the trailer changes by 1 degree Celsius, warning that the cold-chain has been 
broken and that the cargo needs intervention by the driver to recover the cold-chain [57]. 
The issue of the cold chain is tightly related with trailer security, and it is a strategy 
developed between SC3D and SC3T. SC3E seals the trailer with high security seals (ISO 
17712) and there is a seals monitoring form in case of violation during inspection by the 
Mexican authorities. Usually, the cold-chain gets broken during inspections, and a signal is 
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sent to the driver that this has happened. The driver needs to inform the transport provider 
that the cold chain has been broken due to the inspection. Using GPS the transport 
provider matches the location of the truck at the time the driver informs of the broken 
cold-chain, with the location of the inspection point. After inspection the driver must re-
seal the trailer with another high security seal. 
Three reports need to match to make sure the trailer security has not been bridged.  
1) The transport provider’s records of cold-chain breaks, including the time and 
place of the break;  
2) the sensor issued by the trailer cooler, which indicates the time of the cold-
chain breaks; and  
3) the seals monitoring form, indicating the place of the inspection where a seal 
was broken, the unique ID number of the broken seal and the unique ID 
number of the new seal placed at that inspection point.  
The coordination comes when the three reports are issued to SC3D, who analyses the three 
reports, the seals monitoring forms, the trailer temperature report, and the time and 
location of the inspection. Consequently, the cold-chain should only be broken at an 
inspection point, location with the GPS, at the time indicated by the temperature 
monitoring report, with the numbers of the broken and substitution seals of the inspection 
point shown in the seals monitoring form [58].  
The drivers have developed their awareness on conveyance security based on years of 
experience and tacit agreement with other trusted truck drivers. The truck drivers learnt 
that they were exposed to violent or life threatening situations. Thieves and drug cartels 
used to threaten them in case they did not ‘cooperate’; mainly smuggling drugs into the US. 
The firm’s drivers agreed to drive in as large a convoy as possible. The problem for SC3E 
and its drivers is that sometimes they only require one truck hauling two trailers, in which 
case the driver needs to agree with other trusted drivers from other transport providers to 
form convoys, accumulating drivers until the convoy is large enough to ensure they feel 
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safe. The driver requires knowledge of the other colleagues’ reputations, skills to keep up 
with the pace of the convoy79, and coordination to join in the highway [59] [60].  
 
Learning and knowledge sources 
The firm have learnt and accumulated knowledge from three main sources; 1) own 
experience in trying to protect its own personnel, the cargo and the equipment, 2) in the 
relationship with SC3D for procedural security, and 3) the relationship with the 
stakeholders, which were important to learn which drivers to hire, and to select the drivers 
to implement convoy security on the highway. Interestingly there is a trust-based learning 
mechanism behind these security practices. 
 
                                                 
79 The distance from SC3E to SC3D is more than 1,450 kilometres. This is a crucial aspect since the driver 
may need to rest and the convoy may not be able to stop for a single driver: however the driver may agree 
with other trusted convoys to stop in a designated resting area.  
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Table 5.8.1: SC3T Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
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C.OC    55 57   60  3 11 
C.MS  53 54  52     3 
C.IC   54       1 
C.SH    55 56   59  3 
C.SD           
C.VA       58   1 
Resources count  1 1 1 3  1 2    
Total resources 9   
Source: The author, based on interview with SC3T 
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5.9. Supply Chain 4 Distributor (SC4D) 
The compliance process 
In 2004 (T) SC4D received information about CTPAT through the FPAA (P.RI). However 
the firm decided not pursue certification (P.OL) due to a lack of resources allocation 
capacity from the exporter and transport providers (P.A); if their whole supply chain was 
not certified there was no incentive for SC4D to get certified (P.I). However, in 2005 the 
firm hired a consultant, who had previously worked for the CBP, to explain what CTPAT 
was (P.I, and C.SH), and to help the firm to develop a culture of security within the firm 
(P.Imp, and C.SH). It was only in October 2006 (T) (P.A, and P.E), when the CEOs 
received a direct invitation from CTPAT to participate in a seminar, that SC4D decided to 
start their compliance process (P.Imp, and P.OL). The intention of the CTPAT officials 
was to grant them a pre-approval (P.OL) during the seminar, on successfully passing the 
assessment of the implementations and plans for implementation of the firm (P.A, and 
P.E).  
SC4D developed the security profiles for the firm, the exporters of their group (SC4E), and 
for their transport provider (SC4T) (R.Pro, C.OC and C.SD). During the event, the 
CTPAT officials, together with SC4D’s CEO, identified the weaknesses in their security 
practices (P.A, and P.E). In order to receive the pre-approval from CTPAT, the CEO 
signed an agreement to develop the security resources for full compliance by the firms 
(SC4E, SC4T, and SC4D) (P.Imp and C.SH). 
The resources that they agreed to develop were physical security and access controls, 
personnel dedicated exclusively to CTPAT compliance, and training in terrorism and illegal 
activities awareness. The pre-approval was granted: they then waited for the auditors to 
visit their facilities (P.OL).  
Unfortunately for the whole supply chain, they did not get certified (P.OL). This was due 
to a drug incident detected in February 2007 (T) by the CBP in an exporter (not directly 
related with the SC4E), to which SC4D used to provide distribution services (P.E). The 
CTPAT officials considered that the exporters’ supply chain was risky, and all the ‘service 
providers from that exporter were included in a list of risky firms associated to such 
exporter. As the name of SC4D was on the Bill of Lading of the Exporter that was caught 
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smuggling (see Figure 13, p.163), SC4D was rejected for certification. In addition, all of 
supply chain-SC4 (Exporter, Transporter, and Distributor) also had their certification 
applications rejected (P.E). The firm (SC4D), however, continued developing the CTPAT 
security resources in a self-regulated fashion (P.OL). 
 
Figure 13: Supply chains effects of lost certification by SC4D 
SC4D.
Pre-approved.
Rejected
Previous transport provider 'A'.
Lack of security practicesExporter/Packer 'A' for
SC4D. Smuggler
Grower 'D' for SC4D.
Transport provider SC4T.
Pre-approved. Rejected
Grower 'C' for SC4D.
Grower 'B' for SC4D.
Eliminated from the chain
Supply chain 'A'
Supply chain 4
Supply chain 4.
Supply chain 4..
Packer/Exporter SC4E.
Pre-approved. Rejected
Eliminated from the chain.
Rejected
Rejected.
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC4D 
 
The implementation process required involvement of all the personnel and a compliance 
team (P.Imp). The personnel contributed in the re-design of the infrastructure, while the 
firm’s compliance team designed the access controls mechanisms (P.Imp, and C.OC). The 
personnel were not able to monitor the shipping and receiving of cargo through all the 
access points in the warehouse; some were closed and CCTVs were installed to support the 
monitoring procedures (P.E, and R.Phy). 
The most important changes were related to the operational procedures, which required 
performing inspections and recordkeeping of practically all security related operations in 
the warehouse (P.A). However, the firm initially faced problems due to personnel resisting 
the adoption of the security measures. This was solved with the support of a consulting 
company, which was intended to induce a culture of security in the firm through seminars 
and constant meetings (P.Com). Although the personnel eventually agreed that the changes 
were required, they could not think of ways to incorporate the security activities in their 
existing routines: the result was that new security operations were just added to their pre-
existing routines, increasing the overall time of their business operations (P.A, and P.Imp).  
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The CEOs mentioned that resistance to change was not a new story in the firm. In fact, 
they went down the same path when they started the compliance process with GMP 
(Good Manufacturing Practices), started six years ago (2001) (T): changing the culture of 
the employees, equipment, procedures, and practices. To the extent that the organisational 
culture started slowly changing, the personnel started re-thinking their activities and 
procedures, and small tasks were improving slowly (P.Imp). 
The CEOs estimated that, in November, 2007 (T) the firm was able to comply only one 
week and not three days in CTPAT (P.A, and P.OL); and he expected, just like with GMP, 
by the following year (T) they would comply over several weeks and for a couple of days 
they would fail to comply. Eventually the firm would have an automatic and fluid 
compliance process (P.E). 
The compliance team, which included SC4D’s general manager, was responsible for the 
assessment of the security operations; also for managing the issues raised by the personnel 
during attempts to implement the security activities. Since records  of the operations were 
kept, the compliance assessment team was able to analyse whether the operations 
conformed to the guidelines. If that was not the case, the person not complying was 
encouraged to re-think the procedures. In addition, the CEO discussed the implementation 
strategies with SC4E&T and other distributors in Nogales, and used to get feedback to 
improve processes, for instance, on what security criterion to prioritise for implementation 
(P.E, and C.SH).  
The firm also have decided to establish a closer relationship with CBP in making decisions 
about whether a cargo coming from Mexico was risky or not. That was an attempt to re-
build the trust that CBP used to have in SC4D. The CEOs believed that the CBP still 
considered their whole supply chain unsafe and ineligible for a certification in CTPAT. 
This is why, every day, SC4D sent transit condition reports of every cargo due to queue at 
the port of entry waiting to be inspected by the CBP (P.Imp), together with the GPS 
traceability reports,. The CBP assessed whether a driving behaviour was suspicious or not, 
therefore whether to inspect them or not (P.E). The compliance team in SC4D have 
developed a tacit knowledge on what type of driving behaviour is more likely to be 
considered risky, and then communicated this to the transport provider (SC4T) for further 
investigation before reaching the port of entry (P.E). 
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External organisations also played a crucial role in the procedural security implementation 
for SC4D. The Mexican and US customs brokers are in direct communication with SC4D 
(P.Com), and they are the ones realising the electronic manifest and prior notice to the 
CBP and FDA correspondingly. These are the compulsory aspects of the security 
regulations, which means that these key security procedures are outsourced (P.OL, R.Pro, 
and C.SH).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
 
Figure 14: Compliance process SC4D 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC4D 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
The firm built up their physical security, based on internal coordination recommendations 
by re-designing the organisation of their operations [61]. It did, however, require long term 
cultural change from the personnel. 
The physical access controls were developed based on strategies from the compliance team, 
and new administrative procedures to manage visits and limited access by personnel to 
certain areas in the facilities [62]. 
Background checks on personnel were being carried out by the CEOs, however these 
consisted only of normal references and not thorough checks. The CEO mentioned that 
they may need to perform more thorough checks soon. 
The procedural security was developed by their personnel through trial and error. It 
required an important cultural change to initiate the learning process, which was induced by 
the consultancy company [63]. The crucial mandatory aspect of the procedural security 
performed by the customs brokers required strong negotiation, and, most of all, 
collaboration from them. This was because, in order to be able to submit the electronic 
manifest and prior notice for trucks joining the port of entry at 8am, the customs brokers 
needed to manifest and notify at 6am. They dedicated special personnel to perform such 
operations, which were also used for the rest of the customs broker’s clients [64]. The 
fundamental element leading the agreement was the long term relationship between the 
customs brokers and SC4D [65]. 
The trailer security and conveyance security reflected the changes incorporated because of 
the rejection of the certification. There was a tight coordination between the shipping 
receiving department and SC4E&T, especially in the analysis and feedback of the drivers’ 
behaviour on the Mexican highway. SC4D asked SC4E&T to adapt to their needs, as well 
as providing support to SC4D in any respect related to trailer and conveyance security [66] 
[67]. 
The cultural change and the security awareness were all derived from a consultancy firm 
providing the service in 2005 (T). The firm would have not been able to start the 
compliance process without such training [68].  
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Learning and knowledge sources 
The physical and access control relied heavily on intra-firm learning and knowledge 
generation and accumulation. The procedural, trailer, conveyance, and awareness security 
procedures on the other hand, required more involvement of external organisations, such 
as SC4E&T, consulting firms, other distributors and the CBP. However, most of the 
compliance process was closely monitored and supervised by the CEOs. 
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Table 5.9.1: SC4D Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
C
a
p
a
b
. 
c
o
u
n
t 
T
o
ta
l 
c
a
p
a
b
. 
C.OC  61   63     2 12 
C.MS   62       1 
C.IC  61        1 
C.SH     63; 65  66;67 66;67 68 5 
C.SD     64  66;67 66;67  3 
C.VA           
Resources count  1 2  3  2 2 1   
Total resources 11   
Source: The author, based on interview with SC4D 
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5.10. Supply Chain 4 Packer/Exporter & Transport Provider 
(SC4E&T) 
The compliance process 
In this section, the compliance process describes the story of two firms (SC4E and SC4T). 
SC4D decided and instructed that these two firms should form a ‘special operations team’ 
(compliance team) in charge of supply chain issues: one of these was the compliance 
process with CTPAT. The supply chain strategy considered that one compliance team 
should be in charge of the Mexican side of the supply chain and another in charge of the 
US side. Consequently, although there are two different entities, this case study presents 
the compliance process as if they were a single entity (SC4E&T), just as instructed by 
SC4D’s CEOs. 
As mentioned in the previous case, SC4E&T was part of the application pack that SC4D 
developed in October 2006 (T) during a CTPAT seminar, which was rejected in February 
2007 (T). What is relevant and different from SC4D is the implementation process. Hence 
this study focuses on that stage of the compliance. 
In relation to the monitoring and assessment of the overall security implementations, that 
is also continuously done by the compliance team, and the assessments are reported to 
SC4D, who in turn reports to the CBP (P.E).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
171 
 
 
Figure 15: Compliance process SC4E&T 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC4E&T 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
The compliance team combined each company’s knowledge of the operations (SC4E’s 
packing and SC4T’s surveillance) into one procedure, which, according to the compliance 
team, contributed to physical security, access controls and awareness. 
The compliance team members from SC4E contributed with knowledge of the complex 
times and motions in the facility, something difficult to understand for outsiders [69]. 
The members from SC4T contributed systematic and random surveillance expertise to help 
identify suspicious and abnormal behaviour in a facility, something managers were not able 
to do. The team designed uniforms with different colours per working area, together with 
the enforcement of mixed systematic and random surveillance rounds by SC4E’s security 
personnel [70]. 
According to the compliance team, it was easier for the surveillance and packing managers 
to identify the flow of colours by areas, which could change daily according to the 
compliance team’s specifications [71]. Furthermore, the enforcement of the surveillance 
was done with a TouchProbe device, which indicates whether a guard made the round in 
the indicated areas and at specified times. The TouchProbe is unloaded in software that 
indicates the frequency, location and time of the surveillance, and keeps records of the 
rounds and the guard that performed the round. Training on the use of the software and its 
implementation possibilities was delivered by the software supplier [72]. 
CCTVs were also installed in SC4T’s ‘Trocaderos’ (their cargo inspection and re-packing 
facilities in Nogales, Mexico), which did not require much effort since the security 
personnel were already familiar with the system [73]. 
After the drug incident (February 2007) (T) SC4E&T started performing full background 
checks on drivers and security personnel. These included more than normally 
recommended - psychological and physical tests performed by the human resource 
department, anti-doping outsourced analysis, and a criminal conviction check performed by 
the State police department. These were later analysed by the compliance team to issue 
decisions on whether to keep, fire or relocate personnel [74].  
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Although CTPAT promotes its regulations to prevent terrorism, SC4E&T narrowed it 
down to bioterrorism, which implied paying particular attention to the prevention of 
produce contamination (P.I, and P.OL). SC4E’s competencies in GMP and HACCP were 
used to enhance the procedural and trailer security. The aim was to have safer and more 
secure cargo by sanitising and inactivating any biological or chemical component that may 
be present in the trailer prior to loading. SC4E&T received this training from CIAD80 [75] 
[76]. 
The firm needed to report all the security measures and monitoring systems and 
assessments to CTPAT, in case they allowed the firm to re-apply for certification; SC4E&T 
set up a traceability system for the produce from the pick-up location to the supermarket in 
the US. Furthermore, the compliance team argued that they were able to identify who was 
in touch with the produce at a place at any given time. For that, SC4E&T had developed 
labelling standards before CTPAT. Such labelling systems were part of SC4E’s compliance 
to GMP (Good Manufacturing Practices) [77].  
The information technology security resources have been upgraded by further restricting 
access and narrowing down the identification of potential users of the systems. Access to 
computers was password protected and shared between SC4E, SC4T and SC4D. However, 
while the password protection had previously prevented accidental access and manipulation 
of databases, they were later re-designed to identify the type of personnel that accessed the 
systems, in addition to identifying intentional/accidental manipulation of information. The 
type of login profile and password would be indicative of the type of personnel that 
accessed and manipulated the data. Although it is still not personalised, it allows a potential 
investigation within the supply chain to be narrowed down to departmental level within 
each firm [78]. 
The same is true for trailer security, which requires sharpened competencies by the 
customs brokers during the analysis of the seals monitoring forms. The trailer security 
practices were agreed with SC4D and the customs broker; the latter is who authorised the 
type of seals to be used and monitored them. When a cargo is sent to Nogales, SC4E 
electronically sends a list with seals ID numbers to the custom broker. In case the cargo 
requires inspection in SC4’s Trocadero (facility for cargo inspections and burreros 
                                                 
80 Centro de Investigacion en Alimentacion y Desarrollo, A.C. is a Mexican research centre specialised in 
social, economical, technological, environmental, and policy related to food and alimentation.  
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attaching the trailers), the custom broker analyses the seals and the monitoring forms of the 
seals. They have the competencies developed throughout the years to know whether there 
is something strange on the form: it is the custom broker who considers if a trailer is risky 
[79]. 
In relation to conveyance security, the development of the resource required interaction 
between the GPS systems developers (OmniTrack) and the specialised awareness of 
SC4T’s drivers. The GPS software developer was required to set up the virtual limits and 
conditions of the highway where drivers were authorised to drive through. Hence SC4E&T 
was able to identify when a driver was diverting from an authorised route, when he stopped 
longer than expected, and so on. 
The combination of a standards specialised GPS system with the specific knowledge of the 
highway driving behaviours, allow the monitoring and reporting of conveyance security 
threats. The compliance team argued that there were many software providers that could 
equip them with the GPS systems, but only in combination with the knowledge of the 
drivers could that tool be useful. This was due to the fact that, while the GPS did not need 
continuous upgrades in terms of its functionality, it required updated reprogramming to 
reflect the changing conditions of the ‘unsafe’ Mexican highways. SC4E&T combines the 
GPS/highway knowledge capabilities with long-haul driving behaviours to create an 
important security resource to meet the CTPAT security criteria [80]. 
 
Learning and knowledge sources 
The resources that SC4E&T have been developing may reflect the post rejection effect, 
and the attempts to recover their reputation and accelerate the permission to re-apply to 
CTPAT. 
Knowledge has been gathered from all possible sources: internal, between SC4E and SC4T, 
and with other stakeholders, such as CBP, OmniTrack, SC4D, and so on. The weakest 
areas to secure in these SC was the conveyance and trailer security; consequently, the 
knowledge and learning process to build up these trailer security resources have leveraged 
from stakeholder’s feedback, whilst conveyance security resources have apparently been 
leveraged from alignments.  
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Table 5.10.1: SC4E&T Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
C
a
p
a
b
. 
c
o
u
n
t 
T
o
ta
l 
c
a
p
a
b
. 
C.OC  73  74 75 78 75 80  5 17 
C.MS    74 77    72 3 
C.IC     77     1 
C.SH    74 76  76;79 80 72 5 
C.SD           
C.VA  69 70      71 3 
Resources count  1 1 1 3 1 3 1 2   
Total resources 13   
Source: The author, based on interview with SC4E&T
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5.11. Supply Chain 5 Distributor (SC5D) 
The compliance process 
Although the CEOs knew about CTPAT from the CBP (P.RI) and they were 
implementing security measures, surprisingly, they did not engage in the certification 
process until several months before attending the CTPAT seminar in October 2006 (T). It 
was then that the compliance manager started putting together SC5D’s security profile 
(P.A). In the seminar the firm received pre-approval (January 2007) (P.OL), and soon after 
the approval (P.OL). The firm was still waiting the validation in situ by a CTPAT supply 
chain specialist in December 2007-January 2008 (T). Unfortunately for the distributor, their 
transport provider (SC1&5T) had been delaying the certification; therefore SC5D would 
not be able to use the FAST lanes (P.A). 
The firm had been engaged in the implementation of the security regulations for two 
reasons, 1) acquiring the benefits of using the FAST lane, and 2) although at the moment 
the regulation is voluntary it may become mandatory (P.I). The latter motivation developed 
after the ACE (Automated Commercial Environment) was phased out as a voluntary 
programme to become mandatory (P.RI, and P.I). The CEOs had the impression that the 
US government was refining CTPAT as a regulation, and when there was a critical mass of 
certified firms and better regulatory design, it would become mandatory (P.RI). 
Consequently, the firm opted to capitalise on the benefits of certifications as soon as 
possible rather than perhaps being caught in the chaos of the change from voluntary to 
mandatory legislation (P.I, P.A, and P.OL). 
The CEOs were of the idea that their security measures were rather superficial and their 
formal assessments not yet fully reliable (P.A). However, the firm had previously 
performed safety assessments, and the compliance manager was attempting to build up 
from there. That was due to their understanding of safety and security as interrelated 
measures (P.OL). 
The first self-assessment of the security status was based on the security profile developed 
for the 2006 CTPAT seminar (P.E). The results showed weakness in the procedural 
security, and physical and personnel security (P.Imp). The firm would need to introduce 
radical changes in these two aspects to prevent future major modifications (P.A). 
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For the firm, full compliance would be achieved on the cost-effectiveness of the security 
resource (P.OL). They tried to keep expenditure in security resources to a minimum, but 
not to the extent of leaving the firm unprotected. That required assessing different options 
for developing or acquiring resources (P.A, and P.Imp). This strategy was learnt from an 
experience in the CTPAT seminars, where firms declared that the use of batches was useful 
to identify personnel in restricted areas; other firms introduced uniforms with colours per 
working area for the same purpose. Since both ways were accepted by CTPAT managers 
(but coloured identifications were preferred by CTPAT officials), SC5D decided to provide 
coloured batches, aimed at trying to find ways to save money and invest more substantially 
in critical security resources (P.Imp).  
According to the compliance manager, this is the dominant strategy in the firm. That same 
notion was followed for the installation of CCTVs and access controls years before 
CTPAT was considered by the firm. The firm evaluated the coverage, cost, and adaptability 
of various systems (P.A, and P.Imp). 
For the compliance manager, the implementation strategy and procedures had to be based 
on relegation of responsibilities in formal meetings (P.Com) to different departments 
within the firm (P.Imp). For instance, CCTV and electronic access controls to the facilities 
were delegated to the IT department; the procedural security was delegated to the 
warehouse operations manager; the trailer and conveyance security was delegated to the 
shipping/receiving department. Delegation played an important role in the security 
implementations of SC5D (P.Imp).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
 
 
Figure 16: Compliance process SC5D 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC5D 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
The background checks on business partners were not developed in SC5D, the reason 
being that SC5D would not investigate their own family business (SC5E and SC5T); 
however, they were not performing substantial checks on the rest of their exporters either. 
Physical security resources were leveraged out of managerial activities and internal 
coordination systems, consisting in meeting and tasks delegation (P.Com). Before CTPAT, 
the firm did not have physical security, except from CCTV and electronic access controls. 
Physical security involved meetings with the heads of each department to plan the 
reinforcement of the buildings; these department heads had specific knowledge on the 
status of the building and insights on how it could be reinforced. Most of the contributions 
came from the operative departments and less from the administrative areas. Once the 
decisions were made, the delegation of tasks among personnel followed [81]. 
The physical access control required only incorporating technological resources and 
compliance manager competencies to design and identify procedures to restrict areas 
within the facilities. This was combined with the coloured batches given to the personnel 
to identify their workstation and whether they are allowed in certain areas of the facilities. 
This resource did not demand much effort, only feedback from the CTPAT seminars and 
applying the cost-security effectiveness criterion; these were all the responsibility of the 
compliance manager [82].  
The personnel security resources were developed before CTPAT and these were self-
regulated systems incorporated into the normal human resources management routines. 
The compliance manager expressed the seriousness of this practice, and the records of the 
employees are not difficult to gather from all governmental agencies. These routines are 
run by the human resources department [83]. 
The procedural security began to be developed in 1997 (T) when the firm moved to the 
current facilities. At that time (1997), it was not part of a well-planned or designed strategy, 
according to the compliance manager however, the criteria were lower risk and more agility 
(P.I). All started with unloading and loading procedures, where clear spaces and only 
incumbent operators were allowed [84]. This lowered the exposure of produce and raised 
the efficiency of the operation. The same criterion was applied in other areas, warehouse, 
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inspection areas, and sanitation materials, etc. The procedures led to safer and more agile 
operations, which was increasingly appreciated by their clients and the industry in general 
since the risks of accidents, contaminations, and inefficiency were reduced. 
The initial development with procedural security responded to their quest for more 
efficiency and compliance with GMP, therefore, they were resources dedicated more for 
shipping/receiving operations. Later (October 2006) (T), they evolved to comply with 
CTPAT, specifically in traceability systems, increasing the potential identification of 
suspects of intentional/accidental contamination of the produce [84]. To achieve that, it 
was necessary to issue contamination reports to be analysed by specialised human 
resources, who in turn would identify potential suspects [84]. 
The traceability system was rudimentary, yet it met the security purposes. The boxes do not 
contain barcodes, only the pallets. Each pallet had a tag attached at the moment when was 
filled up in the field; that tag relates to the IDs of boxes contained in that pallet, the field, 
furrow, day, time, truck that moved it from the field to the packing, commodity, size, 
variety, and so on. It was also possible to know who packed it, as there is a packer (person) 
ID number written on the box. 
The original purpose of the traceability system was to know, just in case, where a produce 
could have been contaminated. On the other hand, the packer and other human resources 
ID numbers were used for quality management, performance and payment purposes. The 
identification of a suspected accidental/intentional contamination would be impossible 
under separate reports, whereas by cross-referencing the traceability information with the 
packer numbers, SC5D would identify not only the origin but also the potential person 
responsible for a contamination. However, the information system for cross-referencing 
was not developed by SC5D, but SC5E. Therefore, the cross-referencing had to be done 
by SC5E and passed to SC5D [85].  
The IT systems and software were the same in SC5D and SC5E; the difference was the 
function given by each firm. All the systems were installed by the same developer (SC5E’s 
compliance manager, who previously held responsibilities as SC IT manager). The 
developer incorporated the functionalities of each firm into the same system; therefore the 
IT is a fully integrated resource that allowed both firms to access and modify information 
from SC5D and SC5E, with password identification of data entry and management. This 
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meant that the firms would not have to invest in different IT systems, and the only extra 
investment would be on the training on the specific functionality of the IT system for 
SC5D. This system contributed to the visibility of the supply chain information; however 
the system could also be modified to grant access to critical information from both firms 
(SC5E or SC5D). According to the compliance manager, however, the user login type helps 
identify the persons that accessed or modified the information [85].  
Before the CTPAT compliance process, trailers were sealed by SC5E; however, after the 
first inspection by the Mexican authorities the trailer remained unsealed for the rest of the 
journey until it reached the distribution centre. Since there was no security procedures or 
monitoring of events on the journey, SC5D was unable to reliably match information 
related to the cargo, trailer, truck, and driver (P.A).  
To meet the CTPAT compliance process, SC5E provided the drivers with extra seals to re-
seal the trailer in case of inspections on the Mexican highway; in addition, the violated seals 
needed to be recovered by the driver. Each seal has a unique identification number. SC5E 
also gives a signed seals monitoring form to note the ID number of any seal broken by the 
Mexican inspectors and the ID number of the seal placed by the driver; this form is 
‘supposed’ to be signed by the Mexican inspector, which does not always happen. These 
seals monitoring forms, together with the violated seals, needed to be given to the receiving 
manager at SC5D. The receiving manager at SC5D had to match the electronic manifest, 
drivers’ licence, truck number and trailer number associated with the driver, with the name 
on the monitoring form. If everything matched, the cargo was low risk. The analysis of 
documentation and monitoring forms and seals require competencies developed over time 
by the receiving manager, and these were competencies taught during CTPAT seminars 
[86]. 
 
Learning and knowledge sources 
The leverage of security resources in SC5D required a strong emphasis on internal 
knowledge and internal learning processes. Previous compliance with food safety 
regulations harnessed the firm with a platform to leverage security resources. This was due 
on one side to the interrelation between safety and security procedures, and on the other to 
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the fact that experience led the firm to follow ‘similar ways’ to now reach compliance with 
security regulations. The firm also supported its learning from stakeholders such as 
participation in CTPAT seminars, close communication with the supply chain specialist 
from CTPAT, and the resources developed by SC5E’s IT department, and implemented in 
SC5D. Furthermore, the traceability security resource required intense feedback from 
SC5E to SC5D in order to understand the mechanisms and their potential use for security 
purposes.  
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Table 5.11.1: SC5D Security resources and compliance capabilities sophistication 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
C
a
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a
b
. 
c
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a
b
. 
C.OC   82  84  86   3 10 
C.MS  81  83 84     3 
C.IC  81   84     2 
C.SH      85 86   2 
C.SD           
C.VA           
Resources count  1 1 1 1 1 1     
Total resources 6   
Source: The author, based on interview with SC5D
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5.12. Supply Chain 5 Packer/Exporter (SC5E) 
The compliance process 
The firm became aware of the existence of CTPAT in late 2002 (T) (P.RI); however they 
were not interested in being certified at that time (P.OL). Nevertheless, in early 2003 (T) a 
CBP official went to their industry association (CAADES) in Mexico to promote the 
programme, and made it clear that, in the case of another attack, the US government would 
implement emergency management and during that period only CTPAT certified firms 
would be allowed to trade with the US. According to the compliance manager, “it was a 
rather convincing talk” (SC3D, 2007) (P.I).  
Consequently the firm started their quest for certification in CTPAT and FAST for their 
transport providers (P.OL). In summer 2003 (T) the firm contacted a consultant from 
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, who advised SC5E and other exporters from the region. However, 
in 2004 (T) in the middle of the implementation process, the rest of the exporters lost 
interest in the certification. As a consequence, the consultant stopped providing the service 
as there was no critical mass of interested exporters, and the fee covered to SC5E would no 
longer be enough to cover the consultancy costs.  
SC5E continued developing its security resources (P.Imp), and by 2005 (T) they felt they 
were ready for certification, but they had no one to champion their application (P.A, and 
P.OL). On the other hand, the compliance manager still doubts had about whether their 
security measures conformed to CTPAT guidelines. In the same year (2005) (T), SC5E got 
in touch with a consultant from California, who agreed to help them. The consultant 
provided the service not only to SC5E, but also to other exporters who were increasingly 
interested in CTPAT due to intense promotion around Mexico and the US at that time 
(2005) (T). The consultancy fee was very high, but it was shared among the group of 
exporters.  
In that year the consultant assessed SC5E’s security implementation, and concluded that 
most of the resources conformed to CTPAT guidelines (P.A). Therefore the consultant 
developed the security profiles together with the firm, and, at the end of 2005, the 
application was sent (P.OL). The firm received minor comments from the CBP (P.E), and 
then had to make minor changes to get ready for an in situ validation by a CTPAT security 
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specialist. However, SC5E was concerned about the time that could pass before they 
obtained validation, since there was a queue of approximately 300 applications before 
SC5E could be processed. For the compliance manager that was equivalent to an 
involuntary compliance delay (P.OL, and P.I).  
According to the firm, they were lucky to have that particular consultant, who was well 
known in Washington, and who convinced CTPAT officials that SC5E was ready for 
certification and deserved to be moved forward in the queue. CTPAT agreed and placed 
SC5E around the 20th to 30th positions. In a couple of months the firm received the supply 
chain security specialist from CTPAT, and in early 2006 (T) the firm was validated (fully 
certified) (P.OL, and P.E).  
The implementation process lasted approximately one year, and was expensive in terms of 
investment and time spent for the development and deployment of security resources. It 
required full-time support from the consultant (P.Imp). 
The firm acquired the security resources during 2003-2004 (T), however they did not know 
how to use such resources. On the other hand, the consultant already had a security 
programme developed for all the exporters. SC5E then added to the pre-existing security 
resources what they were told by the consultant. SC5E’s main resources missing at that 
time (2004)(T) were record keeping, checklists, procedural and logistical security (P.A). 
At the same time, the resources that were developed and readily available were not being 
exploited. The firm was unknowledgeable about how to use such resources (P.Imp). It was 
the consultant who designed the routines to start deploying the security resources (P.Imp). 
This once again required the presence of the consultant to assess the progress in the 
implementation of the security resources (P.E). When things were not working well, he 
would re-design the procedures and operations (P.A). It required constant communication 
and working as a team with him (P.Com). 
Most of the security criteria were developed and enhanced based on a combination of 
knowledge and learning from key internal managers, transport providers, customs brokers 
and consultant, with the consultant leading the implementation and records keeping design 
that contributed to compliance with CTPAT (P.Imp).  
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Finally, the assessment of the implementation programme was continuously performed by 
the consultant, the compliance manager and heads of different departments of SC5E, and 
transport providers. However there were various assessments stages: 1) incomplete 
implementation and assessment by the first consultant in 2003; 2) complete 
implementation and assessment with the second consultant from 2005 to 2006 (T), which 
also considerably enhanced the security awareness of the firm and its supply chain partners; 
3) CTPAT validation February 2006; and 4) currently, the compliance manager together 
with the transport providers running continuous assessments and monitoring, and updating 
procedures as required by CTPAT guidelines (P.E).  
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Figure 17: Compliance process SC5E 
 
Source: The author, based on interview with SC5E 
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The Compliance Resources and Capabilities 
Although SC5E was an independent entity, the shareholders were the growers to whom 
they were providing the packing and exporting services. On the other hand, the transport 
providers were the same they had been working for years, who had also been developing 
security measures with SC5E. Hence, the stable relationship with its distributor (SC5D) and 
its transport providers (SC1&5T and five other transporters) supported their idea of not 
needing to build up resources to perform background checks on business partners; at most, 
there was an assessment of their security profiles [87].  
However, there was always an element of risk, since at times the transport providers were 
not able to move all the cargo for SC5E, leading the exporter to hire services from other 
transport providers. The compliance manager declared “unfortunately this is a business 
that is driven by market prices, not by implementing security measures, however, if there 
was a problem with drugs, the transport provider would be completely eliminated from the 
chain, it had happened before” (SC3D, 2007). 
Due to the size of the business operations, the firm needed to build up physical security 
resources before the CTPAT compliance process. The firm required some degree of 
protection of personnel and facilities. However, the alarm systems and CCTV were 
exclusively acquired and installed to comply with CTPAT. Hence, these resources required 
investment and training on the use of the equipment for the security personnel and 
managers [88]. 
The access controls were performed by the PEP (State Preventive Police under the Sinaloa 
Department of Public Security) and private security guards. Having both organisations 
allowed the private guards to learn from the public officers, improving their capacity to 
restrict access to the facilities with bigger coverage [89]. 
Controlling access to restricted areas within the packing facilities was not part of the duties 
of the surveillance personnel but of the operations managers. To help in the identification 
of personnel by areas, the firm had provided coloured vests as suggested by the consultant. 
However, it was also necessary to enforce the surveillance performed by the private 
security guards, due to the CTPAT requirement to have records of this particular activity. 
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The firm was informed by a guard about an automated system (TouchStar) to keep 
surveillance records. This system is a magnetic pen that records the time and place when it 
touches magnetic plates, which are fixed to the walls around the packing facilities. The pen 
loads the information into software that keeps records of the inspected points, times and 
guards [90].  
According to the compliance manager, personnel background checks were not a feasible 
resource to develop. The firm had 600 people in the packing facilities and 2,000 in the field 
in 2008 (T). Background checks were plausible, and in fact performed, for personnel in key 
positions such as security personnel, those in loading and shipping areas, warehouse, etc. 
To support the backgrounds and behaviour, the firm acquired biometrics equipment and 
received appropriate training by the technology providers. According to the compliance 
manager, the firm was continuously updating a database of key personnel [91]. 
The most difficult resources to develop were the procedural security. All these required not 
only implementation, but also record keeping for submission to CTPAT as proof of their 
adherence to guidelines. This required intense coordination among different areas in the 
packing, the compliance manager, transport providers and the consultant. 
The firm had already developed traceability and management systems, and but was not able 
to give those resources any security related functionality. The compliance manager arranged 
meetings with different departments and the consultant to identify possible solutions.  
Firstly, they looked for ways of identifying a person that intentionally or accidentally 
contaminated the produce. Personnel from the quality department mentioned that it was 
not possible to know who, but it might be possible to know where, based on mixing 
information on HACCP (contaminant and place of contamination) and traceability 
information printed on the labelling (time of packing and production batch). The human 
resource department, based on a suggestion from the distributor, SC5D, suggested cross-
referencing it with the packer ID number provided by their department and enforced by 
the packing line supervisors. Hence, if the contamination occurred in the packing facility, it 
was possible to narrow down a potential investigation to a person or group of people in a 
packing line. This would in turn facilitate the distributor investigations in case of incidents 
[92]. The consultant therefore arranged and set up this practice as a standard for SC5E [93]. 
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The prior notice/electronic manifest did not represent problems for the firm, since they 
had the competencies from the compliance manager in IT systems, who previously headed 
the IT department. The issue was a notifications design, development, and integration in 
the database that could contribute to reduce operations costs and time.  
The Mexican customs brokers in 2005 (T) were still requiring faxes to transmit Bills of 
Lading to the US customs, but that was costing the firm too much money and time. The 
compliance manager developed the software for the customs broker that printed SC5E’s 
email transmissions of Bills of Lading into their fax machine. Later the custom broker 
started using the email system to transfer the Bills of Lading [94].  
There were other important meetings held between shipping departments, transport 
providers, the compliance manager and the consultant. The transport providers answered 
questionnaires that would allow the consultant to re-design the truck and trailer screening 
procedures, and seals monitoring forms [95]. 
Also based on those meetings, the compliance manager developed a software program that 
integrated the labelling data into the shipping documentation summary [96]. The software 
would convert those summaries into the prior notice and the electronic manifest, 
supposedly to be transmitted by the transport providers. However, since it was integrated 
with the Bill of Lading transmission system to the Mexican customs broker, the compliance 
manager offered the transport providers to realise the transmission for them. The 
electronic manifest and prior notice were going to be enforced by the end of 2006 (T). The 
transport providers welcomed this since they would outsource the operation to SC5E, even 
though they were still accountable for any mistake in the transmission [97]. Interestingly, 
SC1&5T did not agree on outsourcing the operation because they were already complying 
with it before SC5E developed the system. 
In relation to the driving routes; the use of advance technologies was ruled out against 
traditional technologies to monitor conveyance security. During the meetings there was an 
assessment comparing the costs and functionality of GPS against the use of radio, mobiles 
and toll receipts (P.E). The transport providers chose to cross-reference information from 
the invoices of tolls on the Mexican highway, which included time and location, and the 
information provided by the truck driver including, location, time, whether they were in 
transit or at an inspection point [98] [99] [100]. 
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Should drivers follow the designed routes and schedules, the toll receipts and information 
from the driver had to correspond with the plans, especially with tolls located, on average, 
100km from each other. According to the discussions in the meetings, the GPS was not 
superior to the tolls, radio and mobile documentation/information systems. The fact that 
SC5E and its transport providers were monitoring the conveyance routes may have 
contributed to the prevention of drivers deviating from the plans [101]. 
 
Learning and knowledge sources 
All in all, the firm required the use of specialised knowledge from its internal departments 
during discussions, which used to lead to a learning process in the implementation of the 
strategies from the meetings. The same strategy was applied in a vertical alignment fashion 
with the transport providers for trailer and conveyance security. Furthermore, the 
stakeholders’ involvement was not only at the level of IT systems redesigns and integration 
but also at the level of planning and implementation processes led by the security 
consultant. 
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Figure 18: CTPAT related security resources81 
 
Source: Provided by the SC5E compliance management. 
 
                                                 
81 The pictures show: 1) the surveillance officer form the State Police Department, and two private security 
guards; 2) Alarm systems for the offices in the packaging facilities; 3) The monitors of the CCTV; 4) The 
electronic pointer downloading the surveillance routes followed by the guards in the facilities; 4) Sealed trailer; 
5) Employees biometrics; 6) Vest with colour indicating the person was granted access in the loading area 
only (there are other colours for other areas); and 7) State Police Department and dog to detect drugs and 
other chemicals for trailer inspection. 
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Table 5.12.1: SC5E Capability building and resource development 
              Resource 
 
 
Capability 
R.BP R.PhyS R.A R.Per R.Pro R.IT R.CT R.Co R.TA 
C
a
p
a
b
. 
c
o
u
n
t 
T
o
ta
l 
c
a
p
a
b
. 
C.OC 87 88 89       3 19 
C.MS   90 91      2 
C.IC     93     1 
C.SH   89 91 93  98 98 101 5 
C.SD     94     1 
C.VA     95;97 92 95;100 99 101 7 
Resources count 1 1 2 1 4 1 3 2 1   
Total resources 16   
Source: The author, based on interview with SC5E  
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5.13. Brief remarks on the case studies 
From the previous case studies, one may note an increasing degree of complexity of the 
processes, capabilities and, perhaps not so clearly, of the diversity of the security resources 
deployed within the firms and across the supply chains. However, at this stage it is still not 
yet possible to make any conclusions due to the need to conduct the corresponding 
comparative case analysis, upon which this investigation should be based. Therefore, the 
next chapter compares each one of the variables described in previous cases, and later 
integrates these cross-case comparisons with the results of the assessment of the 
governance structures, which relied on questionnaires rather than interviews. 
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6. CHAPTER 6 Empirical results 
The results follow a similar structure as the case study outline. In order, we will summarise 
the compliance process, the capabilities building process, and the governance structures. 
The later results from the questionnaires applied to the firms, rather than from the case 
studies description. 
In each of the sections there will be a summary of results, followed by the qualitative 
comparative analysis (mvQCA), a brief interpretation of the results of the mvQCA, and 
concluding remarks in relation to the results. 
 
6.1. Regulatory compliance process 
6.1.1. Summary of compliance processes 
Identification of the regulation 
The firms’ awareness of CTPAT relied heavily upon the resources and personnel available 
outside their organisations. Despite the lack of internal resources and great internal 
complexities, the attention of firms to CTPAT regulation relied upon nine different 
sources. As expected, the CTPAT agency (officials) was the most active in gaining the 
attentions of the firms. However, other CBP personnel and departments, industry 
networks and industry associations also played important roles in introducing the 
regulation. As expected, the supply chain parties with the most sources of regulatory 
awareness were the distributors (see Table 6.1.1.1, p.196).  
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Table 6.1.1.1. Sources of regulatory information 
 Receptors  
Sources of information Distributor Exporter Transport 
Grand 
Total 
CTPAT 5 3 3 11 
Distributor (D)  3 3 6 
CBP 2 2 1 5 
FPAA 3   3 
Third party certifiers (TPC) 2   2 
Mexican government (Mex) 1 1  2 
Exporter (Exp)   1 1 
Industry association (IA) 1   1 
Industry network (IN)   1 1 
 
 
Although the initial regulatory diffusion may have been formal and direct from CTPAT 
officials to the firms, or indirect throughout the FPAA, the international supply chains 
served as conduits of regulatory awareness. Figure 19 (p.197) shows how awareness 
followed upstream information flows (from distributors to exporters to transport 
providers) but never downstream (from transport providers to exporters to distributors) 
along the supply chain.  
There were three sources of regulatory awareness: 1) the US government (CTPAT and 
other CBP departments); 2) the international supply chain; and 3) stakeholders. The 
information flows related to regulatory awareness reduced formality as it passed from 
distributors to exporters and to transport providers. The distributors have been informed 
via two governments (the US and Mexico) and their industry associations, the exporter 
from both governments, while the transport providers had been informed only through the 
US government and informal networks. Furthermore, the pattern of regulatory awareness 
is not only due to the fact that information sources vary in formality, it is also a matter of 
receptive capacity. Distributors and exporters have departments in charge of regulatory 
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issues such as safety and quality assurance, while the transport providers did not report 
departments exclusively dedicated to respond to regulatory compliance (see Figure 19, 
p.197).  
 
Figure 19: Regulatory awareness diffusion 
C-TPAT
CBPFPAA
Third party
certifiers
Exporters
Industry
associations
Industry networkMexican government
Transport
providers
Distributors
 
 
 
Interpretation, assessment and compliance method 
Regulatory Interpretation and perception of change required for compliance 
Once firms were aware of CTPAT, their CEOs appear to have undertaken a general 
assessments of the regulation based on the interplay between two important factors: 1) 
possible benefits offered by the regulation to the firm, and 2) whether the regulation would 
be easy or difficult to implement, which was evaluated relative to the capacity of the firm to 
implement the security guidelines where required.  
The first factor resulted in firms with two different views: the first of these reflected in the 
views of SC2D, SC3D, SC3E, SC4D, SC4E&T, SC5D and SC5E was that there was a 
positive relationship between regulatory compliance, safer cargo, CBP trust in the firm, and 
a reduced number of inspections; while the other view, represented by firms SC1D and 
SC3T did not see that relationship so clearly. 
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Additionally, within the first group there were claims of two main incentives for early 
compliance. Firstly, firms would enjoy the regulatory benefits for a longer period while the 
rest of the industry was not compliant; this benefit is not only relative but also absolute, 
and tends to disappear to an extent when the rest of the firms reach compliance82 (SC5D). 
Secondly, under the scenario of another terrorist attack, the US would temporarily suspend 
trade with non-compliant firms; hence, the earlier the firm becomes compliant, the sooner 
it will stop running this risk (SC5E). The second group on the other hand considered that 
compliance would be too costly (SC3T), or would not contribute enough towards 
protecting the product, client and service as a whole (SC1D); nonetheless these firms 
decided to develop security resources based on self-regulation.  
In relation to the second factor, there were positive and negative views on whether firms 
would be able to implement the guidelines where security changes were required. On the 
positive side, even though most of the security criteria needed to be developed, it was 
argued that personnel had sufficient experience with security practices, helping the firm to 
deal with the required changes (SC1&5T). Also, having a high security profile but with not 
many changes required, it was thought that safety and security were interrelated, and that 
compliance with the safety or security-related self-regulations contributed to compliance 
with CTPAT (SC1E). Lastly, although all security criteria needed to be implemented, it was 
preferred as a measure to avoid reputational damage and focus on normal business 
operations, rather than building up capabilities and developing resources to rebuild the 
trust from CBP in case of incidents. Building up a reputation for CBP is considered more 
cumbersome than compliance with CTPAT (SC4D). 
There were also negative views on the possibility of implementing security guidelines. For 
instance, a firm that was required to change all its security practices prioritised the 
compliance of safety over security, since the former may contribute to the latter, while the 
opposite may not be the case; furthermore, security implementations may not contribute to 
reaching the regulatory aim anyway, since there were Mexican inspection points breaking 
the security seals in the highway, which weakened security practices along the whole supply 
chain (SC2E&T). Additionally, although firms had a partial development of the security 
                                                 
82 The number of fresh produce chains using FAST lanes was almost inexistent. Should the whole industry 
become compliant, more than 100 thousand trucks would use the FAST lane (CAADES/CIDH, 2007), 
adding pressure to the infrastructure and slowing it down.  
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criteria, they argued that they were only able to manage their own processes; they could not 
monitor the transport providers (SC1D), and even less the whole supply chain (SC1E). 
It is therefore the interplay between regulatory benefits and implementation capacity that 
informs the firms’ interpretation of the regulation and contributes to the decision making 
processes leading to compliance.  
Firms which identified regulatory benefits and implementation capacity positively decided 
to comply, whereas a lack of regulatory benefits and a lack of implementation capacity 
drove firms towards not pursuing compliance. The decision to comply required the 
regulatory benefits to outweigh the lack of implementation capacity, or the implementation 
capacity to outweigh the lack of regulatory benefits.  
 
Figure 20: Compliance decision making83 
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83 SC5E based its decision meking only on risk reduction, rather than on researching any of the direct 
regulatory benefits, such us reduced inpections and/or the use of the FAST lanes.  
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Compliance and regulatory regimes 
Although firms may have decided not to comply with CTPAT, they did try to conform at 
least partially to the CTPAT security guidelines. Since compliance relates to the adherence 
of a firm to a regulation, and conformance relates to the actual implementation and 
processes that meet the regulatory guidelines and standards (Gilliland & Manning, 2002, p. 
322; Scharfeld, 2003, p. 11; R. Wilson, 1997, p. 48), it was useful to avoid mixing 
compliance and conformance84. Firms not looking for adherence to CTPAT (not wanting 
to apply for a CTPAT membership) were classified as low compliant, while those without 
actual development of security resources according to the CTPAT criteria were classified as 
low conformant (having less CTPAT security criteria covered). This means that while firms 
may not be compliant (not searching for certification in CTPAT) they may still conform to 
the CTPAT security criteria (developed security resources) by showing more counts in each 
criterion, as well as in more CTPAT criteria. 
For instance, in spite of 4 out of 13 firms deciding not to become compliant, all firms were 
at least partially and increasingly conforming. However, one firm (SC1E) decided not to 
conform to any more security criteria, while another was delaying the compliance and 
conformance processes (SC2E&T). 
Firms built up compliance and conformance to CTPAT security regulations based on three 
regimes: firstly, to CTPAT guidelines; secondly to self-regulated security measures; and 
thirdly to food safety standards. After starting their compliance or conformance processes, 
one group of firms redefined their previous self-regulatory criteria to prioritise CTPAT 
guidelines (SC1&5T, SC5D, SC5E), and another group redirected efforts from food safety 
regulations to CTPAT criteria (SC2E&T, SC3E, SC5D, SC5E). This however was not to 
substitute former regulations, but to run them jointly. 
Due to the drug incidents reported in four cases (SC3D, SC4D, SC4E&T), firms reapplied 
to gain certification. They then had to keep implementing and developing security 
resources in a self-regulating fashion.  
                                                 
84 Measured by the type of security resources that firms were missing during their first general evaluation of 
their implementation capacity, leading to their decision of whether to comply or not. The measures for this 
construct are low, middle and high, which were assigned according to the initial regulatory assessments by the 
CEOs and compliance managers according to how far the firm was from having the necessary CTPAT 
security resources. 
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The compliance methods varied across firms. Those aiming to become compliant 
prioritised security development based upon CTPAT guidelines, while firms not seeking 
compliance directed their efforts towards self-regulation and partially conforming to 
CTPAT. Also, without a clear pattern, but with more relevance to distributors and 
exporters, food safety implementations were applied to build up capabilities and security 
resources. 
This decision however, locked firms such as SC1E, SC1D, SC2E&T and SC4D into 
negative feedback loops because even though existed between previous compliance 
methods and the decision regarding whether or not to comply with CTPAT. It was 
described in the previous section that either high regulatory benefit or implementation 
capacity was required in order for firms to pursue compliance. Interestingly, where self-
regulation and food safety regulation implementation processes were considered in the 
decision making process, firms decided not to comply.  
In terms of regulatory benefits and implementation capacity, self-regulations and food 
safety regulations have been perceived as more beneficial and easier to implement 
(SC2E&T, SC1E, and SC1D). The exception that proves the rule was found in firm SC4D, 
where the perception of regulatory benefits was reinforced upon rejection of their 
certification, driving the firm to intensify their security resource development in a self-
regulated fashion, later re-applying to CTPAT. According to the CEOs, the self-regulation 
was undertaken to mitigate the reputational damage they suffered. In general, when the 
compliance methods were perceived as better in terms of regulatory benefits or 
implementation than the CTPAT regulation, firms decided not to comply, whereas if the 
compliance method contributed to absorb CTPAT regulatory benefits, the firm decided to 
comply. 
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Figure 21: Negative feedback loops in the compliance decision-making 
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Communication, implementation and evaluation 
The communication systems in firms were interrelated with the implementation process 
and the assessment of the regulatory aims. Firms mainly used seven different 
communication systems, and the ones pursuing compliance with CTPAT had more diverse 
communication systems that those not pursuing compliance. Furthermore, there was a 
clear history of using formal meetings to communicate firms’ security policies and 
strategies within firms, except for SC1&5T and SC5D (Table 6.1.1.2, p.203).  
 
 
 
 
Negative Feedback Loop 
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Table 6.1.1.2: Regulatory regimes and communication systems 
Regulatory regimes 
Firm 
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X  X SC1D      X  
X  X SC1E  X X X    
  X SC2E&T  X      
X   SC3T  X      
X X  SC1&5T  X      
 X  SC2D X  X   X  
 X  SC3D X X X  X   
 X X SC3E X   X X   
 X  SC4D X     X  
 X  SC4E X   X    
 X  SC4T X   X    
X X X SC5D X  X    X 
X X X SC5E X  X  X   
After the CEOs established communication systems to inform their companies about the 
need to initiate the compliance and/or conformance processes, firms built up capabilities 
(organisational competencies, managerial systems, internal coordination across 
departments, contribution of stakeholders to the implementation process, development of 
the suppliers’ capabilities and resources development as a product of the implementation in 
the firm, and vertical alignment of capabilities with the capability development of its client 
or supplier) to be used to develop or acquire the security resources (business partner, 
physical, access, personnel, procedural, IT, conveyance, trailer, and awareness).  
Firms may have been partially conforming (pre-conformance) to specific CTPAT 
guidelines. The fact that firms had other compliance regimes (self-regulation or food safety) 
did not seem to contribute to their pre-conformance or conformance, as shown in Table 
6.1.1.3, p.204.  
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Table 6.1.1.3: Regulatory regimes, conformance, and implementation strategies 
Regulatory 
regimes 
Firm 
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  X SC2E&T Low X Additive Low 0 
 X  SC4D Low  Additive High 2 
 X  SC4E Low X Merger High 2 
 X  SC4T Low X Merger High 2 
 X  SC2D Middle  Additive High 1 
 X  SC3D Middle  Merger High 1 
X   SC3T High X Merger High 0 
X  X SC1D Low X Additive Middle  1 
X X  SC1&5T Low  Additive Low 0 
 X X SC3E Low  Additive High 2 
X  X SC1E Middle X Additive High 1 
X X X SC5D Low  Merger High 2 
X X X SC5E Low X Merger High 2 
* Represents the number of levels in conformance that firms progressed (e.g. from 
low to middle=1; from low to high=2) 
The challenge for firms was to prevent interferences with their normal business activities or 
with other compliance activities. As shown above (Table 6.1.1.3, p.204) some firms also 
tried to avoid the introduction of time consuming or cumbersome routines. This was 
reflected in avoiding or delaying prescriptive security activities that represented higher costs 
or duplicated security functions such as background checks (SC1E, SC3T, SC4E&T and 
SC5E), CCTV (SC2E&T) and GPS (SC5E). 
The firms deployed two basic strategies to develop security resources. Their organisational 
capabilities would seek to either add new resources, or to merge them with the existing 
business operations.  
The ‘adding’ strategy (SC2D, SC3D, SC4D, SC4E&T, SC5D and SC5E) was preferred 
when the security resources would not interfere with business operations (e.g. surveillance 
by guards and CCTV monitoring). This facilitated the upgrading of firms’ conformance 
levels over time. 
The ‘merging’ strategy was used to create security functions that individual resources would 
not be able to perform. Examples of this include combination of expertise of packing 
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complexities and surveillance by SC4E&T, avoiding the use of GPS and merging a series of 
resources to create a comprehensive traceability and monitoring system by SC5E, and the 
experimental re-designs to reduce times and movements, and increase monitoring capacity 
by SC3D85. 
When new security functions were required, but the resources were not able to deliver 
them, resources were merged. Such resources may have been already available or purposely 
created. The development, addition and merger of resources that conform to the regulatory 
guidelines went through trial and error processes (SC3D, SC3E, SC3T, SC4D, SC4E&T, 
SC5D), design-implement processes (SC1D, SC1E, SC1&5T, SC2D, SC2E&T, SC4D, 
SC5D, SC5E), the outsourcing of resources management processes to external 
organisations (SC1E, SC2E&T, SC4E&T, SC5E), or combinations of all of these. 
The previous resources development strategies and processes (Table 6.1.1.3) suggest that, 
rather than showing a pattern towards high conformance, various pathways exist, 
regardless of their pre-conformance (e.g. SC4T vs SC3T) or the regulatory regimes (e.g. 
SC1E vs SC4E) they conform with, or their supply chain stage (e.g. SC1E, SC3T, and 
SC4D). In other words, high conformance does not depend on pre-conformance, 
regulatory regime, or supply chain stage (Exporter, Transporter, or Importer).  
Therefore it is crucial to closely evaluate the development of such resources by both the 
internal and external human resources of the firm. Data shows for low conformance firms 
(SC1&5T and SC2E&T) the main evaluator of security resources were CTPAT officials, 
and secondly, CEOs, supply chain partners, and the firm’s personnel. On the other hand, 
for high conformance firms the main evaluators were the compliance managers followed 
by their supply chain partners (Table 6.1.1.4, p.206); which suggests a need for dedicated 
managers for compliance and supply chain engagement for higher conformance to CTPAT 
guidelines. 
The feedbacks of the evaluation stage modified various elements of the compliance 
processes. Firstly, they changed the perception of the CBP from that of being a partner to 
being a command control regulator (SC3D). Secondly, they influenced firms’ decisions to 
avoid or delay compliance (SC1D and SC2E&T), as well as boosting confidence about 
                                                 
85 Similarly, Sproull (1981) discussed the idea that new programs compete against dominant programs for 
management support, attention, and skilled participants (Sproull, 1981, p. 452).  
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their capacity to develop the required security resources needed to comply (SC1&5T, SC3D 
and SC5E). Thirdly, in the implementation processes they contributed to the better 
coordination of tasks (SC1E and SC5E), the redesign of security resources (SC2D, 
SC2E&T, SC3E, SC3T, SC4D, SC4E&T and SC5E), and to the monitoring of the 
performance of the security resources on a real time basis (SC3T, SC4E&T and SC5E).  
 
Table 6.1.1.4: Participation in the evaluation of the development of security 
resources 
  Participants 
Conformance Firm 
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Low SC1&5T X  X   X   
Low SC2E&T    X  X   
Middle SC1D X        
High SC1E X X   X    
High SC2D  X    X   
High SC3D  X    X X  
High SC3T X   X     
High SC3E  X  X     
High SC4D X X  X  X X X 
High SC4E&T  X  X   X  
High SC5D  X  X  X   
High SC5E  X  X  X  X 
 
 
Conformance speed and intensity 
The initial dates of development of resources for conformance to CTPAT regulations 
show no clear patterns across firms, and neither does the intensity of resources 
development (Table 6.1.1.5, p.208). Although some early-movers have high on-time 
conformity levels, newcomers have also managed to conform to a great degree. This 
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applies equally across firms starting implementations that conform to CTPAT since 1998 
as well as for those who started since 2005. 
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Table 6.1.1.5: Speed and intensity of the conformance process 
 
 
       –  –  –   Period implementing measures for conformance  
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SC2E&T Low Aug-07                      - - Low 
SC1&5T Low Jan-07                     - - - Low 
SC1D Low Aug-05                  - - - - - - Middle 
SC1E Middle Aug-98   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - High 
SC2D Middle Jan-03            - - C - - - - - - - - - High 
SC3D Middle Jan-05                 - - - - - - - High 
SC3T High Dec-03            - - - - - - - - - - - - High 
SC3E Low Oct-05                  - - - - - - High 
SC4D Low Dec-05                   - - - - - High 
SC4E&T Low Dec-05                   - - - - - High 
SC5D Low Aug-97 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - High 
SC5E Low Aug-03             - - - - - - - C - - - High 
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 Summary of the conformance processes 
The description of the compliance processes suggests that there is no such thing as ‘a 
compliance model’. The 14 firms, clustered in 12 cases, show rather complex iterative 
compliance processes, and although some of the overlapping stages are presented 
independently, this is purely for analytical purposes86. Yet there are still compliance patterns 
departing from the pathways towards compliance with CTPAT (Table 6.1.1.6, p.211). 
The summary (Table 6.1.1.6) of pathways available for firms to follow includes two 
exemplar firms (low and high compliant), with their real compliance processes.  
The conformance process of the low compliant firm (SC3T): 1) starts by gathering 
information from exporter and the distributor, 2) the CEO decides not to comply, 3) they 
decide to self-regulate, 4) the company uses face to face communication systems for 
informing about internal security compliance processes and guidelines, 5) the company 
avoids specifically prescribed security technologies and/or systems, and prefers trial and 
error processes and combining previous experiences with new security procedures, 6) the 
security procedures are evaluated by the firm’s CEO and their supply chain partners, finally 
7) since the company did not apply to CTPAT/FAST, from the regulators’ view point they 
are low compliant (See the full compliance process in page 155). 
The conformance process of the high compliant firm (SC5E): 1) starts by gathering 
regulatory information from the Customs Border Protection, 2) the CEO believes that 
there are regulatory benefits from compliance, and also believes to have the capacity to 
implement the changes required by the regulation, 3) they engage with the conforming 
(implementing) and compliance (filling the application for certification) processes, 4) the 
company pull self-regulated measures, food safety measures adopted for security purposes, 
and the CTPAT security guidelines, 4) the company displays banners with security 
compliance related information, calls for regular formal meetings, and adapts its 
information technology systems for security, 5) the company decides to avoid some 
prescriptive security technologies, design and merge security processes with pre-existing 
ones, or with merges outsourced security processes with the internal security operations, 6) 
the evaluation of the security compliance processes are performed by compliance 
                                                 
86 It is important to note that the methodology did not capture the cut points between stages; therefore it was 
not possible to determine the temporal dimension by stages, only of the overall compliance capability 
building processes.  
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managers, supply chain partners, CTPAT officials, and the CBP; 7) the firm filled the 
application for certification and implemented the security measures in ways that to the 
regulators granted the certification (See the full compliance process in page 184). 
The SC3T and SC5E followed a variety of compliance processes, but none of them used 
the Fresh Produce Association of the Americas (FPAA), CTPAT, Third Party Certifiers 
(TPC), Mexican government (MEX), Industry Associations (IN), or Industry Networks 
(IN) for gathering regulatory information. Also, in the communication systems, they did 
not use training sessions, and these two companies did not just create resources and added 
them up to the existing ones, but they merged new security functions in pre-existing 
procedures. For evaluating the compliance process, the two firms did not reply on 
consultants, or TPC, nor their own personnel. 
It is clear that, compliant or not, firms converge in some stages of the compliance process 
(e.g. in their perception of their implementation capacity, or by using an implementation 
strategy of avoiding specific security resources), while in other stages they diverge (e.g. in 
sources of regulatory identification, or in communication systems). These diverging and 
converging paths complicate the identification of the underlying patterns leading towards 
compliance. 
It is therefore important to find reliable ways of identifying patterns out of a combinatorial 
diversity (complexity) generated even with a limited number of cases and observations. The 
Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA), as explained in the research 
process, is used to support that analysis.  
This methodology (mvQCA)87 and the software to run the analyses (TOAMANA) were 
introduced by Cronqvist (Cronqvist, 2005; Ragin, 1989, 2000), and is a variation of the 
Fuzzy and Crisp Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA and csQCA) described in 
chapter 3, p.81. 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 As a reminder, this method is used not to discover what produces an effect, but to identify what co-varies 
with it. 
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Table 6.1.1.6: Summary of the conformance processes (Selected firms: SC3T and SC5E) 
Stages                                    SC3T=▼                    ●=SC5E 
1. Regulatory awareness  FPAA CTPAT D Exp CBP TPC Mex IA IN 
   ▼ ▼ ●     
2. Regulatory interpretation 
and change required             
Regulatory Benefit 
No Regulatory 
Benefit 
Implementation 
Capacity 
No Implementation 
Capacity 
 ● ▼ ●▼  
3. Compliance decision       Compliance Conformance Increase 
Delayed or not 
participating 
 ● ● ▼ 
4. Compliance method  Self-regulation CTPAT 
Food Safety 
Regulations 
 ●▼ ● ● 
5. Communication        Face to face 
Formal 
meetings 
ITS Banners 
Training 
sessions 
Others 
 ▼ ● ● ●   
6. Implementation        Avoiding Adding Merging Trial and Error 
Design-
Implement 
Outsour
ce 
 ▼●  ▼● ▼ ● ● 
7. Evaluation        CEO CM SC CTPAT CBP Consultant TPC 
Personne
l 
 ▼ ● ●▼ ● ●    
Outcome: Compliance 
Low Medium High 
▼  ● 
212 
 
 
6.1.2. mvQCA of the regulatory compliance process 
mvQCA: model specifications 
To proceed with our analysis of the regulatory compliance process and determinants of 
compliance, it is necessary to specify a model. The outcome in this investigation is, in most 
cases, compliance. Compliance has three levels (low, middle and high); thus thresholds 
were set to differentiate the conditions of low compliance, which takes value 0, against 
those conditions of middle or high compliance, which take value 1. Hence, firms are 
grouped into two sets: low compliance (value 0) groups, and the remaining (value 1) 
groups. 
The model for the identification of causal conditions of the process to achieve compliance 
needs to go through seven stages, corresponding to the number of stages in the compliance 
processes. For each stage the outcome (dependent variable) is compliance=1 (middle-high) 
and the causal conditions (independent variables) are the components of each stage of the 
regulatory process. Thus, the model for middle-high compliance is a function of the 
compliance processes causal conditions. 
Model:  Middle-High compliance = f (seven stages causal conditions) 
Stage 1: Minimise (identify) the configurations of ‘regulatory awareness’ or regulatory 
information providers (CTPAT, Distributor, CBP, FPAA, TPC, Mex, Exp, IA 
and IN) causing (co-varies with) middle-high compliance levels (M-H 
Compliance). (See Table 6.1.1.1, p.196 and Table 6.1.2.1, p.215) 
Stage 2: Minimise the configurations of ‘regulatory interpretation and change required’ 
(Perception of Regulatory Benefit and Perception of Implementation Capacity of 
the Firm) causing M-H Compliance. (See Figure 20, p. 199 and Table 6.1.2.1, 
p.215) 
Stage 3: Minimise the configurations of ‘compliance decision’ (Compliance, 
Conformance Increase, Time Block) causing M-H Compliance. (See Table 6.1.1.5, 
p.208 and Table 6.1.2.1, p.215) 
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Stage 4: Minimise (identify) the configurations of ‘compliance methods’ (CTPAT, Self-
regulation, Food Safety) causing M-H Compliance. (See Table 6.1.1.3, p.204 and 
Table 6.1.2.1, p.215) 
Stage 5: Minimise the configurations of ‘communication methods’ (Formal Meetings, 
Face to Face, Banners, Vertical/Hierarchical, IT systems, Training Sessions, 
Horizontal) causing M-H Compliance. (See Table 6.1.1.2, p.203 and Table 6.1.2.1, 
p.215) 
Stage 6: Minimise the configurations of ‘implementation strategies and processes’ 
(Avoiding Specific Resources, Implementation Strategy-add Routines vs. Merge 
Routines, Trial and Error, Design and Implement, and Outsource the 
Development of Resources) causing M-H Compliance (See Table 6.1.1.3, p.204 
and Table 6.1.2.1, p.215) 
Stage 7: Minimise the configurations of ‘evaluating actors’ (CEOs, Compliance Managers, 
Personnel, SC Partners, Food Safety Certifiers, CTPAT, Enforcement CBP, 
Consultants) causing M-H Compliance (See Table 6.1.1.4, p.206 and Table 6.1.2.1, 
p.215) 
 
mvQCA: the compliance process 
The model tries to find the most parsimonious causal configurations of compliance for 
each stage of the regulatory process. The analyses, however, yielded some contradictory 
results: configurations of causal conditions related to compliance in some firms, and to 
non-compliance in other firms. In this case, the model was run again to identify the causal 
conditions of the contradictions. These results are reported in the right-hand side of the 
summary of results.  
Although the model identifies the causal conditions of compliance, contradictions suggest 
that interpretations of the model should be made with care. That is, some causal conditions 
may lead towards compliance; however, if such a causal condition is combined with 
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another, this may lead to non-compliance88. On the other hand, in some instances a cause 
can only produce compliance if another cause is not present.  
The following section, mvQCA: Evaluation and interpretation of the model results, 
explores in detail each one of the seven stages of the compliance processes displayed in 
Table 6.1.2.1, p.215. 
 
 
                                                 
88 Identifying contradictions is an additional advantage of using QCA methods, one that is hardly picked up 
on by traditional case analyses, especially when there are multiple explanatory variables involved. This is the 
value of using a formal method for the analysis of causal configurations. 
215 
 
 
Table 6.1.2.1: Causal configurations of regulatory process for Middle-High Compliance * 
 
Stages Causal configurations Contradictions** 
1. Regulatory awareness  
CBPs FPAAs [ia*(CTPAT+distributor+exp)]s [tpc*exp]+[exp*ia] 
SC15T, SC3D, 
SC5D 
SC2D, SC4D, 
SC3D 
SC15T, SC2D, SC4D, SC3D, SC5D 
SC1E, SC5E, SC2ET, SC3E, 
SC4ET 
2. Regulatory interpretation and change 
required 
IMPLEMCAPACITYs regbenefit*IMPLEMCAPACITY 
SC15T, SC2D, SC3D, SC3E, SC4D, SC4ET, SC5D SC3T, SC5E 
3. Compliance decision  
COMPLIANCEns  
SC15T, SC2D, SC3D, SC3E, SC5E, SC4D, SC4ET, SC5D  
4. Compliance method  
CTPATns  
SC15T, SC2D, SC3D, SC4ET, SC3E, SC4D, SC5D, SC5E  
5. Communication  
FORMAL MEETINGSs [FACE2FACE * banners] 
SC2D, SC3D, SC3E, SC4D, SC4ET, SC5D, SC5E SC15T, SC2ET, SC3T 
6. Implementation  
[OUTSOURCE*IMPSTRATEGY]s resourceavoids  
SC4ET, SC5E 
SC15T, SC2D, SC3D, SC3E, SC4D, 
SC5D 
 
7. Evaluation 
PERSONNELs [COMPLIANCEMANAGER*fsc]s  
SC15T 
SC2D, SC3D, SC3E, SC4D, SC4ET, 
SC5D, SC5E 
 
*The model was run with Tosmana 1.301 (Cronqvist, 2009) to Minimise (find most parsimonious causal configurations)=1 (Middle-High Compliance), 
Including=C(Contradictions)+R(Reminders). ** Minimising=C, Including=R+1(Middle-High Compliance).(See Appendix D for a guide to read TOSMANA reports, p.322). 
1. Regulatory awareness: for definitions see Table 6.1.1.1, p.196. 
2. IMPLEMCAPACITY= Capable to implement security resources; REGBENEFIT=Regulation is beneficial. 
3. COMPLIANCE=Decision to comply. 
4. Compliance method: CTPAT=Complying with CTPAT (see Table 6.1.1.2, p. 203). 
5. FORMAL MEETINGS=Using formal meetings as communication systems; FACE2FACE=Using face to face as communication systems. 
6. OUTSOURCE=Outsourcing the development of security resources. IMPSTRATEGY=Merging resources or routines with existing business operations. 
Impstrategy=Adding resources or routines to existing business operations. RESOURCEAVOID=Avoiding specific security resources. 
7. PERSONNEL= Security resources evaluated by firm’s personnel. COMPLIANCEMANAGER=Security resources evaluated by the compliance managers; FSC=Security 
resources evaluated by food safety certifiers. 
CAPITAL LETTERS INDICATE THE PRESENCE OF THE CAUSAL CONDITION, while lowercases indicate the absence of the causal condition (except for 
impstrategy, which indicates adding routines). 
s=Sufficient condition; n=Necessary condition; ns=Necessary and sufficient condition; variables without subscripts imply that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition. 
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mvQCA: Evaluation and interpretation of the model results 
Stage 1: Regulatory awareness/identification 
There are three configurations of regulatory information for ‘middle-high compliance’: 1) 
information from the Customs Border Protection (CBP); 2) information from the Fresh 
Produce Association of the Americas (FPAA); and 3) information from CTPAT, which is 
only useful if the industry associations are absent. Overall, regardless of the presence of 
other sources of regulatory information, it is sufficient to have CBP’s or FPAA’s regulatory 
information to attain firm compliance. The exception is when industry associations in 
concert with firms (distributors or exporters) try to pull the regulatory information together 
for other firms. In that case we would not have compliance (See Figure 22, p.217). A 
possible explanation is the fact that regulatory information should be tailored to the type of 
firm, e.g. for an exporter or for a distributor, hence, regulatory information provided from 
a distributor to an exporter may not be fit the type of firm. Industry associations may too 
be collecting only very generic information, not tailoring the regulatory information enough 
to fit the firm’s compliance needs.  
In relation to the CBP as a source of regulatory awareness and information, the influence it 
might wield on firms compliance may have come from the good impression it presents to 
their CEOs (SC1&5T), as well as its capacity to encourage them to get informed and 
participate in the CTPAT seminars (SC3D).  
The FPAA was also an advocate of the need of CTPAT to reduce the risks of the supply 
chains of its members. The FPAA, in addition to providing information to its members, 
promoted the CTPAT seminars, which eventually catalysed firms’ compliance (SC2D, 
SC4D).  
Surprisingly, CTPAT itself as a source of regulatory awareness was important for 
compliance, as long as industry associations were not complementing it with regulatory 
information. This suggests that industry associations are not good sources of regulatory 
information. 
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Figure 22: mvQCA of regulatory awareness as causes of middle-high compliance 
 
 
For a reminder of how to read the report, see the Section 9.4 Appendix D: Guide to Read 
TOSMANA Reports, p.324) 
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Stage 2: Assessment of perceived regulatory benefit and implementation capacity 
In order for compliance to be present it is necessary that firms perceive that they have 
implementation capacity; however, this is not in itself sufficient. If firms perceive that 
CTPAT does not provide regulatory benefits, compliance may not occur (SC3T). Yet SC5E 
became compliant even though it did not see direct benefits in CTPAT, only the potential 
of reducing the risks of being trapped behind the border, in cases of US border closures for 
security purposes.  
Stage 3: Decision to comply and to conform as a determinant of compliance  
In this stage, compliance was assessed against the improvements in the firm’s conformance 
level, the length of their implementation, and their decision about whether or not to 
comply. 
As expected, regardless of when the compliance process was initiated, it is sufficient that 
firms take the decision to comply, which implies that whilst early movers had sufficient 
time for their compliance processes, newcomers engaged in very intense conformance 
processes (Figure 23, p.219). But the necessary and sufficient condition is that of firms’ 
making up their minds to comply, not just to conform, regardless of the intensity of the 
processes.  
Stage 4: Regulatory Regimes for compliance 
It was shown that various regulatory regimes are at play in developing security resources 
(See Table 6.1.1.3, p.204). Nevertheless, compliance terms are only relevant within the 
context of CTPAT. Self-regulation/food safety regulations used in combination with 
CTPAT do not contribute to compliance, contrary to what was expected by various firms 
(e.g. SC1E, SC2E&T, SC4D and SC5D). In this study, it is clear that security resources 
derived from regulatory regimes neither compete with nor support the development of 
security resources for CTPAT. In other words, CTPAT-related security resources seem to 
be valuable on their own, when they stand well away from other regulatory regimes.  
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Figure 23: Compliance decision and conformance decision as drivers of compliance 
 
 
Stage 5: Communication mechanisms for compliance 
It was sufficient for middle-high compliant firms to have formal meetings to communicate 
all aspects related to compliance with CTPAT. However, there are also other 
communication systems relevant to compliant firms, i.e. face-to-face communication 
systems. However, this communication system is valuable only in the absence of banners in 
the firms. Banners may be used as a substitute for face-to-face systems to deliver 
information, yet will not carry enough of what is relevant to become a positive contributor 
for compliance on their own. The same may be said about face-to-face and hierarchical 
communications systems. The dangers of the last two systems are their contradictory 
results, as they are also associated with non-compliant firms (Figure 24, p.220). 
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Figure 24: Communication mechanisms for compliance 
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Stage 6: Implementation Strategies 
There are three causal conditions in two configurations related to the implementation 
strategies of the firm leading to compliance. The first configuration indicates that it is 
sufficient that a firm does not avoid the development of specific security resources to 
achieve compliance (SC15T, SC2D, SC3D, SC3E, SC4D and SC5D). The second 
configuration indicates that it is also sufficient that a firm outsources, at the same time that 
it merges, its security resources to existing business operations. It seems that the two firms 
with this causal configuration (SC4E&T and SC5E) needed the external expertise for the 
development of their internal security resources. Therefore they rely on external 
organisations’ resources to merge internal resources to develop new security resources or 
routines. This has further implications in terms of the relationships and interactions 
required between the external organisation and the compliant firm. In other words, 
compliant firms may require that external organisations collaborate closely and embed their 
services or products (resources) within the firm. 
The firms SC4E&T and SC5E have seen larger increases in their investments in security 
resources development, and (as will be shown in the following empirical section) have also 
seen important investments for capability building, in order for them to be able to align 
external and internal resources. 
Stage 7: Regulatory evaluation 
Figure 25, monitoring and evaluation for compliance, shows two configurations in the 
regulatory evaluation stage associated with compliance. Firstly, it was sufficient that the 
personnel were involved in the evaluation of the security resources to relate to compliance 
(SC1&5T), as they may be able to self-enforce the CTPAT regulatory measures, and they 
would have to be capable of applying corrective measures in real-time. 
It was also sufficient that compliance managers evaluate the compliance process, so that 
firms could be associated with compliance; however it was necessary that food safety 
certifiers were not part of the security evaluation process. An interpretation may be that 
food safety certifiers, with respect to security matters, may not generate enough value to 
the firms in terms of compliance; they may undermine the ability of compliance managers 
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to evaluate, monitor and apply corrective measures on a daily basis, which seems to be 
fundamental for any security programme. 
It is important to bear in mind that food safety certifiers popped up in the case studies 
every once in a while. Although they are perceived as positive factor, our results show that 
in fact they are not, at least in terms of feedbacks for security purposes (Figure 25 below). 
 
Figure 25: Monitoring and evaluation for compliance 
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mvQCA: compliance processes remarks 
In summary, there are two relevant sources of regulatory information: Customs Border 
Protection (CBP), and the Fresh Produce Association of the Americas (FPAA). After firms 
take the decision to comply, and focus their security resources to meet the CTPAT 
guidelines, they may set up formal communications systems to pass on information about 
compliance plans and progresses. The implementation requires not avoiding specific 
security resources (e.g. CCTV, GPS), and finally engaging the compliance managers in the 
evaluations of the firm’s compliance process to CTPAT. 
The following sections expand upon the implementation stage of the regulatory process. 
The previous analyses focused on compliance strategies (avoiding, merging, adding, 
outsourcing, trial and error, design and implementation of security resources), whilst the 
following analyses stress the role of capabilities; specifically which capabilities were built, 
and how. 
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6.2. Capability building 
Putting the implementation stage under the microscope helps to understand whether there 
is a relationship between the sophistication of the capabilities built by firms and their 
compliance level. The first part of this section describes and summarises the capabilities 
built at each compliance level. Later it presents the mvQCA for the identification of causal 
configurations, or the bundle of capabilities supporting the move of firms towards higher 
compliance. The third part presents my attempt to make sense of the results of the 
mvQCA. 
 
6.2.1. Summary of capabilities building processes 
Compliance levels 
It was previously explained that conformance is the notion of developing resources to meet 
regulation, in this case CTPAT guidelines, whilst compliance refers to adherence to the 
CTPAT regulation. The three compliance levels are: 1) low, for firms which have not 
applied yet for a CTPAT membership, 2) middle, for firms that applied for a CTPAT 
membership (submitted application and confirmed of receipt by CTPAT department), but 
had not yet been verified in situ, and 3) high, for verified firms in situ (certified)89. The 
classification of firms by conformance and compliance levels shows no apparent patterns 
between them (Table 6.2.1.1, p.225). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 An accepted application suggests that a firm had supposedly developed security resources conforming to 
the CTPAT guidelines; however, at this stage the firm had still not been verified. Furthermore, in fact, their 
security resources may not be conforming to the guidelines, as with the cases SC1&5T and SC2E&T. Once 
the firm is verified in situ, it is given the certification in situ; or it can be given recommendations for 
upgrading their security resources, and a new schedule for in situ verification. 
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Table 6.2.1.1: Compliance and conformance levels 
      Compliance 
 
Conform90 
Low Middle High 
Sample size 
(n) 
Low SC2E&T SC1&5T  2 
Middle SC1D   1 
High SC1E, SC3T 
SC3D, SC3E, SC4D, 
SC4E&T, SC5D 
SC2D, SC5E 
9 
Sample size (n) 4 6 2 12 
 
 
Although conformance is important, in this section the analysis moved from resources 
(related to conformance) to capability building. Thus the next section explores the types of 
capabilities used to develop the security resources, and classifies them according to their 
degree of sophistication. 
 
Sophistication degrees of Capabilities 
To develop security resources firms had to build up and exploit their capabilities. Although 
a capability cannot be seen or be measured in a straightforward way, there are indications 
of its presence and of where it was built (assembled).  
A capability is present when a new function for a security is discovered in an existing 
resource, or when it is designed and developed in a new resource. The degrees of 
sophistication of the capabilities depend on the sources of learning and knowledge that 
combine to build up such capabilities.  
                                                 
90 See Table 6.2.1.1, CTPAT Security Resources Development for the datasource of the classification in low, 
middle and high conformance. Although SC2E&T and SC1&5T have similar resources to SC1D, SC2E&T is 
an exporter and transport provider, and would therefore be expected to have more guidelines covered. 
SC1&5T on the other hand, although possessing similar resources, do not have them in their own facilities, 
and they have declared they have no special leasing arrangements regarding security installations in the 
facilities that will belong to the transport provider. Therefore when SC1&5T move to the new facilities, all 
security installations in the previous facilities will stay there, which means that SC1&5T are subject to 
developing and building all security measures in the new facilities. This is a weak aspect pointed out by the 
CTPAT inspectors.  
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As shown previously we have six sets of capabilities: 1) organisational competencies; 2) 
managerial systems; 3) internal coordination; 4) stakeholders’91 support in the strategy and 
implementation stages; 5) supplier development; and 6) vertical alignment92, according to 
how learning occurred and knowledge was sourced. The capabilities built with internal 
learning and knowledge are considered ‘basic’ in this investigation. The capabilities built 
with bilateral learning, knowledge interchange with stakeholders, unilateral learning, or 
knowledge transfer with supply chain partners, are considered ‘intermediate’. Capabilities 
built with bilateral learning or knowledge exchange with supply chain partners are 
considered ‘advanced’. 
In the case studies we presented summaries (capabilities-resources matrix) of the type of 
capabilities built and the security resources developed (e.g. Table 5.2.1, p.120). The 
following table contains the count of capabilities built by firms rated by sophistication level 
(See Table 6.2.1.2, p.227). 
The table shows the number of times that a given capability was built to develop a security 
resource. In general, the more sophisticated capabilities have the lower counts. 
Nevertheless, capabilities built with learning and knowledge transfers with stakeholders are 
frequent.  
Although the analysis will focus on the capability building only, it is worth presenting the 
CTPAT security resources developed with those capabilities (See Table 6.2.1.3, p.228). The 
most frequent resource developed was procedural security, whilst the least frequent were 
information technology systems and the investigation of business partners. This does not 
mean these resources were not important, but during this period they were not being 
developed, whether they were needed or not. 
In addition, the total count in capabilities is higher than the total count in resources. It was 
shown in the case summaries of capability-security matrixes that in some cases one single 
capability would be enough to develop more than one resource, whilst in other instances 
                                                 
91 Stakeholders comprise: network of suppliers (excluding the supply chain partners) and external 
organisations not directly related to the firms’ normal operations. 
92 Capabilities built in coordination with supply chain partners (exporter, transport provider and distributor). 
Capabilities built with other actors (network of suppliers or unrelated organisations) were classified in 
stakeholders’ support or suppliers’ development. For instance the GPS traceability system development by 
SC4E&T was classified as stakeholder support; as a result of adopting the software developed by a non 
supply chain partner, and adapting its setting for the needs of the firm. 
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more than one capability would be needed to develop a single capability. In general, these 
results suggest that developing single resources in our cases required, on average, more 
than a single capability. 
 
 
Table 6.2.1.2: Summary of capabilities building 
 Basic Intermediate Advanced   
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p
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V
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l 
A
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t Total 
Count 
Share 
SC1D 3 1  1   5 3.9% 
SC1E 1 2 3 1   7 5.5% 
SC1&5T 1 1 3 3   8 6.3% 
SC2D 4 2 2 2 1 1 12 9.4% 
SC2E&T 3 2  3   8 6.3% 
SC3D 5 1 2  3  11 8.6% 
SC3E 2  2 3 1  8 6.3% 
SC3T 3 3 1 3  1 11 8.6% 
SC4D 2 1 1 5 3  12 9.4% 
SC4E&T 5 3 1 5  3 17 13.3% 
SC5D 3 3 2 2   10 7.8% 
SC5E 3 2 1 5 1 7 19 14.8% 
Total  
Share 
35 
27.3% 
21 
16.4% 
18 
14.1% 
33 
25.8% 
9 
7% 
12 
9.4% 
128 
100% 
100% 
Average 
count 
2.9 1.9 1.8 3 1.8 3  
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Table 6.2.1.3: CTPAT Security Resources Development 
Firm B
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g Total 
Count 
Share 
SC5E 1 1 2 1 4 1 3 2 1 16 14.41% 
SC5D  1 1 1 1 1 1   6 5.41% 
SC4E&T  1 1 1 3 1 3 1 2 13 11.71% 
SC4D  1 2  3  2 2 1 11 9.91% 
SC3T  1 1 1 3  1 2  9 8.11% 
SC3E 1 2 2  2  1   8 7.21% 
SC3D 1 4 2  2  1   10 9.01% 
SC2E&T 1  2  4  1   8 7.21% 
SC2D 1 4 2 1 4     12 10.81% 
SC1&5T  1 1  2   1 1 6 5.41% 
SC1E  1 2  3  1   7 6.31% 
SC1D  1   1  1 1 1 5 4.50% 
Total 5 18 18 5 32 3 15 9 6 111 100% 
Share 4.5% 16.2% 16.2% 4.5% 28.8% 2.7% 13.5% 8.1% 5.4% 100% 
Average 
count 
1.0 1.6 1.6 1.0 2.7 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.2   
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Compliance capabilities 
Hypothesis 2a93 states that higher levels of firm compliance correlate with higher degrees 
of capabilities sophistication. In the following paragraphs, we show how the basic 
capabilities, which are predominant in low compliant firms, were increasingly absent in 
middle and high compliant firms, whilst the sophisticated capabilities were less present in 
low compliant firms compared to high compliant firms. This trend is measured based on 
capabilities types count by compliance levels94.  
Table 6.2.1.4 (p.229) shows an increase of sophisticated capabilities according to higher 
compliance levels. Low compliant firms show a higher share of basic capabilities, 71%, 
compared to the total sample average, 57%. Middle compliant firms on the other hand, 
show a higher share of intermediate capabilities, 37%, compared to the total sample 
average, 32%. Finally, high compliant firms show higher share of advanced capabilities, 
25%, than the total sample average, 9%.  
 
Table 6.2.1.4: Compliance levels and capabilities sophistication 
Compliance 
Capabilities  
Basic Intermediate Advanced Total n 
Low 22 8 1 31 4 
Middle 38 25 3 66 6 
High 14 9 8 31 2 
Total 74 42 12 128  
Share of total capabilities by compliance level  
Low 71% 25% 3% 100% 4 
Middle 57% 37% 4% 100% 6 
High 45% 29% 25% 100% 2 
Total 57% 32% 9% 100%  
Share of total capabilities by sophistication  
Low 29% 19% 8% 24% 4 
Middle 51% 59% 25% 51% 6 
High 18% 21% 66% 24% 2 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%  
                                                 
93 See section 3.2 Research questions and hypotheses testing roadmaps. 
94 Although the different capabilities require variegated degrees of knowledge, and each capability is built 
differently, we are not taking a value to represent them. At most, we are indicating how many capabilities the 
firms built. This is like the traditional patent counts, in which each patent represents completely different 
technologies, sectors, knowledge, value, time to register it, and so on, yet the purpose is just to say that it 
exists at a given time in a given context. 
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Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. (p.230), presents the specific capabilities 
that firms built according by compliance level. In general, it shows that basic capabilities 
building lowers at higher compliance levels. Moreover, the stakeholders based capability 
building seem to be important for most of the firms, regardless of their compliance levels. 
On the other hand, vertical alignments, which are advanced capabilities, are predominantly 
built by high compliant firms, i.e. 8 counts, versus 3 and 1 count by middle and low 
compliant firms respectively. Our interpretation of these results is that learning and 
knowledge transfer, and exchange from supply chain partners and stakeholders may be 
needed to progress in compliance, whilst basic capabilities relatively less important. These 
results seem to support hypothesis 2a, which states that higher compliance levels associates 
with sophisticated capabilities, i.e. intermediate and even more on advanced capabilities95.  
 
Figure 26: Capability building by compliance level 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 These results from the descriptive statistics should be taken as preliminary, as a more systematic analysis 
follows ahead with the mvQCA. 
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The next section explores in more detail how these intermediate and advanced capabilities 
were built, with the intention of identifying patterns of capability building. 
 
Intermediate vs. advance compliance capability building  
This exploration of capability building will examine the differences between sets of firms 
that possess different compliance levels. As we assume that there is progress from first low 
to middle, and then eventually to high compliance; and then taking into account and 
focusing on the shares of intermediate capabilities in the transition from low to middle and 
to high compliance (See Table 6.2.1.4, p.229), the next section explores how intermediate 
capabilities were built by low and middle compliant firms. Applying the same logic, we then 
compare the advance capabilities building between middle and high compliant firms.  
 
Intermediate capabilities building 
Low compliant firms build up intermediate capabilities characterised by three main aspects 
(See Table 6.2.1.5, p.233). Firstly, there are considerably enhancements of the security 
applications of their security systems; firms were driven to adoption and adaptation of 
technologies or processes96. 
Secondly, to gain access to security-related expert knowledge without producing it 
internally, firms agreed with stakeholders to accumulate it and exploit it internally. The 
firm’s concern would be about realising the potentials of expert knowledge. The role of the 
stakeholder was supporting the capabilities building of the firm, in whatever manner the 
firm considered necessary. The firms were not concerned about whether the stakeholders’ 
capabilities evolved or not. 
Thirdly, in some instances the stakeholders’ capabilities would be a concern for the firms, 
but only because they required that stakeholders incur single capability upgrading, such as 
                                                 
96 These capabilities resemble what in the literature has been argued as critical to enhance a firm’s 
performance, innovation and absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
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ensuring that the service provided by stakeholder was of good quality. These stakeholders 
were not in the core business of moving the fresh produce, unlike their supply chain 
partners (exporters, transport and distributors)97. 
The middle compliant firms added two additional characteristics to those previously 
explored. Firstly, they had to learn practically how to transfer knowledge to their suppliers 
and clients, so that they (the partners) were able to exploit the security resources developed 
by the firm. In other words, in order for the firm’s resources to deliver the security 
functions and conform to CTPAT, they had to tutor their supply chain partners in how to 
utilise and adapt security resources, which implies the building up of the supply chain 
partner’s resources and capabilities. This is exploiting externally what is developed 
internally98. Secondly, driven by the need to meet security regulations, they engaged in joint 
designs and planning with their stakeholders. At that point it was not enough to transfer 
knowledge or to accumulate it internally. They created systems that provided the security 
functions that were available neither internally nor externally, but which could potentially 
be created by merging stakeholders’ resources with the firm’s internal resources (See Table 
6.2.1.6, p.234). 
 
                                                 
97 In relation to the resource networks, von Tunzelmann and his colleagues (2003, 2007) suggested that firms 
needed to align their resources and capabilities with a network of suppliers and clients. Alignments of 
capabilities between the network of suppliers of resources for the business operations are called resource 
network alignments, whereas the subset of resource network alignment between the main suppliers of inputs 
for production and the users/clients of their products are called vertical alignments (von Tunzelmann, 2003, 
p. 379; von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2007, p. 200). 
98 This is a complementary feature of the absorptive capacity, only it resembles the opposite direction of the 
knowledge transfer, from the focal firm to its suppliers or clients, and it requires identification of the potential 
uses of the own technologies (and processes) in their partners’ operations, establishing the transaction and the 
appropriate knowledge transfer to the external firm; this outward knowledge transfer had been called 
‘desorptive capacity’. More specifically, desorptive capacity is the firm’s ability to externally (outside the 
boundaries of the firm) exploit knowledge (Herzog, 2008, p. 43; Lichtenthaler, 2009, p. 842; Lichtenthaler & 
Ernst, 2007, p. 44). 
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Table 6.2.1.5: Inventory of intermediate capabilities by low compliant firms 
Firm Capabilities building Intermediate capabilities Coding 
SC1D Adoption and adaptation of SC1E traceability system Adoption and adaptation C.SH 
SC1E 
Agreement on the coordination strategies with the State Preventive 
Police with trained personnel and dogs to detect drugs and other 
chemicals at the facilities access point. 
Agreement and coordination with 
Unrelated organisations (SH) 
C.SH 
SC2E&T 
1) Coordination between SC2E&T (driver), customs brokers, and 
insurance providers for traceability and electronic manifest. 
2) Reliance in electronic transmission by the customs broker. 
3) Trailers inspection and hauling in the Mexican customs broker or 
Maymar. 
Coordination with network of 
suppliers (SH)  
Exploiting Network of suppliers’ 
resources (SH) 
Exploiting Network of suppliers’ 
resources (SH) 
C.SH 
 
C.SH 
 
C.SH 
SC3T 
1) Personal CEOs’ networks with drivers with good reputation 
through experience in other firms. 
2) An external company performs the electronic manifest and the 
prior notice. 
3) Trust building and coordination with other drivers for conveyance 
security. 
Exploiting Network of suppliers’ 
resources (SH) 
Coordination with Unrelated 
organisations (SH) 
Coordination with Unrelated 
organisations (SH) 
C.SH 
 
C.SH 
 
C.SH 
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Table 6.2.1.6: Inventory of intermediate capabilities by middle compliant firms 
Firm Capability building Capabilities Coding 
SC1&5T 
1) GPS and electronic manifest integrated software by the developer, in coordination with the SC1&5T. 
2) Following procedural security as defined by exporter and distributor. 
3) Awareness sessions developed by CTPAT, and practical session with the US Department of Transport. 
Adoption and Adaptation 
Adoption 
Adoption 
C.SH 
C.SH 
C.SH 
SC3D 
1) Recommendations and security profiles developments for the SC3E and SC3T in physical security. 
2) Recommendations and security profiles developments for the SC3E and SC3T in access controls and 
procedural security. 
3) Recommendations and security profiles developments for the SC3E and SC3T in procedural security. 
Desorptive capacity 
Desorptive capacity 
 
Desorptive capacity 
C.SD 
C.SD 
 
C.SD 
SC3E 
1) Coordinated service with outsourced private security provider. 
 
2) Implementation adopted and adapted from the SC3D on Physical, access controls, and procedural securities. 
3) Assessing the trailer security of the transport provider and issuing the recommendations given by the SC3D. 
4) Designing access controls in coordination with the private security service provider. 
Agreement with Network of 
suppliers 
Adoption and adaptation 
Desorptive capacity 
Joint design: firm-Unrelated 
organisation 
C.SH 
 
C.SH 
C.SD 
C.SH 
 
SC4D 
1) Development of security profiles with CBP officials. 
 
2) Development of security profiles for the SC4E&T in procedural security and agreeing with customs brokers for 
better coordination of SC4E&T. 
3) Development of security profiles for the SC4E&T in conveyance security. 
4) Analysis of drivers’ behaviour with information provided by SC4E&T’s traceability systems. 
5) Consultant inducing the security awareness in the firm. 
6) Customs broker specialised personnel for electronic manifest for all their clients, not only for SC4. 
7) SC4E&T support in trailer security (GPS and inspection reports). 
8) SC4E&T support in conveyance security (GPS and inspection reports). 
Joint design: firm-Unrelated 
organisation 
Desorptive capacity 
 
Desorptive capacity 
Adoption 
Adoption 
Desorptive capacity  
Adoption and adaptation 
Adoption and adaptation 
C.SH 
 
C.SD 
 
C.SD 
C.SH 
C.SH 
C.SD 
C.SH 
C.SH 
SC4E&T 
1) Procedural security enhanced by incorporating and training on the electronic monitoring of the surveillance 
practices (TouchProbe). 
2) Trailer security procedures developed internally but authorised and inspected by SC4D, US and Mexican 
Customs Brokers.  
3) Agreements on anti-doping and background checks with State Police Department. 
 
4) Adoption of the GPS convoy traceability system and adaptation of the settings to the needs of firms SC4E&T. 
 
5) HACCP training by CIAD for procedural security and trailer security. 
Adoption 
 
Agreement and coordination with 
network of suppliers 
Agreement with Unrelated 
organisation 
Joint design: firm-Unrelated 
organisation  
Adoption and adaptation 
C.SH 
 
C.SH 
 
C.SH 
 
C.SH 
 
C.SH 
SC5D 
1) Adoption of IT systems developed by SC5E. 
2) Implementation by SC5E and information sharing from SC5E to SC5D on how to analyse the management of 
the seals and their monitoring forms. 
Adoption 
Adoption 
C.SH 
C.SH 
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The previous capabilities building inventories seem to provide three general patterns. 
Firstly, Table 6.2.1.5 shows that most low compliant firms build capabilities to exploit and 
coordinate with their stakeholders (SC1E, SC2E&T, SC3T), and with little efforts made to 
build up absorptive capacity (SC1D). Secondly, Table 6.2.1.6 shows that middle compliant 
firms make serious efforts to try to build up absorptive capacity (SC1&5T, SC3E, SC4D, 
SC4E&T, and SC5D). And thirdly, middle compliant firms build up capabilities with their 
stakeholders and supply chain partners (SC3E- 4th capability; SC4D-1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
capabilities; SC4E&T-2nd and 4th capabilities).  
 
Advanced capabilities 
The advanced set of capabilities will be explored in middle and high compliant firms (Table 
6.2.1.7, p.236).  
To start with, it is important to highlight that there was only one middle compliant firm 
that built up advanced capabilities. The capabilities were used to jointly design security 
resources between the SC4E and SC4T. The capabilities evolved through learning by 
experience. The increasing knowledge stocks were expected to be realised within the firm 
SC4E, whilst the firm SC4T played the supportive role in the joint design processes. 
Although the SC4T’s capabilities may evolve, the expected outputs were only appropriable 
by SC5E, and were not shared.  
High compliant firms, on the other hand, not only jointly developed security resources with 
various internal departments, stakeholders and supply chain partners, but also made efforts 
to coordinate the supply chain, which appears to be ‘the key’ for high compliance. 
It seems therefore that low compliant firms try to build up capabilities based on acquiring 
external knowledge for internal exploitation, whilst medium compliant firms have engaged 
in unilateral knowledge transfers from the firm to their partners, or from their partners to 
the firm. And finally, high compliant firms have prioritised the coordination of security 
systems along the supply chain. 
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Table 6.2.1.7: Inventory of advanced capabilities (Vertical alignment) by middle and high compliant firms 
Compliance Firm Capability building 
Advanced capabilities 
(Vertical alignment-C.VA) 
Middle SC4E&T 
Mixed knowledge of surveillance systems by SC4T with complex 
packing facilities operations by SC4E for physical security, access 
control and awareness.  
Joint design with SC 
 
High 
SC2D 
Information sharing (assessment) and coordination on the ways to 
conduct trailer inspections upon visits by SC2D to the SC2E&T 
facilities. 
Coordination with SC 
SC5E 
Capability cogeneration during formal meetings, joint design exercises, 
joint planning, joint strategising, and coordination. It required the 
involvement of packing departments, the compliance manager, the 
SC5D CEOs, transport providers, consultants, and other stakeholders. 
The efforts translated into procedural, information technology, 
container and trailer, conveyance, and threat awareness security 
resources. All for a total of seven different resources. 
Joint design and coordination 
with SC, supplier development, 
stakeholders and internal 
departments involvement and 
coordination. 
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Remarks on intermediate vs. advanced capabilities 
All in all, based on the capabilities inventory by low (Table 6.2.1.5), middle (Table 6.2.1.6), 
and high (Table 6.2.1.7) compliant firms, it seem that firms require sets of capabilities ad-
hoc to the compliance level. 
The first transition, from low to middle compliance, may have required transcending from 
exploiting and coordinating with stakeholders to jointly design and plan the development 
of security resources with their stakeholders, or by developing desorptive capacity to 
support the supply chain partner’s absorptive capacity in order to exploit the firm’s security 
resources outside its own boundaries (by their supply chain partners), rather than inside 
their boundaries (the individual firm). 
The second transition, from middle to high compliance, may have required building up the 
capability to coordinate the supply chain partners’ resources implementation and, very 
importantly, developing their suppliers capabilities in order to enable the functionality of 
the firm’s resources in the supply chain partners’ security practices and operations. This 
suggests that there may be specific capabilities required to progress up the compliance 
ladder. The following section analyses more systematically the capabilities required by 
compliance level using the mvQCA. 
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6.2.2. mvQCA of the compliance capabilities building 
The second research question is about how firms acquired or built up their capabilities and 
developed their resources to become compliant. In the previous section we mentioned two 
transitions towards higher compliance: intermediate capabilities building from lower to 
middle compliance, and advanced capabilities building from middle to high compliance. 
The following sections present the analyses with mvQCA to identify the causal 
configurations of capability building that drove firms towards compliance. A later section 
attempts to evaluate the results and draw conclusions from them.  
 
mvQCA: model specifications 
To proceed with the analysis of the capability building process and determinants of 
compliance, we must specify the model. Similar to the compliance process, the outcome of 
the model is always compliance. In this analysis, due to the limitations of the QCA with 
TOSMANA of treating the output variable as binomial rather than multinomial, following 
the same procedures as with traditional statistical analyses like ANOVA, and the use of 
simple control variables in any type of regression, the dataset was split up to generate two 
groups; one group containing low and middle compliant firms, the other group containing 
middle and high compliant firms. The output variable takes value 0 if there is no 
compliance and 1 if there is compliance.  
The causal conditions (independent variables) of compliance are the 6 capabilities: 
1. Organisational competencies (ORGCAP=C.OC) 
2. Managerial systems (MANSYS=C.MS) 
3. Internal coordination (INTCOORD=C.IC) 
4. Stakeholders support (STAH=C.SH) 
5. Suppliers’ development (SUPDEV=C.SD) 
6. Vertical alignment (ALIGN=C.VA) 
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These causal conditions are not crisp sets yet (0, or 1), but multi-value sets. Consequently, 
thresholds had to be created. The threshold setting rule was the same for all causal 
conditions: ‘if the firm had counts equal or over the median’ in the particular causal 
condition, then that causal condition takes value 1; otherwise it takes value 0. 
There was one exception in the thresholds settings; vertical alignments caused 
contradictory results within such a threshold. To correct this, the threshold for this 
capability was changed from 0.5 to 2, which eliminated the contradiction. With this we 
obtained straightforward results. This decision has implications, however. For all other 
conditions (capabilities) it was assumed that having built at least 1 capability was already 
intensive compared with those not having such a capability at all. The threshold slightly 
modified the interpretation for vertical alignments. Firms with 0 or 1 vertical alignment 
capabilities built are not intensive, and they need to have built twice or more their vertical 
alignments to be considered intensive. 
 
mvQCA: the compliance capability building 
The analysis was divided into three stages. In Stage 0 we identified the causal 
configurations leading to low compliance, comparing against middle compliance firms. In 
Stage 1 we identified the causal configurations of middle compliance, comparing against 
low compliant firms. In Stage 2 we identified the causal configurations of high compliance, 
comparing against middle compliance firms. As in the analyses of the compliance process, 
the models also tried to identify reminders and contradictions, to enhance parsimony and 
inclusiveness. However, we found no more contradictory results. 
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Table 6.2.2.1: Causal configurations of the compliance capability building* 
Stages Causal configurations 
0. Low compliance 
orgcap*[MANSYSs+stahs]+intcoord*align[ORGCAPs+supdevs] 
(SC1E)                       +         (SC1D, SC2ET, SC3T) 
1. Middle compliance 
[ORGCAP*INTCOORD]s+ALIGNs+[STAH*(orgcaps+mansyss)]+[orgcap*mansys]s 
(SC3D, SC5D)            + (SC4ET) +                    (SC15T, SC3E,SC4D) 
2. High compliance 
[MANSYS*SUPDEVn]s + [SUPDEVn*ALIGN]s 
(SC2D, SC5E) 
 
*The model was run with Tosmana 1.301 (Cronqvist, 2009). Minimise =1 or 0, Including=C(Contradictions)+R(Reminders). 
** Minimising=C, Including=R+1(Compliance levels). 
ORGCAP=intensive in organisational competencies; 
MANSYS=Intensive in managerial systems; 
INTCOORD=Intensive in internal coordination;  
STAH=Intensive in stakeholders support; 
SUPDEV=Intensive in supplier development; 
ALIGN=Intensive in vertical alignment;  
CAPITAL LETTERS INDICATE AN INTENSIVE CAUSAL CONDITION (CAPABILITY) 
Lowercases indicate the a non-intensive causal condition (capability) 
Subscripts: s=sufficient condition; n=necessary condition; ns=necessary and sufficient conditions; no subscripts indicate that the condition is neither 
necessary nor sufficient. 
+ in the model results denotes ‘or’, in set theory represents ‘Union’ 
* in the model results denotes ‘and’, in set theory represents ‘Intersection’
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At first glance, the compliance capability building configurations suggest that low 
compliant firms use basic capabilities rather than intermediate or advanced to develop 
security resources. On the other hand, middle compliant firms diversify the capabilities 
building as much as possible for the development of security resources. And finally, there is 
a more focused approach in the capabilities built by high compliant firms, with a key role 
played by knowledge transfers to supply chain partners (supplier development) (Table 
6.2.2.1, p.240). 
In the following section the causal configurations detail the three compliance levels and 
propose some interpretations of the results.  
 
mvQCA: evaluation and interpretation of the model results 
Stage 0: When firms do not want to climb up the compliance ladder 
It was mentioned in previous sections that although some firms were not explicitly seeking 
compliance, they were all trying to conform to some degree with CTPAT guidelines. This 
analysis therefore tries to identify capabilities building by all firms, even when they are not 
looking for compliance.  
Low compliance is associated with various causal configurations. Firms tried to build up 
managerial systems for the development of security resources, but without the support of 
organisational competencies. Also, the lack of organisational competencies was followed by 
a lack of stakeholder support (SC1E). Where there has been an attempt to build up 
organisational competencies for security resources developments, it has been done in 
isolation from other basic and advanced capabilities (SC1E, SC2ET, and SC3T). Hence, the 
only instances where low compliant firms have tried to build up security-related capabilities 
have focused on isolated efforts either in managerial systems or organisational 
competencies (See Figure 27, p.242).  
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Figure 27: Capability building in low compliance 
 
 
Stage 1: The first and steady steps 
Compared to the low compliant firms, the middle compliant firms show greater diversity of 
capabilities, given that low compliance is mainly based upon managerial systems or 
organisational capabilities (Figure 27, p.242), whilst middle compliance is based upon 
vertical alignments, organisational capabilities, internal coordination, and stakeholders 
support (Figure 28, p.243). However, the capabilities for middle compliance are bundled 
into three configurations: 1) vertical alignment capabilities, 2) combinations of 
organisational competencies and internal coordination capabilities, and 3) stakeholders 
support. 
The first configuration, vertical alignment capabilities (ALIGN), shows that the 
development of security resources based on vertical alignment is a valuable on its own, as it 
alone positions the SC4ET in middle compliance (Figure 28, p.243). 
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The second configuration, organisational capabilities and internal coordination, on the 
other hand, imply that the capabilities alone are not sufficient to drive companies, SC3D 
and SC5D, to middle compliance, as the results show only combining them 
(ORGCAP*INTCOORD), rather than individually, firms position themselves in middle 
compliance. This means the value of the capabilities derives from complementing each 
other (Figure 28, p.243).  
The third configuration, stakeholder involvement is valuable, as long as the firms (SC15T, 
SC3E and SC4D) do not divert their attention on organisational competencies 
(orgcap*STAH) or managerial systems building (mansys*STAH), as they risk to be 
identified as low compliant, and lose their status as middle compliant. Thus, full attention 
may be required in acquiring and exchanging knowledge with their stakeholders for middle 
compliance (Figure 28, p.243). 
 
Figure 28: Capability building for middle compliance 
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Stage 2: Compliance leadership 
Previously, a progression in the sophistication of capabilities needed to increase compliance 
levels seemed to be present. Nevertheless, for high compliance rather than focusing on 
advanced capabilities, resources were developed based on intermediate capabilities, 
‘Supplier Development’.  
On the other hand, building up these capabilities is still not enough for high compliance, as 
they have to be accompanied by management systems or by vertical alignment to position 
the firms (SC2D and SC5E) in high compliance. Furthermore, these two capabilities taken 
individually are neither necessary nor sufficient for high compliance.  
Paying closer attention to the two high compliant cases, it is possible to illustrate that firms 
with high compliance may request that their supply chain partners build up security-related 
capabilities in ways that align these partners' security functions with those developed using 
the firm’s resources so that they can be efficiently utilised by their supply chain partners; 
this is a process we refer to as desorptive capacity. Consequently, the whole supply chain 
may conform to the CTPAT guidelines, and may be granted certification, thus eventually 
collectively appropriating regulatory benefits.  
The presence of managerial systems as a complement of desorptive capacity suggests that 
supply chain learning and knowledge sourcing may be accompanied by internal systems for 
high compliance, either to trigger such learning processes or to exploit internal knowledge, 
and the product of that learning. 
This is similar to Winter and Szulanskis’ (2001) propositions about replications as 
strategies. The use of templates (following step-by-step procedures) is used to replicate 
systems and operations to avoid repetition of errors; however, such templates should 
follow periods of experiential learning (Winter & Szulanski, 2001, pp. 733, 737). In our 
context, desorptive capacity may be one of the forms of experimental learning, and 
managerial systems one of the forms of replication systems, or templates. 
When the firm does not complement desorptive capacity with managerial systems, it is still 
possible to make the association to high compliance if vertical alignments are the 
complement. This implies that, upon upgrading of the supply chain partners’ capabilities, 
new potential security functions may be identified by the firm. This may trigger the firm’s 
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intention to re-adapt their resources to deliver new security functions. Such re-adaptations 
may be called a capability, i.e. desorptive capacity, to the extent that their supply chain 
partners exploit the newly developed security functions. 
 
Figure 29: Capability building for high compliance99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 Due to having no contradictions in this stage, the threshold was reset to .05 in vertical alignment. This 
slackens the conditions for high compliance. 
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mvQCA: compliance capabilities building remarks 
In summarising the previous discussion the following observations can be made. Overall, 
the compliance capability building may follow various pathways from low to middle, and 
from middle to high compliance.  
Firstly, when firms are low compliant, they try to develop security resources based on their 
organisational competencies (SC1E), or set up managerial systems (SC1D, SC2ET and 
SC3T) to do so. It seems that intermediate and advanced capabilities are still prohibitive at 
this stage of play.  
For middle compliant firms there were three capability-building pathways. The first was 
based upon basic capabilities and the building up of organisational capabilities together 
with internal coordination capabilities (SC3D and SC5D). The second was based upon 
intermediate capabilities; when firms did not have either managerial systems or 
organisational capabilities, they supported their capability building of their stakeholders 
(SC15T, SC3E and SC4D). The third was based upon advanced capabilities; vertical 
alignments were used to support their capability building for compliance at middle level 
(SC4ET). 
An interesting element related to the capabilities bundle is that managerial systems may 
have different importance at different compliance levels, given that for low compliance it 
was a valuable capability (Figure 27, p.242), for middle compliance it was needed not to be 
present (Figure 28, p.243), and for high compliance, it was also needed in combination with 
desorptive capacity (Figure 29, p.245). Moreover, in the absence of organisational 
capabilities, managerial systems capabilities have a negative impact in terms of compliance, 
positioning firms like SC1E in low compliance (Figure 27, p.242); but it is combined with 
desorptive capacity, it may have great complementary value, positioning firms like SC2D, 
SC5E in high compliance.  
Similarly, desorptive capacity, vertical alignment and managerial systems have only 
complementary value for high compliance. However, to develop security resources with 
enough value to gain high compliance, the necessary condition was building up desorptive 
capacity. Although these results are not supportive of hypothesis 2a, they are revealing, 
since it was an intermediate capability what contributes to a high compliance level, rather 
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than an advanced capability (See Figure 30, p.247). Rejecting the hypothesis highlights the 
value of a systematic assessment based upon mvQCA compared to using simple descriptive 
statistics (p. 236) which suggested accepting the hypothesis. 
 
Figure 30: Compliance capability building 
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The compliance capabilities building processes resemble the evolutionary processes 
described by Teece (1986, p. 289) for complementary assets. Basic capabilities may relate to 
resources and capabilities that are neither complementary nor very difficult to protect 
outside the firm. Stakeholder support implies the unilateral dependency of the firm to their 
suppliers, whilst vertical alignment may relate to bilateral dependency. 
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Figure 31: Evolutionary compliance capability building 
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Desorptive capacity deserves special treatment. It is a case of bilateral dependency; one 
firm depends on the capabilities of the partners to exploit security resources, rather than to 
appropriate knowledge or assets (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009, p. 1321). In this 
case, the value of resources is not only not intrinsic, but is also given by a non-market 
player, the regulator, and mediated by the supply chain partners’ capabilities. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is a new understanding of bilateral dependency, in comparison to the 
traditional vertical alignments view of bilateral dependency which consist on the firm’s 
capacity to acquire knowledge and profit from suppliers or and clients, whilst our 
understanding of bilateral dependency consist on the firm’s capacity to enable the 
knowledge of the suppliers and clients to be able to profit not directly from them, but from 
the regulatory benefits. 
Lastly, Teece (1986) analysed complementary assets under partial integration. It would have 
been useful know how complementary assets are managed under different types of 
governance structure. The next section explores the relationship between capability 
building and supply chain governance, the governance structures associated with 
capabilities building for each compliance level.  
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6.3. Supply chain relationships 
It was shown above that basic capabilities are built upon efforts within the firm, whilst 
intermediate capabilities are built upon unilateral capability building in relationship with 
supply chain partners and/or stakeholders, and advanced capability building required 
substantial efforts and interaction between supply chain partners and, expectedly, with 
bilateral dependency. The present section analyses the governance structures on which 
development of security resources and capabilities is based. It is worth stressing that 
governance structures relate to the overall supply chain relationships, not only for security 
purposes, but also for business relations as a whole. Therefore, the analysis will seek to 
identify the overall governance of the supply chain business relationships that are 
conducive of capability building for security purposes.  
Initially in this section we try to identify the governance structures contributing to 
individual capabilities for high compliance, i.e. managerial systems, desorptive capacity, and 
vertical alignment. Later, we identify the governance structures contributing to capabilities 
configurations for high compliance, i.e. the pairing of managerial systems and desorptive 
capacity, and desorptive capacity and vertical alignment.  
The main constructs under examination are: power asymmetry, dependency, vertical 
integration, and vertical coordination. 
Before we move onto the analysis, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the meaning of 
each component of the governance structure, as described in the methodological chapter 
(Table 3.2.4, p.64).  
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6.3.1. Summary of supply chains governance structures 
Supply chain relationships are structured and governed by their parties. The structure is 
here defined by whether or not the firms are vertically ‘integrated’ and/or ‘coordinated’ 
with their supply chain. These are neither mutually exclusive nor inclusive, and they both 
need to be individually analysed. 
The governance of the supply chain relationships can be seen as a power relation, related to 
the degree of dependency of the firm to the supply chain. Similarly, these are neither 
exclusive nor inclusive, but they must be individually analysed to try to draw meaningful 
conclusions. The following lines summarise the constructs for governance structures: 
 Vertical integration refers to unified: 1) ownership, and 2) hierarchies (or some kind 
of authority) across various supply chain stages. 
 Vertical coordination refers to harmonising and interacting: 1) investments, and 2) 
capabilities and skills building across supply chain stages. 
 Power asymmetry refers to who in the supply chain decides whether the firm should 
comply or not with regulations, standards, norms, and so on. 
 Dependency refers to: 1) the extent to which the firm have developed assets that are 
specific to the supply chain, 2) the time span of the firm’s relationship with its 
supply chain partners, in terms of the time they have been in business and the time 
they expect to continue doing business, and 3) the degree of business transactions 
concentrated in its supply chain partners. 
The governance structures are investigated in three ways: 1) the distributor’s perception of 
the governing and structure in relation to the exporter, 2) the exporter’s perception of the 
governing and structure in relation to the distributor, and 3) the transport provider’s 
perception of the governing structure in its relations with both distributor and exporter.  
The following Table 6.3.1.1, p.251, shows the summary of the values for each one of the 
constructs used to assess each firm’s governance structure. 
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Table 6.3.1.1: Supply chain governance structures 
Firm 
Governance Structures 
P
o
w
er
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ry
 
D
ep
en
d
en
cy
 
C
o
o
rd
in
at
io
n
 
In
te
gr
at
io
n
 
 
D
ec
is
io
n
 
m
ak
in
g1
 
A
ss
et
 
sp
ec
if
ic
it
y2
 
R
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
 
le
n
gt
h
3
 
M
ar
k
et
 
C
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
4 
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s5
 
In
v
es
tm
en
ts
6
 
H
ie
ra
rc
h
ie
s7
 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
8
 
SC15T 6 -3 19 30 0 2 0 0 
SC1D 5 -1 15 100 3 1 0 0 
SC1E 1 1 25 100 5 0 1 0 
SC2D 1 0 23 20 0 4 0 0 
SC2ET 1 0 23 70 5 4 2 3 
SC3D 1 1 18 20 4 4 1 3 
SC3E 1 2 20 90 5 4 1 2 
SC3T 10 1 5 18 1 0 0 0 
SC4D 10 1 30 60 5 4 0 0 
SC4ET 9 6 28 100 4 4 0 3 
SC5D 5 0 30 80 1 3 0 3 
SC5E 4 2 25 80 2 4 0 0 
Mean9 4.5 0.8 22 64 2.9 2.8 0.4 1.2 
Median 4.5 1 23 75 3.5 4 0 0 
1. Power asymmetry: scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that decisions are made by supply chain partners, 10 decisions made by the firm, 
and 5 shared decision making between the firm and supply chain partners. 
2. Asset specificity: scale from -6 to 6, where -6 denotes that assets are not specific, (i.e. 1) Geographic location, 2) infrastructure, 3) 
human capital, 4) brand, 5) technology and processes, and 6) marketing windows), and 6 means that assets are highly specific. 
3. Relationship length. Scale from 0 to 30 years, where 15 years corresponds to the time the firm has spent with the supply chain 
partners, and 15 more years corresponds to the time the firm expects that its relationship with the supply chain partners will last. Any 
time frame was constrained to 15 years; therefore firms with 20 years were classified as 15 years. 
4. Market concentration: scale from 0 to 100, where for the distributor this represents the share of volume of produce distributed for its 
main exporter in the study (SC1D-SC1E); for the exporter this represents the share of volume of produce exported throughout the main 
distributor (SC1E-SC1D); and for the transport provider this represents the share of the movement of cargo for the exporter and 
distributor in the total movement of cargo (SC14T-SC1E and SC1D). 
5. Activities: scale from 0 to 5, where 0 represents no activities coordination with the supply chain partners and 5 represents complete 
coordination of activities with the supply chain partners, i.e. 1) systems of skills and capabilities (synergies between projects), 2) skills and 
capability building roadmaps (information sharing), 3) joint capabilities and skills development planning, 4) exchange (temporal) of 
human resources for skills and capability building between the firm and supply chain partners, and 5) shared (continuous) skills and 
capabilities building teams. 
6. Investments: scale from 0 to 4, where 0 means that no efforts to coordinate investments between the firm and supply chain partners 
have been made, and 4 means that maximum coordination efforts of investments between the firm and its supply chain partners have 
been made, i.e. 1) systems of assets (synergies between projects), 2) roadmaps for investments, 3) parallel and interacting investments 
across units among firms; and 4) loans and financing the client/supplier. 
7. Hierarchies: Scale from 0 to 2, where 0 indicates that the firm manages the skills formation and capability building activities only 
within its boundaries; 1 indicates that the firm also manages the skills formation of other stages of the supply chain; and, 2 indicates that 
the firm also manages the entire capability building activities of other stages of the supply chain. 
8. Ownership: scale 0 to 3; where 0 means separate ownership between the firm and other supply chain partners; 1 means the presence 
of minority investments by the firm in their supply chain partners business; 2 means the presence of joint ventures (resulting in creation 
of new entities) between the firm and the supply chain partners; and 3 means that the firm is under unified ownership 
(acquisition/merger) with other supply chain partners. 
9. Although it is useful to make broad comparisons by using averages it may also be misleading, since for instance in ownership, in our 
sample, there is no case with minority investments in the supply chain partners, while the average is suggesting that there is. 
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The Table 6.3.1.1, p.251 shows firms (e.g. SC3E) under power relations concentrated in the 
supply chain partners rather than in their own firm (SC3E power asymmetry=1), with a 
high degree of dependency due to high asset specificity (SC3E asset specificity=2), 
relationship length below the average (SC3E relationship length=20 years) their market 
concentration is far above the rest of the firms in the study (SC3E concentration=90%). 
This indicates that the firm may be falling under unilateral dependency in favour of their 
supply chain partners. 
There are also cases of firms concentrating the decision making power (e.g. SC4D power 
asymmetry=10) yet still being dependent on their supply chain partners (SC4D asset 
specificity=1, relationship length=30, and market concentration=60%). 
In terms of structures, there are firms which are vertically coordinated and integrated 
(SC2E&T Activities=5, Investments=4, Hierarchies=2, and Ownership=3). There are 
other firms which are vertically uncoordinated and disintegrated (SC3T Activities=1, 
Investments=0, Hierarchies=0, and Ownership=0), and various degrees in between. 
The combination of the previous elements helped identifying various supply chain 
governance structures. Averaging and dichotomising the values for the four constructs 
(symmetric-asymmetric power, dependent-independent, coordinated-uncoordinated, and 
integrated-disintegrated) it is possible to devise 16 different combinations of governance 
structures, which lead to Table 6.3.1.2, p.253. 
The following Table 6.3.1.2, p.253, shows that among 12 cases in our investigation, there 
are 10 different types of governance structures under which security-based capabilities were 
built. 
In the searching of patterns of governance structures we plot the 4 constructs of the 
governance structure into a four-dimensional graph. Hence the following (Figure 32, p.254) 
is a graph rotated along different angles in order to facilitate the search for patterns across 
firms. 
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Table 6.3.1.2: Summary of supply chain governance structure100 
Firm Power asymmetry Dependency Coordination Integration 
Governance 
structures types 
count 
SC15T Symmetric Independent Uncoordinated Disintegrated 1 
SC1D Symmetric Independent Uncoordinated Disintegrated 1 
SC1E Partners Dependent Uncoordinated Disintegrated 2 
SC2D Partners Independent Uncoordinated Disintegrated 3 
SC2ET Partners Independent Coordinated Integrated 4 
SC3D Partners Independent Coordinated Integrated 4 
SC3E Partners Dependent Coordinated Integrated 5 
SC3T Firm Independent Uncoordinated Disintegrated 6 
SC4D Firm Independent Coordinated Disintegrated 7 
SC4ET Firm Dependent Coordinated Integrated 8 
SC5D Symmetric Dependent Uncoordinated Integrated 9 
SC5E Symmetric Dependent Coordinated Disintegrated 10 
 
The first dimension in the graph (Figure 32, p.254), power asymmetry, has a scale of 0 to 4. 
0 and 4 do not have meaning, as they were used for graphical convenience, 1 means that 
the decision-making power is located within the firm, 2 means that the decision making 
power is shared between the firm and the supply chain partners, and 3 means that the 
decision making power is held by the supply chain partners. 
The second dimension, coordination, has a scale of 0 to 3. 0 and 3 do not have meaning, as 
like previously they were introduced for graphical convenience, 1 means that the firm is 
uncoordinated, and 2 means that the firm is coordinated with the supply chain. 
The third dimension, integration, has a scale of 0 to 3. 0 and 3 do not have meaning, as the 
previous variables, 1 means that the firm is disintegrated from the supply chain, and 2 
means that it is integrated with the supply chain. 
The fourth dimension, dependency, is represented with two key shapes (∆ and ●). ● means 
that the firm is independent from its supply chain, whereas ∆ means that the firm is 
dependent on its supply chain. (See Figure 32, p.254). 
 
 
                                                 
100 The thresholds to categorise governance structures as asymmetric or not, dependent or independent, 
coordinated or uncoordinated, and integrated or disintegrated, were based upon thresholds set by 
TOSMANA software (mvQCA software). This is explained further below (Figure 33). 
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Figure 32: Visual representation of the governance structures 
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From the previous graphs (Figure 32, p.254), it is difficult to identify an underlying pattern 
of governance structures. Hence, it is not possible to associate governance structures with 
the types of capabilities that led firms (SC2D and SC5E) to compliance. Thus the following 
section tries to identify such patterns based on the mvQCA. 
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6.3.2. mvQCA of the Supply chains governance structures 
This section initially demonstrates how specific capabilities (i.e. managerial systems, 
desorptive capacity, and vertical alignment) link with the firms’ governance structures. It 
then demonstrates the configurations that contributed to firms (SC5E and SC2D) building 
up joint managerial systems and desorptive capacity, as well as joint desorptive capacity and 
vertical alignment. 
As in the previous mvQCA analysis, the model specifications are presented first, to be 
followed by a summary of the results, and finally some interpretations of them. 
 
mvQCA: Model specifications 
In previous sections, the mvQCA was intended to identify compliance processes and 
capabilities for each compliance level; in other words, compliance processes and 
capabilities were the independent variables, whilst compliance was the dependent variable. 
In these sections, we follow a different strategy; we will try to identify the structural and 
governance conditions under which capabilities were built. This means that governance 
structures are the independent variables and capabilities are the dependent variables.  
Hypothesis 3a is that increasing capability sophistication may drive integration, 
coordination, power asymmetry, and bilateral dependency. Hence, to test for this 
hypothesis, we applied the mvQCA to identify the causal configurations 4 times, for: 1) 
managerial systems, 2) desorptive capacity, 3) vertical alignment, and 4) joint managerial 
systems and desorptive capacity, and joint desorptive capacity and vertical alignments.  
The governance structures (causal conditions) of security-based capability building include 
8 variables. These causal conditions may be crisp (binomial) or multi-value (ordinal) sets. 
Therefore, various thresholds had to be created. The threshold setting rule was similar for 
all causal conditions: ‘if the count was close to the median’ the causal condition took a 
value of 1. Otherwise, it took a value of 0. The threshold however, had to be adapted to 
each causal condition, to have balanced and analytically justifiable groups, which also 
helped reducing contradictory results (See Table 6.3.1.1, p.251; and Table 6.3.2.1, p.260). 
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The justification and the implication of these adjustments is explained in the following 
paragraphs. 
In general, the mvQCA acknowledges that setting thresholds may not necessarily be a 
sensibly practice, due to the structure of the data, which in some cases may not allow for 
homogenous subsets (Cronqvist, 2005, p. 3); hence, given that all variables have different 
structures and analytical implications, it may be as non-sense setting random thresholds as 
well as setting the same threshold for all variables. For some variables it may be necessary 
to dichotomise setting one threshold (e.g. it would be acceptable to classify firms according 
to the time span of their relationship, as long or short), whilst for others to trichotomise 
setting two thresholds (e.g. it would be better to classify firms according to the decision 
making power held by the supplier, or by the exporter, or by both).  
For instance, the variable power asymmetry, lends itself to be clustered in three ‘relatively 
homogeneous’ subset of firms, 1) the subset of firms which declared that the decision 
making power rested in the supply chain partner, 2) the subset of firms which declared that 
the decision making power rested in themselves, and 3) the subset of firms declaring that 
the decision making power was so some extent similar or shared between the themselves 
and their supply chain partners. These thresholds intend to capture the correlation between 
the distribution of the decision making power along the supply chain and the compliance 
capabilities building. In this case, the lower threshold was set on 3.5 of the power 
asymmetry scale, whilst the upper threshold was set on 6.5. Note that there would be no 
difference in the analysis if the lower threshold was set in the region between 1 and 4 
(excluding these values), or if the upper threshold was set in the region between 6 and 9 
(excluding these values), because it would not change the classification of the firms, as they 
remain in the same cluster (see Chart 5, p.258, and Table 6.3.2.1, p.260)101. 
Another example is the variable asset specificity, which although it might be possible to set 
two thresholds, the analysis tries to differentiate firms with specific assets from the rest (the 
ones with generic assets), which means setting only one threshold (1.5 of the asset 
specificity scale). So, firms over the 1.5 threshold are the ones with compliance capabilities 
and resources specific to their supply chain partners (see Chart 6, p.259 and Table 6.3.2.1, 
                                                 
101 However, if we had a larger sample size, it is likely we would have firms in the currently empty region and 
results could have changed; hence it is important that thresholds make analytical sense and they are very fine 
tuned. 
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p.260). If the previous threshold had been put somewhere in the region between 0 and 1, it 
would had some of the firms (not all) with middle degree of asset specificity would have 
been classified together with the high specific assets, and then we would only distinguish 
between generic assets and slight asset specificity vs. middle and high asset specificity. 
Similarly, placing the threshold between -1 and 0 would have differentiated between firms 
with generic assets from the rest102. Thus, the threshold reflects our interest in 
differentiating firms with high asset specificity form the rest. 
 
 
 
Chart 5. Threshold setting for power asymmetry 
Power asymmetry
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102 Again, it is important setting thresholds that make analytical sense, as it has implications in a potential 
context of larger sample sizes, where one may potentially find firms in one or the other side of the threshold 
with potentially different results. 
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Chart 6. Threshold setting for Asset specificity 
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Table 6.3.2.1. Causal conditions, thresholds, and interpretations of governance structures 
Governance 
structure conditions 
Values and Thresholds Interpretation 
Power asymmetry 
(Decision making) 
Value=0 if < 3.5 
Value=1 if ≥ 3.5  
           and < 6.5 
Value=2 if ≥ 6.5 
Power concentrated in the SC partners 
Symmetric power 
 
Power concentrated in the Firm 
Asset specificity 
Value=0 if < 1.5 
Value=1 if ≥ 1.5 
Generic or re-deployable assets 
Specific assets 
Relationship length 
Value=0 if < 24 
Value=1 if ≥ 24 
Low time span of  SC relationship 
High time span of SC relationship 
Market 
concentration 
Value=0 if < 75 
Value=1 if ≥ 75 
Low market concentration in the SC 
High market concentration in the SC 
Activities 
coordination 
Value=0 if < 3.5 
Value=1 if ≥ 3.5 
Uncoordinated activities with the SC 
Coordinated activities with the SC 
Investment 
coordination 
Value=0 if < 3.5 
Value=1 if ≥ 3.5 
Uncoordinated investments with the SC 
Coordinated investments with the SC 
Hierarchies 
Value=0 
Value=1 
Value=2 
Disintegrated authorities between SC partners 
Integrated authorities for skills and capabilities building between SC partners 
Integrated authorities for control over all activities between SC partners 
Ownership 
Value=0 if < 1 
Value=1 if ≥ 1 
Disintegrated ownership between SC partners 
Integrated (unified) ownership between SC partners 
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mvQCA: model results 
mvQCA: evaluation and interpretation of model results 
Governing and structuring security-based managerial systems 
The governance structures that contributed to building up security-based managerial 
systems were: 1) vertical integration in the form of hierarchies controlling all the operations 
of the supply chain parties; 2) asymmetric power in combination with lack of coordination 
of activities between supply chain partners; and 3) (bilateral or unilateral) dependency 
relationships, characterised by long term relationships and high market concentration of 
the firms in the supply chain (Figure 33, p.263). 
Hence security-based managerial systems require either vertical integration (SC3ET), 
asymmetric power between firms (SC2D and SC3T), or dependency relationships (SC1E, 
SC4ET, SC5D and SC5E). Among all the causal conditions, there is only one that is 
individually sufficient to build up the capability, which is the presence of hierarchies 
(SC2E&T), as it is shown in results in Figure 33, p.263, the rest of the governance 
structures constructs are combined with at least another one, which means that the rest of 
the causal conditions are sufficient only in combination with others. These governance 
structures suggest strong intervention and control of the processes across firms in the 
supply chain, rather than freedom of choice among SC partners.  
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Table 6.3.2.2: Governance and structure configurations of capability building* 
Capabilities Causal configurations1 
Managerial systems (MS)1 
Hierarchies(2)s+[PowerAsymmetry(0,2)*CoordActivities(0)]s+[RelationshipLength(1)*Concentration(1)]s 
(SC2ET)          +                              (SC2D, SC3T)                            +       (SC1E, SC4ET, SC5D+SC5E) 
Desorptive capacity (DC) 
[RelationshipLength(0)*Hierarchies(1)]s+[CoorInvest(1)*Ownership(0)]s 
(SC3D, SC3E)                        +                (SC2D, SC4D, SC5E) 
 
[CoorInvest(1)*Hierarchies(1)] s + [Hierarchies(1)*Ownership(1)] s 
(SC3D, SC3E) 
Vertical alignment (VA) 
[PowerAsymmetry(0,2)*CoordActivities(0)]s +   [PowerAsymmetry(1,2)*AssetSpecificity(1)]s 
(SC2D, SC3T)                               +                         (SC4ET, SC5E) 
 
[AssetSpecificity(1)*RelationshipLength(1)]s   +     [AssetSpecificity(1)*Hierarchies(0)]s 
(SC4ET, SC5E)                              +                        (SC4ET, SC5E) 
MS ^ DC; and DC ^ VA 
[CoordActivities(0)*CoordInvest(1)]s 
(SC4ET, SC5E) 
*The model was run with Tosmana 1.301(Cronqvist, 2009). Minimise =1, Including=C(Contradictions)+R(Reminders). 
1 Hierarchies (2)= Integrated authorities for control over all activities between SC partners. PowerAsymmetry (0,2)=(Power concentrated in the supply chain partner for 
SC2D, and Power concentrated in the firm SC3T). The values of all the causal conditions are given in (Table 6.3.2.1, p.260).  
Subscripts: s=Sufficient condition; n=Necessary condition; ns=Necessary and sufficient conditions; no subscript indicates that the condition is neither necessary nor 
sufficient. 
+ in the model results denotes ‘or’, in set theory represents ‘Union’. 
* in the model results denotes ‘and’, in set theory represents ‘Intersection’. 
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Figure 33: Governance structures for security-based managerial systems 
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Governing and structuring desorptive capacity 
Conversely, building up desorptive capacity is free of issues of dependency relationships 
and asymmetric power in the supply chain. This does not mean that there is a need for the 
absence of governance of the supply chain, but that upon integration and/or coordination 
the governance fashion does not make a difference whatsoever (Figure 34, p.265). 
Building up desorptive capacity certainly requires coordinated and integrated structures in 
the supply chain (SC3D and SC3E). Yet there are cases where vertical disintegration is a 
condition for desorptive capacity, as long as there are coordinated investments between 
supply chain partners (SC2D, SC4D and SC5E). 
There are also governance structures that require the presence of hierarchies structuring the 
development of skills and capabilities across supply chain partners; however, this will only 
contribute to desorptive capacity building if the relationship is relatively new, or if the firms 
are independent from each other. So firms may still be able to build up the capability in the 
initial stages when they are still freely adapting to one another (SC3D and SC3E). 
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Figure 34: Governance structures for security-based desorptive capacity 
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Governing and structuring vertical alignments 
Vertical alignment seems to be favoured by presence of dependent relationships among 
supply chain partners (See Figure 35, p.267). 
There are various governance structures under which vertical alignments may evolve. The 
first causal configuration seems to support the idea that synergies and coordinated activities 
for SC2D and SC3T are not required. Vertical alignments occurred under vertically 
uncoordinated relations and unilateral decision-making. The firm SC2D reported that the 
exporter had the power to decide what SC2D should comply with; whilst SC3T reported 
that the power was retained in-house. 
However, the firm SC2D and its partner SC2E&T reported that their power was not held 
within their own firms, but by their partners. Similarly, the firm SC3T reported that they 
had the capacity to set the norms and regulations for their supply chain, which they only 
had a one-year relationship with. On the other hand, SC3E and SC3D reported that the 
power was held by their partners, and not by SC3T. This suggests that these firms have 
more symmetric power than they perceive. 
Therefore it seems that these supply chains (SC2 and SC3) do not have a clear idea as to 
who sets the norms and regulates the supply chain, and the extent to which these norms 
and regulations are binding. It appears to be more the case that a supply chain partner may 
issue a recommendation that could benefit their security capabilities and resources for 
compliance; the firm may then believe it is a binding norm, and will adapt their processes 
and systems accordingly. However, because there is not a binding norm, there are hardly 
any timeframes or control mechanisms to support the transformation of the firm’s 
processes and systems; hence, there are no coordinated transformations of the firm’s 
capabilities according to the supply chain partner’s capabilities; nonetheless ad-hoc vertical 
alignments may still happen. 
Another causal configuration suggests that regardless of the structure of the chain, it is 
sufficient to be in a dependent relationship (SC4E&T and SC5E: asset specificity=1), no 
matter if that dependency is bilateral (SC4E&T=power asymmetry=1) or unilateral (SC5E: 
power asymmetry=2). As expected, it seems that firms who build up specific assets are able 
to align better vertically to their partner’s evolving capabilities.  
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Furthermore, according to the final causal configuration, hierarchical controls are not 
necessary for dependency to favour the presence of vertical alignments (SC4E&T and 
SC5E), which supports the notion of issuing recommendations by supply chain partners 
rather than forcing or structuring transformations along the chains.  
All in all, vertical alignments will evolve eventually within the firm, as long as there is a 
need expressed by the supply chain partner. 
 
Figure 35: Governance structures for security-based vertical alignments 
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Governing and structuring managerial systems and desorptive capacity, and desorptive capacity and vertical 
alignment 
The previous analysis aimed to identify the governance structures favouring the individual 
capability building, whereas the present analysis is specifically intended to identify the 
conditions for capabilities building for high compliance which we have identified as 
involving paired capabilities, i.e. managerial systems and desorptive capacity, and desorptive 
capacity and vertical alignment. Although these two paired capabilities are different, they 
were present in the same sets of firms (SC2D and SC5E). Therefore, the governance 
structures will be the same for the configuration consisting of managerial systems and 
desorptive capacity, and desorptive capacity and vertical alignment. Consequently, the 
analysis is primarily run to identify the governance structures favouring either capability 
building configuration. 
Additionally, the analysis is run in three phases identifying: 1) the governance conditions 
for compliance capabilities, 2) structural conditions for compliance capabilities, and 3) the 
governance structures conditions for high compliance capabilities (i.e. managerial systems 
and desorptive capacity, and desorptive capacity and vertical alignments). 
Firstly, the governance conditions for high compliance capabilities building show that 
bilateral dependency (power asymmetry=1 and asset specificity=1) (SC5E) is sufficient for 
building up high compliance capabilities. Alternatively, high compliance capabilities are also 
built under independent governance relationships, with generic or re-deployable assets 
(asset specificity=0) and with low market concentration of the firm (market 
concentration=0) (SC2D). Interestingly, this points towards loose supply chain relations, 
characteristic of market transactions (See Figure 36, p.269). 
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Figure 36: Governance conditions for security-based compliance capabilities 
 
 
Secondly, the structural conditions suggest that rather than vertical integration, 
coordination in the form of investment mechanisms (coordinated investments=1) may 
sustain high compliance capabilities. It is also necessary that firms ‘do not’ coordinate skills 
and capabilities building between them (coordinated activities=0), in order to set the 
structural conditions for high compliance capabilities (SC2D and SC5E). It seems that skills 
and capabilities coordination may divert the efficient investment coordination across firms, 
which sets the conditions for more relevant or valuable high compliance capabilities (See 
Figure 37, p.270). 
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Figure 37: Structural conditions for security-based compliance capabilities 
 
 
 
The individual assessment of governance and of structures showed that no matter the 
integration type of the supply chain, firms needed to operate in a coordinated fashion 
(Figure 37, p.270) and a bilaterally dependent manner, if not independently (Figure 36, 
p.269). 
However, the integrated analysis of the governance and structures is consistent with the 
structure analysis. This means that high compliance capabilities will emerge from the 
vertical coordinating of investments, and not from forcing the development of capabilities 
across firms (SC2D and SC5E) (Figure 38, p.271). Henceforth, vertical integration or 
hierarchical control over the supply chain may not be supportive of high compliance 
capabilities. 
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Figure 38: Governance structures for security-based compliance capabilities 
 
 
In other words, there is more need of investment coordination mechanisms with 
collaborative and cooperative (self-regulated), rather than integrated or governed 
(enforced), capabilities and resources development across firms in the supply chains. 
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mvQCA: governance structures for compliance capabilities, remarks 
and conclusions 
The previous analysis may be summarised as follows. Building up managerial systems 
(internal knowledge) requires strong control mechanisms and interventions through 
asymmetric, dependent, integrated and uncoordinated supply chains. The development of 
desorptive capacity (external knowledge: learning internally, transferring knowledge to the 
suppliers for their exploitation by the suppliers/clients) requires mainly vertical integration 
or vertical coordination. The vertical alignments, on the other hand (external knowledge: 
learning together, exploiting it internally), require loose structures, but dependency based 
upon developing specific assets to the supply chain. This means that internal knowledge 
requires supply chain control and integration, external knowledge for external exploitation 
requires supply chain integration and coordination, and external knowledge for internal 
transformations requires supply chain specific assets. 
In conclusion, it seems that internal transformations relate to supply chain governance 
mechanisms to controls the supply chain partners, such the case of SC2E&T with its 
overarching hierarchies over the export and the transportation, or the asymmetric power 
that the supply chain partners have over SC3T (see Figure 33, p.263), whilst external 
transformations relate to supply chain structural mechanisms, such the cases SC2D, SC4D, 
SC5E, which based their supply chain relationship more on investment coordination and 
not much hierarchies (see Figure 34, p.265). Clearly, these results should be seen in light of 
the small sample size, thus the need to corroborate this result with more empirical 
investigations. 
Going back to hypothesis 3a, it was suggested that a transition from basic to sophisticated 
capabilities would be associated to: 1) increased controls or asymmetric power, 2) increased 
bilateral dependency, 3) increased coordination, and 4) increased integration. However, we 
found that moving from basic (managerial systems) to intermediate (desorptive capacity) 
and advanced (vertical alignment, and desorptive capacity and vertical alignment), the only 
consistent pattern was in increasing coordination, whilst we found the opposite trend for 
control and power asymmetry, and for dependency and integration we found no patterns. 
Hence, overall hypothesis 3a was rejected by our cases.  
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Yet, elaborating on the only construct that supported hypothesis 3a, we suggest that high 
compliance requires capability building to be supported by supply chain structural 
mechanisms, vertical coordination. Hence, compliance capability building is reinforced by: 
1) establishment of synergies between projects; 2) sharing firms’ investment plans; 3) 
parallel, alternating, and interacting investments across units between firms; and 4) 
exchanging loans and financial supports between supply chain partners. 
All in all, the importance of these results lies not in the ‘enabling’ but in the ‘non-enabling’ 
conditions for high compliance capabilities, such as: governance and integration. Hence, 
regardless of the dependency of the supply chain, the power asymmetries, the degrees of 
vertical integration, what matters is whether the supply chain investments are vertically 
coordinated, and that capability building is not constrained into a supply chain programme, 
but it is allowed to evolve at the supply chain will. 
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7. CHAPTER 7 Discussion of results 
This chapter proposes a way to use the Resource-Based View to understand how 
capabilities, driven by regulations rather than market norms, are built. The structure of the 
discussion follows the research questions stated in the methodological chapter. Firstly, it 
addresses the organisational processes that firms follow in relation to their compliance, 
inferring that rather than a single ‘compliance model’ there are multiple ‘pathways to 
compliance’. 
Secondly, it addresses capability building and resource development, and how their value is 
leveraged, showing that rather than ‘cumulative capabilities models’ (i.e. basic, intermediate 
or advanced), we may see multiple trajectories, and that different values may be associated 
with each one of them. A key element addressed here is how resources and capabilities are 
leveraged to bring benefits for complying firms. In this section, the traditional view of 
resources and capabilities is revisited. It argues that firms create value when they find, build 
and exploit meaningful capabilities configurations, in light of the consumer’s (regulator’s) 
needs, rather than simply accumulating capabilities and resources. 
Thirdly, it addresses supply chain governance structures and the role of supply chain 
integration and coordination in the compliance-capabilities building processes. It shows the 
benefits of measuring integration and coordination separately, so that coordination may be 
identified as the key driver of higher compliance. This connects the discussion back to the 
issue of the value of resources and capabilities, and suggests that competitive advantage 
may come from long term supply chain relationships, and also from realising the value of 
security resources and capabilities of the firms involved as quickly as possible. Value 
emerges here from the appropriation of regulatory benefits and risk reductions that come 
from compliance. 
 
7.1. Business regulation and the compliance process 
This section discusses the complexity of the compliance processes to highlight that 
understanding compliance (and its absence) requires paying attention to the role of 
capability building, rather than just ‘willingness’, which has been the main focus in previous 
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regulatory studies. Thus, the argument suggests that responsive and ‘really responsive’ 
regulation scholars may benefit by deepening the analysis of willingness and capabilities as 
causes of compliance and noncompliance by moving from just organisational theories to 
include the RBV, in other words, paying attention to the firms’ resources and capabilities 
building. Such distinctions may also inform regulators seeking to develop and implement 
better regulations. 
This may enable regulators to show in which cases noncompliance is the result of lack of 
willingness, or lack of capabilities, and the processes by which firms may be incentivised to 
comply from either starting point, firms’ unwillingness or incapability. Further, although 
this discussion derives mainly from an impact assessment of a public-private regulatory 
partnership (i.e. CTPAT), we previously explained that it was not possible to find cases 
exclusively complying with PPPs, Public, and Private regimes. Hence, this discussion may, 
in theory, have similar implications for public and private social regulations, since our cases 
have not only built up security resources in response to CTPAT, but also in response to 
other regulations independently, i.e. to public and their self-regulations. 
As mentioned beforehand, the notion of compliance processes was introduced by Sproull 
(1981), enriched by French et al. (1992), and furthered by Henson and Heasman (1998). 
This investigation conducted an empirical investigation to identify the causal conditions of 
conformance and compliance103, which are typically implicit, but more often neglected in 
empirical regulatory studies. 
In general, the results show heterogeneous processes (Table 6.1.1.6, p.211), yet with 
distinctive behavioural patterns of compliance and non-compliance (See Table 6.1.2.1, 
p.215). More specifically, there were distinctive compliance patterns between compliant 
and non-compliant firms: 1) differences in regulatory awareness, 2) differences in their 
compliance methods, and 3) differences between compliance leadership and delays. 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 As explained in page 200, compliance relates to the adherence of a firm to a regulation, and conformance 
relates to the actual implementation and processes that meet the regulatory guidelines and standards (Gilliland 
& Manning, 2002, p. 322; Scharfeld, 2003, p. 11; R. Wilson, 1997, p. 48) 
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Differences in regulatory awareness 
On the basis of the evidence gathered here, it seems that only well known, reputable and 
legitimate institutions can regulate firms in this context. Customs Border Protection (CBP) 
and the Fresh Produce Association of the Americas (FPAA) are the institutions that make 
firms aware of regulations. Surprisingly it was not sufficient to have CTPAT as a reference 
institution, given that it is the CTPAT certifying agency. A possible explanation is that 
CTPAT lacks sufficient enforcement and prosecution powers and needs to refer back to 
the CBP when potential wrongdoing by firms is identified. Consequently, it is the CBP that 
gets identified as the most important source of awareness for countering terrorism. These 
results are consistent with other regulatory studies that argue that hegemony, power and 
legitimacy are necessary to trigger responses from regulated parties (Braithwaite & Drahos, 
2000, p. 398; Scott, 1987, p. 451). 
Another explanation relates to Baldwin and Black’s (2008) suggestion that complex 
regulatory regimes, with regulatory functions such as information, inspections, certification, 
and enforcement being dispersed across different sectors, can add uncertainty, confusion 
and interferences between the regulator and the regulated. As a result, firms may not have a 
clear idea as to who is demanding what, and which regulator they should be listening to 
(Baldwin & Black, 2008, p. 63). This may limit the possibilities regulators have to effectively 
drive firms towards compliance. 
Interestingly, CTPAT had been a source of regulatory awareness only in the absence of 
industry associations’ regulatory information (Figure 22, p.217), suggesting that for this 
public-private regulatory regime, a multiplicity of actors and duplicity of roles may make 
effectively changing the behaviour of firms more difficult, even after they have decided to 
comply. 
 
Regulatory competition and multiple compliance processes 
Previous investigations in the software, chemical and financial sectors argued that 
compliance with a given regulation is influenced by previous compliance processes to other 
regulations and by the presence of competing compliance processes (Blount, 2007; EPA, 
2000, p. 10; Vlachos, 2004, p. 5).  
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For regulatory studies, regulatory competition is a relevant issue. In fact, Meidinger (2009) 
persuasively argued that governments have regained authority in recent years, yet find 
themselves competing with private sector safety regulatory programmes (Meidinger, 2009, 
p. 242). Regulatory competition is important because, to meet regulatory aims, firms 
require resources and capabilities that adhere to the norms (Yapp & Fairman, 2006, p. 44) 
at a precise time (Williams & Edge, 1996, p. 873). Thus, a regulatory regime whose 
compliance processes attract more resources and capabilities from the firm, is assumed to 
be more authoritative than other regulatory regimes not attracting as many resources and 
capabilities. 
Our empirical results on the other hand suggest that this is not the case here. Although 
having multiple compliance processes simultaneously on-going does not seem to have a 
positive influence, it also does not seem to have a negative effect. In the implementation 
stage, the new security-based operations merged into the pre-existing operations of external 
organisations (supply chain partners mainly, i.e. SC4ET, SC5E). The learning processes for 
capability building and their related investments were split between the firms’ and the 
external organisations’ operations. It is therefore possible that in a mixed regulatory regime 
like CTPAT it may not be given that resources and capabilities are incompatible. In our 
cases they co-exist, and can even merge. 
Therefore, conforming to PPPs seems to allow for the coexistence of multiple regulatory 
regimes; achieving social aims, responding to consumer needs, and reducing the burdens 
and discriminatory conditions as Garcia-Martinez et al. (2007) suggested previously for food 
safety standards. There must be limits to this sharing and overlapping of resources between 
compliance processes involving multiple regulatory regimes, but it is also possible that such 
limits may be mainly set by the capabilities of the firms. 
 
Compliance leadership and delays 
The results in this investigation do not seem to support the notions of first mover 
advantage advocated by Ashford et al., (1979) and Porter and van der Linde (1995). Most of 
the early movers (SC5D, SC3T, SC2D and SC1E), rather than attempting to increase the 
resource barriers as Wernerfelt (1984) suggests, focused on understanding how to secure 
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their facilities and supply chains through open knowledge exchange and collaborations with 
other stakeholders. This approach was the same with on time movers and newcomers, 
many of whom ended up conforming highly to CTPAT. As a result, resources and 
capabilities were accessed by latecomers, which implies that there were no major resources 
barriers, opposite to Wernerfelt’s (1984) hypothesis, and that they faced intense periods of 
learning and capabilities upgrading, and perhaps leapfrogging. 
These processes are not uncommon; Kim (2004) showed how Asian firms with low 
knowledge bases invested heavily in absorptive capacity building, with intense periods of 
continuous and discontinuous learning, eventually driving up their knowledge base (Kim, 
2004, p. 348). Hence, there is a strong relationship between intensity of effort and 
commitment, and long-term learning and competitiveness. Yet firms may fail to comply, at 
least temporarily, when they miss out on a critical knowledge base. 
Hence, regulatory scholars interested in delays in regulatory compliance and leadership may 
want to take into account the idea that, after willingness has been established, firms may 
depend on their knowledge base and capabilities. The research suggests two reasons why 
building early security resources and capabilities did not raise barriers. Firstly, CTPAT 
regulators do not continuously, publicly and transparently update the guidelines for 
compliance with CTPAT. Secondly, CTPAT does not maintain fluent bilateral 
communication systems to nurture and support firms’ early engagement. 
Hence, there may be more to non-compliance than just unwillingness to comply, or 
violation of the law or norms. Non-compliance is also influenced by who regulates and 
how, and with implementation strategies, rather than whether a firm is early, on time, or 
delayed. Yet regulatory studies keep focusing on issues of willingness, reluctance or 
attitudinal settings to explain compliance. 
 
Capabilities: the missing link between willingness and compliance 
Regulatory scholars generally consider that “non-compliance is, first of all, a violation of 
the law” (Lai et al., 2007, p. 539). Such violations may be due to lack of: 1) enforcement 
capacity, 2) rewards systems, 3) organisational expectations of regulatory benefits, or 4) 
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adequate institutional arrangements, or management tactics opening up planning legislation 
to the public and stakeholders. 
A step forward in the acknowledgement of the importance of competencies and 
capabilities in the regulatory studies was made by scholars such as Parker (2006), Nielsen 
and Parker (2008), and Baldwin and Black (2008). 
In 2006, Parker stressed that enforcement was about regulators persuading businesspeople 
of the value of compliance, and regulators understanding the motivational complexities that 
lead to non-compliance, and learning how to improve regulation to enforce it in fair and 
non-stigmatising ways. For her, non-compliant behaviour leads to conflict, particularly 
when management is responsible, because their willingness (norms of compliance) does not 
match up to their behaviour due to, among other reasons, ‘incompetence’ (Parker, 2006, p. 
610). Under such conditions, regulators fall into a “compliance trap dilemma” because they 
lack political and cultural support for their views. As a result, the regulator can 1) accept the 
firm’s views, 2) enforce harder, or 3) change businesspeoples’ views about the morality of 
their own behaviour, in order that the enforcement method is seen as legitimate, and 
compliance is seen as normal (Parker, 2006, p. 611). 
Interestingly, in Parker’s anti-cartel case study, firms were willing but not able to comply. 
After enforcement, the agency had broken the intrinsic motivations of the firms to comply, 
leading to resistance, defiance or disengagement (Parker, 2006, p. 611). Similar responses 
were seen in firms SC4E&T and SC4D, the supply chain that list certification, and which in 
non-structured interview information, suggested that they were waiting for the benefits that 
come from the upgrading of the traditional cross-border infrastructure to emerge, so that 
they can disengage from CTPAT. 
Nielsen and Parker (2008) showed that firms’ internal resources (such as research and 
development, legal knowledge, economic knowledge and technical knowledge relevant to 
compliance) drove compliance in Australian firms (Nielsen & Parker, 2008, pp. 330-332). It 
is therefore encouraging that our results resemble findings from criminologists scholars, 
calling for larger scale and more widespread confirmatory research of out thesis. 
Baldwin and Black (2008, p. 69), drawing on institutional theories of organisations, also 
understand compliance in terms of firms’ operating and cognitive frameworks and how 
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resources are distributed between organisations, or what they called ‘attitudinal settings’. In 
relation to the operative and cognitive frameworks, they describe organisational responses 
as structured strategic actions driven by rational and institutional pressures. However, the 
authors later turned responses and actions (processes) into ‘cultures and understandings’ 
(structures), which operate within regulated organisations (Baldwin & Black, 2008, p. 70). 
Interestingly, the authors moved from the understanding of processes to the understanding 
of structures, leading to a focus on ‘stocks of resources’ or ‘attitudes’ among organisations 
rather than the processes by which these resources and attitudes are created. 
Although non-compliance may be a violation of the law, it is worth putting this into 
context and differentiating between firms that are unwilling to comply and those that are 
unable to develop the knowledge base, the resources and the capabilities needed for 
compliance. Moreover, because errors are normal in any learning process, firms may 
unwittingly follow paths that lead to non-compliance. Regulators may want to take that 
into account when deciding what enforcement strategy to follow, by for instance allowing 
self-regulations for willing firms with capabilities, incentive-based regulations for unwilling 
firms with capabilities, voluntary capacity building programmes for willing firms without 
capabilities, and incentive-based regulations and capacity building programmes for 
unwilling firms without capabilities; however, such conditions and the corresponding 
regulatory strategies are not yet clearly captured in the literature. On the other hand, it is 
not so easy to measure the intent which is what willingness is about. And finally, 
command-control regulations may ultimately be required after persuasion and capacity 
building are not effective for reluctant firms. 
The next section discusses how capabilities acquire value in the compliance process. 
 
7.2. Leveraging value from compliance capabilities 
This section highlights the importance of interaction between internal and external sources 
of knowledge. The idea is that compliance may not need incremental or linear capability 
building processes, nor incremental injections of money as argued, for example, in 
regulatory studies of the value of death (Viscusi, 1995, p. 46). Instead, it is a rather complex 
process, with patterns of external sourcing and internal application, and patterns of internal 
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development and external exploitation. Such complex processes derive from the 
heterogeneity of resources and capabilities, and from the attempts of the firm to leverage 
the value of compliance, which is often externally given. 
Earlier sections showed how the RBV sees resources as (tangible or intangible) things and 
capabilities as ways (even potentially) of doing or producing things. These resources and 
capabilities may be complementary, or they may have their own intrinsic value. 
The question being addressed here is whether the same will hold for capabilities and 
resources created for compliance. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) suggest that capabilities are 
dynamic when they respond to changing environments, and that they can be built from 
many starting points both inside and outside the firm (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, p. 1116). 
In practical terms, this means that dynamic capabilities have intrinsic value that may be 
carried over to wherever they are applied to. 
Based on this interpretation, the summary of capabilities by compliance level (Table 6.2.1.4, 
p. 229) suggests that at low compliance levels, the most advanced (i.e. dynamic) capabilities 
are only just emerging, and that they evolve, grow and multiply during the transition to 
higher compliance. As advanced capabilities develop, the role of more basic capabilities 
diminishes at higher compliance levels. 
The problem with this interpretation is that it does not address the role of each type of 
capability in the compliance process, or the difficulties of identifying patterns of 
compliance-capability building. The application of qualitative comparative analysis 
(mvQCA) shows that desorptive capacity with vertical alignment, and desorptive capacity 
with managerial systems, are associated with high compliance. The remaining capabilities, 
although they may be present, may not be crucial (for the time being) for high compliance 
(See Figure 29, p.245). 
So although heterogeneity is good, it is more relevant in terms of compliance to discover 
the patterns of capabilities building under different environmental pressures. If the value of 
capabilities is not intrinsic but exogenous, perhaps a firm needs capabilities configurations 
capable of leveraging the value of compliance for the firm, rather than a variety of 
capabilities. Heterogeneous capabilities therefore are, at most, preconditions to enable what 
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are important and valuable capabilities configurations. But how can a capabilities 
configuration leverage value for the firm in a compliance context? 
Just as technological ‘mutations’ are offered to the markets, which are far from random 
(Nelson, 1994, p. 50), capabilities mutations may be offered to regulators. The individual 
(and bundles of) capabilities embedded in security resources offered to CTPAT may be 
‘systematically selected’, creating patterns of surviving capabilities and resources 
configurations. These configurations capture the regulatory benefits, leveraging the value of 
compliance by the firm. 
The following sections show the patterns of capabilities and resources configurations 
systematically selected by CTPAT regulators. 
 
Compliance: a transition to limited diversity of capabilities 
In the present investigation, we have discovered three paths of compliance capability 
building relating to each compliance level or to environmental pressure, and two paths 
from low to middle and from middle to high compliance (Table 6.2.2.1, p.240). Initially, 
low compliant firms focused largely on internal capabilities. There was no sourcing of 
knowledge or learning from outside their own boundaries for compliance, suggesting a lack 
of either absorptive or exploitive capacities. But then, how do these firms progress towards 
compliance? 
The RBV scholars Buysse and Verbeke (2003) suggested that a shift from reactive to 
preventive, and to compliance leadership104 requires the engagement of a broader range of 
stakeholders. Their general suggestion is greater stakeholder involvement for higher 
compliance and conformance (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003, p. 454). However, our 
investigation only reflects the similar pathways from low to middle compliance, not from 
middle to high. 
In our case, the low compliant (reactive) firms built up single capabilities that could have 
the potential to internally exploit the security resources (Figure 27, p.242). The pathway to 
middle compliance complemented internal learning sources with a broader range of sources 
                                                 
104 It corresponds to a shift from low to middle and high compliance in our case. 
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of knowledge from stakeholders and supply chain partners (Figure 28, p.243), and we 
suspect that this also required higher investment. On the other hand, the pathway to high 
compliance required narrowing down the sources of knowledge and learning to intra firm 
(managerial systems) and supply chain partners (vertical alignment), whilst stakeholder 
support does not play a key role; hence the diversity of capabilities building is more limited 
than that which Buysee and Verbeke (2003) predicted for high compliance. 
The pathway to high compliance consists of two configurations: 1) managerial systems and 
desorptive capacity, and 2) desorptive capacity and vertical alignments (Figure 29, p.245).  
For the first configuration, firms developed security resources out of their own managerial 
systems, and later enabled their suppliers understanding and the exploitive capacity of the 
firm’s resources. This is similar to recent findings in open innovation frameworks for 
information and communication technologies (see Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009, pp. 
1321-1322). 
For the second configuration, firms coordinated the development and timely deployed 
their security resources along their supply chains, rather than their capabilities building. 
Perhaps scheduling investments for security resources deployment between firms may have 
been the trigger for inter-firm learning and knowledge exchanges. This looks like the 
‘internally facing’ and ‘externally oriented’ capabilities building theorised by von 
Tunzelmann and Wang (2007), for which until now little empirical evidence has been 
provided, and which according to the authors the dynamic interactive capabilities may be 
important to advance the theory of production, given that productivity of technology may 
lie in its ability to generate more technology (2007, p. 202). Our investigation aligns with 
such view, in addition to highlight that the new technology does not only generates in the 
firm building up the capabilities and knowledge for it, but also in their supply chain 
partners or stakeholders firms. 
 
The value of capabilities and resources 
A key point towards understanding compliance relates to whether the capabilities and 
resources are seen as valuable by the regulators. There are questions as to whether or not 
such value is intrinsic, whether or not the RBV falls into a tautology. Some short answers 
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are yes, their values have been assumed intrinsic, yet the RBV is not tautological, and we 
provide empirical contributions to dispute the RBV tautology argument.  
There are two main criticisms of the tautology of the RBV. First, not questioning what 
makes capabilities and resources valuable (Porter, 1991, p. 108). This has been mostly truth; 
however, without a clear notion of how capabilities and resources are translated into value 
we have a weak theory but not a tautological (self-evidentially true). Likewise, there is a 
criticism the RBV assumes the presence of value in resources and capabilities, making the 
theory tautological (truth by assumption) (Priem & Butler, 2001, p. 64). The second 
criticism is the lack of empirical investigations to assess the presence of value in resources 
and capabilities (Foss, 1998, p. 147), however, this makes it speculative, not tautological, 
which may not contribute to the falsification of theories. This thesis is a small empirical 
contribution to remove the assumptions that resources and capabilities have value 
intrinsically, by showing that the value depend on the ways capabilities or resources are 
combined to satisfy a client, in our case the client being the CTPAT regulators. 
Barney (2001) responded to Priem and Butler (2001) by recalling that resources and 
capabilities are valuable according to the market context in which a firm operates (Barney, 
2001), because it is ultimately the market that values and pays a price for the resources and 
capabilities. 
The present investigation not only supports Barney’s assertion, but also reinforces it. Here, 
values differ even within the same market contexts, because capabilities and resources were 
created for regulatory compliance, therefore the value assigned by the regulator may differ 
across firms competing in the same markets according to each compliance level (Table 
6.2.2.1, p.240). In other words, the capabilities and resources at low compliance may be less 
valuable than at high compliance in the eyes of the regulators. 
Foss (1998, p.146) also argues in favour of the non-tautological character of the RBV, 
suggesting that the value of resources and capabilities positively feed on each other, making 
such values not given. This investigation not only complements Foss’ (1998) argument, but 
also provides evidence of organisational learning not always feeding security capabilities 
and resources creation positively, but sometimes negatively, with feedback loops in the 
compliance decision making processes (Figure 21, p.202). This interrelationship between 
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capabilities and resources suggests that the value is not leveraged in individual capabilities 
or resources; hence, their value is not always intrinsic. 
What is more, such value may actually be lost in combination with other types of 
capabilities and resources, or it may be valuable only in the absence of other capabilities; 
hence, capabilities are not always complementary, they may also be substitutes (Figure 28, 
p.243). Therefore, like other goods, it is not given that the value of capabilities and 
resources is intrinsic, complementary or substitute in nature. A reason for this may be that 
the value of the security capabilities and resources is assigned externally by the regulator, in 
an exercise of comparing against what the regulator knows about the rest of the industry’s 
security capabilities and resources. 
All in all, the possibility of intrinsic value is small, whilst the possibility of complementary 
and substitute value is higher. Also, although the firm may make efforts to leverage value 
by making capabilities and resources appealing to the regulators105, it is the later that 
ultimately decides whether or not they are worthy of certification. 
For instance, if the firm does not complement vertical alignments with desorptive capacity, 
the capabilities and their newly created resources may not yield the value as defined by 
CTPAT regulators (e.g. fast cross-border clearance, customs payment accounts, reduced 
inspections rates, and so on). The example of managerial systems is even more drastic, 
since removing desorptive capacity and leaving managerial systems alone may drive 
regulators to classify the firm as low compliant (Table 6.2.2.1, p.240).  
All in all, removing the assumption that knowledge, assets, capabilities and resources are 
always complementary or that they always have intrinsic value, and testing for 
configurations (heterogeneous patterns) rather than mere diversity (heterogeneity), 
counters criticisms that argue the RBV to be imprecise, untested, or tautological. Even 
more important, it may contribute insights about how to propose better strategies to the 
firm to leverage value after compliance has been achieved. 
In cases in which the value of such configurations requires the combination of resources 
and capabilities located in different firms along a supply chain, the analysis of the inter-firm 
                                                 
105 In a market context, the firm invests in advertisements to appeal to consumers, and in a regulatory context 
the firm invests in lobbying to appeal to regulators. 
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relationship may be paramount, since these can regulate and govern the capability building 
and resources development across firms.  
 
7.3.  Supply chain relationships for capability building 
The previous discussions about the compliance process and compliance capabilities 
showed that supply chains are determinant upon the individual firms’ capacity to comply; 
on the one hand because the implementation strategies consist of outsourcing security 
measures to their supply chain partners and stakeholders without relocating those activities 
outside the firm, and on the other because capability building and resources allocation leads 
firms to source knowledge from, and enable, their supply chain partners. These strategies 
and patterns of capabilities building suggest that supply chain relationships play important 
roles, and the following section discusses the results of governance structures. 
The first part of the following section discusses the results of supply chain structures, 
taking into account and separating the effects of integration and coordination. The second 
part discusses the role of the supply chain governance to attempt to understand whether 
asymmetric or symmetric powers in the supply chains dominate the capabilities building. It 
concludes with the interaction effect of the supply chain governance and structure.  
Overall, it will be shown that although compliance requires relevant knowledge transfer 
and collective capabilities building, which should happen with selective and justified 
information sharing (Lamming, Caldwell, Harrison, & Phillips, 2001, p. 7), the risk of over-
reliance on just one or two suppliers that may not comply with regulation (Cousins et al., 
2004, p. 557) such as Supply Chain 3 and Supply Chain 4, was tackled by compliant firms 
(SC2D and SC5E) using collaborative strategies (Cousins et al., 2004, p. 556) (vertical 
coordination) rather than vertical integration. 
 
Supply chains structure 
This part of the discussion contributes to the removal of the assumption that supply chain 
governance structures are holistic systems, i.e. integrated or disintegrated (markets, 
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hierarchies, and intermediate points). Considering that more detailed analysis of the supply 
chain relationships is needed, the discussion focuses on both integration and coordination 
mechanisms, and the ways in which they mediate the firms’ capabilities building and 
resources development for compliance. 
Given that firms need to at least interact with other firms to exchange and transfer 
knowledge for capability building, and that they are exposed to hierarchical inter-firm 
controls (Delmas, 1999, p. 663; Williamson, 1971, p. 113), we now turn our attention to the 
supply chain governance structures, which we have argued mediates such inter-firm 
interactions (Arshinder et al., 2008, p. 318; Frank & Henderson, 1992, p. 942; Jaspers & 
van den Ende, 2006, p. 819; Patnayakuni et al., 2006, p. 15; Sirmon et al., 2007, p. 277).  
Following Williamson (1971), and Delmas (1999), it should be possible to predict that 
firms with access to knowledge from their supply chain partners possess this knowledge 
because they are integrated, i.e. the different organisations are owned by the same entity. If 
the firm is not situated in vertically integrated supply chains, for capabilities to be 
exchanged between organisations (because they are not marketable) the least that can 
happen is that the organisations engage in an alliance; this is due to a mixture of equity 
sharing and a lack of hierarchical control (Delmas, 1999, p. 639), or there may also be 
pressures to integrate the chain. 
On the contrary, the Resource-Based View predicts that vertically disintegrated firms lead 
to heterogeneous external knowledge, which is later incorporated into the firm by means of 
coordination mechanisms. In these cases, Lorenzoni and Lipaparini (1999) argued that may 
be as a result of lowering the costs by introduction of trust and other relational capital, 
which may eliminate the need for the exogenous safeguards devised by Transaction Costs 
Theory (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999, pp. 332-333). However, there is the underlying 
argument that trust and relational capital are cheaper than exogenous safeguards. 
Similarly, the food value chain and supply chain literatures closely relate to the Resource-
Based View. Even without the need of trust and social capital, they argue that global food 
supply requires coordination economies for competitiveness (Henson & Humphrey, 2009, 
p. 9) and performance (Arshinder et al., 2008, p. 317). Thus, if a firm is situated in a 
vertically disintegrated supply chain, then knowledge may be transferred across firms in a 
vertically coordinated fashion. 
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Although recent supply chain contributions acknowledge that coordination is a separate 
issue from integration (Jaspers & van den Ende, 2006, p. 821; Patnayakuni et al., 2006, p. 
15; Robertson & Langlois, 1995, p. 547), there have been only a few attempts to capture 
their individual and interactive effects. 
For instance, the literature on economies of speed, scope and scale suggests that the 
creation of organisations that have the capacity to coordinate and control (integration) 
within and between large firms is what drives economies of speed (Chandler, 1973, pp. 6-
7). Yet in this analysis coordination is not independent from, but a by-product of, 
disintegration. The underlying assumption is that coordination follows the corporate 
disintegration into largely specialised subdivisions. On the contrary, a resource-based and 
evolutionary view argues that coordination is a by-product of integration, at least in 
complex systems industries (Prencipe, 2004, p. 129). These arguments seem to be 
concerned with deciding whether or not coordination and integration are different sides of 
the same coin. 
A literature strain that considers coordination and integration to be two different subjects is 
that of the ‘Global Production Networks’ (GPN). Yet they are not so much concerned 
with the relationship with capability building, but with how coordination efficiency may 
lead to reduce incentives of integration, which in turn drives supply chains into 
disintegration (Ernst & Kim, 2002, p. 1422; Rugman, 1997, p. 183). This is the inverse 
causality stated by Chandler (1973, pp. 6-7). The GPN scholars seem to be more interested 
in issues of economic development, industrial organisation and general business 
transactions, than they are in the capabilities in the context of coordination and integration. 
Our investigation shows the results of analysing integration and coordination individually, 
and their interaction effects on capability building. 
The main result is that capability building among supply chain partners may not require full 
integration of the supply chain, merely coordination (Table 6.3.2.2, p.262). The implication 
is that integration does not follow coordination, and that coordination does not follow 
integration. More specifically, knowledge exchange between supply chain partners may 
occur on an ad-hoc basis, and investments need to be coordinated between the firms for 
the development and deployment of security resources (Figure 37, p.270). What we 
discovered is that no control (integration) over the supply chain was required, but rather a 
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‘commitment’ from the firms to ‘engage’ with the whole supply chain to develop and 
deploy their security resources in due course.  
This suggests that elements of trust or relational capital, i.e. commitment and engagement, 
eliminate the need for the safeguards set up by the Transaction Costs theory, and therefore 
do not cause integration. This is similar to what Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) found, 
where relational capital drove not only increased coordination among supply chain 
partners, but also disintegration (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999, pp. 332-333). In fact, their 
findings are closely related to Chandler’s predictions (1973, pp. 6-7), which state that 
disintegration is associated with coordination. Our results, on the other hand, support the 
relationship between relational capital and coordination, but not of relational capital and 
integration in the supply chain. 
Furthermore, our results showed that firms with high compliance did not coordinate their 
skills and capabilities development with their supply chain partners (Figure 38, p.271). This 
seems contradictory in light of the presence of vertical alignment and desorptive capacity 
for high compliance (Figure 29, p.245), and of outsourcing and merging strategies with 
stakeholders and supply chain partners in the sixth stage of the compliance processes 
(p.221 and Table 6.1.2.1, p.215). Nevertheless, it does not mean that firms did not interact 
for the purposes of knowledge exchange and exploitation at all, or that they did not use 
informal inter-firms skills and capability-building. In fact, the very presence of vertical 
alignment and desorptive capacity is evidence of informal coordination mechanisms106. 
These mechanisms are not unusual; Baden-Fuller & Winter (2005) have shown that 
through trial and error and experience, successful principles (e.g. guidelines and good 
practices) may be reproduced to enable organisational change and learning (Baden-Fuller & 
Winter, 2005, p. 52). 
Moreover, our results suggest that learning and knowledge exchange between supply chain 
partners required close collaboration, commitment and engagement. These informal 
exchanges and knowledge flows may occur via either trial and error or design-implement 
                                                 
106 The results may represent coordination mechanisms such as: 1) systems (synergies between projects), 2) 
roadmaps (information) sharing, 3) joint planning, 4) exchange of human resources, and 5) shared teams. On 
the other hand, stakeholder support, desorptive capacity and vertical alignment may imply more informal 
coordination mechanisms. 
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strategies, but these are not formalised between firms. What we seem to have here are 
evolutionary and unplanned processes.  
Hence formal coordination mechanisms cannot precede capability building, but may 
precede resources development and deployment. No specific resources need to be in the 
minds of the compliance managers to collaborate with partners, only the intention to 
discover the potentials of their capabilities107. Once a potential security resource is in the 
pipeline, investment coordination may take place for the relevant development and 
deployment of resources. This is important in more general terms, because such discoveries 
for compliance with CTPAT may bring about ancillary benefits, which is not unusual in 
regulatory compliance (Ashford et al., 1979, p. 179).  
All in all, our results suggest that regulators tend to select firms with security resources 
developed after vertical alignments and desorptive capacity, or managerial systems and 
desorptive capacity. Hence regulators are an important part of the ‘selection environments’ 
(Nelson & Winter, 1975, p. 340), and supply chain structures are ‘selected systems’ 
throughout certifications. Therefore regulators may be driving the informal coordination 
for compliance capabilities building and formal coordination for resources development, 
whilst integration or disintegration remains unaffected. 
The following section presents a discussion about how supply chain structures are 
governed.  
 
Supply chain governance structures 
The previous section demonstrated some of the ways in which the supply chains are 
governed; this section is a more comprehensive discussion of supply chain governance and 
structured compliance capability building. 
 
 
                                                 
107 This is also consistent with the compliance process, which seems to disregard the avoiding of resources if 
compliance is the target. 
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Supply chain governance 
The Resource-Based View (RBV) and Supply and Value Chain literatures state that the 
interaction of capabilities across firms is influenced by the ways relationships between them 
are governed. Two important elements of such governance are dependency and power 
asymmetry in the relationships (Cousins, 2002, p. 79; Gereffi et al., 2005, p. 88; Monteverde 
& Teece, 1982, p. 324; Strange, 2009; Teece, 1986, p. 289).  
This investigation identified 10 combinations of supply chain governance (Table 6.3.1.2, 
p.253). For instance, there is unilateral dependency (Supply Chain 1, 3 and 4), bilateral 
dependency (Supply Chain 5) and independent (Supply Chain 2) relationships (Table 
6.3.1.2, p.253). There are also relationships with symmetric power (Supply Chain 5) and 
asymmetric power (Supply Chain 1).  
Unlike previous studies, our investigation did not assume that a dependent firm has less 
power in the relationship. A firm may be mainly fitted for transactions with a given partner, 
but such a partner may also have transactions with several other firms, which indicates that 
the firm is dependent on the partner, but not the other way around. But this not to say that 
dependent firms are also norm takers and those independent firms are norm setters. 
For instance, an exporter (SC2ET) may be independent from a distributor (SC2D), because 
the volume of produce traded through said distributor is less than the median of the rest of 
the surveyed firms. Their relationship length is also expected to be less than that expected 
in the rest of the cases. Finally, because their operations are not specific enough to trade 
only with the distributor (SC2D), they can switch with relatively ease compared to the rest 
of the cases under investigation. Yet the exporter (SC2ET) reports that it may find itself 
taking the norms and standards set by the distributor. 
Similarly, an exporter (SC4E&T) may be dependent, because 100% of its transactions are 
through a single distributor (SC4D). Their relationship length is expected to be the 
maximum possible, which acts as a deterrent to switch distributor, and its assets are highly 
specific to the operations with its distributor, which means that it is very difficult (and is 
therefore unlikely) to find another distributor that matches the exporters’ specific 
operations. Yet the exporter (SC4E&T) may find itself setting the norms that its supply 
chain needs to follow (Table 6.3.1.1, p. 251). 
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Griffith and Myers (2005) explain that even discrepancies may be caused by different 
expectations of the supply chain partners in how to govern their relationships. Power 
struggles and negotiations may be at will then, and these may even translate into hybridised 
norms among partners in a single chain (Griffith & Myers, 2005, p. 257). Hence assuming 
that supply chain governance is the same across partners may negate the possibility that 
power asymmetry and struggles for compliance capability building exist, and this is an 
assumption difficult to sustain, in this investigation at least.  
Our analyses, rather than focusing on one or the other elements of governance, i.e. 
dependency or power asymmetry, look at both, independently and interactively. 
Compliance capability building may occur either way: 1) with bilateral dependency and 
symmetric power relations, or 2) with independent and asymmetric power relations (Figure 
36, p.269). 
The first type of governance, bilateral dependency, is similar to other studies’ results. 
Intense exchanges of knowledge and complementary assets between the firms may lock 
both parties into the relationship (Cousins, 2002, p. 79; Monteverde & Teece, 1982, p. 324; 
Strange, 2009; Teece, 1986, p. 289); however, our results also show that the power in such 
relationships is usually symmetric, so both firms (SC5E and SC5D) tend to be able to set 
norms for the supply chain. This may contribute to the free mobilisation of knowledge 
across firms’ boundaries.  
The second finding is more puzzling, but also more interesting. It seems to prove the 
opposite of the previous argument. Compliance capability was also possible between firms 
with lower market concentration and without specific assets (SC2D). This type of 
governance is similar to what the Value Chain Governance studies call market transactions. 
Following Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon’s (2005) framework, it is possible to explain 
that increasing firms’ capabilities drives a value chain to disintegration, and that governance 
will be driven by market transactions (Gereffi et al., 2005, p. 87). However, our analysis 
also takes into account issues of power asymmetry. 
Firms (SC5E) capable of setting norms and collaborating with supply chain partners may 
be able to build up their compliance capabilities, i.e. by first finding. But when firms are not 
able to set norms (SC2D), they may need to be able to shift volumes of produce transacted 
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with different partners, as well as to re-use their assets in ways that allow them to meet the 
norms set by their partner. For instance, if a distributor (SC2D) with production lots from 
a given exporter (SC2E&T) is not able to set the norms, and the norms that the exporter 
(SC2E&T) sets are entirely compatible with the distributor (SC2D), then at least the 
distributor (SC2D) should be able to source production from other exporters. On the other 
hand, if the new norms set by the exporter make the distributor’s current assets obsolete, 
the distributor may need to adapt and re-deploy part of its assets according to the needs of 
the new sets of norms. Part of the assets, those adapted and redeployed, may be those 
applicable for transactions with the exporter that has concentrated its power and adjusted 
its norms. The other part of the assets, that which is not adapted, remains for transaction 
from exporters that did not modify their norms, and which do not have power over the 
distributor. 
All in all, capability building may need some degree of freedom, either in terms of the 
freedom to switch partners (market transactions or re-deployable assets) or if that is not 
possible, then to set norms (bilateral dependency).  
 
Supply chain governance structure 
The interaction effects of the governance structures show that vertical coordination, and 
more precisely investments coordination of the supply chains. Although for some scholars 
who advocate that dependency and power in the supply chain is main driving element for 
capability building (Aust, 1997; Moreno-Luzon & Lloria, 2008; Nefussi & Priolon, 1997; 
Patnayakuni et al., 2006; Sherman, 2004), it may be surprising that what seems more novel 
in our results is ‘what is not there’, such as power relations, dependency and integration. 
This is, the high compliant firms in our investigation, SC2D and SC5E, rather than forcing 
the capabilities development throughout in their supply chains, the capability building 
emerged from coordinating investments with their supply chain partners (Figure 38, p.271), 
thus trial and error, experience and learning, together with formal investment coordination 
mechanisms to deploy newly developed security resources may be driving the compliance 
capability building processes for the Mexican fresh produce supply chain to the United 
States. 
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So, although compliance requires relevant knowledge transfer and collective capabilities 
building, which should happen with selective and justified information sharing (Lamming 
et al., 2001, p. 7) (which in turn runs a risk of overreliance on one or two suppliers that may 
fail to comply (Cousins et al., 2004, p. 557) (SC3 and SC4), the strategy of compliant firms 
(SC2D and SC5E) seems to have tackled such risks by favouring more collaborative and 
flexible supply chain relationships (Cousins et al., 2004, p. 556) (vertical coordination) over 
vertical integration. 
To meet the objective of the thesis of  building up a framework to analyse compliance, The 
following section integrates the previous discussions on compliance processes, capability 
building and supply chain governance structures, as a way of meeting the objective of the 
thesis; explaining the behaviour of firms towards compliance and the role played by the 
supply chain relationships. 
 
7.4. Compliance capability building’s governance structures 
In our framework, regulations, standards and norms are given; yet the framework allows 
for an assessment of the impact in terms of resources and capabilities building to different 
regulatory settings, because regulators are important parts of the selection environment of 
the firms (Nelson, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1975). There are three categories to select firms 
according to their compliance levels: ‘low’ for firms not aiming for CTPAT selection; 
‘medium’ for firms building up resources and whose application for certification is on-
going or pending with the CTPAT regulator; and ‘high’ for firms that have been granted 
the certification by the CTPAT regulator (CTPAT/CBP, 2006).  
After identifying the environment selecting criteria (CTPAT voluntary program), some 
firms may decide to adhere to the norm, and although there is a general model that firms 
may follow for compliance (Henson & Heasman, 1998), the process is rather complex and 
iterative. Nevertheless, cases of the Mexico-US fresh produce supply chains have followed 
some patterns of compliance. The two most important patterns were: firstly, although they 
are not necessarily complementary, firms complying with multiple-regulations 
simultaneously, without conflicting results derived from limited resources availability, 
perhaps because each compliance regime may yield ancillary benefits anyway (Ashford, 
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2001; Ashford, Ayers, & Stone, 1985; Ashford et al., 1979; Sproull, 1981). The second 
pattern was the need for merging resources at the same time that external knowledge is 
required (outsourcing) in the context of the firm’s supply chain relationship, as expected 
(but not completely proven) by Buysse and Verbeke (2003).  
The need for interaction with the supply chain as a consequence of the compliance process 
seems to be driving the agri-business to build up dynamic capabilities. This may be 
surprising considering that dynamic capabilities are usually associated with highly 
changeable, uncertain, but hugely valuable technologies or products (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Hoopes & Madsen, 2008; Lee & Slater, 2007; Petroni, 1998; Richey, 2003; Teece et 
al., 1997), whilst our cases are fairly stable and certain commodities industries. 
Building up these dynamic capabilities for compliance, or what we call compliance 
capabilities (i.e. managerial systems together with desorptive capacity, or vertical alignment 
together with desorptive capacity), was proven to require close intervention of their supply 
chain partners to source knowledge internally and externally, and to exploit it 
correspondingly, similar to more technologically advanced industries (Harris & Li, 2009; 
Lichtenthaler, 2007; Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009; Malhotra, Gosain, & El Sawy, 
2005; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). 
A necessary element of the compliance process was the desorptive capacity, which means 
supporting the capability building of the firms’ partners. This implies that governance 
structures should condition the way these capabilities are built. However, contrary to 
previous investigations in which either vertically integrating, or exercising asymmetric 
power over the supply chain, or taking advantage of the dependency of the supply chain 
partners would have been suggested as the possible mechanisms to put pressures to drive 
compliance capability building processes of the supply chain partners (Cousins, 2002, p. 79; 
Delmas, 1999, p. 663; Ernst & Kim, 2002, p. 1422; Gereffi et al., 2005, p. 88; Monteverde 
& Teece, 1982, p. 324; Rugman, 1997, p. 183; Strange, 2009; Teece, 1986, p. 289; 
Williamson, 1971, p. 113), in our investigation, we found that a more promising mechanism 
for promoting compliance capability building processes is tighter supply chain 
coordination,  without modifying the degree of vertical integration of the firms, i.e. 
ownership. This is important because, it implies less hassle than expected if supply chain 
compliance capabilities want to be promoted.  
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Similarly, recent contributions on discontinuous innovation and the role of supply chain 
relationships show that strategic dalliances and non-committal supply chain relationships 
for activities that last very short periods and which allow flexibility, agility, freedom, and 
rapid adaptations, are necessary for obtaining crucial technologies and competencies, 
reducing the need for mergers and acquisitions, or in-house capability development 
(Phillips et al., 2006, p. 455)108. Hence, firms did not need to dismantle or assemble the 
firm, but were able to run parallel relationships with new temporal partners, along with 
their already established supply chains partners. 
There are similarities and differences in our results and those of Phillips, Lamming, Bessant 
& Noke (2006). The similarities are the presence of flexibility, adaptability and freedom for 
the acquisition of supply chain knowledge, without increasing integration. The differences 
are that the relationships parallel to their supply chain partners were not necessary, and the 
strong commitment to the project, i.e. compliance, led to firms developing new 
relationships with the same supply chain partners, without switching from long-term to 
short-term relationships. 
A possible reason for such differences may be that compliance encourages and requires 
that systems be run within the supply chain stages. Consequently, it may be difficult to run 
parallel business relations for compliant firms when the systems need to be deployed with 
their long-standing supply chain partners. 
All in all, CTPAT has signalled firms about the need to comply with security regulations 
most effectively by means of CBP enforcement officers and the Fresh Produce Association 
of the Americas. Firms may have followed different pathways in their compliance process; 
those that align vertically and desorb capacity to their supply chain partners are able to 
develop the security-based resources that adhere better to the CTPAT guidelines, which 
grants them the certification from CTPAT regulators. Such compliance capabilities are 
facilitated by coordinated supply chains. Therefore, although it is not clear whether or not 
CTPAT certification will transform the governance and integration of the supply chains 
with which firms are building up compliance capabilities, it is clear that CTPAT 
certification drives firms to commit to tighter vertical coordination mechanisms with their 
supply chains for compliance capability building. 
                                                 
108 Although the previous study raises the question of how to differentiate between short and long terms, a 
possible answer may be one that depends on the sector, region and so on. 
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8. CHAPTER 8 Conclusions 
The objective of the thesis had been to build up and use a framework to analyse firms’ 
behaviour when they are subject to regulations, particularly regarding the way compliance 
occurs. The results of the analysis in this thesis generated some policy implications of the 
Mexico-United States fresh produce supply chains. There are also methodological 
implications on how to analyse business compliance with regulations when supply chains, 
not only the individual firms, need to be involved.  
The conclusion is divided into 5 sections: 1) addressing the research questions, 2) theory 
and methodological implications, 3) policy implications, 4) contributions, and 5) limitations 
and further research. 
 
8.1. Answering the research questions 
The thesis answered three research questions, and in the process it was possible to make 
additional findings.  
Answering research questions and hypotheses 
The first set of questions tried to understand the different firms’ organisational compliance 
processes in response to supply chain security regulations. In particular, they asked: What 
compliance processes do firms follow to meet regulations for the prevention of accidental 
and intentional contamination of food? And, do differences in the compliance processes 
across firms explain the differences in their compliance levels with CTPAT? This question 
was not followed by a hypothesis, but it was promised to be raised in these conclusions.  
Based on the analysis of the results with multi value Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(mvQCA), we identified firms following variegated compliance processes when trying to 
reach compliance with CTPAT. Although we had identified some general patterns in 
various stages of the compliance processes, we could not identify a compliance process 
model, and in fact, the mvQCA had revealed various pathways at different stages of the 
compliance processes. First, high compliant firms’ processes appeared to be triggered by 
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the intervention of long established and reputable institutions more than by the regulatory 
agency administering the regulation (CTPAT). After initial assessment by firms (low, 
middle and high compliant), only the highest compliant firms have shown a decision to 
comply and the necessary compliance capability building. Low compliant firms have been 
exposed to multiple sources of regulatory information, which led us to infer that 
duplication of sources of regulatory awareness may hinder firms’ understanding of the 
regulatory requirements, i.e. regulatory confusion, driving firms to non-compliance. 
Between the decision to comply and actually complying, there were rather complex iterative 
processes that low compliant firms had not been able to manage, at least not to the full. 
Based on the results and the mvQCA we infer that one of the reasons for it is the 
increasing need of supply chain partners’ engagement, which was not present among low 
compliant firms. 
Middle and high complying firms not only used their supply chain partners but also their 
stakeholders support. The mvQCA results showed that some operations owned and 
controlled by low compliant firms, in the case of middle and high compliant firms were 
actually outsourced (losing ownership) to their stakeholders but with the operations 
remaining within the firm (without lost control over them). Thus we infer that in the 
course from low to high compliance, firms may have to disintegrate operations as a result 
of investment decision makings, but retaining control over them, as a result of 
coordination and collaboration decision makings.  
Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: the compliance processes followed by firms 
may not be based on a compliance model or on heterogeneity of compliance processes, but 
on a limited diversity of pathways, of which may include a variety or combination of 
regulatory clarity, engagement, supply chain and stakeholders support, strong capability 
building, and internal and supply chain-based compliance process auditors.  
The second set of questions tried to understand how firms build up compliance 
capabilities and developed security resources, as well as whether compliance capabilities 
correlated with different compliance levels. The hypothesis was that compliance was 
present among firms with more advanced capabilities. 
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After understanding how capabilities are built based upon case studies, although a first 
statistical description shows a direct correlation between capabilities and compliance, the 
mvQCA have actually rejected this hypothesis. The mvQCA showed that high compliance 
may be reached either by combining basic with intermediate capabilities, or intermediate 
capability with advanced capabilities. An intermediate capability was used to exploit in-
house resources within the facilities of their supply chain partners, desorptive capacity. 
Such resources were developed from their managerial systems and from the firms efforts to 
match their supply chain partners’ capabilities.  
So, we deduce that substituting basic for advanced capabilities is not a sufficient condition 
to reach compliance. Compliant firms ‘combined capabilities’ (i.e. mixed basic, intermediate 
and advanced) to develop resources that met better the regulatory guidelines. These two 
statements are against our original hypothesis, 2a. Instead, we can now infer that, building 
and piling up heterogeneous capabilities is only a precondition for compliance, and the 
right combination of capabilities bring firms closer to compliance, and a necessary 
condition is that in such combinations, desorptive capacity is present. 
All in all, regardless of the efforts firms pay to become compliant, there are specific 
conditions related to compliance capabilities building, to satisfy the regulator, and the 
certification to be granted. 
The third set of questions tried to identify the supply chain governance structures that 
enable firms to build up compliance capabilities, and whether difference in governance 
structures would explain the presence of such capabilities. The hypothesis was that firms 
with more integrated, coordinated, dependent and asymmetric power supply chain would 
be able to build up compliance capabilities.  
The basic statistics did not show any pattern in this respect, while the mvQCA was able to 
show patterns, they were only partially supporting our hypothesis. In terms of supply chain 
structure, the presence of compliance capabilities was common among firms with supply 
chain coordination, and not with integration. In terms of supply chain governance, the 
presence of compliance capabilities was common among firms sufficiently interdependent 
from their supply chains, or having complete freedom to switch supply chain partners 
when these were not able to build up compliance capabilities. So far so good; however, the 
interaction effect of supply chain governance and structures, showed that the common 
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feature among firms with compliance capabilities was only the high degree of supply chain 
coordination.  
Thus, overall three of our explanatory variables (power, dependency, and integration) were 
not supporting our hypothesis, whilst coordination was indeed. Interestingly, this goes in 
line with the results in capability building processes, and in the organisational compliance 
processes, whereby supply chain partners engagement seem to play an important part in 
assessment of the compliance process, exchanging knowledge, desorpting or aligning 
capabilities with them, for compliance. From this we infer that, although there may be 
various pathways firms may follow to compliance, the ones including supply chain-based 
organisational processes, capabilities building, and coordination may be closer to develop 
the security resources worthy of certification. 
Yet, taking into account that this thesis is based on a small sample, we would like to 
encourage further investigations for enhancing the statistical representativeness and validity 
of our claims. Yet, we have no reasons to believe that our cases are too dissimilar to other 
fresh produce supply chain firms engaged cross border transactions between Mexico and 
United States, as described in the background chapter. 
 
8.2. Theoretical contributions and implications  
Business regulation and compliance 
During the discussion, it was shown how the smartest regulatory regimes (such as 
‘responsive’ and ‘really responsive’ regulations) consider that repetitive violations should be 
confronted by the use of harder regulatory tools, whilst those who comply with regulations 
require only softer regulatory tools. Although this is not to be rejected, our investigation 
has shown that non-compliance may not only be a matter of willingness, but also a matter 
of complex compliance processes, whose paths do not necessarily lead to compliance.  
In relation to understanding compliance, we have shown, for this case, that it is a complex 
process one requiring substantial resources and capabilities. But more importantly, 
although we have shown that, for some types of regulation including the case offered, there 
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may be no such thing as a compliance model, there are still ‘compliance patterns’, each one 
of them consisting of configurations of capabilities that aid in the development resources 
suitable for meeting the regulatory requirements. 
Thus, if compliance requires more than just willingness, it may worth including in 
regulatory theories different prescriptions for enforcement tools, some of which may be 
suitable for firms lacking the commitment, and others suitable for firms lacking the 
capabilities, the intention being to inform policy making about smarter ways to enable 
compliance. 
In fact, risk regulations have been criticised along similar lines because they “tend to under 
emphasise the need to understand why such a non-complier is not behaving as required 
and to identify better regulatory responses to that non-compliance” (Baldwin & Black, 
2008, p. 67). 
As discussed earlier, however, the tendency of regulatory studies to use institutional 
approaches to explain business behaviour fixes their analyses in attitudinal settings 
(Baldwin & Black, 2008, p. 69), and normative and calculative aspects (Dao & Ofori, 2010; 
Greer & Downey, 1982, p. 491). Furthermore, when scholars have captured the 
importance of the firm’s knowledge base, resources and capabilities (Nielsen & Parker, 
2008, pp. 330-332), they have turned to the institutional prescriptions of accepting or 
changing the firm’s moral behaviour, or enforcing regulations harder (Parker, 2006, p. 611), 
failing to adapt their prescriptions to the new empirical evidence. 
Rather than a contribution to regulatory theories, this is a call for using different tools for 
enforcing compliance. More refined theories would offer institutional prescriptions for 
firms whose common denominators are issues of willingness and commitment; whereas for 
those whose common denominators are issues of competencies and capabilities, scholars 
may want to work more on theories for capacity building enforcement strategies.  
If capabilities are important drivers of compliance regardless of the willingness of the firm 
or of their attitudinal settings, then regulatory prescriptions may be adapted for 
“incompetent firms” so that they are subject to capacity building enforcement programmes 
according to their compliance levels, rather than just revoking their licences. This should 
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not be taken, however, as denying the priority of the precautionary principle in any 
regulatory matter.  
 
The Resource-Based View 
It was questioned in this thesis whether the RBV would benefit from measures of 
performance that captured not only traditional profitability indicators, but also qualitative 
ones, such as compliance levels to given regulatory regimes. 
Many empirical investigations omit from their performance measures the regulatory 
compliance indicators, although they acknowledge the importance of the regulatory 
environment. As a consequence, it remains a major challenge to understand capabilities and 
resources heterogeneity from the RBV. We have shown that Value-Price-Cost differences 
remain high in the context of regulatory compliance in our case. The argument here is, we 
are failing to inform regulatory scholars about how given regulations impact firms’ 
behaviour, and what sort of remedies (capabilities) may be suitable to drive compliance. An 
important message to the regulatory scholars may be that heterogeneous capabilities and 
resources are preconditions (starting points) in a path towards compliance, but full 
compliance is conditioned by the presence of valuable capabilities configurations. Hence, 
different regulatory strategies may need to be fitted to firms at different stages of 
compliance capabilities building (i.e. limited capabilities, heterogeneous capabilities, and 
limited diversity of capabilities), so that compliance is achieved more effectively, and with 
fewer economic burdens. 
At the moment, the RBV is only able to communicate that regulations impact positively or 
negatively, falling into the same trap as regulatory studies, measuring regulation as an input 
and compliance as an output, rather than explaining what is happening inside the firm. 
Hence, regulators may not have a clear understanding as to what the relationship between 
guidelines/standards, certification, and compliance resources is, with the value, price and 
cost of capabilities.  
This investigation has tried open up a new perspective on the relevance of the RBV for 
Regulatory Studies, translating the value, price and cost of capabilities reflecting the actions 
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of regulators. The regulator influences the value of capabilities by its capacity to grant or 
deny access to markets. The ‘price,’ viewed in terms of the enhancement in unit revenue, or 
longer term supply chain relationships, or lower biosecurity risks, that such capabilities 
garner, is determined by the regulator’s decision, as well as market conditions (other 
channels for output as well as the extent and nature of demand (some buyers may be 
unavailable reducing the thickness of the market and subjecting the seller to buyer power 
or to excessive competition). Finally, the cost of capability building, although potentially 
less overloaded by the regulator’s actions, can become more risky in situations where 
regulators are not transparent or where regulations are very difficult to interpret and, in all 
cases, require the accumulation and development of resources, processes that are 
themselves costly and subject to learning (knowledge accumulation).  
Likewise, another contribution relates to issues of values of resources and capabilities. If it 
is true that the values of resources and capabilities are subject to dynamic changes between 
the firms supply of resources and capabilities and the regulatory demand for resources and 
capabilities, then RBV scholars may want to investigate how such values fluctuate, rather 
than assuming them to be given. Some indicators may then be provided to the markets, 
policy makers, regulators, society and stakeholders. However, we acknowledge that it may 
represent important methodological challenges for the RBV. 
Yet, following Nelson on technological uncertainty and systematic selection (Nelson, 1994, 
p. 50) in the context of the present investigation, the value of capabilities may change 
according to whether the security resources offered to the regulators are indeed 
systematically selected and certified because they adhere to the regulatory requirements. 
However, this systematic selection may change according to the security resources offered 
by the industry in the future, and even according to the dynamic targets for compliance set 
up by regulators (CTPAT/CBP, 2006). 
All in all, although there are grounds for systematically enhancing the value of firms and 
supply chains’ capabilities, it may be subject to their capacity to continuously re-assess 
resources to meet such dynamic targets, based on: 1) security resources offered by the 
industry, and 2) regulatory policies.  
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Supply chain relationships 
It was shown that resources and capabilities building within the firm are mediated by the 
supply chain relationships. However, this investigation disaggregated the effects of 
structures (integration and coordination) and governance (dependency and asymmetry).  
The investigation identified that firms’ innovative capabilities to prevent contamination of 
food are based upon knowledge flows and investment coordination between supply chain 
partners, as has also been implied in manufacturing and environment studies (Bowen et al., 
2001; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Lawson, Petersen, Cousins, & Handfield, 2009; Sheffi, 
2001; Squire et al., 2009). Nevertheless, what is new is the key role played by the desorptive 
capacity (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009) in comparison with the absorptive capacity 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) or the vertical alignment (von Tunzelmann & Wang, 2007), as 
an innovative capability needed by the supply chain to prevent contamination of food. 
The rejection of the hypothesis that ever increasing sophistication of capabilities may be 
associated with higher compliance levels is intriguing. It indicates that innovative 
compliance capabilities require iterative processes of internal exploration and exploitation 
of knowledge, followed by external exploration and exploitation of knowledge. In this 
process, the exploration within the firm consists of organisational capabilities and 
managerial systems building. Internal exploitation may also involve internal coordination 
capabilities. External exploration may involve construction of vertical alignments and 
stakeholders support, and external exploitation may require desorptive capacity.  
Therefore, the supply chain governance structures become crucially important for 
explaining external explorative and exploitive capabilities.  
The analysis shows that vertical coordination, and more precisely investment coordination, 
of the supply chains enables such exploration and exploitation across supply chain partners, 
as is implied by other studies (Aust, 1997; Moreno-Luzon & Lloria, 2008; Nefussi & 
Priolon, 1997; Patnayakuni et al., 2006; Sherman, 2004). The novel results are, however, 
about ‘what is not there’. Power relations, dependency, and vertical integration are ‘not’ 
determinants of supply chain innovative capabilities for the development of resources to 
prevent contamination of the food along the chain.  
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However, that does not mean that the situation is static with respect to supply chain 
relationships. The fact that tighter investment coordination between partners is required to 
build up capabilities in order to prevent contamination of food along the supply chain 
indicates that financial, security-based resources and organisational capability building are 
important. Although the recourse for meeting these requirements may not be rare, they 
may be costly, time consuming, and ever changing. These characteristics of the compliance 
capability building process and the role played by the supply chain in these processes may 
contribute to raising the entry barriers to trans-national fresh produce supply chains. 
Those findings seem to replicate results of compliance with food safety standards 
preventing accidental contamination in Senegal (Maertens & Swinnen, 2009), where it was 
found that although compliance led to poverty reduction of the international supply chains’ 
partners, it also led to 72% of contract farmers losing their contracts with such chains 
(Maertens & Swinnen, 2009, p. 165).  
Hence further investigations are required in order to assess more fully the economic 
consequences, especially if developing countries are involved in international supply chains 
subject to compliance with regulations preventing intentional or accidental contamination 
of food. 
 
8.3. Methodological contributions, limitations and implications 
This research contributes with 12 case studies, including 16 firms grouped into 5 supply 
chains. The 5 supply chains included three stages (exporter, transport and distributor), 
which is a methodological approach that, although suggested as superior to other supply 
chain analysis in terms of validity and rigour through triangulation of information (Seuring, 
2006, pp. 246, 248), is rarely performed (Seuring, 2006, p. 237). This allowed discussions 
about not only intra-firm behaviour, but also supply chain interactions.  
This investigation employed the RBV concerning the analysis of the values of resources 
and capabilities. It contributed to the understanding of intrinsic, complementary, or 
substitute values of resources and capabilities. This analysis was only possible thanks to the 
use of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which captures individual and 
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interactive effects of the causal conditions of compliance. We found that the language of 
necessity, sufficiency, presence, and absence associated with the QCA is compatible with 
the notions of independent, substitute and complementary values of resources and 
capabilities of the RBV. 
Furthermore, the mvQCA proved that it is possible to test for the presence or absence of 
such values, based upon qualitative indicators, thus overcoming the limitations of 
traditional quantitative indicators such as profitability or other market-based indicators. 
Hence, it is possible to capture the value in qualitative and quantitative constructs assigned 
by multiple actors, e.g. regulators, NGOs, consumers, customers, shareholders, 
stakeholders, and so on. 
Although advantageous, the limitation with such an approach is the same that applies to all 
case studies, which is the fact that any generalisation is theoretical, and not statistical. Our 
selection of case studies, implies that our generalisations were applicable only to fresh 
produce supply chains, leaving other agri-businesses on the margins. However, there is no 
reason to believe that securing the standard facilities and supply chain operations of a 
tomatoes exporter would be too dissimilar to securing those of a cucumber exporter or of 
other fresh produce exporters; or to believe that securing the transport operations of the 
exporter would be too dissimilar if the transport had been outsourced. Furthermore, the 
temporal dimension was captured by asking the CEOs to indicate when resources and 
capabilities were developed, rather than by following a panel-like investigation, and we 
therefore rely entirely on the informants for our understanding as to the dynamics of the 
capability building. 
It is proposed that further investigations seek to tackle such statistical generalisation, by 
designing a methodology that replicates the fuzzy qualitative comparative analysis for the 
identification of the causal conditions of the prevention of food contamination along 
international supply chains. Furthermore, it may be relevant to standardise the data-
gathering instruments to apply the study in a panel-like fashion, across regions and across 
agri-business activities, possibly assessing different types of regulations, such as 
environmental, social responsibility, food standards, and so on, as this investigation has not 
much to say about. 
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Proceeding in such a way, the investigators may attain a more dynamic and comprehensive 
understanding of firms’ and supply chains’ behaviour. On the other hand, it may lower 
their capacity to capture the dynamics of capability building and intra and inter knowledge 
flows between supply chain partners, which is the benefit of narrative case studies, another 
key component of the analysis offered here.  
Finally, this thesis contributed with a methodological procedure of splitting the sample, 
following the example of traditional statistical analyses like ANOVA and the use of simple 
control variables in any type of regression. This procedure allowed dealing with the issue of 
having a trichotomic dependent variable (low, middle, and high compliance), transcending 
the problem of dichotomous dependent variables in the use of QCA with TOSMANA. 
 
8.4. Regulatory implications 
It was suggested that product attributes are valued differently by different consumers 
(Ashford, 2001). Extending Ashford’s proposition, from products to resources and 
capabilities attributes, and from consumers to regulators and other stakeholders (NGOs, 
Research-base, International organisations, and so on), this thesis suggests the need to re-
define and better articulate the value of capabilities and resources in relation to the degree 
that their attributes adhere to the demand of regulators and other stakeholders, or to the 
degree they help to achieve better social outcomes, such as security, threat reduction, and 
so on.  
In this sense, unless there are clear benefits (derived from certification) to compliance, the 
resources produced by the firms will fail to meet the expectations of the regulator. In this 
respect, the CTPAT indicators are not very helpful, since the average number of firms 
reporting tangible benefits by holding a certification (high compliance) is 19% 
(CTPAT/CBP, 2007, p. 46). 
It is clear that such results do not adhere to previous regulatory studies propositions that 
when firms make an effort and achieve significant but not complete compliance, they 
should still be rewarded with fail-soft strategies, and with adjustable sanctions (Ashford et 
al., 1985, p. 463). Possibly CTPAT regulatory policy is not sending the right message to the 
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international supply chains. Perhaps this might limit firms’ willingness to comply, hence 
failing to build up their own technological and organisational capabilities. 
Other regulatory studies (Porter & van der Linde, 1995, p. 110) suggested that regulators 
should not try to influence innovation. For them, one of the foundations of the 
relationship between regulation and innovation is that the maximum opportunity for 
innovation occurs when it is left to the industry, and not the standard-setting agency. 
However, ‘bad innovation’ may also emerge from industry practices. An example of this is 
the way “High Security Seals ISO-17712” are sometimes handled. Secondary data in this 
investigation showed that there is no control over the distribution of High Security Seals 
ISO-17712 in Mexico; consequently, intentional intrusions and contamination of food in a 
container may be covered up by re-sealing with another seal, which are distributed on the 
open market unrestrictedly, and with no record of who is acquiring them. Thus, tight 
complementary controls and monitoring measures are required with the use of such seals, 
as required by the regulatory agency, CTPAT. 
Regulators have at least some degree of understanding of compliance, and of the potential 
of their own regulatory strategies. In our investigation we found that firms may take 
regulatory prescriptions as ways of concentrating the efforts of the firms during basic and 
intermediate capabilities building, exploiting them for securing the supply chain. Such was 
the case of (SC5E) who engaged in developing the resources as stated by the CTPAT 
guidelines, and when their capabilities were enhanced, they engaged in designing their own 
resources.  
During the initial stages of compliance capabilities building, avoiding the exploration of 
new technologies may reduce the need for supply chain knowledge and capabilities, 
lowering their efforts, while still contributing to compliance. On the other hand, firms may 
also need to divert away from the suggested technologies, opening up possibilities for new 
technologies also capable of meeting the regulatory requirements. 
Thus, it is not given that prescriptive regulations are not good for innovation, yet in some 
cases they may not be enough or they may not be the only regulatory strategy capable of 
driving innovative compliance. 
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A similar argument was given by Ashford (1985), who stated that regulators should have 
desirable technologies in mind, leaving as little room for uncertainty as possible (Ashford et 
al., 1985, pp. 462-463). We add that such a strategy might give flexibility to the firm to 
develop their technologies as soon as their capabilities evolve, which may occur before or 
after prescriptive technologies have been deployed within the firm and along their supply 
chain. 
As said above, bad innovations may also derive from prescriptive regulations. An example 
of this is the poor use of the High Security Seals ISO-17712; also the GPS conveyance 
traceability technologies, which are preferred instead of cheaper methods for risk 
identification like tolls receipts with mobile communications (SC5), or the traditional 
criminal record background checks against social networks in the transport industry to 
establish the reliability of truck drivers (SC3T). 
If the above technologies contribute to compliance and are not abnormal in the fresh 
produce and food industries, then regulators may want to take into account that regulatory 
guidelines and enforcement practices may need some flexibility, by for instance allowing 
self-regulations for willing firms with capabilities, incentive-based regulations for unwilling 
firms with capabilities, voluntary capacity building programmes for willing firms without 
capabilities, and incentive-based regulations and capacity building programmes for 
unwilling firms without capabilities. On the other hand, command-control regulations may 
ultimately be required after persuasion and capacity building are not effective for reluctant 
firms, in order to encourage product and process changes to better utilise resources, at the 
same time as reducing risks in the early stages of compliance, rather than just forcing end-
of-pipe technologies. 
 
8.5. STI Security Regulation and Policy implications 
A principal policy implication is the potential value of developing institutional mechanisms 
in developing countries to stimulate the dynamic capabilities of small farmers to adapt to 
the fast-changing regulatory environment in terms of security, safety, sustainability, social 
responsibility, inclusiveness, and so on. This in turn might enable new entrants to 
coordinate with international supply chains; it might also enable existing firms to 
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strategically exit given supply chains to engage with other ones, say, reorienting exports 
from either the US or EU to other growing global markets (e.g. BRICs or MIST 
economies).  
Therefore if higher compliance requires desorptive capacity and vertical alignment, as our 
own investigation suggests, there may be two alternative policies. The first would be to 
retain policies that supervise compliance competition and exclusion issues within 
international supply chains, and allow compliance efforts to focus on a few partners, 
potentially excluding some farmers from global chains and raising entry barriers. The 
second would be to develop policy instruments to identify what supply chain stages require 
capacity building support, in order that they are not excluded from the international supply 
chains. 
A number of economic policies may follow on from this second option. If one of the most 
important supply chain issues for capability building is the coordination of investments, as 
suggested by our research, then policy makers may want to devise specific financial 
instruments to enable less able firms, and increase their likelihood of sustaining 
relationships with supply chain partners based upon compliance capability building and 
resources development. 
Equally important are Science, Technology and Innovation Policies. This investigation 
identified that higher compliance required intermediate and advanced capabilities for the 
development of security resources. If this is replicated throughout the rest of the industry 
then the faster the supply chain needs to comply with dynamic regulatory requirements, the 
faster the transfers, exchanges and flows of knowledge should occur along the supply 
chains, together with tighter coordination of investments between supply chain partners. 
STI policy makers may wish to deploy instruments to improve such processes, especially if 
knowledge needs to be transferred across countries, and even more so if one of them is a 
developing country. Under such circumstances, the internationalisation of security STI 
policies may become increasingly important.  
311 
 
 
Although such internationalisation is already a reality109, these initiatives seem to promote 
innovations in science and technologies that enhance the capacity of the national 
institutions enforcement agencies in their counter-terrorism missions. So far, at least, they 
have not focused on international supply chain security itself. 
One example of how STI research and policy would enhance the international supply chain 
security is given by understanding the trade-off between security and economic impact. 
Moreover, it has been argued that innovation involves doing things rather differently to 
increase efficiency or reduce costs. This investigation identified three supply chains (SC3, 
SC4 and SC5) that had applied operational security procedures that met the purpose of 
conducting risk assessments, and that if shared with the CBP may support automated cargo 
inspection decision making. 
These systems may be better off compared to other less cost-effective systems such as 
COOLTRAX and ACR SmartButton ($880 USD per container), contrary to what has been 
suggested elsewhere (Nganje et al., 2009), which because it lacks GPS, the classification of 
the cargo as low or high risk is unreliable anyway, because inspection points along highway 
by Mexican Department of Defence (SEDENA) cause changes in the internal trailer 
environments that may not necessarily mean that the cargo is of high risk. Perhaps the 
opposite is possible, and lower risk ratings may be assigned if the cargo can be proven to 
have been inspected by SEDENA with re-sealing carried out at the inspection point under 
the supervision of the same agency. However, since there are no international research and 
policy programmes, comparisons between innovative, ad-hoc, and cost-effective 
technologies and systems have yet to be assessed. 
There is also a question as to whether SEDENA practices can be aligned with industrial 
interests. Even though the Mexican Presidency throughout SEDENA may seem interested 
in the Mexican agri-business, as shown with the elimination and modernization of 
inspection points, it may be more in accord with US border agencies, because even if 
Mexican producers may have a diminished voice in influencing these agencies their 
customers in the US may be more effective in having influence, and still the main concern 
of an agency like SEDENA is national security. This goes to the question worthy of further 
                                                 
109 See, for instance the International Cooperative Programs Office (ICPO) of the Department of Homeland 
Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1246475440457.shtm. 
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investigation (though not here) of the tradeoffs between security and economic objectives 
and (further) the interaction of these tradeoffs with political processes. 
Another matter is that while the regulatory policy is increasingly transferring responsibilities 
to the industry to engage in protecting the people, it is necessary that international security-
based STI policies devise mechanisms that enable the international supply chains to meet 
those responsibilities. 
Therefore it may be advisable to enhance the Science and Technology’s Human 
Factors/Behavioural Science Division of US Homeland Security by including 
Organisational Behaviour to its remit. Although it may be implicitly included already, the 
US security policy would gain presence and influence by not only extending the regulatory 
arm to the industry thus making it accountable for protecting the population, but also by 
extending the policy arm as a mechanism to enable such regulatory mandate, even if it is 
only on a voluntary basis. 
Furthermore, the International Research in Homeland Security Science and Technology 
Mission Areas should include among its highest priorities science, technologies and 
innovation needs and the organisational behaviour studies for international supply chain 
security. This might support the change of the traditional concept of border from ‘port of 
entry’ to a more modern approach of mutually agreed security standards that create ‘a 
border’ within which international supply chains’ may comply with the highest security 
guidelines and the distinction is not the geopolitical boundary but organisational. 
Under such new approaches, delays in the certification processes after the firm is already in 
compliance are neither an incentive for innovative compliance, nor for a secure border. 
Regulatory certification processes may be designed to grant increasing certification 
according to the regulatory aims being implemented. Fully visible real time upgradable 
certification processes may be required to incentivise firms in compliance leadership. Full 
knowledge of their status and cross industry benchmarking may lead firms to undertake 
greater efforts for compliance, or to focus their resource allocation and capabilities on 
other compliance processes. 
An important incentive for compliance with CTPAT is the use of the FAST lanes. 
However, secondary interview data shows that there are industry initiatives promoting the 
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enhancement of the capacity of cross-border operations. This will promote faster clearance 
of trucks in cross-border operations, even in those that are not complying with CTPAT. 
This sends a message to the industry that using CTPAT/FAST may not be as important as 
increasing industry investments in the US and Mexican borders infrastructure to release 
cargo faster. Hence the acknowledgement of the trade-offs between cross-border 
infrastructure and CTPAT compliance for access to FAST Lanes is a matter that the US 
and Mexico may want to prioritise; they need to make a decision about whether to enhance 
security at the port of entry, or over the entire supply chain, and this is a decision that has 
to be made between traditional and modern views of security policies.  
Currently there are approximately 250,000 trucks using the Nogales port of entry, against a 
total of 6000 firms certified in the US and Mexico. Assuming that the number of certified 
firms in Mexico increases, the number of cross-border operations may increase using FAST 
lanes; the pressure on the two FAST lanes may cause bottlenecks, reducing the current 
pressure of the normal lanes. Opening new normal lanes may release around 30% of the 
pressure, which would be equivalent to allowing around 70,000 operations without the 
need to implement any security measures110. Interestingly, this suggests a conflict between 
security regulations and the security policy of the Department of Homeland Security. 
These policy recommendations attempt to bring new issues to the attention of homeland 
security and national security policy makers. They stress potential incompatibility between 
national security policy and homeland security, which may endanger the engagement of the 
supply chain in the wider aim of securing the food supply. 
                                                 
110 The Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) is constructing two additional commercial vehicle 
lanes at the Mariposa Port of Entry (POE). These new lanes will be on the east side of the existing lanes to 
accommodate commercial traffic during peak flows. A fourth Super Booth for primary inspection will be 
added. The two existing commercial lanes will be designated as FAST lanes, although the design allows 
maximum flexibility to shift trucks among the four lanes according to demand. The design also facilitates the 
safe movement of oversize and HAZMAT loads. Status: Construction $4.19 Million. The federal compound 
will be totally redesigned: the existing passenger vehicle building and most of the commercial vehicle facilities 
will be replaced. The initial phase contemplates six passenger vehicle lanes (expandable to 12); four pre-
primary lanes for commercial vehicles (expandable to six); six primary inspection booths for commercial 
vehicles (expandable to 10); 50 commercial docks (expandable to 100), of which 25 will be enclosed for 
climate control; a new export dock including auto export facilities; bus loading, unloading and inspection 
areas; an area for four X-ray or VACIS (gamma ray) inspection machines; and a new commercial building. 
Status: Design. $95 Million (www.bip.arizona.edu 
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Hence it is necessary to analyse the trade-offs between international security-based 
regulatory regimes and national security policies, at a time when allocation of public and 
private resources is dedicated to regulatory compliance and security policies. 
This policy recommendation tries to call the attention of homeland security and national 
security policy makers to the potential incompatibility between the international security 
agenda to counter terrorism and attempts to improve boarder infrastructure, because of the 
impact of the later on firms’ incentives to comply with security regulations. Hence, a 
question is raised about whether countering terrorism is a state or a public-private 
partnership responsibility. In either case, the global supply chains need to be informed in 
order to plan their next moves.  
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9. Appendices 
9.1. Appendix A: Cover letter 
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9.2. Appendix B: Interview COMCAP 2007-2008 
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9.3. Appendix C: Questionnaire COMCAP 2007-2008 
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9.4. Appendix D: Guide to Read TOSMANA Reports 
Report on Regulatory awareness (Figure 22: mvQCA of regulatory awareness as causes of 
middle-high compliance, p.217) 
 
 
The algorithm  
There are two types of algorithms for the identification of parsimonious causal conditions 
in TOSMANA, the Quine–McCluskey algorithm and the Graph-Based Agent algorithm 
(Cronqvist, 2007, pp. 244-258). The Quine–McCluskey algorithm minimizes, or isolates the 
conditions (e.g. capabilities) that produce the output (e.g. compliance) from those 
conditions (present of absent) that are do not (Rubenzer, 2008, p. 180). The Graph-Based 
Agent algorithm was developed for TOSMANA to have the capability to minimize or 
isolate conditions that produce the output, including ‘logical remainders’, which is not 
possible to do with the Quine–McCluskey algorithm (Cronqvist, 2007, p. 241). 
Logical reminders are important as they are all possible combinations of the causal 
conditions that are not actually representing any case study. For instance, if we have 5 
possible causal dichotomous conditions, there would be 25=32 possible configurations of 
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causal conditions. If we have 12 case studies, and assuming their causal conditions 
configurations are not repeated, we would have 20 unrepresented configurations=32 
possible configurations - 12 present cases. Those configurations not represented by any 
case study are the logical remainders. 
The importance of the logical remainders is that by assuming that they produce the 
outcome (in our case compliance) they become a tool for the identification of the most 
parsimonious configurations; hence, their exclusion from the analysis produces too 
complex configurations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, p. 409). This means that rather 
than identifying A*b*c*D*E (complex causal configuration of 5 dichotomous variables), 
with logical reminders it is possible to obtain A*c (parsimonious causal configuration of 5 
dichotomous variables) as the causal configuration of compliance. Therefore, in our 
analysis, we decided to include the logical reminders, hence all our TOSMANA reports 
show Agent-Based algorithms as it is the one that handle logical reminders. 
 
The model settings 
The model settings have two components, ‘minimising value’ and the ‘including’. The first 
component –i.e. minimising value- indicates that whatever output is being explained (in our 
case compliance), 1 represent the presence of the output, while 0 represents the absence of 
the output. This is possible because TOSMANA is capable of identifying causal 
configurations of compliance (minimizing value=1), as well as causal configurations of 
non-compliance (minimizing value=0). In cases when there are contradictory results from 
same causal configurations, it is possible to identify the causal configurations of such 
contradictions, in which case, the model should be run with the ‘contradictions’ as the 
output.  
The second component –i.e. including- indicates whether causal configurations that yield 
contradictory and logical reminders are included in the analysis. 
 
Variable settings 
This indicates whether the variables were set as Crisp Set (dichotomous variables) or multi-
value set, this scale numbers. For instance, in case of Figure 22: mvQCA of regulatory 
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awareness as causes of middle-high compliance (p.217) the variables were set to Crisp-Sets, 
whilst in Figure 23: Compliance decision and conformance decision as drivers of 
compliance (p.219) they were set to multi-value. As a consequence of having multi-value 
variables, TOSMANA reports where the thresholds for the variable were set, in order to 
indicate order. Setting thresholds implies transforming a scale variable to ordinal. And each 
interval of the newly converted ordinal variable becomes a category of the variable. In the 
example from Figure 23 (p.219), the variable month has two thresholds, 26 and 55. This 
means that the variable has three categories, ‘0’ when the variable takes values under 26 
months, ‘1’ when the variable takes values over 26 and under 55 months, and ‘2’ when the 
variable takes values over 55 months (values exactly on the thresholds are omitted from the 
analyses).  
 
The truth table 
This section of the report consists of 2 components. The first component of the section 
reports the independent and dependent variables of the model. The independent variables 
are coded and named -e.g. v1: P.RI.CTPAT, v2: P.RI.Distributor, and so on- also the 
dependent variable is coded and named only that it will always be coded 0 -e.g. 0: 
Compliance-, so that it is easily identifiable in the next component of the section, that is the 
truth table. 
The component of the truth table shows the values that each variable take for each case 
study. Each case is identifiable in the column at the far right of the table headed ‘id’. 
However, the truth table rather than reporting case by case, it shows all the causal 
configurations in the database, and at the id column reports the cases that present that 
particular configuration. For instance, in the Figure 22 (p.217), the fourth configuration – 
source of regulatory awareness are CTPAT and the FPAA (Fresh Produce Association of 
the Americas) and not from the rest of the organisations- is shared by two firms with 
regulatory compliance, SC2D and SC4D. The third configuration on the other hand, is also 
shared by two firms (SC1E and SC5E), however, one of them is compliant and the other 
not. 
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Results 
The last section (e.g. Figure 22, p.217) shows the results of the analysis. It displays the 
configurations (complex if logical remainders are not included in the minimisation, or 
parsimonious if they are included, in this case remainders were included hence the 
parsimonious results) of causal conditions that produced compliance, as well as the firms 
that have such configurations. Note that the configurations represent the pathways to 
compliance, and the sign + indicates alternative pathways to compliance, whereas the sign * 
indicates that the causal conditions are connected (they need to be together to cause 
compliance). 
Further, in case crisp-sets, the condition will change to ‘CAPITAL LETTER’ if the 
condition should be present, whilst it will remain ‘lowercase’ if the condition should be 
absent. So for instance, the first line of results show when the source of regulatory 
awareness was the Customs Border Protection (CBP), the firm -i.e. SC15T, SC3D, and 
SC5D- reached compliance; same for the firms whose source was the Fresh Produce 
Association of the Americas (FPAA). Similarly (second line of results), another pathway to 
compliance by firms (SC15T, SC2D, SC4D, SC3D, and SC5D) was having CTPAT and not 
their ‘industry associations’ as source of regulatory awareness. And so on. 
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